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The Peace Policy of Spain. 1596-1604. i s an examination of the motives of 
the government of P h i l i p I I and of P h i l i p I I I i n bringing to an end a long 
and exhausting war with three enemies - France, England and the United 
Provinces. I t i s based almost e n t i r e l y upon o r i g i n a l manuscript sources, 
most of which have not previously been studied i n depth or f o r the period 
as a whole. The i n t e l l e c t u a l climate i n which decisions were made, the 
p o l i t i c a l state of the Court, the efficiency of the handling of foreign 
a f f a i r s , the dramatis personae and t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards Spain and her 
resources are f i r s t described by way of introduction. Relations with the 
Low Countries are then examined so as to provide the back-cloth to the rest 
of the foreign policy, and the war against the Dutch i s shewn as being 
Spain 1s true p r i o r i t y . The chapters on the negotiations that led up to 
the Treaty of Vervins (1598), on the Saluzzo c r i s i s (1600) and on the cold 
war that culminated i n the Biron conspiracy (1602) shew the working-out 
of a new policy towards France. Anglo-Spanish a f f a i r s occupy the chapters 
on the f a i l u r e to f i n d a naval or, i n the English succession question, a 
diplomatic solution to the problem of England's h o s t i l i t y , and those on 
the preliminaries and course of the Treaty of London (I6O4). New l i g h t i s 
thrown on to the efficiency and range of Spain's governmental and diplomatic 
machinery, as on to her sense of imperial mission; some of the customary 
str i c t u r e s upon the government's vapidity and indifference are strongly 
c r i t i c i z e d ; and Spain's great reluctance to face the economic and m i l i t a r y 
fact that she had outgrown her strength emerges with c l a r i t y . 
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FOREWORD. 
The present thesis i s not primarily intended to be an account of the 
diplomatic exchanges that concerned Spain between 1596 and I6Q4. Rather, 
i t i s an attempt to discover the motives that lay behind them and so i n 
some measure to comprehend the mentality of the makers of Spanish foreign 
policy at a c r u c i a l time. Consequently, although the information contained 
i n ambassadorial reports has been found valuable, much greater use has been 
made of governmental memoranda, consultas and royal despatches. Moreover, 
by looking at the foreign policy of these years as a whole and examining 
each decision i n the context of a l l the decisions that surrounded i t , I 
hope that I have been able to achieve a view more balanced than \jould have 
been the case had I concentrated simply upon Spain's relations with any one 
of her European neighbours. The period i s p a r t i c u l a r l y rewarding f o r a 
number of reasons. I n the f i r s t place, the remarkably ample documentation, 
c h i e f l y to be found i n the Archivo General de Simancas, presents a perhaps 
unique opportunity to trace i n considerable d e t a i l the mental processes of 
the King and his closest advisers. Secondly, the last years of the reign 
of P h i l i p I I and the f i r s t years of that of P h i l i p I I I mark an extremely 
important turning-point i n Spanish fortunes and policy. After a h a l f -
century's uninterrupted extension of imperial horizons, Spain was forced 
d r a s t i c a l l y to reduce her commitments. The mental stresses that resulted 
from the attempt to graft new r e a l i t i e s on to old assumptions repay study: 
for , i f nothing else, they help us to see what, i n the end, was considered 
v i t a l and what merely desirable by Spanish statesmen. I n the t h i r d place, 
u n t i l very recently there has previously been a marked lack of detailed 
scholarly investigation of the period i n question. Scholars have instead 
tended to make certain assumptions: that P h i l i p I I I was mild-mannered and 
uninterested i n his royal duties; that the eighteenth-century English 
assessment of his favourite, the Duke of Lerma - "agreeably to the mildness 
- i i i 
of his own disposition and his love of magnificence, he was of opinion 
that the d i g n i t y of the Spanish monarchy was best maintained by peace, pomp 
and parade" ( l ) - i s largely correct; and that Spanish foreign policy f a i t h -
f u l l y reflected the supposed f a i l i n g s of them both. Considerations of time 
and space have prevented me from taking greater samples of archival material 
outside Spain, as from pursuing the story up to i t s culmination i n the 
Twelve Years' Truce, made with the Dutch i n 1609: but I hope that I have 
been able to go some way towards f i l l i n g a gap. 
At the end of so long a period of research, the l i s t of my obligations 
i s considerable. F i r s t place must go to my supervisor, Dr. Peter Brightwell, 
who f i r s t aroused my interest i n the study of foreign policy, and whose 
comments and suggestions I have invariably found stimulating and valuable; 
Dr. D. M. Loades has continued the labour that he began whilst I was s t i l l 
an undergraduate, and I should l i k e to express here my gratitude t o both 
him and his wife; Dr. Eberhard Straub of the University of Munich, i n many 
long conversations and over many flesh-pots, brought to my att e n t i o n themes 
that would not otherwise have occurred to an English-trained h i s t o r i a n ; 
Don Modesto Ulloa of Montevideo provided welcome and useful information 
about Spanish royal finances; Professor H. S. Off l e r , Professor W. R. Ward 
and t h e i r colleagues i n the Department of Modern History have always shewn 
me every kindness, as have the successive Masters and Officers of Van Mildert 
College; the Department of Education and Science provided me with the Major 
State Studentship that enabled me to carry out the great bulk of my research; 
the electors appointed by the Anglo-Spanish Cultural Foundation awarded me 
the Don Vicente Canada Blanch Senior Fellowship i n the University of London 
for the session 1973-1974.; Mrs. Anne Harbin has kindly typed my manuscript; 
( l ) Watson 421. The standard view was well expressed by Antonio C^novas 
del C a s t i l l o i n La Casa de Austria (Ediciones Marte, Barcelona, 1971), 
pp. 127 seqq. The work of Professor Lynch and of Dr. Patrick Williams 
(q.v. i n f r a ) has called i t into question at certain important points. 
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nor can I f a i l to r e c a l l with affection the help and friendship shewn to 
me by Don Amando Represa and his colleagues at the Archivo General de 
Simancas. For help of a d i f f e r e n t kind, I am indebted to my parents; to 
my friends of the Hogar-Colegio El Porvenir. Madrid; to Dona Trinidad 
Fernandez Sanjuan and her family; and to the Revdo Miguel de Olaiz Fresno, 
Pbo (IERE), his wife and daughter. To a l l of them, my deepest and sincerest 
thanks. And on a personal note>,I should l i k e to echo the Psalmist: "except 
the Lord build the house, t h e i r labour i s but lo s t that b u i l d i t . " 
J. C. T. 
EXPLANATORY NOTES. 
The following abbreviations have been used i n the footnotes: 
AGR Archives Gdndrales du Royaume de Belgique, Brussels. 
AGS Archivo General de Simancas, Valladolid. 
AHN Archivo Hist<5rico Nacional, Madrid. 
BN Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid. 
BRAH Boletin de l a Real Academia de l a Historia, 
CJH Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda. 
CMH The Cambridge Modern History. 
CODOIN Coleccidn de documentos indditos para l a h i s t o r i a de Espana. 
CSP Sp Calendar of State Papers. Spanish. 
CSP V Calendar of State Papers. Venetian. 
DHE Diccionario de h i s t o r i a de Espana: 2nd edi t i o n : 3 v o l : Madrid, 1968. 
E Seccidn Estado. 
EHR The English H i s t o r i c a l Review. 
GA Seccidn Guerra Antigua. 
LM Lettres missives. 
nd no date. 
PEA Papiers d'Etat et de l 1Audience. 
PRO The Public Record Office, London, 
qvi quod vide i n f r a 
qvs quod vide supra 
RBPhH Revue beige de philologie et d'histoire. 
Sarum Calendar of the Mss of the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, KG. 
SEG Secrdtairerie d'Etat et de Guerre. 
sf sin f o l i a r . 
v vide. 
VM Vuestra Majestad. 
Vm Vuestra merced. 
v i 
VS Vuestra sefiorla. 
SM Su Ma.iestad/Sa Majesty. 
SS Su Santidad/Sa Saintete'. 
The spelling of the o r i g i n a l documents has been modernized i n accordance 
with the norms of the Real Academia de l a Lengua, and a l l translations 
are my own, except where otherwise indicated. 
Dates are given i n New Style, and the year i s assumed to have started on 
1st January, except where otherwise indicated. 
References have been abbreviated as much as possible: AGS £2023/3, f o r 
example, s i g n i f i e s "Archivo General de Simancas, seccidn Estado, legajo 2023, 
f o l i o 3". 
The f u l l t i t l e s of printed works have not generally been cited i n the 
footnotes. 
INTRODUCTION 
( i ) The Spanish World-Picture 
I n his acute essay on the Spanish character, E l espanol y los siete 
pecados capitales, Fernando Diaz Plaja makes no apology f o r devoting 
proportionately more space to the sin of pride than to any other. The 
Spaniard has always suffered c r i t i c i s m on t h i s account, no less i n the 
sixteenth than i n any other century. The fact was not lost upon writers 
of the former time: 
"There i s one f a u l t that certain foreign countries ascribe to 
Spain: they say that she i s arrogant, proud, provocative, exuberant, 
insufferable, hyper-active, and that f o r t h i s she has earned herself 
hatred and enmity - though they a l l afterwards recognize her as being, 
a f t e r themselves, the best nation i n the world. But to my mind these 
harsh cri t i c i s m s are the source of much glory to the Spaniards, f o r 
they spring from the c r i t i c s ' simple r e a l i z a t i o n that they are so 
beset with d i f f i c u l t i e s themselves and so f a r behind, and thus think 
themselves so i n f e r i o r i n everything; and t h i s has made the Spaniards 
f l y so high - indeed, out of sight." 
(una sola f a l t a imputan algunas naciones a l a espanola: dicen de e l l a 
que es arogante, soberbia, atrevida, briosa, raal sufrida e inquieta, 
con que ha granjeado odio y enemistad; aunque cada una despuds de s i 
l a reconoce por l a mejor del rnundo. Mas a mi parecer de esta calumnia 
resulta mucha g l o r i a a los espanoles, pues no tiene mds fundamento 
que verlos tan encumbrados y perdidos de vista los calumniadores, y 
e l considerarse a s i tan i n f e r i o r e s en todo, lo que a los espanoles 
hizo volar tan alto y desaparecdrseles. ( l ) ) 
I n the Golden Age, Spain seemed to have a good deal to be proud of. The 
growth of her power had been one of the wonders of the epoch. From a 
group of unstable r i v a l kingdoms, Ferdinand and Isabella had begun, however 
imperfectly, to lay the foundations of an empire. Castile and Aragon had 
used t h e i r united forces to win a number of remarkable successes. The 
Moorish kingdom of Granada was captured i n L+92; i n the same year, Columbus 
discovered the New World; i n 1505, Ferdinand's possession of the kingdom 
( l ) Salazar, vol. I , book I , t i t l e I , section xx. 
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of Naples was recognized by his French r i v a l . The enthusiasm of contemporary 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s was perhaps pardonable: beati oculi qui vident quod v i d e t i s . 
wrote one. (2) The Spaniards had regained t h e i r self-confidence. 
The effects of the reign of the Catholic Kings are especially noticeable 
i n the foreign policy of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain. The 
marriage that Ferdinand arranged between Joanna the Mad and the Archduke 
P h i l i p the Fair was to entangle Spain s t i l l more i n the diplomatic and 
m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s of the rest of Europe. Charles V, i n his dual role as 
King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, forced Spain to look outwards as never 
before. France's h o s t i l i t y towards the Spanish monarch, already present i n 
the previous reign, was exacerbated by the immensity of Charles' empire. 
Because, therefore, Charles' f i g h t was to some extent Spain's f i g h t , large 
sums of money were sent to help him on his campaigns. After the suspicion 
of Charles' early years, Spain grew to be proud of the fact that her r u l e r 
was also Holy Roman Emperor - witness the hope that P h i l i p , the Prince of 
Asturias, would also i n h e r i t the imperial t i t l e (3). But i n one important 
respect, her outlook was bounded by the Iberian Peninsula. Despite the 
fact that, f o r a l l his many commitments, Charles spent at least half his 
reign i n Spain, his absences were greatly d i s l i k e d (4). Spain was to be 
s a t i s f i e d i n t h i s respect only with his successor: who, although his father's 
mantle had f a l l e n upon him as the heir to the best parts of the Habsburg 
inheritance - Spain, the New World, I t a l y and the Low Countries - between 
1559 and his death i n 1598 never once l e f t Spain. 
Philip's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were numerous and cosmopolitan. Whilst his 
uncle, Ferdinand, had succeeded to the Holy Roman Empire and the struggle 
against German Protestants and the Turk, P h i l i p was l e f t with the perhaps 
more onerous task of guarding his f a r - f l u n g possessions. His realms i n the 
(2) Cepeda 130. 
(3) Fernandez Alvarez 132. 
(4) Jover Carlos V... passim. 
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New World, greatly augmented by his succession to the crown of Portugal 
i n 1580, were increasingly under attack from French, English and Dutch 
privateers and clandestine traders. He was obliged t o combat the threat 
posed by Christendom by the Turk i n the eastern Mediterranean. His power 
i n the Low Countries was threatened by rebellion, Protestantism and the 
intervention of greedy and envious neighbours. His religious principles 
encouraged him to look to the decaying state of Roman Catholicism i n 
England, Scotland and France. His sense of justice made him lay his 
family's claims to the throne of France. Having jus t f a i l e d i n an attempt 
to invade England, by 1589 he was warring on three fronts - France, Flanders 
and I t a l y . 
His outlook, and that of his subjects, was nevertheless f a r from 
cosmopolitan. Spain's co l l e c t i v e ideology i n our period was f i r m l y rooted 
i n a passionate b e l i e f that an ineluctable h i s t o r i c a l process had marked 
her out from her fellows. The loss of the imperial d i g n i t y to the cadet 
branch of the royal house mattered l i t t l e : f o r Spain was the elect nation. 
She had been founded by Tubal, son of Japhet and grandson of Noah, and 
numbered Hercules amongst her rulers (5). The r e a l starting-point f o r her 
glorious history was invariably taken as being the entry of the Goths i n t o 
the peninsula and the Emperor Honorius' acknowledgement that Alaric law-
f u l l y possessed Spain by r i g h t of conquest. Great play was made of the 
utt e r respectability of the arrangement - "since the time when we f i r s t 
had kings, we Spaniards have never known or recognized any emperor who 
was not at the same time our own monarch" (6). When the Roman Empire i n 
the West f e l l , Spain was l e f t as the oldest-established kingdom. Admittedly, 
the rule of the Gothic kings had ended with Roderick's defeat at the hands 
of the Moorish invaders - some said because of his adultery, others because 
of treachery: but t h e i r l i n e had continued. Seven hundred and eighty 
(5) Salazar, vol. I , book I , t i t l e I , section i . 
(6) L6pez Madera 9« "Los espanoles desde que tuvimos reyes nunca 
conocimos ni reconocimos algun emperador sino siendo juntamente rey 
nuestro." 
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c a b a l i s t i c years were to elapse before Ferdinand and Isabella could 
revenge t h e i r ancestors (7). The f i n a l portion of the ancient inheritance 
was restored when, i n 1580, P h i l i p I I took possession of Portugal: 
" a l l the Gothic possessions and kingdoms were joined together under 
the Catholic King P h i l i p I I , who thereby became rul e r of a l l Spain, 
there not having been one such f o r more than 850 years since the 
f a l l of Roderick, the l a s t King of the Goths." 
(todos estos reinos y senorfos se juntaron en e l rey catdlico Don 
Felipe segundo de este nombre con que vino a ser senor de toda 
Espana no habidndolo sido antecesor alguno suyo por mds de 850 anos 
que pasaron desde l a pdrdida del rey Roderico ultimo de los godos.(8) ) 
P h i l i p , whose Gothic blood had been f o r t i f i e d by the infusion of that of 
the Habsburgs, the other respectable family of the West, deserved the 
respect due to the monarch of the oldest kingdom i n Christendom (9). 
The v i t a l force i n t h i s h i s t o r i c a l pattern was the supposed p u r i t y 
of Spanish C h r i s t i a n i t y . The f a i t h was popularly believed to have been 
brought to Spain by S. James the Great (Santiago) w i t h i n eleven years of 
the Crucifixion, and to have been further strengthened by the personal 
evangelism of S. Peter and, especially, S. Paul (10). From these begin-
nings, i t had gone from strength to strength. Arianism had quickly been 
abandoned by the Goths, and the baptism of t h e i r kings marked the beginning 
of a long, seemingly endless, series of godly princes. Early and venerable 
councils were held i n Spain under t h e i r aegis. Above a l l , the country 
seemed abundantly to have brought f o r t h the f r u i t s of the S p i r i t : "there 
i s scarcely a settlement of importance i n Spain which has not been enriched 
by the triumphant blood of great and glorious martyrs, or which has no 
famous l o c a l saints" ( l l ) . During the sixteenth century alone, Spain had 
(7) Garibay I I x i x . 
(8) Salazar, Vol. I , book I , t i t l e I , section i v . 
(9) Ldpez Madera 33, 47. 
(10) Ldpez Madera 36, 38. 
(11) Ldpez Madera 40. "Apenas se hallara" pueblo de nombre en Espana que 
no haya sido regado con triunfante sangre de martirios soberanos o 
que no tenga santos muy senalados naturales." 
- 5 -
greatly contributed to the strength of Roman Catholicism: i n learning, 
by Cisneros 1 great new university at Alcald; i n evangelism, by Loyola's 
Jesuit order; i n mysticism and s p i r i t u a l i t y by, amongst many others, 
Teresa of Avila. The constant and all-pervasive vigilance of the 
I n q u i s i t i o n , which was not afraid to prosecute the Spanish primate him-
self, ensured that contrary opinions were e f f e c t i v e l y weeded out. With 
considerable pride, a seventeenth-century w r i t e r could exclaim, "Seek i n 
the entire sphere of Spanish influence a tolerated heretic or a concealed 
error ... Spain i s the garden of Jesus Christ" (12). 
At once the greatest sign of Spanish f a i t h and of divine favour was 
the reconquista. For eight centuries, the Spanish Christians had seemed 
to have a sole aim: to oust the Moor from t h e i r country. The capture of 
Granada i n 1492 therefore appeared of transcendental importance, to 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers as much as to immediate con-
temporaries. The claim that the Almighty looked favourably upon the 
unparalleled valour and perseverance of his Spanish children seemed 
vindicated. Mariana, w r i t i n g i n 1601, saw the completion of the reconquista 
as the basis f o r a l l the glories that he had seen i n his time, as his 
soliloquy on the Catholic Kings' triumphal entry i n t o the c i t y of Granada 
shews: 
"They gazed at them as though they were more than men, as though 
they were sent from above f o r the health of Spain. And indeed i t 
was they who established once again the justice that had previously 
decayed and become corrupt. They promulgated good laws f o r the 
government of t h e i r peoples and the determining of law-suits. They 
gave new l i f e to r e l i g i o n and the f a i t h and established public peace 
at home and abroad, quietening discord and disturbance. They extended 
t h e i r power, not only i n Spain but at the same time also to the ends 
(12) Quoted i n Jover 1635... 431. "Buscad en todo e l orbe espanol un 
hereje permitido, un error disimulado ... Espana j a r d f n es de 
Jesucristo." 
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of the world. A point much to be praised i s that they d i s t r i b u t e d 
rewards and honours, of which there are many and of great value i n 
Spain - not f o r the merits of lineage nor because of base favour, 
but i n accordance with the merits of each man; and i n t h i s way they 
encouraged t h e i r subjects to devote themselves to virtue and to 
learning. There i s no need to enumerate the benefits that have 
resulted from a l l t h i s : they are obvious. I f we are honest, where 
are more learned or more sain t l y bishops to be found? Where more 
sagacious or more upright judges? I t i s true that, before t h i s 
period, there had been few learned Spaniards: but who can count the 
Spaniards who thenceforth have advanced themselves i n a l l sorts of 
learning and erudition?" 
(mirdbanlos como s i fueran mds que hombres y como dados del cielo 
para l a salud de Espana. A l a verdad ellos fueron los que pusieron 
en su punto l a j u s t i c i a , antes de su tiempo estragada y calda. 
Publicaron leyes muy buenas para e l gobierno de los pueblos y para 
sentenciar los p l e i t o s . Volvieron por l a r e l i g i d n y por l a f e , 
fundaron l a paz piiblica, sosegadas las discordias y alborotos, asi 
de dentro como de fuera. Ensancharon su senorlo, no solamente en 
Espana sino tambie'n en e l mismo tiempo se extendieron hasta lo 
postrero del raundo. Lo que es mucho de alabar, repartieron los 
premios y dignidades, que los hay muy grandes y ricos en Espana, no 
conforme a l a nobleza de los antepasados ni por favor de cualquier 
que fuese, sino conforme a los me"ritos que cada uno tenia, con que 
despertaron los ingenios de sus vasallos para darse a l a v i r t u d y 
a las l e t r a s . De todo esto cuanto provecho haya resultado, no hay 
para que decirlo; l a cosa por s i misma y los ef§ctos lo declaran. 
Si va a decir verdad, ien que" parte del mundo se hallar^n sacerdotes 
y obispos n i m£s eruditos n i mas santos? iddndejueces de mayor 
prudencia y rectitud? Es as i , que antes de estos tiempos pocos se 
pueden contar de los espanoles sefialados en ciencia; de aqul adelante 
iquie'n podrd declarar cuan grande ha sido e l ndmero de los que en 
Espana se han aventajado en toda suerte de letras y erudicidn? (13) ) 
The year of the conquest of Granada brought with i t the great reward. 
Columbus' discovery gave Spain another mission, even more glorious than 
that which she had just completed. 
" I t was not the w i l l of Almighty God that the inv i n c i b l e might of 
the Spaniards, who f o r so many centuries had fought against the 
Moorish enemies of our holy f a i t h , should grow stagnant now that the 
(13) Mariana i i 239-
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main part of the struggle had come to an end, but that they should 
always f i g h t against the heathen to the glory of the f a i t h : wherefore 
He ordained the discovery of the Nev; World, f u l l of idolaters who had 
not seen the l i g h t of salvation. And now that matters at home had 
been dealt with, Divine Providence gave the Spaniards a new, previously 
unknown world so that they might f i g h t unceasingly i n the extension of 
the catholic f a i t h . " 
(no querla e l omnipotente Dios que las invencibles fuerzas de los 
espanoles que en tantos centenares de anos habian peleado contra los 
moros, enemigos de nuestra santa fe ya que en Espafia lo esencial de 
su guerra se habla acabado que tampoco dende en adelante estuviesen 
ociosas sino siempre peleasen contra los paganos en e l ensalzamiento 
de l a fe por lo cual ordend este descubrimiento del nuevo mundo lleno 
de gentes iddlatras carecientes de l a lumbre de l a salvacidn ... y 
ahora que lo dome*stico era concluido permitio* l a divina providencia 
darles un nuevo mundo antes ignorado para que incesablemente pugnasen 
en e l aumento de l a fe catdlica. (14) ) 
I n return, the conquistadores were to open up t e r r i t o r i e s of undreamed-of 
extent and wealth: the Spanish empire was to become bigger and richer than 
any other ever known, superseding even that of ancient Rome (15). I f , 
therefore, Spain were f a i t h f u l to her divine mission, what greatness would 
be hers i n the future? 
But could a l l t h i s be considered congruent with the natural law so 
much stressed i n orthodox Thomism? To Las Casas' passionate assertion 
that i t could not came the calm reply of the Dominican, V i t o r i a . I f the 
inhabitants of a country had abominable practices, attacked peaceful 
s e t t l e r s , prevented the preaching of the Gospel or were ruled by those who 
offended thus, the use of force against them was j u s t i f i e d . I f , moreover, 
the rulers had been expressly condemned by duly-constituted authority -
the Roman Catholic Church - the same held true (16). According t o Vitoria's 
view, therefore, although heathen and heretic were not per se incapable of 
v a l i d rule, they were bound to offend these four precepts. By 1584, 
(14) Garibay vol. I I , book x i x , section i . 
(15) Ldpez Madera 66. 
(16) V i t o r i a , esp pp. 100-116. 
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Vitoria's post facto theories were supplanted by something more speculative. 
I n lectures given i n that year the Jesuit Suarez put forward the just 
defence of the innocent as a proper reason f o r intervention (17). For 
him, religious wars were f o r the natural r i g h t of others; and he needed to 
make no mention of papal sentences of deposition as a necessary pre-
requisite. From t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l basis, Spain would be j u s t i f i e d i n 
intervening wherever Roman Catholicism was not i n f u l l f l o u r i s h . Herein 
we may see the origins of what a modern Spanish scholar has termed a 
"White House policy", which forced Spain to f i g h t i n defence of her 
proudly-held ideology (18). 
Abroad, there seemed ample cause f o r concern. Spain's opinion of 
her neighbours was predictably low. L<5pez Madera, throughout his j i n g o i s t i c 
work, was constantly at pains to point out the h i s t o r i c i n f e r i o r i t y of 
France. Neither i n a n t i q u i t y nor i n virtue was she to be compared with 
Spain. Her C h r i s t i a n i t y had come much l a t e r , with the preaching of S. Denis, 
and had not taken so f i r m a hold. Whereas Spain had consistently persecuted 
the Jews, P h i l i p Augustus of France had favoured them (19)- I n more recent 
times, France had been foremost i n f r u s t r a t i n g Spain's goldly p o l i c i e s . 
Her king, Francis I , had a l l i e d with the Turk, and was an oath-breaker; 
her current claimant, Henry of Navarre, was a relapsed and excommunicated 
heretic. England, too, was to be despised. Her monarchs had ousted the 
authority of the Pope, nor was her Protestantism even genuine: P h i l i p I I , 
during the time of his unhappy marriage with Mary Tudor, had become con-
vinced that the Englishman's r e l i g i o n was that of a time-server. The 
Dutchman was a rebel and a Calvinist; the Protestant German a f r i e n d of 
Turks. Small wonder, therefore, that these insincere and s p i r i t u a l l y -
corrupt neighbours should f i g h t so b i t t e r l y against the Spanish greatness 
(17) Perena 27-33, 90. 
(18) Sanchez Albornoz I I , 490, 574-
(19) Ldpez Madera 39, 45. 
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that they envied and that by t h e i r very nature they could never hope to 
achieve. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Herrera's Historia General del Mundo, published 
i n 1601, saw the "mala inclinacidn" of Spain's enemies as being i n dir e c t 
proportion to t h e i r Protestantism (20). Peace could only return t o Europe 
when a l l men recognized the pax romana that was presided over by the Pope 
and protected by the Catholic King. 
( i i ) Kings< Councillors and Ministers Abroad 
Spain's ideology was entrusted to w i l l i n g and f a i t h f u l keepers. 
P h i l i p I I has long been regarded as the embodiment of pride and zeal f o r 
Roman Catholicism, and with some j u s t i c e . The instructions that he drew 
up for his son i n 1597 are imbued with an exalted re l i g i o u s fervour. 
Besides urging him to undertake no task before hearing d a i l y Mass, he 
expounded his theory of kingly service: 
"Be assured, my son, that no e v i l thing w i l l harm you i f you are 
obedient to our holy r e l i g i o n and follow, love and defend i t with 
a l l your heart. You w i l l win many crowns of glory i f , i n doing t h i s 
duty, you should lose the earthly crown that I sha l l leave you. For 
i f you present yourself to the b a t t l e as the hardy champion to defend 
our sacred r e l i g i o n , though you lose your kingdom, God w i l l give you 
the glory that i s established and which alone we should desire; and 
know that, i f you do a l l t h i s , I promise you on God's behalf that He 
never yet f a i l e d the good king who, jealous f o r His holy r e l i g i o n and 
the honour of His holy Name and inflamed with t h i s desire, braves the 
greatest p e r i l : f o r He brings him out of the p e r i l , immeasurably 
augments his earthly possessions, and assures him of those that are 
eternal." 
(Debris estar c i e r t o , h i j o , que no habrd cosa que mal os avenga s i a 
nuestra santa r e l i g i d n obedece"is, seguis y amaMs y defenders con todo 
vuestro coraz<5n; muchas coronas de gl o r i a hallare*is s i l a terrena que 
(20) Herrera was cronista mayor de las Indias and cronista de C a s t i l l a : 
his book was dedicated to the Count of Miranda. 
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os dejare* perdie'seis en esta demanda, porque s i campetfn extorzado 
os present&is a l a bat a l l a por defender nuestra r e l i g i o n sagrada 
aunque perddis e l reino os dard. Dios l a g l o r i a que es lo f i j o y lo 
linico que debemos desear y creed que de parte de Bios os l o prometto 
s i asf l o hicie'reis adema's que jamds f a l t d Dios a l buen rey que 
celoso de su sagrada r e l i g i o n y de l a honra de su santisimo norabre 
se aventura inflamado de este deseo a l major peligro, pues de e l 
lo saca y acrecienta en sumo grado sus bienes temporales y tiene 
como asegurados los eternos. (21) ) . 
But influences other than that of r e l i g i o n had t h e i r effect upon him. As 
a small boy, he was noted f o r his wilfulness, thus shewing himself a true 
son of his Portuguese mother - who had refused to demean herself by groaning 
i n c h i l d b i r t h (22). He was capable of imprisoning his son and heir, of 
submitting his primate and his f i r s t secretary (Carranza and Antonio Pe'rez) 
to j u d i c i a l process, and of ordering that blasphemers amongst the oarsmen 
of the galleys that fought at Lepanto be thrown overboard (23)- His father, 
Charles V, had subjected him to a rigorous education and at various times 
wrote long and detailed moral and p o l i t i c a l instructions f o r his better 
guidance. Perhaps the precept that he most took to heart was that which 
Charles had given to him i n 1548: "you must keep hold of what i s yours i n 
order to avoid greater r i s k s " ( 2 4 ) . This was to apply, not only to his 
t e r r i t o r i a l possessions, but also to a f f a i r s of state. P h i l i p did not 
delegate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l i n g l y ; and his one departure from the ru l e , 
Antonio Pe'rez, was t e r r i b l y punished (25). With t h i s one lapse, he kept 
f i r m hold of the reins of power. Because of his sedentary habits, he was 
able to devote f a r more time to the business of government than had his 
father, and he laboriously f i l l e d the margins of the documents presented 
to him with often i l l e g i b l e and usually banal comments. A lover of 
solitude and austerity, having bought and pulled down the two mansions 
adjacent to his estate at Aranjuez, he spent three m i l l i o n ducats on a 
vast retreat, more monastery than palace, at El Escorial ( 2 6 ) . From his 
(21) BN 10623• 
(22) Pfandl 4 4 . 
(23) Fernandez Alvarez 217. 
(24) Fernandez Alvarez 105-
(25) Marandn. 
(26) Pfandl 365. 
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writing-desk i n t h i s remote corner of Europe (27) he attempted to manage 
his vast interests. Although he was not devoid of l i g h t e r t r a i t s - witness 
his taste f o r horticulture - perhaps Hume's verdict i s the most accurate: 
a "sad, slow, d i s t r u s t f u l man, with his r i g i d methods and his mind f o r 
microscopic d e t a i l " (28). 
Nevertheless, f o r a l l the delays that his punctiliousness caused, 
Ph i l i p presided over a highly-developed governmental system. I n France, 
there was nothing comparable to i t : long years of c i v i l war, the precarious 
establishment of a new royal house - that of Bourbon - to succeed the old 
and feeble, the constant need to pander to vested interests of various, and 
usually conflicting, types had profoundly adverse effects. I n England, 
jobbery, vicious court f a c t i o n and a queen who d a i l y walked the tight-rope 
above the turbulent waters of national and international p o l i t i c s weakened 
the central government. I n Spain, however, a network of royal councils 
interlocked to serve the monarch at his desire, and an archive existed i n 
the castle of Simancas, a few miles from Valladolid, where c o n c i l i a r 
documents were stored i n safety (29). I n one respect, however, the system 
lacked i t s proper crown. Philip's natural suspicions had impeded the 
development of a formal body that could consider the most important matters 
of state: foreign policy. But the Spanish monarchy was too large and i t s 
commitments too numerous to allow even P h i l i p to take every decision 
unaided. Thus, i n the las t years of his reign, we see a small, ad hoc 
group to which the King f e l t that he could t u r n for advice. I t was 
characteristic of his reluctance to confide u t t e r l y i n anyone that he seems 
to have avoided formality i n his relations even with these men. Their 
consultas, or w r i t t e n memoranda, are very scarce indeed f o r the period 
(27) Motley i i i 40 . 
(28) Hume Ph i l i p I I 6. 
(29) The archive's efficiency, however, could not always be guaranteed. 
I n 1603, when the Council of State wished to consult the t e x t of 
the Treaty of Cateau-Cambre'sis, i t could not be found. AGS EK1606/12. 
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between 1595 and 1598, and i n t h e i r form are more casual than those that 
were shortly to be presented to P h i l i p I I I . For t h i s reason, i t i s more 
accurate to speak of councillors of state, rather than of a Council. 
Because they were few, personal and often unannounced access to the King 
seems to have been normal. I t i s very hard to t e l l the extent to which 
P h i l i p followed t h e i r advice: but he was under no obligation to admit 
them i n t o his s o l i t a r y l i f e , and there would have been no point i n reducing 
t h e i r consultations to a mere formality ( 30 ) . 
Moreover, i n so f a r as P h i l i p f e l t able to t r u s t i n any group, that 
which surrounded him i n his l a s t years must have seemed eminently dependable. 
U n t i l his departure f o r the Low Countries as governor i n 1595, his favourite 
nephew, the Archduke Albert of Austria, had been prominent; and his transfer 
to Flanders at a very d i f f i c u l t time was a token of the esteem i n which he 
was held (31)- Of the rest, Don Cristdbal de Moura, Don Juan de Idiaquez 
and the Count of Chinchdn were by f a r the most important. Moura, a Portu-
guese noble, was reckoned the most i n f l u e n t i a l of the t r i o ; and although 
he was especially concerned with the a f f a i r s of Portugal and the Indies, 
his name appeared prominently upon consultas that dealt with foreign policy 
( 3 2 ) . He also acted as the King's main l i n k with the Treasury, and i n the 
1590's large numbers of payment orders were signed by him. Yet he was no 
more than primus i n t e r pares* More unassuming, but wielding great influence, 
was Idiaquez, sprung from a family of Biscayan hidalgos and as bland and 
patient as Moura was ir a s c i b l e and impetuous (33)• His father had been one 
of Charles V's secretaries of state u n t i l his death at the hands of German 
Protestant forces i n 154.7, and several of the Idiaquez were numbered amongst 
(30) On t h i s point, as on others, I am i n considerable disagreement with 
Dr. Williams' views as set out i n his recent a r t i c l e . As w i l l be 
clear from my chapter on the Treaty of Vervins ( i i i i n f r a ) the 
councillors of state were called upon to deal with matters of immense 
importance; and t h e i r consultas are not confined to AGS E2741. cf 
Williams EHR 753,754-
(31) qvi 
(32) Danvila 719; AGE E965/sf. 
(33) Danvila 727; Cabrera Felipe I I i i i 251. 
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the royal secretaries at the tu r n of the century (34)• He himself, a f t e r 
some years' experience as ambassador i n Genoa, Venice and Paris, had 
succeeded Antonio Pe"rez as secretary of state, and was made a councillor 
of state i n 1594- He seems to have w r i t t e n t o and confided i n no-one -
which probably accounts f o r his success i n weathering every p o l i t i c a l 
storm from about 1580 u n t i l his death i n I 6 I 4 . The t h i r d member of the 
t r i o , Chinchdn, was apparently not on the best of terms with the other 
two ( 3 5 ) . He had been with P h i l i p longest and had assisted at the two 
great occasions of the reign - the signing of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambre'sis 
i n 1559 and Philip's proclamation as King of Portugal i n 1580; he seems to 
have been on intimate terms with the King throughout ( 3 6 ) . He had served 
as ambassador i n Rome and at the imperial court; he was a member of the 
Councils of State, War, Aragon and I t a l y ; and was the King's mayordomo 
mayor ( 3 7 ) . A l e t t e r of the Count of Portalegre gives the impression that 
Chinchdn was a disagreeably greedy man: but as a f r i e n d of Moura, Portalegre 
was perhaps biased ( 3 8 ) . There were others who bore the t i t l e of councillor 
of state, but who were f a r less i n f l u e n t i a l i n the conduct of policy. The 
Marquess of Velada, t u t o r of the future P h i l i p I I I , occupied himself with 
his charge; Juan Andrea Doria, the admiral of the Mediterranean galleys, 
l i v e d i n Genoa and only wrote an opinion when s p e c i f i c a l l y asked to do so; 
Pedro Ix5pez de Ayala, Count of Fuensalida and comendador mayor de C a s t i l l a . 
was the "mayordomo e l mds antiguo del rey" and his name appears only once 
on a consulta during our period ( 39 ) . The eighteenth-century antiquarian, 
Garma, noted the names of the Count of Miranda, the Marquess of Mirabel 
and the Cardinal de Castro as having been appointed councillors of state 
i n 1596, but I have seen no evidence to corroborate t h i s ( 4 0 ) . The 
(34) Pdrez MInguez 69. 
(35) Hinojosa i 378. 
(36) Cabrera Felipe I I i 2 4 I , i i 633, et passim. 
(37) Alcocer i 381 . For the great importance of the la s t o f f i c e , 
V. Pfandl 154. 
(38) C0D0IN x l i i i 553-
(39) Cabrera Felipe I I i v 263-
(40) Garma i v 66. 
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remaining councillor, the Count of Olivares, was absent as Viceroy of 
S i c i l y and, l a t e r , Naples. With three councillors, P h i l i p was s a t i s f i e d : 
they were men of considerable experience and varied talents, and a policy 
recommended by them would be well-reasoned and with a due regard f o r 
p r a c t i c a l i t i e s , but thoroughly imbued with a high sense of Spain's c a l l i n g 
and of t h e i r duties as Spaniards. 
The death of P h i l i p I I i n El Escorial on 13th September, 1598, brought 
about a number of important changes i n the conduct of a f f a i r s of state. 
The new king, P h i l i p I I I , had always been a d u t i f u l son - "the obedient 
Isaac, the loving Joseph," remarked Cabrera ( 4 l ) - His personal piety had 
been, and was always to be, considerable and he saw himself unmistakeably 
as the wielder of the sword of the f a i t h ( 4 2 ) . He was affable, " i t not 
being known that he ever interrupted anyone, how much soever the speaker 
might abuse his benignity and patience," (4.3) but tended to be uncommunicati 
His passion^for hunting, however, contrasted strongly with his father's d i s -
i n t e r e s t . And above a l l , unlike his father, he chose to be the f i r s t gentle 
man, rather than the chief clerk, of his kingdom. He has often been 
c r i t i c i z e d f o r his apparent b e l i e f that kingship should have as one of i t s 
main elements an easy generosity, and the grants that he made to his 
favourite and the sums that he spent on royal progresses, masques and 
court entertainments are normally regarded as having been an irresponsible 
drain upon the Treasury. But he had much lee-way to make up. P h i l i p I I , 
by the standards of the time, had defaulted upon his obligations towards 
court and n o b i l i t y and had shrunk from personal contact with his subjects. 
The w r i t e r Alamos de Barrientos was clear about what course the new king 
should adopt, and his advice was a t a c i t c r i t i c i s m of P h i l i p I I 1 s practice: 
"before a l l else, Your Majesty should v i s i t a l l his kingdoms, 
beginning with Aragon and ending up with Portugal, and give as much 
(41) Cabrera Felipe I I i v 200. 
(42) Seco 80-81; qvi fp ^ o, ^ 
(43) Bentivoglio 370. 
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to be understood so as to raise expectations. V i s i t s are recognized 
as being most necessary f o r new monarchs, fo r by t h i s means the 
people's l o y a l t y i s confirmed ... Modesty, a good physique and 
personal attractiveness are proper at t r i b u t e s f o r a prince and make 
him l i k e d by the people. Personal contact, and the exposition of 
grievances and t h e i r remedy w i l l gain the people's affe c t i o n ; they 
w i l l know that they have the King they need and w i l l f e e l impelled 
to serve and help him. Although the unseen i s more feared, i t i s 
not more loved..." 
(Ante todas cosas VM debe v i s i t a r todos sus reinos comenzando de los 
de Arag<5n y parando en e l de Portugal y dando luego muestra de lo que 
ha de hacer as! para que se entretengan con l a esperanza; con l a 
v i s i t a (muy necesaria y confesada por t a l en los principes nuevos) 
confirmara' los £nimos de sus pueblos que l a modestia, e l buen 
t a l l e y l a hermosura son partes muy dignas de un prfncipe y con que 
se hace amable a l pueblo y con verle y t r a t a r l e decirle sus agravios 
y r e c i b i r e l remedio de ellos granjeard su a f i c i d n y sabrdn que tienen 
rey y e l rey que han menester, moveralos con l a v i s t a a s e r v i r l e y 
socorrerle; que aunque se teme mas lo que no se^ve no se ama tanto 
. . . (44) ) 
P h i l i p I I I was therefore perhaps truer to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century ideal of monarchy. Surrounded by the same aura of majesty as his 
father, he wished to shew himself to his subjects. Long and costly pro-
gresses therefore became common; the court was moved to Valladolid, i n 
the heart of Old Castile; the King was often to be seen i n court ceremonies 
or, l i k e any gentleman, hunting i n the chase. He f e l t himself more a man 
of action than his father, and on more than one occasion i n the early years 
of his reign offered to lead his armies i n person against the enemy ( 4 5 ) . 
From these beginnings has sprung a legend that P h i l i p I I I played 
l i t t l e part i n the conduct of a f f a i r s of state: "scarcely a hairdresser 
or lemonade-dealer i n a l l Spain was less cognizant of the p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s of the kingdom than was i t s monarch." (46) "Casual, lazy and 
(44) BN 904/315 Verso. 
(45) qvi p.-fo^It i s in t e r e s t i n g to see the importance given to hunting 
as a kingly exercize by Saavedra, empresa i v . 
(46) Motley IV 128. 
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d i f f i d e n t , " i s the most recent judgement ( 47 ) . The evidence of the state 
papers shews otherwise. I n 1605, the Venetian Contarini noted that the 
King habitually spent three or four hours i n the middle of the day attending 
to important business, and indeed the comments that the l a t t e r wrote i n the 
margin of the consultas presented to him prove conclusively that he was 
e n t i r e l y au f a i t with the issues that arose, sometimes more so than his 
councillors ( 4 8 ) . He kept his Council busy with ambassadorial despatches -
which he had generally seen f i r s t - and t h e i r opinions reached him no 
matter where he was: the replies that he decided to send often bear the 
name of one of his hunting-lodges. He may indeed have seemed to work less 
than his father: but the l a t t e r had always preferred to deal with unprocessed 
material. P h i l i p I I I returned to the more f l e x i b l e practice of Charles V, 
who had been too active to deal with any more than the most essential 
business: though his desire t o emulate his grandfather's m i l i t a r y exploits 
was to remain u n f u l f i l l e d . 
Despite his streak of self-assertiveness, P h i l i p I I I seems to have 
needed a good deal of moral support. His sincere and enduring friendship 
with Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, Marquess of Denia and soon Duke of 
Lerma, stands as proof of t h i s . Despite his dying father's obvious d i s l i k e 
of Lerma and his charge that his son r e t a i n the old and trusted advisers 
of the l a s t years of the reign, P h i l i p I I I had other plans ( 4 9 ) . There i s 
a story i n the Adiciones to Malvezzi's History of P h i l i p I I I t hat, even as 
P h i l i p I I lay on his death-bed, his son ordered Moura to surrender the keys 
of the document-cabinet to Lerma ( 50 ) . True or not, the episode has been 
taken as symbolizing the f i r s t and decisive defeat of Moura and the old-
guard, a defeat that was to be followed by Moura's v i r t u a l banishment to 
Portugal as Viceroy and the concentration of a l l power i n t o Lerma's hands. 
(47) Williams EHR 751 . 
(48) Cabrera Felipe I I I 576; qvi passim. 
(49) Gonzalez Davila 26. 
(50) Yanez I4I. 
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Such a view cannot be sustained f o r long. I n the f i r s t place, Moura's 
position was nothing l i k e that which Lerma was soon to a t t a i n ; as we have 
seen, the former was one of a group, and merely to supplant him would not 
bring a man to power. Ididquez was s t i l l prominent; and Velada, the new 
king's t u t o r , surely posed the greatest threat of a l l , the more so since 
his p u p i l thought highly of him. I n the second place, Moura was perhaps 
not the type who would appeal to the young P h i l i p . Aged sixty - some 
f i f t e e n years older than Lerma - he was reputed to be brusque, even rude, 
and i l l - a b l e to conceal annoyance or ambition. Above a l l , i t had been 
Lerma, and not Moura, who had courted Philip's friendship when the l a t t e r 
had been an exuberant s t r i p l i n g and had augmented his prote'ge''s small income 
out of his own pocket (51). 
I n f a c t , contemporary accounts of the f i r s t weeks of P h i l i p I l l ' s 
reign give the d i s t i n c t impression that Moura and the rest of his colleagues 
were s t i l l near the centre of power. Admittedly, P h i l i p ordered that none 
of his father's old advisers should be admitted to his chambers unannounced 
af t e r Chinch6n, fo r g e t t i n g that times had changed, had simply walked i n 
one day. But both Moura and Idiaquez were, l i k e Lerma, given accommodation 
i n the palace at E l Escorial when the King moved there from the nearby 
v i l l a g e ; and Moura, with Velada and Lerma, accompanied the King on his 
daily v i s i t s t o the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia (52). Nor do Moura's 
l e t t e r s shew him to be unduly depressed. On 22nd September, just over a 
week af t e r P h i l i p I I ' s death, he t o l d his f r i e n d , the Count of Portalegre, 
that he was beginning a new l i f e at s i x t y : 
"we f i n d ourselves with a new king who works wonders and does us 
more favour than we a l l deserve, but no-one i s happy with his deserts 
unless he obtains what he desires: the man who i s t i r e d and wants 
l i t t l e w i l l be free of t h i s burden. I r e a l l y could not go on 
(51) Pe"rez Bustamante 39. 
(52) AHN E Coleccidn Vega tomo 9/37. 
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shouldering the burden that I was carrying, and the least r e l i e f w i l l 
be welcome: more one cannot say to one who i s so f a r away. Your Lordship 
commend us to God and be assured that we have a very good King." 
(quedamos con e l nuevo rey que hace maravillas y m£s merced que 
merecemos todos mas nadie se contenta con l o que merece s i no llega 
a l o que desea; de ese trabajo se l i b r a r d quien se hallare cansado 
y deseare poco ... realmente no podfa ya con l o que llevaba a cuestas 
y asf cualquier a l i v i o por pequeno que sea sera" bien recibido y no se 
puede mds a quien estd tan lejos; VS nos encomiende a Dios y tenga 
por c i e r t o que tenemos muy buen rey.(53) ) 
I n the documents of the Council of State there are several traces of Moura's 
continued a c t i v i t y . We f i n d him, f o r instance, with Ididquez i n Lerma's 
chambers i n November, 1598, discussing l e t t e r s from Seville and Cadiz, at 
a time when LermaJ s star was recognized to be i n the ascendant and when 
also a whole flood of new councillors had been appointed ( 54 ) . There are 
few consultas extant from the f i r s t f i f t e e n months of the reign, but Moura 
cle a r l y was present at the most important meetings of the Council of State, 
and I have noted that only Idiaquez attended more sessions than he. Perhaps 
the serious l i v e r trouble, to which Cabrera refers, r e s t r i c t e d his movements, 
as i t seems to have confined him to Madrid during the royal progress to 
Valencia i n 1599; he was, a f t e r a l l , quite an old man ( 5 5 ) . His appointment 
as Viceroy of Portugal, though i t had been rumoured as early as October, 
1598, came some eighteen months after the death of his old master ( 5 6 ) . I n 
short, he did not suffer badly at the hands of the new king and his favourite: 
he kept up with important p o l i t i c a l business, and he was given one of the 
most important charges of the Spanish empire - much to the annoyance of the 
Portuguese, who had expected someone of royal blood ( 5 7 ) . Undoubtedly, 
Lerma cannot have been devoid of fear of Moura: a melancholy and somewhat 
depressive man, he must have been apprehensive of a l l possible r i v a l s . But 
there i s no prima facie evidence that he was as f u l l of enmity as l a t e r 
(53) BN 981/110. 
(54) Seco 84; AGS E2636/4O. 
(55) Cabrera Felipe I I I 5, 13-
(56) Danvila 778-9-
(57) Cabrera Felipe I I I 7 1 . 
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authors have suggested and that he f e l t impelled to remove Moura i n order 
to establish his position. 
A further misconception must be removed: Lerma was no enemy of the 
Council of State. There was no point i n repeating the mistake of the 
previous reign and overwhelming King and favourite i n an enormous and 
suffocating mass of paper. As the anonymous Advertencias a l Duque de Lerma 
cuando en l a privanza con e l senor rey Don Felipe I I I pointed out, the 
Council has i t s uses: 
" I n the l a s t government three means of consultation were used: by the 
f i r s t , the presidents of the councils made verbal reports on a l l 
matters and His Majesty gave them verbal decisions; by the second, 
the secretaries consulted His Majesty verbally, t e l l i n g him what had 
been decided i n the councils, and His Majesty gave them verbal decisions 
by the l a s t , the councils make signed and w r i t t e n reports about every-
thing, and the secretaries take them to and f r o , returning with the 
replies. This las t I take to be the best f o r obtaining a r i g h t and 
balanced view of a f f a i r s , and I advise Your Lordship to ensure that 
His Royal Highness demand to receive the consultas personally, that 
you t a l k them over with him, that the appropriate secretary d r a f t the 
decrees, and that the councils be extremely prudent and secretive 
about t h e i r consultas." 
(En e l gobierno pasado se han usado tres maneras de consultar: l a 
primera que los presidentes consultaban a boca todas las cosas y a 
boca las resolvfa SM con e l l o s ; l a segunda que los secretarios 
consultaban con SM a boca, haciendo relacidn del acuerdo quese 
tomaba en los consejos y SM se resolvia con ellos a boca; l a ultima 
ha sido consultar los consejos todas las cosas por papel con su 
firma, enviando los secretarios las consultas y a e l l o s volvlan 
las respuestas ... La ultima manera tengo por mds j u s t i f i c a d a para 
l a verdad y para tomar buen acuerdo en ellas y que VS [exija?] de 
SA que todas las consultas lleguen a sus manos y que VS las resuelva 
a boca con SA y que asiente los decretos e l secretario que para e l l o 
se senalare y que en e l consejo de estas consultas haya grand!simo 
recato y secreto (58). ) 
(58) BN 10857/81. 
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This was but one of many signs that the popularity of P h i l i p IT's mode of 
rule was wearing t h i n . The Venetian ambassador reported that, only a 
f o r t n i g h t a f t e r Philip's death, the Adelantado of Castile was complaining 
that, i n the past, Spain had been "subject to a single brain that thought 
i t knew a l l that could be known and treated everyone else as a blockhead" 
(59) • The same sentiment, though less f o r t h r i g h t l y expressed, i s obvious 
i n the Consideraciones para que comenzase a reinar con f e l i c i d a d Felipe I I I 
(60) . Having eulogized the late king, the w r i t e r bewailed, not only 
declining national prestige and a lack of money, but also the absence of 
"grandes cabezas de estado". 
"Your Majesty must order that there be a standing Council of State, 
and must put on i t those who best understand i t s nature and purpose; 
they should have considerable p r a c t i c a l experience and the other 
q u a l i t i e s that should be necessary to merit so great a position, 
rather than that they should be mere recipients of an honour; the 
o f f i c e of councillor i s proper to great captains and generals who 
have grown old i n conquering enemies and winning great v i c t o r i e s , to 
ambassadors and viceroys who have exercized t h e i r charges i n exemplary 
fashion and with due approbation." 
(Ha de ser VM servido de mandar que l e haya ordinariamente y de poner 
en e l las personas que mejor lo entendieren con larga experiencia y 
e j e r c i c i o y con las otras partes con que se ha de merecer y alcanzar 
tan gran lugar m£s que por hacer merced y honrar a las personas, 
o f i c i o que es propio de grandes capitanes, generales, envejecidos en 
veneer enemigos y alcanzar grandes v i c t o r i a s , embajadores y virreyes 
que hayan gobernado con gran ejemplo y aprobacidn) 
He went on to point out the dangers of governing by means of "avisos y 
relaciones secretos" and stressed that, i f P h i l i p I I ' s practices were 
continued, the dangers would increase. 
"Your Majesty must be assured that there i s no opinion i n the world 
so c e r t a i n as that of a good council, and that those who take away 
(59) CSPV i x 744-
(60) BN 2346/23: i n t e r n a l evidence shews i t to have been contemporary. 
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the management of a f f a i r s from such men do not do so f o r the sake of 
God's service and Your Majesty's and the common weal, but p r i n c i p a l l y 
f o r t h e i r private ends or f o r sheer ambition, and so as to appear the 
only ones who are trusted. We have seen an i n f i n i t y of things go 
astray by t h i s means, and not one on account of an opinion of the 
council: f o r although i n a council there may be someone who has his 
own ends i n view, God i s merciful and so gives His aid that where one 
errs the others r e c t i f y , so that as a whole they never err - as the 
Holy Ghost fo r e t o l d where He proclaims that ' i n the multitude of 
counsellors there i s safety'." 
(Persuaclese VM que no hay tan seguro parecer en e l mundo como es de 
un buen consejo y que los que sacan los negocios de los que son tales 
no lo hacen por lo que conviene a l servicio de Dios y de VM y bien 
universal sino principalmente por sus fines particulares o por pura 
ambicidn y que parezca que se confia de ellos solos* Hanse vi s t o 
erradas i n f i n i t a s cosas y negocios gobernados por este camino y 
ninguno por parecer del consejo donde aunque hubiese alguno que 
tuviese f i n p a r t i c u l a r favorece Dios y a s i s t i r l e tanto a los consejos 
que lo que unosyerran lo enderezan otros de manera que nunca se yerra 
como lo tiene previsto e l E s p l r i t u Santo que dice que esti. l a salud 
en los rauchos consejos.) 
P h i l i p I I I seems to have taken t h i s advice to heart. Within a f o r t n i g h t 
of his accession, he had appointed to the Council of State Lerma, the Count 
of Miranda, Rodrigo Vazquez de Arce (President of the Council of Castile), 
the Dukes of Ndjera and Medina Sidonia, the Count of Fuentes, the Adelantado 
Mayor of Castile (Martin de Padilla y Manrique, Count of Buendla and Santa 
Gadea) and Don Juan de Borja (soon to be created Count of Fi c a l l o ) ( 6 l ) . 
Others were added gradually: The Count of Alba de Liste makes his f i r s t 
appearance i n a document of September, 1599; the Cardinal Guevara and the 
Archbishop of Toledo (Bernado de Sandoval y Rojas, Lerma's uncle) i n 
November of the same year; the Duke of Infantado i n March, 1600; Fray 
Gaspar de Cdrdoba, the royal confessor, i n September, 1600; the Constable 
of Castile i n May, 1601; the Marquess of Poza i n February, 1602; the Count 
(61) Actas de las Cortes xv 674, 680; AHN E Coleccion Vega tomo 9/37. 
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of Olivares i n October, 1602; and the Duke of Sesa i n May, I6Q4 (62). 
The appointments shew that P h i l i p wished t o draw from a l l sections of 
public l i f e - administration, diplomacy, the army and navy, the Court, 
the Church. Not a l l were Castilians: Idiaquez was Basque and Borja and 
Sesa were Catalans. As f a r as scant personal data allow us to see, they 
were a l l roughly of the same generation - men i n t h e i r f i f t i e s and above -
and of the same class: only the confessor was not of noble b i r t h . They 
did not a l l have the same influence and importance, however, and by no means 
a l l the members were present at any given session of the Council. The most 
regular attenders were Idiaquez, Miranda and Chinchdn; Alba de Liste, 
F i c a l l o , the Constable, Cdrdoba and, from 1602, Poza came next; the rest 
t r a i l e d f a r behind. The pattern of t h e i r attendances i s d i f f i c u l t to 
explain. Idiaquez, f o r instance, did not appear i n the Council between 
mid-April, 1602, and mid-November of the same year, nor from early A p r i l 
to early July, 1603, nor from mid-November of the same year u n t i l March, 
I6Q4. The la s t two periods of absence could hardly have been f o r holidays: 
the negotiations with England were i n f u l l swing and Idiaquez, as the most 
experienced member of the Council, could hardly have wished to avoid taking 
part. Perhaps a comparatively healthy age forgets the seriousness of the 
ailments of former generations. 
Nor were the most regular members always the most i n f l u e n t i a l . 
Chinchdn's opinions were often too extreme to be practicable, and Cdrdoba, 
though a less frequent attender, wielded more influence than he (63). The 
majority of the Council usually did l i t t l e more than lend weight to the 
(62) Garma i v cap. v also l i s t s Garcia de Loaysa y Gir<5n (Archbishop of 
Toledo u n t i l his death on 20th February, 1599) and Pedro Portocarrero 
(inquisitor-General and Bishop of Calahora, Cdrdoba and Cuenca u n t i l 
his death on 20th September of the same year) but I have found no 
trace of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s as councillors. 
(63) I am almost e n t i r e l y certain that Cdrdoba did not use his position 
as confessor to exert a great and secret influence upon the King's 
decisions. His opinions i n the Council were always frank, and 
occasionally at variance with the policy adopted. He was, moreover, 
not always with the King. 
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opinions expressed by the two leaders: Idiaquez and Miranda. Ididquez, 
the i n t e l l i g e n t and experienced c i v i l servant who preferred to be a power 
behind the throne and the "Great Commoner" of his generation - he had no 
noble t i t l e - was the great friend and a l l y of his colleague., Miranda had 
been Governor of Catalonia and Viceroy of Naples, and i n the new reign held 
the presidency both of the Council of Castile and the Council of I t a l y . He 
had the reputation of being an honest and reasonable man, not eloquent but 
capable and we l l - l i k e d . I n his younger days, he had apparently fought with 
Don John of Austria i n I t a l y (64) which perhaps accounted f o r his lameness, 
but by our period he had become more r e f l e c t i v e (65). Although the two 
did not always agree i n d e t a i l s , by and large t h e i r advice to the King was 
similar - experienced, with a due regard to p r a c t i c a l i t i e s and, equally 
important, to Spain's sense of mission; i t was, moreover, advice that was 
nearly always followed by the King and his favourite. 
The Council seems to have worked i n quite an e f f i c i e n t way. Their 
j o i n t a c t i v i t i e s f o r the f i r s t f i f t e e n months are largely unrecorded: 
probably the royal progress of 1599 caused too much turmoil, and i t i s very 
l i k e l y that the texts of at least some of the consultas were l o s t or mislaid 
i n the f l u r r y of journeying and wedding-festivities (66). I t was i n about 
February, 1600, that the Council settled down to the regular pattern that 
was to be characteristic of the next few years, with sessions held i n the 
ca p i t a l , whether Madrid or, from January of 1601, Valladolid. The Council 
met once or twice a week and, i n the normal course of events, probably f o r 
two or three hours at a time. The King very rarely attended. The Council's 
main business was the discussion of the despatches that arrived from abroad 
which, having f i r s t been sent to the King, were then passed on through Lerma 
(64) Williams Ph.D. 416 
(65) Contarini, printed as an appendix to Cabrera Felipe I I I . 
(66) I think Dr. Williams incautious i n assuming that the extant consultas 
of t h i s period are the only ones that were made. EHR 759• 
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to a secretary of state - usually Andre's de Prada or Pedro de Franqueza -
who read them to the Council. The debate would then ensue. The secretary 
took notes of each councillor's opinion (these were expressed i n order of 
seniority on the Council, the longest-serving member speaking f i r s t ) , made 
a dr a f t and, i f the meeting had been p a r t i c u l a r l y important or contentious, 
would receive the councillors' personal drafts of t h e i r speeches. A f a i r 
copy was then made and the te x t presented t o the next session of the Council. 
Those who had been present at the previous meeting - and sometimes those 
who had not - signed t h e i r i n i t i a l (rdbrica) at the end of the consulta, 
which was then presented to the King. I n due course, the consulta was 
returned t o the Council with the King's r i d e r w r i t t e n i n the margin, and 
one of the councillors would often supervise the dr a f t i n g of the appropriate 
despatch, putting his i n i t i a l at the foot. The King then signed the f a i r 
copy. There are considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s i n knowing how long t h i s process 
took. The King's riders bear no date, and despatches are not always available. 
I t should be said, however, that with one exception, there were no complaints 
about the dilatoriness of either P h i l i p or the Council during our period. 
Ambassadors seem to have been quite content with the pace of a f f a i r s and 
urgent business was dealt with as quickly as possible. Only the matter of 
the English succession saw long delays, and t h i s was the result of a 
deliberate policy (67). The King's frequent absences from his Court do 
not appear to have made much difference. The Council continued t o meet i n 
the c a p i t a l , and l e t t e r s were frequently drafted i n the royal hunting-lodges: 
P h i l i p even when on holiday s t i l l kept abreast of a f f a i r s . The much-criticized 
delays of the period were the result of the ine f f i c i e n c y of the Treasury, 
not of the Council of State. 
But P h i l i p did not always f i n d i t convenient to refer matters to the 
Council. He was, aft e r a l l , under no obligation to do so; as Ididquez once 
(67) qvi p. Ai>A st^. 
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pointed out, the Council was e n t i r e l y dependent upon the King: 
"although that body i s of such authority and confidence, there are 
matters that are best not submitted to the judgement of many; and the 
judgement of kings i s so above a l l others that t h e i r subjects cannot 
c a l l i t i n t o question, and they themselves are not bound to t e l l every-
thing to t h e i r councillors; f o r the l a t t e r ' s o r i g i n a l function was to 
advise the King i n his doubts: when he has none, neither reason nor 
custom make him wait upon his Council." 
(Si bien aquel t r i b u n a l es de tanta autoridad y confianza hay materias 
que es bien no ponerlas a l j u i c i o de muchos; y e l de los reyes es tan 
soberano que no pueden residenciarles los vasallos n i forzoso que l o 
comunique todo a los consejeros cuya i n s t i t u c i d n fue consultar en las 
dudas del prlncipe pero cuando no las tiene en las cosas que ocurren 
por razdn n i por costumbre no depende del consejo. (68) ) 
Moreover, i t s discretion was sometimes i n doubt. I n 1603, P h i l i p wrote with 
his own hand the Orden de SM sobre e l secreto que se debe guardar en e l 
consejo, which complained that ministers were too careless with state 
secrets (69). The King was therefore thrown back on to his favourite. I t 
would be wrong to take too l i t e r a l l y the opinion of the Venetian ambassador 
that "the whole machine" was "managed" by Lerma (70). Admittedly, Lerma 
had great influence with his young protdgd. The new Archbishop of Toledo, 
Sandoval, went so f a r as to c r i t i c i z e his nephew f o r encouraging the King 
to roam about the countryside on hunting-expeditions, f a r away from the 
press of pot e n t i a l royal servants and f o r c o n t r o l l i n g with great rigour 
admission to the royal presence (71). Some have gone so f a r as to see the 
move of the Court from Madrid to Valladolid early i n 1601 as an attempt 
upon Lerma's part to prevent regular contact between P h i l i p and his aunt, 
the dowager-empress Maria (72). Certainty on t h i s point i s not easily t o 
(68) Pdrez Mfnguez, Appendix. For t h i s reason, I think Dr. Williams 
mistaken when he writes of the " j u r i s d i c t i o n a l scope" of the Council 
as being small. The Council had no j u r i s d i c t i o n a l scope, i n the normal 
sense, because by i t s nature and function i t needed none. EHR 754• 
(69) AHN E193/2. 
(70) CSPV i x 999. 
(71) BN 4.013/101; BN 1492/32. 
(72) Pe*rez Bustamante 74. 
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be found, by the very nature of the case. But the move to Valladolid was 
by no means a sudden decision, rumours to the effect having been current 
f o r a good twelve months previously, and the order was not immediately 
rescinded on the Empress' death i n 1603 (73)• Moreover, Valladolid was no 
bad choice. I n the heart of the old kingdom of Castile and Lec5n, i t s 
climate was, and i s , perhaps less extreme than that of Madrid: even one of 
the reluctant courtiers, resentful of being uprooted from his f a m i l i a r 
haunts, had to acknowledge that matters could have been worse (74). 
Undoubtedly, however, Lerma's only means of keeping i n p r i s t i n e repair 
his intimacy with the King was to maintain a continuity of contact that 
hone could hope to r i v a l . I t i s a token of the strength of his position 
that he was able to do so with unqualified success throughout the early 
years of the reign. 
The legend that Lerma was as indolent and uninformed as his young 
master i s s i m i l a r l y untenable. He rarely attended the Council of State, 
but when he spoke i t was with authority and influence (75). Like Moura 
before him, he frequently sent orders to the Treasury. He often gave 
audiences to foreign ambassadors - a task that required great tact and 
perception - and sometimes received l e t t e r s from abroad - Henry IV of 
France and the Archduke i n Flanders were amongst his correspondents (76). 
With the Infanta Isabella especially he was on the best of terms and a 
voluminous correspondence between them bears a l l the signs of a warm 
friendship. I n a l l , he spent a good deal of time at a f f a i r s of state, 
and on one occasion was reproved by Isabella f o r over-working (77). One 
thing i s certain: he was no p a c i f i s t . His expressed opinions i n the 
(73) Cabrera Felipe I I I . 
(74) BN 1492/97. 
(75) qvi pf.-fofi,^. I am forced once more to disagree with Dr. Williams. 
EHR 752. 
(76) AGS EK2460/7; BRAH x l v i i , x l v i i i , x l i x j AGR SEG 300. 
(77) BRAH x l v i i . 334-
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Council shew him to have been bellicose on more than one occasion (78). 
And, jus t as he fostered Philip's love of magnificence, court l i f e and 
hunting, so he must have paid due regard to his patron's desire to emulate 
the warlike exploits of his ancestors. I t i s inconceivable that a Castilian 
noble l i k e Lerma, exposed to the same c u l t u r a l influences as the King, would 
have wished to eradicate t h i s t r a i t . 
Clear proof of both his interest i n and influence upon state a f f a i r s 
i s to be found i n his relations with the junta de t r e s . This body had an 
i l l u s t r i o u s membership: Idiaquez, Miranda, Cdrdoba and, occasionally, 
Velada (79)• I t has recently been suggested that i t was i n some way 
dependent upon the Council of State - a committee rather than a cabal (80). 
I n fact, the junta received i t s orders from the King by way of the favourite. 
Important matters were discussed: the Biron a f f a i r , a league against the 
Turk, the p o s s i b i l i t y of peace with the United Provinces, the report of an 
entente between England and France, the re-incorporation of the Low Countries 
i n t o the Spanish crown. There are unmistakeable signs that the outer rin g 
of councillors, who with the members of the junta made up the Council of 
State, had no detailed knowledge of what t h e i r more favoured colleagues 
debated. Nor i s i t r i g h t to see the junta as derogating from Lerma's 
position, f o r he manifestly kept a close eye upon proceedings. Many of 
the consultas that they produced were w r i t t e n out by Lerma' creature, 
Franqueza, and sent d i r e c t l y to the favourite; sometimes, indeed, Franqueza 
seems to have regarded himself as a member of the junta (though he was never 
a councillor of state), f o r his i n i t i a l appears at the foot with the others 
( 8 l ) . Nor must we assume that P h i l i p and Lerma were incapable of taking 
(78) qvi ppjS/foC An interesting p o r t r a i t of Lerma, made by Rubens i n 
1603, depicts the Duke half-armoured and mounted, with a background 
of armies. Museo del Prado, Madrid, no. 3137. 
(79) I am surprised that Dr. Williams should regard a body made up of 
the two most experienced royal administrators, the royal confessor 
and the King's old t u t o r as being "grotesquely-composed". EHR 762, 766. 
(80) Williams Ph.D. 333; cf Lynch Spain under the Habsburgs i i 20-21. 
(81) For a b r i e f account of Franqueza's career, see Juderfas. 
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any decision unaided: Villamediana i n 1603 was sent to England with detailed 
instructions that had been drawn up by the King and the favourite without 
reference to any member of the Council. Our conclusion surely must be that 
P h i l i p I I I p r o f i t e d by the mistake of his father, and never stood i n danger 
of losing sight of the wood because of the tangle of administrative trees. 
But many miles had to be t r a v e l l e d and several weeks to pass before 
the orders that came from the King and his advisers could be acted upon; 
and even when at t h e i r destination, they passed int o the hands of a t h i r d 
party, who might conceivably i n t e r p r e t the King's wishes to suit his own 
convenience or the exigencies of the s i t u a t i o n i n which he found himself. 
I n f a c t , throughout our period, Spain was obediently served by those whom 
she had "sent to l i e abroad". Not a l l were of the highest q u a l i t y . Juan 
Bautista de Tasis, who held the Paris embassy from 1599 u n t i l his retirement 
i n 1603, sent the most t u r g i d and unrewarding despatches of the period and 
provided more advice than information; he seemed unable to stand up to 
Henry IV, a defect frequently noted during the Saluzzo c r i s i s , , and had 
l i t t l e standing and few contacts at the French Court - although, towards 
the end of his term of o f f i c e even he more than made up f o r his former 
p r o l i x i t y by providing secret information gained from a f r i e n d i n high 
places (82). But he had from the f i r s t been an interim appointee and, 
though conscientious, was elderly; and he remained at his post f o r so 
long only because of a series of unavoidable delays i n f i n d i n g him a 
successor. Other ministers were more highly thought of. The Duke of 
Sesa i n Rome - " e l centro donde cae todo" - discharged his mission at a 
most d i f f i c u l t period to the constant approbation of the Council and 
received the reward of a seat on that body. Don Baltasar de Zuniga, the 
bright young man of the diplomatic service, a f t e r a signally-successful 
term at the Brussels embassy, was sent to Paris. Don Guille'n de San Clemente 
(82) qvi p. igg. 
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continued to watch over Spanish interests at the Court of the Holy Roman 
Emperor with consummate s k i l l as he had done since 1592. These three 
ambassadors merited, and received, nothing butpraise. 
There i s , furthermore, no record of an ambassador's having exceeded 
his instructions. The decision of the Count of Fuentes, Captain-General 
and Governor of Milan, to open relations with the dissident Duke of Biron 
might perhaps be cited as an exception, f o r he seems to have had no p r i o r 
order from the King to take so important a step (83). l e t his b e l i e f that 
he was j u s t i f i e d i n grasping a golden opportunity as soon as possible was 
understood and approved of by P h i l i p and his closest advisers (84). A 
minister abroad was expected to int e r p r e t his orders imaginatively and 
wisely: provided he l e f t strategy to his government, he had considerable 
l i b e r t y i n formulating his own t a c t i c s . I n our period, the arrangement; 
worked well. The other means by which an ambassador could influence policy 
was by sending wrong or biased information to his master (85). I t i s easy 
;fco attach too much importance t o t h i s obvious f a c t . When an ambassador 
was worth his s a l t , his reports were accurate and the f r u i t of his personal 
observation and knowledge. Spies were not approved of and confidants d i s -
trusted, and t h e i r information rarely accorded much importance either by 
the ambassador or by the government; t h i s i s especially obvious i n Spain's 
consistent reserve when dealing with the numerous English recusants whose 
petit i o n s f o r help came i n a constant stream (86). Any i n t e l l e c t u a l or 
ideological l i m i t a t i o n s were those of a noble Spaniard of the epoch, and 
were shared with the members of the government. Even when his judgement 
was perhaps not p a r t i c u l a r l y acute - as with Juan Bautista de Tasis and 
with Villamediana - the fact was obvious to the Council of State: both the 
f a i l i n g s of the one and the inexperience of the other were f u l l y recognized. 
(83) qvi p--124 s«w-
(84) qvi p-nz.. 
(85) cf the great emphasis l a i d upon the q u a l i t y of information by Professor 
C. H. Carter i n The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs. passim. 
(86) qvi j>f>. -140, 45-8-
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When Tasis' continued and erroneous report that Henry IV would not go to 
war over Saluzzo was disbelieved, and Villamediana 1s continued and erroneous 
opinion that James I genuinely wished to concede more than proved to be the 
case was steadfastly believed, we must conclude that, i n both instances, 
i t was because the King and Council wished i t t o be so. I t was here that 
the process of decision-making, f o r a l l i t s good points, f e l l down. 
( i i i ) Royal Finance. 
Spain's immense commitments were reflected i n her expenses. At the end 
of P h i l i p I I ' s reign, the l a t t e r were reckoned at about 11,000,000 ducats a 
year, of which no less than 3,000,000 were devoted to the war i n Flanders 
(87). Her resources, however, were not as great as her neighbours believed. 
Admittedly, Spain had the advantage over other countries: James I of England 
was said to dispose of 1,130,000 escudos a year, and Henry IV of France of 
9,258,368 escudos (88). According to Cornwallis, the f i r s t resident English 
ambassador i n Spain a f t e r the end of the war i n I6O4, P h i l i p I I I ' s annual 
income was some 14,000,000 ducats a year. But he at once pointed out the 
major problem of the Spanish monarchy: a large proportion of these millions 
never reached the King (89). Although his general calculation was inexact, 
Cornwallis had reached the heart of the matter. The Spanish f i n a n c i a l 
system was a hopelessly-intricate maze, as well f o r o f f i c i a l s of the six -
teenth and seventeenth centuries as f o r modern scholars. Concise balance-
sheets are few, and must be used with caution. Nevertheless, ce r t a i n broad 
trends are f a i r l y clear. During our period, the o f f i c i a l annual income of 
the King of Spain was between ten and twelve-and-a-half m i l l i o n ducats (90). 
(87) Parker Spanish Road Appendix K; CJH 358/sf document of November (?), 
1596; CJH 380/sf document of 21st October, 1598. I n fac t , more than 
t h i s sum was usually sent to Flanders; i n 1600 alone, 4,581,295 ducats 
were remitted: AGS E626/43; C0D0IN xxxvi 509-544-
(88) AGS E840/189; AGS EK1604/27; AGS EKl603/43,44. An escudo i n our 
period was of roughly the same value as the ducat, the former being 
worth 4OO maravedfs and the l a t t e r 375-
(89) Cornwallis 306. 
(90) AGS E6l6/l97,198; AGS CJH408/sf, document of 1601. 
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The t r a d i t i o n a l source of royal wealth, and that which ought to have been 
by f a r the most f r u i t f u l , the crown lands, was v i r t u a l l y useless. During 
the sixteenth century, the Habsburgs had alienated t h e i r revenues by 
granting .juros to t h e i r subjects i n return f o r a lump sum. The short-term 
rewards of the policy were obvious: without precisely alienating t h e i r lands, 
the Habsburgs could realize the c a p i t a l that they represented. The " r i c h 
men of the middle sort and the merchants who pr o f i t e d by the needs and 
enterprises of the kings and t h e i r armies" (91) were assured of an annual 
income i n return f o r t h e i r o r i g i n a l down-payment. Over a longer period, 
however, the results were disastrous- I n 1556, some 68$ of the lands were 
devoted to paying the interest upon juros: and by the death of P h i l i p I I , 
the proportion had risen alarmingly to 96.5% (92). 
The King was therefore forced to depend upon various sorts of extra-
ordinary revenue. The Pope habitually allowed the crown to c o l l e c t and 
spend three c l e r i c a l subsidies, the subsidio, excusado and cruzada, which 
brought i n between 1,200,000 ducats and 1,400,000 ducats (93). The annual 
flow of treasure from the New World " l i k e new f l e e t s of Solomon or of 
Ophir" (94) provided between 2,500,000 ducats and 3,000,000 ducats (95). 
The Cortes of Castile were occasionally urged to help the King out. I n 
December, 1598, the President of the Council of Castile, Vdzquez de Arce, 
t o l d the procuradores that when P h i l i p I I died, the royal patrimony had 
died with him. His successor, the Count of Miranda, painted a similar 
picture twelve months l a t e r : 
"His Majesty has succeeded to his father's commitment to go to the 
defence of the Catholic Church and to maintain these kingdoms i n 
peace and justice - and t h i s without the great amounts of money that 
(91) BN 18716/4 
(92) C a s t i l l o Hispania 52. 
(93) AGS CJH 358/sf, document of November (?), 1596; AGS E616/197,198. 
(94) Lopez Madera 74-
(95) as (93). 
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are needed to maintain the royal estate and dig n i t y and the many things 
that depend upon the King : so much so that one may t r u t h f u l l y say that 
he has only the name of king without the resources with which to d i s -
charge the obligations and commitments that go with i t , f o r everything 
i s pledged to the h i l t . " 
(SM ha sucedido en las mismas obligaciones de acudir a l a defensa de 
l a i g l e s i a catdlica y sustentar estos reinos en paz y j u s t i c i a y sin 
tener hacienda ninguna siendo menester tanta para sustentar e l estado 
y dignidad r e a l y tantas cosas como de SM penden que con verdad se 
puede decir que sdlo ha sido e l nombre de rey con las cargas y 
obligaciones de t a l y sin tener con que cumplirlas por estar todo 
enajenado. (96) ) 
These emotive appeals were not gladly received. As early as 1593, the Cortes 
had urged P h i l i p I I to reduce his expenditure and had shewn l i t t l e sympathy 
towards his imperial dream (97). Nevertheless, t h e i r subsidies provided the 
crown with 400,000 ducats a year during our period (98). Other expedients 
were less happy. Between 1599 and 1606, ve l l t i n coinage to the value of 
22 m i l l i o n ducats was minted (99). I n A p r i l , 1601, attempts were made to 
compile an inventory of a l l privately-owned s i l v e r plate with a view to 
taxation: but the reaction of Philip's subjects, both c l e r i c a l and lay, was 
so markedly hostile that the idea was quickly abandoned (100). Other parts 
of the Spanish empire had t h e i r own f i n a n c i a l problems. Although S i c i l y 
had an annual income of 362,298 escudos and Milan that of between 2,874,716 
ducats and 3,313,185 ducats, debts there too were heavy. Both these 
possessions bore the brunt of the pensions that the Spanish monarchy 
granted to i t s f a i t h f u l servants and retainers - soldiers, courtiers and 
administrators - but had begun to stagger under the burden. I n 1600, 
Naples had an annual d e f i c i t of about 550,000 ducats and an accumulated 
debt of 2,754,034 ducats, and S i c i l y ' s accumulated debt had reached 
1,836,153 ducats by 1602 (101). The main expedient, that of the asiento - a 
(96) Actas de las Cortes x v i i i 425. 
(97) Sanchez Albornoz i i 528. 
(98) AGE E616/197,198. 
(99) Vicens Vives Historia Econdmioa 4O6. 
(100) Cabrera Felipe I I I 100, 110; BN 1492/36; BN 4013/317. 
(101) AGS E1160/152; AGS E1875/193; AGS E1099/55,56. 
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loan contracted with a merchant, usually a foreigner - was the most ruinous 
of a l l ; the crown was forced to pay i n f l a t e d rates of int e r e s t f o r the 
service that was provided (102). 
I n 1596, P h i l i p I I had t r i e d to cut the Gordian knot by suspending 
payment to the asentistas and converting the asientos i n t o juros. which 
bound him to pay a f a r lower rate of interest (103). By t h i s time, the 
royal debt had reached astronomical proportions. I t was expected that, 
by the end of 1599, i t would be some 25,858,275 ducats; and on P h i l i p I l l ' s 
accession, the annual debt from 1601 was forecasted as being a probable 
1,612,435 ducats (IQ4). A document i n the Biblioteca Hacional records a 
remarkable conversation between Ph i l i p , at the time s t i l l Prince of Asturias, 
and an o f f i c i a l of the Treasury (105). The l a t t e r set out the manifold 
d i f f i c u l t i e s that the Spanish monarchy faced; and to the Prince's question, 
"Is there some sizeable sum which would make possible conquests, 
expeditions, defence against our enemies or the redemption of royal 
rents - which, as f a r as I can see w i l l be the mightiest project that 
could be undertaken?" 
he was forced to give a b r u t a l reply: 
'There i s absolutely no money. Even i f there were, be i t never so 
certain, i t would not suffice f o r the preservation of these kingdoms, 
f o r the interest that has to be paid i s an eating canker that increases 
the damage that we sustain when faced with the needs and circumstances 
that present themselves." 
(iHay alguna suma junta de cantidad con que se puedan eraprender 
conquistas y jornadas y r e s i s t i r enemigos o para t r a t a r del desempeno 
de las rentas reales que segdn veo sera" l a mayor empresa que se puede 
intentar? 
No hay tesoro punto n i esa hacienda aunque fuera firme y f i j a basta 
para l a conservacidn de los reinos por l a p o l i l l a de los rdditos que 
acrecientan e l dano en las necesidades y ocasiones que se ofrecen.) 
(102) C a s t i l l o ESC 752; AGS CJH 358/sf, document of November (?), 1596. 
(103) i b i d . 
(IQ4) AGS CJH 358/sf, document of November (?), 1596; AGS CJH 380/sf, 
document of 21st October, 1598. 
(105) BN 18716/4. 
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Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t single fact i n our period i s that P h i l i p chose 
to disregard the obvious import of the f i s c a l ' s discourse. As the heir to 
a great empire and an exalted t r a d i t i o n , he preferred to keep face before 
the world; and, i n the main, his advisers tended to agree with him. As I 
sh a l l attempt to shew i n the pages that follow, the most prudent course -
the immediate and drastic reduction of commitments abroad - was not at once 
adopted. Spanish foreign policy i n the years under examination was the 
gradual r e a l i z a t i o n that pecunia nervus b e l l i was as true f o r the Habsburg 
monarchy as f o r any other. 
( i v ) The Fight against Islam. 
The b i t t e r t r u t h that ideals were one thing and p r a c t i c a l i t i e s another 
was most noticeable i n Spain 1s attit u d e towards the Turk. I t was a l l very 
we l l to speak of a divine mission whilst the enemy was s t i l l w i t h i n the 
very gates: but as the empire grew, p r i o r i t i e s had to be adjusted. The 
idea of a Crusade f o r the recapture of Constantinople and the deliverance 
of Jerusalem was by no means dead i n our period; as we s h a l l see, Clement V I I I 
on more than one occasion hoped to organize a league to t h i s end. The Spanish 
authorities, however, shewed scant i n t e r e s t . Quite apart from a l i v e l y 
suspicion of those who would be t h e i r main a l l i e s - France and Venice - the 
Islamic problem was perhaps more complex f o r them than f o r t h e i r neighbours. 
I n the f i r s t place, even a f t e r 1492, large numbers of moriscos - to the old 
Christians l i t t l e better than Moors - had remained i n the Peninsula. The 
two wars of the Alpujarras seemed to j u s t i f y the Christians' worst fears: 
the moriscos would never be f u l l y integrated i n t o the wider community. 
Unfortunately, t h e i r economic position was powerful. The government knew 
that i n Granada they occupied key roles - shopkeepers, bakers, butchers, 
inn-keepers, water-carriers (106); i n Valencia they were cheek by jowl with 
the fourteen or f i f t e e n thousand Frenchmen who also l i v e d there; i n Aragon, 
(106) Actas de las Cortes xv 631. 
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they could be expected to rise i n support of any French army that might 
cross the Pyrenees (107). Some were known to be i n contact with the Berbers 
and even with the Sultan (108). The sanguine hope of the Catholic Kings had 
been that missionary work would be s u f f i c i e n t to wean the moriscos away from 
t h e i r former re l i g i o u s habits, but i t was not to be f u l f i l l e d . Prejudice, 
tactlesness and oppression ensured that the moriscos' C h r i s t i a n i t y remained 
as obdurately s u p e r f i c i a l as ever. The problem seemed to have only one 
solution, that which was proposed by the Adelantado of Castile i n February, 
1602: enslave or slaughter the entire morisco population. The former proposal 
was too d i f f i c u l t and dangerous, the l a t t e r too bloody; and although the 
Council of State had c r i t i c i z e d Charles V and P h i l i p I I f o r allowing a f f a i r s 
to reach so bad a state, they were unable to decide upon a satisfactory 
course of action (109). I n Spain at least, the problem of Islam had to 
remain untackled and unsolved. 
Abroad too, zeal was to be tempered with realism. The Turkish threat 
was viewed i n strategic, rather than religious, terms. Spain's great concern 
was f o r her south I t a l i a n possessions, which would be the f i r s t to suffer 
from any Ottoman f l e e t . I n the 1590's, the Viceroy of Naples was habitually 
f e a r f u l because of reports that Cigala, the Turkish admiral, was l i k e l y t o 
put to sea. As the Sultan 1 s power waned, the Viceroy urged strong counter-
measures to take a f i t t i n g revenge upon the house that had f o r so long 
threatened Christendom (110). The suggestion was favourably received i n 
Spain, but there was never at any time a serious chance that i t would be 
acted upon, even i n the f i r s t , f i n e , careless rapture of the warlike P h i l i p 
I I I . Doings i n Naples and S i c i l y were to be of a completely defensive 
nature, and intended to counterbalance Cigala's strength, reports of which 
continued to be frequent. Appealing as the idea of a massive naval offensive 
(107) AGS E2636/45; AGS El874/sf, document of 30th November, 1601. 
(108) Hess, passim. 
(109) AGS E2636/36. 
(110) AGS Ell58/185-
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was, the King and his Council were i n no doubt that more pressing business 
lay elsewhere ( i l l ) . The one hint that Spain would launch her own Crusade 
a f t e r a l l was quickly s t i f l e d . Spain's admiral i n the Mediterranean, the 
Genoese Juan Andrea Doria, could not amass the forces that he wished because 
of the pressure of Spain's already great commitments, and he proved to be 
fa r too prudent to put a l l at r i s k by an i l l - j u d g e d expedition (112). Even 
the report of the Sultan's death i n I6Q4 did l i t t l e t o a l t e r Spain's studied 
dis i n t e r e s t . The opportunity, as the Count of Miranda pointed out, was 
tempting: 
"Your Majesty who, by the mercy of God, i s i n the flower of youth, 
valiant and healthy, able to labour and conserve the greatness and 
reputation of your monarchy and that of the holy zeal of your forebears 
and to gain credit by your royal actions, ought to do what you can to 
launch some enterprise and to f i l l the world with your fame." 
(VM que por l a misericordia de Dios se halla en l a f l o r de su edad, 
gallardo y fuerte de salud para trabajar y conservar l a grandeza y 
reputacic*n de su monarqula y del santo celo de sus antepasados y 
ganar cre'dito de sus reales acciones debe hacer l o que pudiere para 
que se haga alguna jornada y henchir e l mundo de su fama. (113) ) 
But he agreed with his colleague, Idid.quez: the time was not yet r i p e . And 
even P h i l i p himself, although he expressed himself w i l l i n g to f i g h t the 
Turk i n person i n East or West, agreed ( I I 4 ) . The same reluctance i s 
apparent i n Spain's dealings with the representatives of the various Balkan 
states who periodically made t h e i r way to the Court to ask for help i n 
r i s i n g against the Turk. Offers of vast new t e r r i t o r i e s and immense income 
were made, and the appeals were often couched i n pathetic terms, but the 
same answer was returned to a l l of them: the matter would have t o wait (115). 
(111) AGS E1885/62: " a l consejo parece que los indicios de l a declinacidn 
del imperio turquesco son tales que s i las guerras con Inglaterra y 
rebeldes y e l recelo de las cosas de Francia y l a ocupacidn de las 
de Alemania y l a f a l t a de hacienda no desayudaran no se debiera 
perder tan buena ocasidn." 
(112) AGS E1931/107; AGS E1431/93-
(113) AGS E1857/35; qv AGS EI876/2I4. 
(114) i b i d . 
(115) eg AGS E1097/80,81. 
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The one positive step taken against the Turk was hardly i n the best t r a d i t i o n s 
of the reconquista: an exchange of ambassadors took place with the Persians. 
As enemies of the Turk, they were useful a l l i e s ; and as such, i n Spanish eyes 
at least, the terms of the papal b u l l I n coena domini could not be held to 
apply to them (116). 
I n North Africa, however, there was important work to be done. Spain 
had a long-standing interest i n Algiers, a nest of Moorish and renegade 
Christian pirates who threatened Mediterranean shipping and had uncomfortably 
close relations with dissident moriscos. Charles V had once attempted to 
capture the c i t y , and his lack of success made i t even more of a touchstone. 
I t was therefore natural f o r P h i l i p I I I and the Council of State, soon a f t e r 
"the former's accession, to place i t high on the l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s : f i r s t 
England and Ireland, then Algiers (117). Almost c e r t a i n l y with t h i s i n 
mind - though the reports of Cigala's plans had some part to play - the 
King throughout 1600 ordered Doria and the Viceroys of Naples and S i c i l y 
to prepare large numbers of galleys (118). Through lack of resources, the 
plan was held over u n t i l the following year, and on Doria's advice, was 
d e f i n i t e l y to be against Algiers (119)- By February, 1601, the need had 
become pressing. Because of the Saluzzo c r i s i s , troops had been mustered 
f o r a war that never came (120); and o f f i c i a l f e e l i n g was that, unless 
Spain were to be made to appear ridiculous, the men would have to be used 
f o r some prestigious venture. I t i s a sign of the continued importance of 
the crusading ideal that, even whilst the wars with England and the Dutch 
were i n f u l l vigour, Algiers was chosen as a proper object f o r Spain's 
dwindling strength (121). P h i l i p waxed l y r i c a l . He ordered Doria to 
(116) AGS E618/90; AGS E 1928/51. 
(117) AGS El855/sf, document of 20th June, 1599-
(118) AGS E1159/131; AGS E1931/417; AGS E1097/33; AGS E1931/76. 
(119) AGS E1931/81; AGS EI430/264; AGS E14.30/267; AGS E1931/87. 
(120) qvi cap. iv. 
(121) AGS El874/sf, document of 17th February, 1601; the wisest of the 
councillors, however, Ididquez, was not i n favour. 
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destroy Algiers "so that there remain no memory of i t nor a p o s s i b i l i t y of 
i t s reconstruction, that the place where so much offence has been given to 
God and so much harm to Christendom been i n f l i c t e d be destroyed i n just 
vengeance". I t was f o r him "the most important objective f o r Christendom 
and f o r my interests" (122). His favourite, Lerma, was of a similar 
opinion, and referred t o a session at which Algiers had been discussed as 
"the Council-meeting that I have attended with more pleasure than ever 
before" (123)- The lateness of the season and heavy storms o f f Menorca, 
however, forced Doria to return to port (124) . Nothing daunted, plans 
were at once made f o r a similar expedition i n 1602. This time, further 
complications arose: Algiers was said to be on the a l e r t , and the matter 
had to be abandoned (125). Once more, the only positive step taken i n 
North Africa was to a l l y with an Islamic princeling, the King of Cuco, 
whose enmity with Algiers commended him to the Spanish authorities (126) . 
As we sh a l l see, Spain's Islamic policy was symbolic of the f r u s t r a t i o n 
of her aims i n Europe. 
(122) AGS E1931/123-
(123) AGS E1931/124; AGS E1931/103; AGS E1931/125. 
(124) AGS EI431/122,123-
(125) AGS El874/sf, document of 30th November, 1601; AGS E1948/94-
(126) AGS EI84/163; AGS E2023/1I4; Joulia San-Cyr. 
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I I . THE KEYSTONE 
When Ferdinand the Catholic i n I496 arranged the marriage of his 
daughter, Joanna, to the Habsburg Archduke P h i l i p the Fair, he can have 
had no i n k l i n g of the consequences. I n 1500, and against a l l expectations, 
Joanna became heir-presumptive and succeeded her mother as Queen of Castile 
four years l a t e r . Philip's inheritance i n Burgundy and the Low Countries 
therefore became joined to that of the Catholic Kings - two areas that 
were immensely d i f f e r e n t : the one the land of powerful towns, commerce, 
Gerson, Erasmus and the devotio moderna, and the other that of the great 
l a t i f u n d i s t s , the Crusade and the I n q u i s i t i o n . So long as each had l i t t l e 
to do with the other, a l l was well. P h i l i p the Fair did not long survive 
i n Spain, and the new heir, Charles V, was wise enough to entrust the Low 
Countries to able members of his own family who resided i n s i t u ( l ) . The 
accession of P h i l i p I I , however, brought about a marked change. A thorough 
Castilian whose sense of duty encouraged him to rule as well as reign, he 
was not the man f o r Flanders; he neither understood the markedly-different 
temperament of his subjects there nor was able to cope with the i n t e r n a l 
tensions that had begun to manifest themselves i n the previous reign. His 
i n a b i l i t y to realize that he could not hope to impose the Castilian concept 
of monarchy upon an agglomeration of semi-independent provinces that knew 
no single t i t l e of r u l e r made revolt inevitable. Unfortunately, revolt was 
only the beginning of Philip's troubles. His desire to centralize and to 
repress aroused deep misgivings i n France and England. A strong Spanish 
outpost i n northern Europe would pose a grave threat: France saw herself 
about to be surrounded by Habsburg strongholds, and England feared the 
proximity of a country whose r u l e r was passionately opposed to Protestantism 
Their consequent m i l i t a r y intervention sealed Spain's doom: although she 
( l ) cf Rosenfeld passim. 
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poured money and men i n t o the Netherlands, she enjoyed only p a r t i a l success 
against the rebels, and at the time that our period begins the northern 
provinces, which had become the heart of the r e v o l t , remained free. 
Although t o t a l v i c t o r y was increasingly unlikely, there was no question 
of giving i n . Despite the immense problems - diplomatic, m i l i t a r y , strategic 
and f i n a n c i a l - that Spain faced, one aim remained constant. Peace might be 
made with France, though Henry IV be scheming and insincere, and with England, 
though Elizabeth be " l a f i e r a de l a i g l e s i a " (2) and James a Protestant 
polemicist: but to make peace with the rebel Dutch was more than Spain was 
prepared to do. I n the f i r s t place, the war was seen i n religious terms. 
I n 1590, during the siege of Paris, the ambassador Bernadino de Mendoza 
addressed a trenchant explanation of the Dutch revolt to the young Prince 
of Asturias, l a t e r to become P h i l i p I I I : 
"from what I have said about the rebels' impeding the exercize of our 
holy Roman Catholic apostolic f a i t h as soon as they entered i n the 
towns and villages, one may see whether the causes of the r e b e l l i o n 
were, as some have said, the excesses of Spanish troops (when excesses 
there were) f o r which the churches, images and the persons of s a i n t l y 
clergy and religious - natives of the same country who were persecuted 
with such fury and bloodiness by the rebels - cannot be blamed; or the 
justice that the Duke of Alba took of the leaders of the f i r s t r i s i n g , 
preachers and ministers of heresies and iconoclasts as the people 
executed were; or the demand for the tenth penny, which was i n con-
sideration of the excessive expenses which His Majesty had incurred 
i n the past war i n defending the states from the rebels who threatened 
them, expelling them and conserving i n peace and quietness the catholic 
r e l i g i o n i n i t s p r i s t i n e p u r i t y as His Majesty had sworn when recognized 
as the heir of the Emperor Charles V of glorious memory, t h e i r legitimate 
(2) Noyoa 206. 
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prince and sovereign l o r d . A l l goes to prove these charges to have 
been temporizing dissimulations and i l l u s i o n s t o deceive the g u l l i b l e 
and so allow the rebels to gain control of at least some of the provinces 
of the Low Countries, as we have seen subsequently, rooting and founding 
heresy there with greater effectiveness." 
(Por lo que he apuntado arriba del impedir los rebeldes a l momento 
que entraban en las v i l l a s y aldeas e l e j e r c i c i o de nuestra santa fe 
cat<51ica apostdlica romana se puede colegir s i era l a causa de l a « 
rebelidn corao algunos se hablan dado a entender los excesos de l a 
gente de guerra espanola, cuando hubiese algunos, de que no podlan 
tener culpa las iglesias imdgenes cuerpos de santos cle'rigos y 
religiosos siendo naturales de l a misma t i e r r a y a quien los rebeldes 
persegulan con tanto furor y sangre; ni asimismo l a j u s t i c i a que e l 
duque de Alba habla hecho de las cabezas de l a primera conjuracidn 
predicantes y ministros de las herejlas y rompedores de imdgenes que 
fueron los personajes que se ejecutaron; ni pedir e l derecho del de"cimo 
dinero en consideracidn de los excesivos gastos que SM hab£a hecho en 
l a guerra pasada por defender los estados de los rebeldes que los 
acometieron echandoles de ellos y conservar con paz y quietud en los 
paises l a r e l i g i o n catdlica en l a pureza que siempre se habfa profesado 
en ellos cosa que SM les juro" a l reconocerle por heredero del emperador 
Carlos V de gloriosa memoria su padre y por su legltimo prfncipe y 
soberano senor: lo cual arguye servirse de estos achaques para cubierta 
y enganar a los que por sus propias pasiones se dejaban persuadir de 
semejantes aparencias dando con esto tiempo a l tiempo y calor para 
usurpar los rebeldes como se vi6 despuds algunas de las provincias de 
los Pafses Bajos s i no padian todos y arraigar por este medio l a 
herejfa establecidndola con m&s fundamento. (3) ) 
I n the second place, f o r sixteenth-century governments, r e b e l l i o n was "the 
puddle and sink of a l l crimes against God and man". I f once a r e b e l l i o n 
were o f f i c i a l l y admitted to have succeeded, the entire structure of p o l i t i c s 
and administration would be undermined: even Elizabeth, and l a t e r James, 
were conscience-striken at sending help to the Dutch (4). There was also 
an important strategic consideration: French and English intervention had 
i r o n i c a l l y made the Low Countries of even greater value to Spain. From 
t h i s northern base, the hostile plans of the enemy, whether i n Europe or 
the Indies, would be more easily frustrated (5). Not perceiving the r e a l 
(3) Mendoza 4-76. The same opinion i s obvious i n Carnero's work. 
(4) qvi pp. 194. 203. 
(5) cf AGS E2023/24; Alcocer i, 6: "Conviene atender a l a conservacio"n 
de los estados de Flandes ••. por ser e l freno con que se enfrena y 
reprime l a potencia de franceses, ingleses y rebeldes, cuyas fuerzas 
s i aquel escudo faltase cargarfan contra VM y sus reinos por diversas 
partes de que se seguirian mayores gastos y dafios." 
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cause of the enmity, Spain mistakenly thought that, i n the long run, she 
would save great quantities of money and of trouble by keeping the Low 
Countries. Moreover, a f t e r the cession made to Albert and Isabella i n 
1598, there was a f o u r t h reason: the King of Spain could not possibly leave 
his close relatives - his sis t e r and brother-in-law - i n the lurch, f o r the 
s o l i d a r i t y of the House of Habsburg was a thing much to be prized (6). But 
perhaps the most powerful motive of a l l was that of pride. Flanders had 
become the cock-pit i n which Spain had confronted her unscrupulous enemies, 
the tomb i n which money and men had been l a i d to rest (7). Under no circum-
stances could Spain afford to back down, i f she were to r e t a i n the s e l f -
respect that was her l i f e - b l o o d . I n the l a s t analysis, as her changing 
relations with France and England were to shew, r e l i g i o n and t r a d i t i o n a l 
francophobia could be put on one side: but the consuming desire to have 
one's due from one's own subjects could not (8). Of a l l her commitments, 
that of the Low Countries was the most important and that f o r which sacrifices 
were most w i l l i n g l y made (9). 
I n the l a s t years of his reign, however, P h i l i p I I had begun to realize 
that some new expedient had to be found i n order to end the apparent stale-
mate with the Dutch. He had come to the opinion that most of the troubles 
had been caused by the fact that he had l e f t Flanders i n 1559 and had never 
returned. By 1595, he could no longer remedy t h i s personally, nor could he 
send his seventeen-year-old son and heir. Instead, he appointed his favourite 
(6) AGS E617/213: " . . l o que importa que e l mundo vea por las obras en lo 
que VM estima a sus hermanos ;" AGS E2023/42; Alcocer i, 155: "Por 
ninguna cosa siento tanto e l estado de mi hacienda como por no poderse 
proveer a mis hermanos con l a largueza y brevedad que yo quisiera." 
(7) Novoa I64: "... Holanda y Zelanda sepulcro de espanoles y tesoros 
donde por espacio de 59 anos te (sc. Espana) has obligado por e l 
honor de t u principe a r e s i s t i r y castigar sus desacatos, rebeldias 
y desobediencias a l a i g l e s i a ; donde todos los principes de Europa 
disimulada y maliciosamente te han hecho l a guerra con l a espada y 
l a pluma de l a herejia..." 
(8) cf AGS E2023/126, opinion of P h i l i p I I I ; Alcocer i 252. 
(9) cf AGS E2023/31. 
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nephew, the Archduke Albert, to the governorship of the Low Countries i n 
the hope that m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y , lineage and social standing would happily 
combine to solve a serious s i t u a t i o n (10). Within the year, he had decided 
to take a more drastic step: Albert was to marry the Infanta Isabella, and 
they were to rule i n the north as j o i n t sovereigns ( l l ) . P h i l i p hoped two 
things by t h i s arrangement. F i r s t , he expected that the United Provinces 
would be less reluctant to return to t h e i r due obedience i f they and t h e i r 
southern compatriots could enjoy the prospect of a measure of independence 
from the Spanish crown (12). No less important was the desire to save money: 
Ph i l i p seems genuinely to have believed that the cession would reduce Spain's 
f i n a n c i a l burden, and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that the f i r s t mention of the match 
between Albert and Isabella came soon a f t e r his declaration of bankruptcy 
i n 1596 (13)- The cession, however, was absolute i n neither theory nor 
practice, and there was no question of setting up a new kingdom: Albert had 
t e n t a t i v e l y suggested the conferment of a royal t i t l e , but P h i l i p had not 
responded (I4). The Low Countries were given to Isabella i n fee and as a 
simple donation to form her dowry, the sig n i f i c a n t legal act being executed 
by the bride, her father and her brother: Albert's task was nothing more 
than to marry her and so enter i n t o his wife's property. I t i s open to 
question whether P h i l i p envisaged the founding of a new regnant branch of 
his dynasty. Some, then and l a t e r , asserted that he did not expect issue 
of the marriage. But at the time of i t s arrangement i n 1596, Albert was 
38 and Isabella 30, and although neither had been married before there was 
no reason to suppose that they would be childless. Nevertheless, careful 
provision was made to ensure that only offspring of both the partners would 
i n h e r i t the Low Countries, and i t was stipulated that i f Albert pre-deceased 
(10) AHN EL;H./sf, document of 21st July, 1595; cf AGS E2023/126, opinion 
of Chinchc*n; Alcocer i 252. 
(11) AHN E3028/13. 
(12) cf Cabrera Felipe I I i v 285; Novoa 73. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that the 
Estates of L i l l e , Douai and Orchiers thought that the cession would 
herald a speedy peace (Sarum x i v 50). 
(13) AGS E634/25; AGS E634/15. 
(14) AGS E615/96; AGS E22241Ai6>. 
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his wife, the dowry would revert to the Spanish crown. Two secret conditions 
imposed further r e s t r i c t i o n s : f i r s t , that the King of Spain keep possession 
of c ertain towns, amongst them Antwerp, Ghent and Cambrai; and secondly, that 
the Archduke swear to uphold Roman Catholicism and refuse to have Protestant 
ministers or retainers (15). 
I n practice as well as i n theory, the p o l i t i c a l position of the new 
appanage was d e f i n i t e l y i n f e r i o r to that of Spain. As long as the war with 
the Dutch continued, the Spaniards paid the piper and called the tune. The 
army, the single most important i n s t i t u t i o n i n the Netherlands, was financed 
and directed from Spain and administered by Spanish o f f i c i a l s . Albert's 
secretary, Mancicidor, had been a protdge' of Idiaquez ( l 6 ) . Above a l l , the 
Archdukes were wholly d u t i f u l members of the House of Habsburg, and at no 
time i n our period was there any question of t h e i r acting against the policy 
of the King of Spain. Albert, the son of the Emperor Maximilian I I , had 
been brought up at P h i l i p I I 1 s Court and seems to have taken his uncle as 
his model. At the age of t h i r t y , he had become the f i r s t governor of 
Portugal and had dealt with the English attack upon Lisbon i n 1589 with 
considerable resolution, i n Hume's view combining "terrorism, energy and 
promptness" to save the s i t u a t i o n (17). His bravery i n the family cause 
was further demonstrated at the Battle of the Dunes i n 1600, at which he won 
the esteem of Fleming and Spaniard alike by being wounded as the result of 
a hand-to-hand engagement (18). L i t t l e i s known of his personal relations 
with P h i l i p I I I and Lerma, though he had been recalled from Portugal i n 
(15) AHN £2894/6,21,22,25,27; BN 18634/44; CODOIN x l i i 216 seqq. The 
secret clauses were held to be so important that even the highly-
trusted Zuniga was only informed of t h e i r nature a f t e r his a r r i v a l 
i n the Low Countries (AGS E2023/18; Alcocer i 79). 
(16) Lefevre RBPhH 1925-
(17) Hume The Year 50. 
(18) cf AGS E2023/124; Alcocer i 30. There are no grounds f o r the usual 
b e l i e f that Albert's defeat led to a decline i n his standing with 
the Spanish authorities: a l l indications are to the contrary. A 
similar error has been made as to the date of the b a t t l e , which took 
place on 2nd, and not 22nd, July, cf DHE. 
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1593 i n order to act as the young Philip's mentor and i n that capacity 
would have come across Lerma, and from 159° maintained regular and amicable 
contact with both of them (19)- The face that Albert presented to the world 
was wholly Spanish. The papal nuncio i n Brussels, Bentivoglio, saw i n him 
another P h i l i p I I - slow, discreet, of great d i g n i t y and respectability, 
and i n s p i r i n g respect rather than love i n his subjects. I n many ways, he 
was perhaps not i d e a l l y suited to the position he occupied: "Flanders 
requires a prince more affable and tractable, and the wars there more 
efficacious and more resolute actions than are those of the Archduke"(20). 
But his l o y a l t y , which l i k e his piety was above reproach, was that of a 
Habsburg born and bred. Isabella's character d i f f e r e d from that of her 
husband only i n degree. Her a f f a b i l i t y and graciousness made her the more 
popular partner, and she shewed considerable a b i l i t y i n the conduct of 
a f f a i r s , as was to be proved af t e r Albert's death i n 1621, "Having i n her 
masculine s p i r i t , yea even a greater resolution than the Archduke." (21). 
The blood of Isabella the Catholic seems to have run true i n her veins. 
I n her report of the Battle of the Dunes, she expressed a wif e l y concern 
at her husband's misadventure, but continued, 
" I must say that he has improved his reputation so much by f i g h t i n g 
i n person as he did that, a f t e r I saw that he was well, I did not wish 
that things had transpired d i f f e r e n t l y , no, not at any price; and f o r 
t h i s reason I am glad that i t was a sword-wound, f o r t h i s shews that 
he fought hand-to-hand, not with an arquebus from afar but with his 
blade. I hope that t h i s blood that he has shed f o r Our Lord w i l l 
become i t s own compensation, as i t i s now i n process of doing: f o r i t 
has so heartened our subjects that they say they w i l l s e l l t h e i r 
children so as to help us." 
(19) BN 687; AGS E615/133,134-
(20) Bentivoglio 52. 
(21) i b i d . 
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(Pero tambi^n os confieso que ha ganado tanta reputacidn con haber 
peleado con su persona como lo ha hecho que despue's que le he visto 
bueno no quisiera que lo hubiera dejado de hacer por nada; y as! me 
he holgado de que l a herida que sac<5 fuese cuchillada pues se ve por 
e l l a que peled por sus manos y no con arcabuz de lejos sino con su 
espada. Espero que esta sangre que ha derramado por nuestro senor 
nos l a ha de pagar como lo va haciendo ya que ha puesto tanto dnimo 
en nuestros vasallos que dicen que venderdn hasta sus hijos por 
ayudarnos. (22) ) 
Her relations with her brother and Lerma were of the most cordial, and her 
l e t t e r s to the l a t t e r especially shew a high degree of intimacy. Isabella " 
f e l t that she could reprove Lerma f o r over-working, and i t was to him that 
she turned f o r support when she and her husband wished to scotch the proposal 
to give the army command to someone other than Albert: " I am cert a i n that 
t h i s proposal has not come out of your head," she insisted (23). I n t h i s 
l i g h t we must judge the Archdukes' p o l i c i e s . Professor Carter's assertion 
that most of Spain's policy-making took place i n Brussels rather than i n 
Madrid takes no account of the facts: Albert and Isabella had neither 
i n c l i n a t i o n nor opportunity to disregard the orders of the head of t h e i r 
family (24). Pirenne's view, though more br u t a l , i s nearer the t r u t h : 
" l a Belgique n'e'tait plus qu'un gouvernement espagnol." (25) 
The Flemings themselves, however, were f a r less dependable. With a 
long t r a d i t i o n of self-government, they possessed a highly-developed system 
of c i v i l administration that culminated i n the Estates-General and the 
Council of State. Neither of these bodies was much i n favour of Spain's 
presence i n t h e i r midst. Like every body responsible f o r the voting of 
subsidies, the Estates-General were greatly reluctant to meet the demands 
made of them (26). Admittedly, they were no partisans of the Dutch: Albert 
noted that a f t e r his defeat at the Dunes, they had shewn themselves eager 
(22) BRAH x l v i i 280. 
(23) BRAH x l v i i 44O. 
(24) Carter Belgian Autonomy. 245,254; cf i n f r a 490. 
(25) Pirenne 248. 
(26) AGS E617/74. 
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to finance ten thousand Walloon in f a n t r y , three thousand cavalry and a l l 
the garrisons of the Low Countries (some eight or ten thousand men) to the 
tune of a m i l l i o n ducats a year (27). But t h e i r general view was that the 
war had gone on f o r f a r too long. The world's most powerful monarch had 
f a i l e d to reduce the rebels to t h e i r due obedience but refused to acknowledge 
the f a c t . Instead, o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s seemed to think, as one Flemish w r i t e r 
put i t , "that the subjects had to be weakened so as to strengthen the prince," 
and that force was the only weapon to use - "whereby t h i s poor country has 
lapsed i n t o ancient Chaos." (28) Mutinies, disorders i n otherwise peaceful 
areas, poverty and gross inconvenience were being i n f l i c t e d upon them f o r 
the sake of Spanish pride (29). By 1600, the demands of the Estates-General 
had reached unparalleled proportions, and an attempt was made by them to 
begin negotiations of t h e i r own with the Dutch (30). 
Apart from t h i s turbulent and occasional body, "of many heads, more 
changeable and inconstant i n t h e i r whims than a weather-cock i n i t s move-
ments", Spain could look to the n o b i l i t y and the ducal councils f o r a 
further r e f l e x i o n of Flemish opinion. The principal nobles were a mixed 
assortment. Mansfelt and Barlaymont could be ruled out, the one through 
age and the other through ineptitude. Aremberg was undoubtedly the best-
disposed of a l l , but unfortunately combined mediocre a b i l i t y with a chronic 
need to meet the f i n a n c i a l demands made of him by a numerous family. The 
two most able nobles, Havre and Aerschot, could not be depended upon. The 
former was said to be greedy f o r power and too much inclined towards making 
peace with the Dutch, yet though his motives were suspect his good-will was 
essential. Aerschot posed a more d i f f i c u l t problem. A former Protestant, 
(27) AGS E617/74. The offer, however, was made on condition that the 
Spanish authorities had n 0 part i n the matter (AGS E622/176,177). 
(28) BN 2346/271. 
(29) AGS E6l7/93,97,98. 
(30) Brants, 33,62. 
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his wife l i v e d i n the United Provinces and he courted the popularity of the 
masses, posing as the tribune of a troubled people; he was clever, ambitious 
and - h o r r i b i l e d i c t u - "inclined to novelties" (31). The Council of State 
was scarcely more useful. Besides Mansfelt and Havre, i t included the aged 
hispanophile d'Asonville and two opponents of Spain, the Abbots of S.Vaz 
and Meroles. The key figure was undoubtedly the President Richardot, the 
best-informed and most able of a l l the Flemish statesmen. Yet even he could 
not be e n t i r e l y trusted. Although he had been the right-hand man of the 
Duke of Parma during his governorship and had thereby made enemies of a 
number of his compatriots, he was deep i n the counsels of the Abbot of S.Vaz 
and of the best of the secretaries of state, Moriensarte, who shared the 
Abbot's p o l i t i c a l sympathies. The higher c i v i l servants presented the same 
problem. The two remaining secretaries of state, Verreyken and Pratz, were 
well-disposed towards Spain but either too deliberate or lacking i n characte 
The Treasury Board, on the other hand, had nothing to redeem i t . With two 
old men and two others of dubious allegiance, i t contained only one Spanish 
sympathizer. The s i x t h member, Champagny, was a choleric hispanophobe. 
Most serious of a l l was the unwelcome fact that the Treasurer-General, 
Dricaurt, the man who of a l l his colleagues knew the true workings of the 
f i n a n c i a l system, had been a violent opponent of the former captain-general, 
Fuentes, and was thoroughly Flemish i n his sympathies (32). And as though 
to emphasize the d i s p a r i t y of outlook between Spain and the Flemish, the 
government's o f f i c i a l language was French, and was so used by Albert i n his 
o f f i c i a l dealings (33). 
Whilst remaining e n t i r e l y obedient to the w i l l of Spain, Albert and 
Isabella nevertheless came gradually to have a good deal of sympathy with 
t h e i r subjects. They had, admittedly, started badly. The act of cession 
(31) AGS E612/1L;. 
(32) AGS E612/113. 
(33) eg BN 687/138. 
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had been regarded with some misgivings i n Flanders, and Albert's f i r s t 
entry i n t o Brussels as Archduke without the mantle and coronet of the Dukes 
of Brabant and with a Spanish, and not a c i v i c , m i l i t a r y escort, caused 
some i l l - f e e l i n g (34)- Moreover, f a r from f u l f i l l i n g the Flemish hope 
that the t r a d i t i o n a l forms of provincial government would be restored to 
t h e i r former glory, Albert and Isabella seemed to use t h e i r powers only to 
strengthen government at the centre (35). Acting under a commission given 
to him by P h i l i p I I , Domingo de Orbea set out from Spain i n July, 1597, as 
Superintendent of Finances to conduct a thorough investigation of the Flemish 
Treasury; the result was the pressing of charges against f o r t y - f o u r corrupt 
o f f i c i a l s and a good deal of unpopularity (36). Legal c o d i f i c a t i o n was 
begun, to be completed i n 1611; the Estates-General, a f t e r the stormy 
sessions of 1600, were not called again; and the needs of the army seemed 
to take precedence over everything else. But three issues were to arise 
that tended to set the Archdukes against Spain and thus, i n a way, to 
i d e n t i f y them with the Flemings. The f i r s t of these had i t s o r i g i n i n the 
question of sending an aide to Albert a f t e r the Battle of the Dunes. For 
although the Archduke had earned unstinted praise f o r his bravery, his 
being wounded f i l l e d the Council of State i n Valladolid with concern: i f 
his i n j u r i e s had been f a t a l , Isabella would have been l e f t alone to cope 
with both the army and the state. I t was therefore suggested that, as the 
Duke of Parma had o r i g i n a l l y been sent to assist Don John of Austria, so 
some m i l i t a r y man be sent to Albert. At f i r s t , the Council did not set 
t h e i r sights high: the names they suggested were those of soldiers, and no 
p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y was looked f o r (37). When, however, the matter was raised 
once more a f t e r eighteen months as part of the proposals f o r the general 
reform of the army, the continued f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y setbacks made the 
(34) GSPV i x 839-
(35) Brants cap. i i i . 
(36) AGS E615/127,128; AGS E616/200-244; AGS E617/175-
(37) AGS E6l7/208,209; Alcocer i 33; Mesia, the Marquess of Santa Cruz, 
D.Alonso de Ididquez and D. Fe'idro de Toledo were mentioned. 
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Council r e f l e c t more deeply. The King had suggested the names of George 
Basta and Don Luis de Velasco, who were of the same type as those named i n 
1600 f o r the post. The Council, without voicing any c r i t i c i s m of Albert, 
shewed t h e i r opinion by unanimously nominating the Constable of Castile, 
who was both a distinguished soldier and a statesman: f o r them, the time 
had come to change commanders (38). P h i l i p agreed: but because the 
Constable's ostensible task was to give advice to Villamediana on the 
conduct of negotiations with England, Albert and Isabella did not wake up 
to the fact that he was intended also as t h e i r chief adviser u n t i l June, 
I6Q4 (39). Their dismay was then considerable: 
"not only i s i t greatly offensive to our reputation, but i s also a 
clear sign of the scant s a t i s f a c t i o n which His Majesty has of the 
conscientiousness with which I proceed i n a l l things and with which 
I t r y to order matters here i n his service's best i n t e r e s t . " 
(No s<51o es en gran ofensa de nuestra reputacidn pero clara demostraci<5n 
de l a poca satisfaccidn que 5M tiene del cuidado con que yo procedo en 
todo y procuro encaminar las cosas de aqul como conviene a su servicio. 
(40) ) 
But thanks p a r t l y to t h e i r fervent appeal to Lerma and pa r t l y to general 
surprise at t h e i r vehemence, the blow to t h e i r pride was not delivered (41)-
The second issue, although i t was never mentioned outside the innermost 
c i r c l e s of the Spanish government, was of s t i l l greater importance. The 
cession of the Low Countries had always had i t s opponents, who f e l t that 
" t h i s pearl i n Your Majesty's crown" was too precious to be surrendered 
i n t o other hands (42). As time went on, t h e i r case became stronger. Whereas 
Ph i l i p I I had hoped to save money by the new arrangement, t h i s was not to be: 
i n 1600, at least four-and-a-half m i l l i o n ducats had been sent to Flanders, 
(38) AGS E622/237. The Constable had for some years maintained a f r i e n d l y 
correspondence with Albert. AGR SEG 513-
(39) cf CSPV x. 193-
(40) BN 687/339; cf BRAH x l v i i 44O. 
(41) AGS E634/16. 
(42) AGS E617/212. 
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i n contrast to 3,600,000 i n 1596 (43). The United Provinces were no more 
inclined to make peace, and t h e i r m i l i t a r y defeat was as remote a prospect 
as ever (44). Moreover, Spain was never e n t i r e l y happy about the extent of 
her control over Flanders. The behavi'tour of the Estates-General i n 1600 
had suggested that, l e f t to themselves, the Flemings would sue f o r peace 
at any price. And s l i g h t doubts had begun to be entertained about the 
Archdukes themselves. Albert's manifest desire to avoid a war with France 
during the Saluzzo c r i s i s (45) had made the Spanish authorities wonder 
whether his support could be counted upon i f h o s t i l i t i e s were i n fact to 
break out. The Spanish ambassador i n Flanders, Don Baltasar de Ziiniga, 
assured them that t h e i r fear was u n j u s t i f i e d and that Albert's primary 
concern had been to avoid over-taxing Philip's already strained resources 
(46). Whilst accepting Zuniga's opinion, the members of the junta de tres 
f e l t that here was food f o r thought. Albert and Isabella might be wholly 
trustworthy - but what of t h e i r heirs? Could Spain be certain that the 
Low Countries would invariably follow the policies of Madrid? The fact 
that the Archdukes were s t i l l childless almost seemed a sign that Heaven 
intended the cession to be a temporary expedient (47). The junta was 
therefore strongly i n favour of re-incorporating the Low Countries i n t o 
the Spanish crown at the e a r l i e s t opportunity - probably a f t e r a truce had 
been arranged with the Dutch. Ph i l i p was e n t i r e l y i n agreement. But the 
plan, as so many others, could not be put into e f f e c t . I n the f i r s t place, 
the truce with the Dutch was not to be achieved u n t i l 1609- I n the second 
place, there seemed to be no obvious means of compensating the Archdukes. 
Family pride and the ling e r i n g hope that Albert would be elected King of 
(43) AGS E626/43; AGS CJH 358/sf. 
(44) cf Isabella's reported d i s i l l u s i o n early i n 1602 (Winwood i 379). 
(45) qvi cap- 'V. 
(46) AGS E619/76. 
(47) AGS E634/25: "viendo que con l a f a l t a de sucesi<5n de l a sefiora 
Infanta los quiere Dios volver a esta corona..." 
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the Romans (48) demanded that they be not treated shabbily: but what could 
they be given? Isabella was not l i k e l y to win the crown of England, and 
indeed shewed no signs of ambition i n that d i r e c t i o n (49); and Catalonia, 
Portugal and a l l the I t a l i a n states were f e l t t o be unsuitable (50). Nothing 
was therefore ever said to the Archdukes, but suspicions on both sides did 
nothing to relieve a growing tension. 
The t h i r d and most important issue was that of relations with the Dutch. 
For a l l his excellent q u a l i t i t e s , Albert sometimes seemed easily led. Even 
Ziiniga, no enemy to the Archduke, regretted the influence that Flemish 
ministers wielded over him (51). The Flemings badly wanted peace - with 
England and with the Dutch - and t h e i r a t t i t u d e seemed to Spain to be 
i n f e c t i n g that of the Archdukes. I n f a c t , t h i s was unjust and inaccurate. 
Unlike P h i l i p and his Council, Albert had personally to face the exigencies 
of the war. He, better than they, knew what a mutiny, a shortage of money 
or a m i l i t a r y defeat did to Spanish interests; and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that 
his eagerness to reduce his commitments was eventually shared by a l l those 
Spaniards who went north to watch over the diplomatic s i t u a t i o n - Ztiniga, 
Villamediana and the Constable himself (52). Whereas the Council of State 
merely bewailed the d i f f i c u l t i e s , Albert had to solve them. The crux of 
the matter lay i n the size and r e g u l a r i t y of Spain's remittances to pay f o r 
the war. Although remittances of 600,000 ducats a-year less were proposed 
as from 1596, Spain was s t i l l sending an annual three m i l l i o n ducats ( 5 3 ) . 
Sometimes, the remittances were greater: i n the single year 1600, no less 
than 4 , 581, 295 ducats l e f t the C a s t i l i a n Treasury f o r Flanders ( 5 4 ) . But 
the t r u t h was that, with frequent bursts of extraordinary expenditure, the 
(48) qvi p.-163 . I n order to support the dignity, Albert would need to 
have adequate f i n a n c i a l and t e r r i t o r i a l standing. 
(49) qvi p ^ 7-
(50) AGS E634/10,15-
(51) AGS E2288/sf, document of 15th September, 1601. 
(52) qvi pp. 205. 
(53) AGS CJH 358/sf, document of November (?), 1596; CJH 380/sf, document 
of 21st October, 1598; AGS E2023/123-
(54) AGS E626/43. 
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buying-off of mutineers and the plethora of pensions awarded to f a i t h f u l 
servants, the money was p l a i n l y inadequate. Indeed, there was not enough 
with which to pay the normal standing army. I n I6Q4, i t was calculated 
t h a t 25,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and the garrisons, a r t i l l e r y and 
commisariat cost 328,000 escudoS;each month, a sum that was not covered by 
the income of the m i l i t a r y authorities (55). The Spanish f i n a n c i a l system 
was unable to cope with the s t r a i n . Constant l e t t e r s from Brussels to 
Castile urged the need f o r the prompt receipt of more money. Not infrequently, 
a grim picture was painted. "There i s scarcely a r e a l l e f t , " wrote Zuniga 
on one occasion i n 1603; and i n the previous year, one of p a r t i c u l a r l y 
numerous appeals, Isabella was forced to t r y to pawn her jewellery, remarking 
to Lerma, "You unquestionably have a thousand reasons f o r saying what you 
do about these merchants: they are t e r r i b l e . " (56) Mutinies were a constant 
source of anxiety (57). Not only was the routine of campaigning broken and 
d i s c i p l i n e badly damaged, but the enemy was not slow to take advantage: one 
Spanish o f f i c i a l , indeed, regarded mutinies as the United Provinces' most 
powerful weapon - i n token of t h i s , the f o r t s of S. Andries and Crevecoeur 
were sold to the Dutch by Walloon mutineers (58). Not surprisingly, the 
general war-effort sorely lacked success. Admittedly, from 1598 onwards, 
there was a pause i n the series of great campaigns, f o r neither side had 
s u f f i c i e n t resources or s k i l l much to a l t e r t h e i r f r o n t i e r s (59); the Battle 
of the Dunes, the only major f i e l d engagement i n our period, made no difference 
(55) AGS E2868/sf, document of 4 t h December, I6O4. This was including a 
grant of 75,185 escudos received from Flemish sources. 
(56) BRAH x l v i i 344- The depredations of the financiers were considerable. 
At one meeting of the .junta de tres i t was asserted that, of a budget 
of f i v e m i l l i o n ducats, three m i l l i o n would be spent on the army, one 
on the mutineers and one i n interest (AGS E634/9) . 
(57) Parker Spanish Road appendix J. 
(58) AGS E617/85: "lo que ha descompuesto y desautorizado este e j d r c i t o 
es en cinco anos veinticuatro motines con tanta l i b e r t a d que l a 
p r i n c i p a l confianza de los enemigos consiste en l a conversion de 
nuestras armas contra nosotros; sacan condiciones extraordinarias 
con que crecen sus sueldos y crdditos a grandes sumas y hacen otras 
tales des6rdenes con que no son crelbles n i es justo lleguen a oldos 
de VM." AGS E6l7/86,93-
(59) For the Dutch v. Den Tex i 217. 
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to either, f o r the Dutch were unable to follow up t h e i r advantage through 
lack of funds. Yet i n the f r o n t i e r skirmishing that s t i l l took place, the 
Dutch were the more successful party: S. Andries, Crevecoeur, Rheinberg, 
Carpen and Grave were lost to them, and although a f t e r a long and d i f f i c u l t 
siege Albert's forces took Ostende i n September, I6O4, the capture was to 
be more than offset by the simultaneous loss of Sluys. Small wonder that 
Isabella was worried: 
"we are paralyzed with the fear that the cavalry and garrisons w i l l 
mutiny, especially here i n Brussels. I have no doubts of i t , f o r I 
know that they are owed more than 100,000 ducats even though they are 
only two companies. I do not know what was done with the money that 
was coming int o t h i s country f o r , as you so r i g h t l y say, more has" been 
paid by my brother than i n the many years of my father's l i f e t i m e . 
But since our blood i s hot, as the saying goes, t h i s i s what most upsets 
us and makes us want to see a l l t h i s solved, so that my brother's 
Treasury can gain a respite, the more so since i t i s i n i t s present 
state. I f I could see my brother so refreshed that he could put up a 
resistance, t h i s would not worry me i n the least: but with things as 
they are, I cannot but be preoccupied." 
(Estamos muertos de miedo que ... se ha de amotinar l a caballeria y 
guarniciones, particularmente l a de aqul; yo l o tengo por c i e r t o 
porque s^ que les deben mds que cien mil ducados con no ser sino dos 
companias que yo no s^ que se hacla de tanto dinero como entraba en 
estos estados pues, como vos decls muy bien, mi hermano ha pagado mds 
que se pagd en muchos afios en vida de mi padre ... pero a nosotros 
como nos hierve l a sangre, como dice e l refrdn, esto es lo que m£s 
nos duele y lo que mds nos hace ver esto en sosiego por que pueda 
descansar l a hacienda de mi hermano y mds estando como estd ... y 
s i yo viese a mi hermano tan descansado que pudiese r e s i s t i r l e s no 
me darfa esto cuidado ninguno: pero estando como esta" no puedo dejar 
de ddrmela. (60) ) 
The Archdukes' desire to see an end to the war was to a large extent 
shared by the authorities i n Spain. There had already been some attempts 
to come to a proper understanding. The Netherlands' status as imperial 
(60) BRAH x l v i i 340. 
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f i e f s provided a useful excuse f o r the intervention of the Emperor who, as 
one who was on the fringes of the c o n f l i c t , could act as intermediary. I n 
1574, 1579, 1591, 1592 and l a t t e r l y i n 1596, attempts on his part had been 
made to bring the combatants to the conference-table ( 6 l ) . Thus f a r , nothing 
had come of them, despite P h i l i p I I 1 s hopes. There were, i n any case, l i m i t s 
to the acceptability of t h i s mode of negotiation. When i n 1602 i t was 
suggested that the United Provinces once more become f u l l imperial states 
which, nevertheless, would pay dues to Albert and Isabella, only Idiaquez 
i n the Council approved of the idea. His colleagues, Lerma amongst them, 
saw the force of his argument that i t was better to lose a limb than 
sa c r i f i c e the whole body, but f e l t that so drastic a solution should be 
saved as a las t resort (62). More direc t methods of t r e a t i n g , however, 
posed t h e i r own problems, f o r i t was impossible that the United Provinces 
would accede to the demands that Spain was determined to make of them. 
There was never any doubt i n the l a t t e r ' s mind that the Dutch were rebels 
whose only course was to return to what Ph i l i p I I termed "the obedience 
due to God and t h e i r King" ( 6 3 ) . This was not to say that P h i l i p was not 
prepared to make concessions: indeed, at the end of his l i f e , and wishing 
to give his favourite daughter a worthy inheritance, by his own l i g h t s he 
offered to give way a good deal. Realizing that, to begin with at least, 
Protestantism could not be extirpated i n the United Provinces, he thought 
of agreeing to some form of religious t o l e r a t i o n , "with God's help sub-
sequently to pluck more f r u i t " (64.). His willingness was shared by his 
son's advisers who, regarding i t as the means of gaining t o l e r a t i o n f o r 
the Roman Catholics i n the north, therefore spoke of success rather than 
(61) AGS E702/sf, documents of 12 th September, 1595 and 4 t h June, 1596. 
(62) AGS E634-/15: " d i j o que en e l estado presente en que tanta aparencia 
hay de perderse todo e l cuerpo por ventura serla menos mal cortar 
un miembro de 61." cf AGS E621/24; AGS E620/259; AGS E2224 2 /246; 
AGS E2288/sf, document of 18th July, 1602. 
E2223/ (63) AGS 25 
(64) AGS E2224V202. 
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compromise ( 6 5 ) . Important though t h i s decision was, there were more 
important points that were l e f t undiscussed. What did Spain mean by "due 
obedience", and how f a r would the Dutch keep t h e i r independence? On the 
one occasion when arrangements f o r the future government of the reconciled 
provinces were discussed, the matter was dismissed a i r i l y : "se podria dar 
buena orden." (66) 
Not surprisingly, the Dutch were consistently reluctant to come to 
terms. During the negotiations that led up to the Treaty of Vervins, both 
France and Spain had wished to see them j o i n i n (67). Henry wished to 
r e t a i n his a l l i e s ' confidence by giving them the opportunity of peace, but 
was to be disappointed: 
" I have found the Dutch, from the day of t h e i r a r r i v a l to the day of 
t h e i r departure, so set upon war that there has been no way of 
moderating them nor of i n c l i n i n g them towards peace." 
(J'ai trouve* les autres depuis le premier jour de leur arrive - jusqu'a 
leur partement s i re"solus a. l a guerre q u ' i l n'y a eu moyen de les 
f l d c h i r n i disposer a l a paix. (68) ) 
For the Spaniards, t h i s was something of a blow. Quite apart from Henry's 
insistence, they had early realized f o r themselves that peace with one of 
the a l l i e s meant, id e a l l y , peace with a l l : f o r i f France were free from war 
but Spain forced to continue i t elsewhere, Henry would suck out no small 
advantage ( 6 9 ) . But the Dutch took no part i n the discussions at Vervins, 
and with an i l l grace refused the truce that was offered to them (70). 
After the abortive negotiations with England at Boulogne - from which the 
Dutch were purposely excluded - another attempt to meet them was made (71). 
(65) AGS E2511/13, consulta of 13th September, 1600. For the moment, 
however, Albert was to speak of religious compromise as though i t 
were purely an idea of his own (AGS E25H/18). 
(66) AGS E634./9. 
(67) qvi f-?4*«M-
(68) LM i v 973-
(69) AGS E2855/sf, documents of 13th November, 1596, and 17th December, 
1597. qvi />.%. 
(70) LM i v 992-
(71) AGS E22242/57. 
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The precedence dispute between the two parties at Boulogne had brought 
home to them the d e s i r a b i l i t y of holding any future conference i n the 
United Provinces - to England the land of an a l l y , t o Spain part of her 
own dominions, and to both a ground where each could gracefully give 
precedence to the other. This, and the shock of the Battle of the Dunes, 
had made Archdukes and diplomats alike eager to t r y to come to terms with 
the Dutch (72). The authorities i n Valiadolid were largely sympathetic. 
The s i t u a t i o n i n Flanders was nothing less than desperate, and the Council 
was forced to admit that " i n the present state of Your Majesty's Treasury, 
i t i s impossible to continue the war f o r much longer" (73). Albert was 
therefore sent powers to make peace with the rebels, and reference was made 
i n the t e x t to t h e i r former exemplary vassalship and Spain's deep regret 
that they had been led astray by e v i l counsels (74)• 
A few days l a t e r , however, the presence of the King and of Ididquez 
i n the Council brought about an important amendment to the plan. To make 
peace with the rebels would undoubtedly be d i f f i c u l t : Spain would be con-
cerned f o r her reputation and, to judge from t h e i r rebuff to the represent-
atives of the Flemish Estates-General at Bergen-op-Zoom, the Dutch were not 
disposed t o compromise (75)• Spain's interests would be better served by 
a simple truce. Since matters of high principle would thus not be broached, 
the Dutch would not be able to p r o f i t by the low ebb of the Archdukes' 
fortunes. Spanish troops would be able to stay i n Flanders to restore 
t h e i r strength; and the rel i g i o u s question could be l e f t f o r a more opportune 
time - fo r , as the councillors observed, " i t would be an insecure foundation 
to begin with so pernicious an act and one that set such a bad example and 
that brought with i t consequences so unwelcome" as to be forced i n t o making 
(72) AGS E2288/sf, document of 17th August, 1600. 
(73) AGS E25H/22. 
(74.) AGS E2907/sf, document of 25th September, 1600. 
(75) q v i ; Den Tex i 294-6. 
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improper concessions on t h i s score (76). The Council f i r m l y believed that 
the way to a Dutchman's heart was through his purse; as Idiaquez p i t h i l y 
remarked, "there can be no doubt that personal interest weighs more with 
those f o l k than r e l i g i o n or any other consideration" (77). They therefore 
hoped that great rewards would be reaped from re-admitting the Dutch to 
trade with Spain's European dominions, as would be the case i f a truce 
were concluded with them. P h i l i p and his advisers did not much elaborate 
upon what would happen when the truce expired. From t h e i r constant 
reference to " l a verdadera reduccidn de aquellas provincias", we must 
deduce that they expected that the United Provinces, having grown f a t and 
t o r p i d , would f a l l i n t o Spain's hand l i k e a ripe apple (78). 
The decision to press f o r a long truce rather than f o r peace, however, 
was not easily accepted by Albert and his Flemish advisers. Many were con-
vinced that a truce would only t i e t h e i r hands: Dutch aggression would con-
tinue u n o f f i c i a l l y and nothing could be done i n reply, f o r the Habsburgs 
never excelled at g u e r i l l a warfare by land or, more important, by sea. 
Albert therefore t o l d Ziiniga quite p l a i n l y that he saw the choice as being 
only two-fold: continue the war or make peace (79)- Other, more national-
i s t i c , Flemings had t h e i r own reasons fo r preferring peace to a truce; f o r 
them, the primary aim was to r i d themselves completely of a need f o r the 
Spanish troops that had done so much to disrupt the t r a d i t i o n a l l i f e and 
l i b e r t i e s of the Low Countries (80). The reaction of the Spanish authorities 
was predictably h o r r i f i e d . Albert's stubbornness was putting at r i s k a l l 
(76) AHN E l i b r o 77/217; AGS E634./25-
(77) AGS E621/1. cf the s i m i l a r l y low opinion of the Protestant English 
i n 1603 and 1604, i n f r a . 
(78) cf AGS E2511/13: " s i . una vez comienzan los naturales ... a gustar del 
provecho de l a quietud y del comercio que de e l l a se les seguira- serd 
mucho mas f d c i l e l reducirlos a l a verdadera obediencia." AGS E634/15: 
"se viniese a domesticarlos y reducirlos a l a verdadera y debida 
obediencia de su senor natural." 
(79) AGS E2288/sf, document of 15th September, 1601. 
(80) AGS E621/261. 
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Spain's interests, as well as his own; i t also almost seemed possible that 
he was thinking of forcing Spain's hand, making peace and consolidating 
his own position, a l l at a time when the advantages of re-uniting Spain 
and Flanders were becoming increasingly clear (81). The Archdukes' 
ingratitude was sickening: 
"the junta regrets, as i t ought, that although Your Majesty has done 
so much f o r your kinsmen and at so great and damaging a cost, even 
robbing yourself of meat so as to provide f o r them, they do not 
acknowledge the fact as they ought and are so b l i n d that they forget 
the pressures that beset Your Majesty's Treasury." 
(La junta ha sentido como es justo que habiendo VM hecho tanto como 
se sabe por sus hermanos con tan gran gasto y dano de su hacienda 
hasta q u i t a r l a de su comida por darla a SSAA no lo reconozcan como 
deben y este*n tan ciegos que no se acuerden del apretado estado de 
l a hacienda de VM. (82) ) 
Worse s t i l l , despite the f a c t that the English, l i k e the Dutch themselves, 
were known to favour the expedient of a truce, the Flemish envoy Coemans 
i n a recent v i s i t to London had refused to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of any-
thing less than a f u l l peace (83). I n the end, and as always, Albert bowed 
to his brother-in-law's command and undertook to arrange a truce, a l b e i t 
under the ostensible guise of a peace; and negotiations of the most general 
sort were placed i n the hands of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza, and one 
of his lieutenants, with Spain keeping well i n the background ( 8 4 ) . 
Matters took a d i f f e r e n t turn, however, with Spain's announcement of 
a t a r i f f of 30% to be imposed upon a wide range of goods ( 8 5 ) . This could 
not but vastly complicate Mendoza's task. The whole point of the truce 
was to allow the Dutch to enjoy the benefits of free trade with Spain, 
whereas the t a r i f f would in e v i t a b l y make the Dutch, and the rest of Europe, 
(81) AGS E634/9. 
(82) AGS E634/IL 
(83) i b i d . 
(84) AGS E620/7 ,10 ,61 , 261,2625 C0D0IN x l i i 205-
(85) qvi fj>. A^t, 243. 
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doubt Spain's good f a i t h (86). The miscalculation was followed shortly 
afterwards by a marked deterioration i n Albert's m i l i t a r y position, 
culminating i n the loss of Grave as the result of a shortage of gunpowder 
(87). With considerable annoyance, the Council decided that the plan f o r 
a truce would have to be dropped, observing acidly that i f Albert had not 
delayed i n obeying Phi l i p , the arrangements would have been completed long 
before (88). Attempts to bring the Dutch into the Treaty of London were 
no more successful. Despite a l l his expressed willingness to do a l l that 
he could to reconcile the rebels to Spain, James I's only f i r m o f f e r was 
to obtain a short truce of between three and four months i n order to allow 
the United Provinces to decide whether or not they wished to take part. 
This was t o t a l l y unacceptable to Spain. The siege of Ostende was i n a 
c r i t i c a l state, and a short truce would allow the Dutch to bring up 
reinforcements: i f there were to be a truce, i t should be f o r a period of 
years (89). On t h i s point, however, the Dutch were as obdurate as ever. 
One further solution to the Dutch problem remained: that of s t r i k i n g 
at the foundation of t h e i r prosperity. I n the years immediately following 
the outbreak of the revo l t , the amount of trade i n the hands of the northern 
provinces of Holland and Zealand had increased sharply. By 1594, 58% of 
the Bal t i c trade was i n the hands of t h e i r middlemen, who kept the whole 
of Europe supplied with essential commodities - wood, cordage and Polish 
grain (90). Foreigners were not blin d to the United Provinces' astonishing 
commercial power; i n 1601, the Englishman John Keymor wrote, 
"There were i n Holland (sic) 126,000 mariners twenty years past, since 
which time t h e i r shipping and mariners are mightily increased; every 
town i s grown as great again as they were before the wars and beautified 
(86) AGS E620/256. 
(87) AGS E620/139. 
(88) AGS E2023/69; Alcocer i 232. 
(89) AGS E2512/27. 
(90) S l u i t e r 167, quoting Sound T o l l s t a t i s t i c s . 
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with an i n f i n i t e number of sumptuous buildings, enriched with a l l kinds 
of merchandise and coins; and where they had but one haven before i n 
a town before the wars, they have now two or three, and yet not able 
to hold t h e i r ships i f they were a l l at home at one time ... They make 
t h e i r landmen seamen, t h e i r seamen fishermen, t h e i r fishermen mariners, 
mariners merchants, and of t h e i r merchants statesmen, to govern and 
make t h e i r country prosper by long experience (91)." 
Spain, even more than her neighbours, depended a good deal upon the goods 
carried by the Dutch. Her increasingly-precarious agriculture made necessary 
a heavy dependence upon imported wood and, i n times of famine, grain (92). 
Only as late as 1585 did P h i l i p I I see f i t t o declare an embargo upon the 
rebel vessels that v i s i t e d Spanish ports, and even t h i s seems to have been 
a dead l e t t e r w i t h i n three years (93)- Further embargoes were declared i n 
1595 and, by P h i l i p I I I , i n 1598, but proved t o be no more successful (94)-
Despite reports that the Dutch were severely incommoded - not only by the 
closure of a large and lucrative market, but also because they themselves 
could no longer buy the Spanish salt that was v i t a l f o r t h e i r important 
herring industry - Spain and her possessions were cl e a r l y suffering more 
(95). I n 1595, the c i t y of Seville petitioned the King to l i f t the embargo 
i n the interests of t h e i r trade: f o r , i n the absence of a native merchant 
marine, the Dutch had come to play a key role, and t h e i r exclusion could 
not be s u f f i c i e n t l y compensated fo r by the merchants of the Hanse (96). 
A worried Andreas (the interim governor of the Low Countries during Albert's 
absence i n 1598) reported that the Low Countries would lose 200,000 escudos 
a-year because of i t (97). Taking more energetic measures, the Archduke 
(91) Keymor 225,227. 
(92) Salomon; Klein; Moret; Sarum v i i i 536. 
(93) S l u i t e r I69. 
(94) AGS E174/sf, document of 1595; AGS E2223/34; AGS GA 56l/sf, document 
of 24th October, 1598; AGS E1095/280. 
(95) AGS E611/168; AGS E617/77,127; AGS E620/100. 
(96) AGS E174/sf, document of 29th September, 1595; cf AGS E6II/9. 
(97) AGS E615/42. 
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Albert h o r r i f i e d the Council by granting passports and licences to Dutch 
merchants i n an attempt to keep open the trade i n f i s h , cheese, butter and 
wine upon which his subjects depended (98). Equally great was the problem 
of enforcing the ban. A lack of honest port o f f i c i a l s i n Spain and a host 
of Dutch subterfuges i n obtaining passports - the. Dutch could poae as Danes 
or members of the Hanse - made t h e i r t o t a l exclusion impossible (99)' 
Attempting to p r o f i t by t h e i r b i t t e r experience, the Council of State early 
i n 1603 decided to change t h e i r t a c t i c s . A Spanish o f f i c i a l i n the Flemish 
Treasury, Juan de Gaona, had suggested that the Dutch be re-admitted to 
f u l l trade with Spain and the Low Countries, but on payment of a new t a r i f f 
of 30%. There were a good many objections: i t would put paid to hopes that 
Mendoza's tentative negotiations would bear f r u i t , and commercial reprisals 
from other powers affected, notably France and England, might be expected 
(100). But there was no better plan, and P h i l i p and the Council decided 
to adopt i t early i n February (101). 
The proclamation, which was signed on 27th of that month, formally 
allowed the vessels of a l l nations to trade with Spain and her European 
possessions (102). The t a r i f f was to apply to them a l l , but with certain 
concessions:! vessels that v i s i t e d Mediterranean ports were t o t a l l y exempt, 
provided they carried consular l e t t e r s of bona fi d e s : Biscayan i r o n and 
steel were also exempt, as was a l l t r a f f i c between Spain and the l o y a l 
Low Countries. A shipmaster was also given the opportunity to return to 
Spain to redeem his 30% with l e t t e r s that proved that he had discharged 
his cargo i n the Low Countries (103). Not surprisingly, the author of the 
scheme was throughout alone i n his b e l i e f that i t was successful or even 
(98) AGS E620/248; AGS E2023/101; Alcocer i 183-
(99) AGS E617/215; AGS E618/31. 
(100) AGS E620/256. 
(101) AGS E2636/135. 
(102) For t h i s purpose i t was assumed that the English, I r i s h or Dutch 
merchants who might a v a i l themselves of the new arrangements would 
be Spanish sympathizers. 
(103) AGS E196/sf, AGS E2023/86. BN 2347/78. 
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moderately workable (IQ4). The Dutch remained as ingenious as ever at f i n d i 
loop-holes (105)- O f f i c i a l s were not appointed i n s u f f i c i e n t quantities and 
t h e i r honesty was by some f e l t not to be above reproach (106). Albert con-
tinued t o issue a small number of licences to the Dutch (107). The i n t e r -
national scene had been overcast, and at a time when Spain could i l l afford 
i t to be so: English and French reaction had been markedly h o s t i l e , and the 
l a t t e r had replied with a t o t a l embargo that was causing grave d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n Spain and the Low Countries (108). Worst of a l l , now that they had been 
admitted once more to Spanish ports, the Dutch were able to resume purchase 
of large quantities of s a l t , manifestly considering the 30$ t a r i f f a small 
price to pay (109). Forced along by English demands during the Treaty of 
London and the need to re-open trade with France, i n the summer of I6Q4 the 
Spanish authorities decided to revoke the t a r i f f (110). I r o n i c a l l y , the 
obvious step - the restoration of a complete embargo upon Dutch vessels -
could not at once be taken: famine i n Portugal and Andalucia could only be 
relieved by the Polish and Baltic grain brought i n by the rebels ( i l l ) . 
The revolt of the Netherlands indeed constituted a grave and far-reaching 
problem. 
(1Q4) AGS E2023/79; Alcocer i 365. 
(105) AGS E622/165. 
(106) AGS E622/195; AGS E2023/89-
(107) AGS E2023/79; Alcocer i 365. 
(108) AGS E2024/83; Alcocer i i 4.0. 
(109) AGS E623/23. 
(110) qvi /> 214. ; AGS E2024/61; Alcocer i i 81. 
(111) AGS E2024/76. The embargo was f i n a l l y restored i n December 
(AGS E284.7/sf, document of 10th December, I6O4) . 
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I I I . ACQUIESCENCE. 
I n the eyes of the world at large, France was Spain's main enemy: " i t 
i s at t h i s day," noted Sir Thomas Overbury i n 1609, "the greatest united 
force of Christendom ... the only entire body that makes head against the 
Spanish monarchy (1)." I n various forms, the r i v a l r y between the two powers 
was centuries-old, with i t s origins i n the Franco-Imperial struggle f o r 
northern I t a l y i n the Middle Ages and the turbulent relations between the 
Valois and the House of Burgundy i n the f i f t e e n t h century. With the 
astonishing and rapid extension of Habsburg influence since the beginning 
of the sixteenth century, Spain had also inherited i n t e n s i f i e d French 
suspicions. Threatened by Habsburg lands to the south and west, and per-
petually f e a r f u l that England would enter the opposite camp, France con-
sidered i t imperative to break the strangle-hold that she f e l t one day 
could end her independent existence; and perhaps there was more than a 
l i t t l e jealousy i n her attitude towards a neighbour that, a century before, 
had been even less stable than herself and that now occupied f i r s t place 
amongst the world powers. Hence, French interference whenever possible 
i n Germany, Flanders and I t a l y . 
For the f i r s t half of his reign, however, P h i l i p I I had been compara-
t i v e l y free of preoccupations on t h i s score. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambre'sis 
i n 1559 had set the seal upon Habsburg success a f t e r many years of trouble-
some wars, and the perpetual state of c i v i l unrest brought about by a 
succession of ro i s faineants prevented the French from casting more than 
greedy eyes upon t h e i r neighbours' greatness. French h o s t i l i t y could only 
make i t s e l f f e l t by in d i r e c t means, and v i r t u a l alliances with the Turk, 
with England and with the Dutch rebels were not taken by Spain as s u f f i c i e n t 
reason f o r declaring war: P h i l i p , f o r a l l his wealth, was already engaged 
(1) Overbury 311,314. 
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i n combat with these three enemies. He therefore contented himself with 
paying his r i v a l back i n his own coin; his agents, foremost amongst them 
Bernadino de Mendoza, the ambassador i n Paris, were hard at work fomenting 
discord (2). The death i n I584 of Henry I l l ' s brother and heir-presumptive, 
the Duke of Anjou, caused P h i l i p to redouble his e f f o r t s . Whilst Anjou 
li v e d , he could expect the next king to be a r i v a l , i t was true: but he 
could always hope that Anjou would contain his envy or even seek to be on 
f r i e n d l y terms with Spain. The same could not be said of the new heir-
presumptive. Henry of Navarre was of strong character and considerable 
m i l i t a r y experience; he was moreover a Huguenot. The threat that he posed 
to Spanish interests could not be disregarded. P h i l i p , with his high sense 
of re l i g i o u s c a l l i n g , could not view with equanimity the prospect of yet 
another Protestant monarch i n Europe, especially one of so large a neigh-
bouring country. Henry shared his rel i g i o u s allegiance with both Elizabeth 
of England and the rebel Dutch; and even i f he had shewn himself w i l l i n g to 
compromise, P h i l i p could never have followed s u i t . I t behoved the l a t t e r 
as the self-appointed guardian both of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambre'sis and 
of d o c t r i n a l p u r i t y to combat Henry's undoubted malevolence. I n 1585, he 
therefore concluded the Treaty of J o i n v i l l e with the Roman Catholic League 
i n France, and began to make a serious contribution to the c i v i l war there 
(3). 
With the murder of Henry I I I and the accession of Henry IV i n 1589, 
the danger became more acute. I n order to combat i t , and to solve the 
problem of France once f o r a l l , P h i l i p announced that the true monarch of 
France was his daughter, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia. For Henry's 
claim was f e l t by many to be tenuous. As a descendant of the s i x t h son of 
S. Louis, he was cousin i n the twenty-second degree to the previous king (4) 
(2) Jensen, passim. 
(3) i b i d . 
(4) Mousnier 91. 
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Isabella, on the other hand, possessed a respectable claim of her own as 
the heir of the Dukes of Brittany, and Spanish commentators were agreed 
that the Salic Law that forbade female succession to the throne was the 
vain invention of mediaeval French j u r i s t s (5). Above a l l , P h i l i p , speaking 
fo r a large section of French opinion, asserted that Henry's Protestantism 
di s q u a l i f i e d him out of hand. I n t h i s , he had support from the papacy, as 
he f u l l y expected - "for there i s an obvious difference between the depend-
a b i l i t y and service that His Holiness and the Holy See can expect from what 
i s i n our hands and from that which i s i n the hands of the French." (6) 
Neither Sixtus V i n 1585 nor Gregory XIV i n 1591 was prepared to tolerate 
a Most Christian King who did not recognize t h e i r s p i r i t u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n 
and who would i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y encourage large numbers of his subjects 
to follow his example, and t h e i r b ulls issued i n those years declared that 
Henry's t i t l e was i n e l i g i b l e (7). 
Whilst these pontificates lasted, a l l was well. P h i l i p could remain 
secure i n the knowledge that p o l i t i c a l advantage and religious duty coincided 
exactly. His statement to the nuncio i n May, 1596, although i t not un-
naturally l a i d a somewhat greater stress upon the higher rather than the 
lower motive, admirably expressed his a t t i t u d e : 
"His Majesty has always rejoiced i n peace and has always kept i t 
according to the service of God and of His holy catholic f a i t h ; he 
has never i n the past occupied himself i n anything that has not carried 
with i t the obligation of defending either that f a i t h or j u s t i c e , and 
has kept peace or declared war with only t h i s i n mind; and he hopes, 
with God's help, to shew himself like-minded i n the future." 
(5) cf Salazar de Mendoza vol. I I l i b r o v., t i t l e v., section 1; 
AHN EI4I4, document of 2ls t July, 1595, section 49. 
(6) AGS El855/sf, royal despatch of 15th September, 1597-
(7) Mousnier 145-6; Maridjol 326. 
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(Sierapre SM ha holgado con l a paz y conservadola en las partes y 
tierapos que ha concertado con e l servicio de Dios y de su santa fe 
catdlica y nunca ha tenido por lo pasado a que no le hubiese llevado 
l a obligacic'n de La defensa de l a misma fe o de l a j u s t i c i a midiendo 
l a paz y l a guerra con s<51o este f i n e intento y que en l o porvenir 
piensa con l a ayuda de Dios parecido asl raisrao (8). ) 
But a new pope, Clement V I I I , who succeeded to the t i a r a i n 1592, was soon 
to be faced with a problem of the f i r s t order. On 25th July, 1593, Henry IV 
publicly abjured Protestantism and became a Roman Catholic, as he had done 
once before at the time of the S. Bartholemew massacres i n 1572. I n so doing, 
he encouraged a l l the latent Gallicanism of his subjects; f o r , i n spite of 
papal prohibitions, the Parlement of Paris and large numbers of French clergy 
had not only recognized Henry as t h e i r lawful monarch, but had also had him 
absolved, crowned and anointed whilst s t i l l under the papal ban (9). When 
Henry sent his representatives to Rome to ask the Pope to confirm what had 
been done, Clement could hardly send them away (10). Admittedly, the fact 
that Henry was a relapsed heretic complicated matters, and the papal 
absolution that might otherwise have been readily granted was delayed con-
siderably. But i f Henry could give adequate guarantees of his resolve to 
persist i n his new allegiance, Clement would f i n d no f a u l t . The papal aim 
had been to ensure that France was ruled by a Roman Catholic; and an 
opportunity to do so without further bloodshed had now presented i t s e l f . 
There was, moreover, an even more pressing consideration. A warning had 
come from France that, i f the Pope witheld his approval, he could give up 
his authority i n France fo r lost (11). Under such pressure, Clement had 
no choice; and on 17th September, 1595, he formally absolved the new French 
king. 
From the f i r s t , Spain had urged the other side of the case. Henry, as 
a relapsed heretic, and an enemy of Spain, could not be credited with 
(8) AGS E968/sf, document of 13th May, 1596. 
(9) Maridjol 379 seqq. 
(10) Ossat i 248. Henry's appeal to the Pope i s dated 18th August, 1593-
(11) Pastor x x i i i 105-
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sinc e r i t y ; the Pope's energies would be better employed i n sending tropps, 
rather than l e t t e r s of absolution, to France (12). When, despite a l l 
representations, Clement recognized Henry, Spain's disappointment was con-
siderable. But s t i l l more considerable was her annoyance at the terms of 
the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . Henry had been forced to make few sacrifices: he had 
given no e x p l i c i t promise to root out Protestantism from his realm; his 
heir-presumptive was to be the Protestant Conde", rather than the Leaguer 
Count of Soissons - which meant that the Pope had acquiesced to the very 
principle against which P h i l i p I I had reacted so v i o l e n t l y , that a Huguenot 
could succeed to the throne of France; and f i n a l l y , as though to add i n s u l t 
to i n j u r y , Henry was described i n the papal documents as King of Navarre, 
a t i t l e which P h i l i p already regarded as his own by vir t u e of a previous 
papal grant (13). I t was hard to believe that the r e a l state of a f f a i r s 
i n France had not come to Clement's ears. When he appealed to Philip's 
zeal f o r the f a i t h by suggesting a t r i - p a r t i t e attack upon the Turk, the 
Spanish ambassador, Sesa, could scarcely repress a scornful laugh (14). 
And when the l a t t e r complained that Henry since his absolution had continued 
to consort with Protestants at home and abroad, Clement had even suggested 
that a part of the blame might be Philip's, f o r desiring to continue a war 
which forced such compromises upon the French king (15). Papal attempts 
to bring about a re c o n c i l i a t i o n were therefore unwelcome, and even suspect; 
as Sesa pointed out, Clement had taken more thought f o r his own advantage 
than f o r t r u t h and decency: 
"blindness i n t h i s matter i s considerable here; they cannot bear that 
the peace with France suffer any obstacle, f o r they think that with 
i t events w i l l be moved on and the Holy See better obeyed." 
(12) AGS E968/sf, consulta of 8th March, 1595-
(13) AGS E966/sf, document of 7th December, 1595; AGS E968/sf, document 
of 12th January, 1596. 
(14) AGS E967/sf, document of 14th May, 1596. 
(15) i b i d . 
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(Es grande l a ceguedad que aqul pasa en esta materia no pudiendo 
s u f r i r que se d i f i c u l t e l a paz con Francia pareci^doles que con esto 
quedardn avanzadas las cosas y esta santa sede serd mejor obedecida 
(16). ) 
The same notable lack of principle was increasingly obvious i n most of the 
Leaguers, who had formerly been Philip's close a l l i e s . The Duke of Guise 
had surrendered late i n 15%, and the decrees of Folembray i n January, 1596, 
marked the defection of Mayenne, Nemours and Joyeuse (17). On every count, 
Spain could understandably f e e l that she had been betrayed by her best 
friends f o r the sake of a compromise with the powers of darkness. But the 
defection of the Pope provoked an important c r i s i s of conscience i n Spanish 
o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s . Throughout the war, P h i l i p had chosen to stress the 
re l i g i o u s motives behind his intervention i n France; and now that the papacy 
had convinced i t s e l f of Henry's sincerity, he could no longer be considered 
i t s temporal representative on t h i s count. Admittedly, P h i l i p had appeared 
more papist than the Pope on previous occasions, but never before i n a 
matter of such gravity. His problem was obvious: ought he too to sacri f i c e 
principles to expediency? But i n his case, more than principles were at 
stake. Having f o r so long regarded himself as the most powerful and, 
r e l i g i o u s l y speaking, the most f a i t h f u l monarch i n Europe, P h i l i p found 
genuine d i f f i c u l t y i n following the Pope's lead; f o r i n s a c r i f i c i n g his 
principles, he would also have to sacrifice his pride. His gradual and 
p a i n f u l r e a l i z a t i o n that he would have to give way i s at the root of the 
diplomacy of the las t years of the reign. 
Amongst the few factors that helped to smooth Philip's path towards 
peace was Henry IV's dire need to end the war. Not unnaturally, the new 
king greatly wished to avenge his country's honour by punishing the i n t e r -
f e r i n g neighbour who had trespassed upon French s o i l , and he f e l t that his 
every action would have to be consonant with a high sense of reputation and 
(16) AGS E967/sf, document of 4th November, 1596. 
(17) Maridjol 391; CMH 668; Dumont V i 507,510,519 
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glory i f he were to restore French fortunes to t h e i r former greatness (18). 
As a token of his new confidence, he had made his formal declaration of war 
against P h i l i p early i n 1595 (19), and at times he would speak grandiloquently 
of his m i l i t a r y p o tential and of his subjects' resolve to carry on the f i g h t : 
"only respect f o r His Holiness urges me towards peace: for although my 
kingdom badly needs to rest a f t e r suffering so much f o r so long, my 
subjects and I are so used to the e v i l s of war that we can s t i l l make 
as s p i r i t e d a resistance as any of our neighbours. I have a jus t cause 
against a notorious usurper who uses the name of r e l i g i o n to cloak his 
usurpation. 1 1 
(La seule consideration de sa Saintete* me pousse a. l a paix; car encore 
que mon royaume a i t tout besoin de repos apres avoir tant et s i longue-
ment p a t i toutesfois mes subjets et moi sommes s i accoutume's au mal de 
l a guerre que nous y pouvons rdsi s t e r gaillardement encore, autant que 
nuls autres que nos voisins. Ma cause est juste contre un manifest 
usurpateur qui emploie le nom de l a r e l i g i o n pour couvrir son 
usurpation (20). ) 
But though he might express his b e l i e f that P h i l i p would receive i n t h i s 
world the jus t deserts of his wickedness, Henry could not pretend that he 
would be the agent. Economically and m i l i t a r i l y , France had been badly 
mauled. Although fortune had of late smiled upon her armies, she could not 
continue the e f f o r t f o r much longer without suffering irreparable damage. 
Taxes, shortages and disruptions were pressing increasingly upon Henry's 
subjects. To his great inconvenience, Henry's victo r y at Amiens was 
immediately followed by the spontaneous disbanding of his army, which 
refused to f i g h t without pay; on Friday evening, according to the King, he 
was attended by f i v e thousand gentlemen: by mid-day on Saturday, by less 
than a t i t h e of that number - " l a legere'te' des francais, c'est grande," 
he remarked r u e f u l l y (21). Moreover, a good many sections of French society, 
although they had no wish to f i g h t f o r Spain, were not prepared to prolong 
(18) Sully i 206. 
(19) Dumont V i 512,514-
(20) LM i v 883. 
(21) Anquez 48-9-
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unduly the struggle against her. The former Leaguers, the rentiers, the 
merchants - especially those who were financing Henry's operations - the 
p r i n c i p a l towns, the parlements and, i n general, a l l Roman Catholics were 
disposed to come to terms (22). The Huguenots, offended at the decree of 
Traversy of 1596, which restored property and f u l l l i b e r t y to the Roman 
Catholic Church, had refused to f i g h t (23). I n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s too, 
opinion was increasingly i n favour of ending the war. I n a memorandum 
presented to the King probably early i n 1598, the President Jeannin stated 
the case cogently. Undoubtedly, Spain was weak: but France was i n no f i t 
state to take advantage of the f a c t . Unlike P h i l i p I I , Henry could not 
command credit on a vast scale; unlike P h i l i p , he did not rule a r e l a t i v e l y -
undivided nation - the Edict of Nantes was wholly welcome to none, and the 
i n t e r - p r o v i n c i a l and i n t e r - f a m i l y r i v a l r i e s that had come to the surface 
during the c i v i l war could not be eradicated merely by the King's change 
of r e l i g i o n . Henry would be wise to p r o f i t by Philip's reported i l l - h e a l t h . 
Whilst the l a t t e r lived and controlled Spanish policy, there would be delays, 
i n e f f i c i e n c i e s and i l l - j u d g e d parsimony: but i f the war were to drag on 
u n t i l the succession of his son, Henry might be faced with an energetic and 
bellicose young monarch who could well t i p the balance i n Spain's favour. 
I n Jeannin's view, there was no other course but to make peace, and as 
quickly as possible (24). 
Unfortunately f o r P h i l i p , Spain had similar problems, but on a s t i l l 
greater scale. Since the absolution of Henry IV, she had suffered a number 
of serious m i l i t a r y setbacks. The already-nervous Duke of Mercoeur was 
being encouraged by the Pope to surrender Brittany to Henry, and Spain's 
only hope of retaining his l o y a l t y was to provide the reinforcements that 
he badly needed (25). Another important a l l y was i n severe d i f f i c u l t i e s : 
(22) cf AGS E612/140 
(23) Mousnier 126. 
(24) Jeannin 669 seqq; the editors - i n my view mistakenly - ascribe the 
document to 1595* 
(25) AGS EK1599/43,55; AGS EKI6OO/63,67,68,80,117; AGS EK1601/54,59-
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Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, who had fo r some time been suffering at the hands 
of the Huguenot general, Lesdiguieres, was unable to pay his way. His 
subjects' patience was exhausted: unless he were to face a rebellion, he 
would have to gain a respite, f i n a n c i a l or m i l i t a r y . But Spain was unable 
to help either of them. Her forces i n Brittany were i n a desperate state; 
one of the commanders protested that his men were a l l dying of cold and 
hunger, and although a thousand new troops arrived i n the summer of 1597, 
they were to prove i n s u f f i c i e n t ( 26 ) . Not surprisingly, Mercoeur came to 
terms with Henry early i n 1598 (27). The s i t u a t i o n i n Milan, the only 
source from which Charles Emmanuel could expect support, was no less serious. 
The Spanish commander, the Constable of Castile, was f a r from excitable: 
but he painted a grim picture of the conditions under which he had to serve 
the King: 
"because of the course of nature and the accidents which have improved 
French fortunes and damaged our own, the dangers that I foresaw many 
months ago are coming too close. I have to t e l l lour Majesty that we 
can do less than ever about them unless you send help from your great 
reserves of power. The coffers of the Chamber of Mia n are empty and 
charged with debts, and there i s no help humanly to be expected from 
them; and Your Majesty's subjects are impoverished with ordinary taxes, 
extraordinary loans, lean years and - the heaviest burden of a l l - the 
continual b i l l e t t i n g of raw soldiery." 
(Por e l curso de l a naturaleza y por los accidentes en que franceses 
se han mejorado y enflaquecido nuestro partido se nos acercan demasiado 
los peligros que ha muchos meses que antevi y represento a VM con menos 
remedio que jamds tuvieron sino nos viene de l a poderosa mano de VM 
pues de l a camera de Mildn no hay nada que esperar socorro humano segiin 
se halla exausta y empenada y pobres los siibditos de VM con las cargas 
ordinarias y anticipaciones extraordinarias y e s t e r i l i d a d de los anos 
y los alojamientos continuos de soldadesca nueva que los consume rads 
que otra cosa (28). ) 
(26) AGS EK1599/52; AGS EKI6OI/.I3. 
(27) Marie*jol 4.06; AGS EK1601/91. 
(28) AGS E1283/82. 
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I n t h i s ill-prepared state, the Constable expected to have to face Biron, 
who was threatening Bresse and Savoy; and great as were Charles Emmanuel's 
claims upon his father-in-law, Phi l i p , they were not s u f f i c i e n t to warrant 
throwing i n t o jeopardy Spain's most important possession i n I t a l y . With 
great regret, P h i l i p and his advisers were forced to abandon Savoy to her 
fate; and Charles Emmanuel concluded, with Spain's t a c i t approval, a truce 
with France i n 1596 (29). The setbacks suffered by her a l l i e s were mirrored 
i n Spain's own m i l i t a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s . Her recent record was not one of 
unmitigated defeat: i n 1596 alone, her troops took Calais, Ham, Guisnes and 
Amiens (30). But Marseilles defected to Henry IV i n February, 1596, and 
Amiens was quickly lost once more (31). And whereas i n May, 1596, Henry 
was able to renew his alliance with England and the United Provinces, Spain 
was now f i g h t i n g alone. The Iberian Peninsula i t s e l f had been badly alarmed 
by the apparent f i r s t - f r u i t s of the t r i - p a r t i t e agreement; the r a i d on Cadiz 
had admittedly not turned out as successfully as i t s organizers had hoped: 
but Spain could not afford to disregard the p o s s i b i l i t y that at some future 
date a j o i n t venture of t h i s type might prove only too ef f e c t i v e . 
Although his m i l i t a r y and ideological positions were i n doubt, P h i l i p 
was not disposed to give i n so easily. He continued to believe fervently 
i n the justice of his cause, and shewed no signs of being i n a hurry to come 
to terms. Nevertheless, he was not b l i n d to the dangers that faced him; and 
he had made i t p l a i n to Albert, when he sent him to Flanders i n 1595, that, 
provided the conditions were r i g h t , he would not object to l i s t e n i n g t o any 
French proposals f o r a truce. But he s t i l l believed that any such proposals 
(29) AGS E1284./17: "presupuesto las dificultades o casi imposibilidades que 
hay de ayudarle halldndose todo tan agotado y consumido como est& 
especialmente e l estado de Milan de donde habia de ser l a p r i n c i p a l 
y habiendo tanto a que acudir a otras partes aunque fuera conveniente 
darsela..." qvq CMH 1+11; AGS E1282/38,77,174; AGS E1283/173; 
AGS E1284/17,19-
(30) Maridjol 4O7. 
(31) AGS E1428/61 
- 74 -
would be serpentine, and on one point he was adamant: the f i r s t move would 
have to be Henry's (32). Perhaps fortunately, t h i s was to be the case. 
Through the agency of one Ronan, who claimed to be a staunch supporter of 
P h i l i p but who c l e a r l y had s i g n i f i c a n t contacts with the French authorities, 
the governor of S. Denis, de Vic, made known to Albert Henry's strong desire 
fo r peace or at least f o r a truce (33)• Albert believed de Vic to be "a 
good Catholic", and was prepared to take the information seriously. Com-
f o r t i n g himself with the thought that, a f t e r a l l , i t had been the French 
who had spoken f i r s t , he sent Ronan back to France with a passport and the 
strong impression that the o f f e r would not be rejected out of hand. Since 
Ronan's mission brought f o r t h no d e f i n i t e proposals from either side, the 
two Flemish ministers, Richardot and Verreyken, met de Vic and one of Henry's 
secretaries of state at Boulogne i n July or early August, 1596. There was 
s t i l l nothing o f f i c i a l i n the meeting: Richardot's ostensible reason f o r 
being i n the area was that he was bound for Calais on some administrative 
matter and had turned aside to hear, informally and i n private, what de Vic 
had to say (34.) • After some preliminary skirmishing about the d e s i r a b i l i t y 
of avoiding damage to the harvest i n the Calais region, the question of peace 
was raised. I t quickly became apparent that the French would i n s i s t upon 
the return of the towns that Spain occupied; and with t h i s clear sign of 
French intentions, the two Flemings returned to Brussels (35)• 
This was precisely what P h i l i p I I had wanted: an o f f e r that might 
result i n a truce that would, hopefully, include a l l the French b a t t l e areas 
(36 ) . But almost at once his hand was forced. For now that the entire war-
e f f o r t had been shifted to Spain's shoulders, the burden could no longer be 
supported. Expenses were enormous. A r e l a t i o n drawn up probably towards 
(32) AHN El4l4/sf, document of 21st July, 1595, section %• AGS E968/sf, 
document of 12th July, 1596. 
(33) AGS E6ll/68,83. 
(34) AGS E6ll/l ] 4,121. 
(35) AGS E611/121. 
(36) AGS E2223/173,H5. 
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the end of 1596 estimated that Spain would have to spend 11,034>945 ducats 
i n the t h i r t e e n months between November, 1596 and December of the following 
year, a sum of which the greater part would be consumed by the war-effort. 
I f , miraculously, a l l her resources were drawn upon to the f u l l , an income 
of 11,590,000 ducats could be expected f o r the same period. I n face, the 
normal annual income of the crown was considerably less, r i s i n g to only 
4,133*000 ducats; and i f the war continued, P h i l i p could expect by the end 
of 1599 to have a t o t a l debt of some 25,858,275 ducats (37). There was 
only one course to adopt: as on three previous occasions, P h i l i p was forced 
to repudiate his debts. On 11th November, 1596, secret orders were sent out 
to suspend payments to the merchants who were Philip's creditors, and an 
o f f i c i a l proclamation followed nine days l a t e r (38). And although the 
author of an u n o f f i c i a l memorandum three months l a t e r was probably only 
guessing when he calculated the cost of the war as 300,000 ducats and the 
cost of a peace-treaty as only 20,000, the general import was undeniably 
correct: Spain could not afford to go on (39). 
The bankruptcy therefore had a profound effect upon Spanish policy. 
With i t vanished the second of the two bases of Philip's b e l i e f that he 
was the hammer of the ungodly and the upholder of the Habsburg world-order. 
The f i r s t had gone when Clement V I I I had shewn that the papacy had a mind 
and policy of i t s own; and now neither P h i l i p nor anyone else could continue 
to regard Spain's immense resources as s u f f i c i e n t f o r her needs, l e t alone 
inexhaustible. A l l the assumptions of P h i l i p and his advisers were now 
shaken. For many years, they had given l i t t l e thought to the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of defeat and had expected a constant advance towards the imposing of world 
peace. The f i n a l collapse of the grand policy was a cruel blow to t h e i r 
pride and self-confidence. The hateful course of compromise seemed 
(37) AGS CJH 358/sf, document of November (?) 1596; qvs p-3<> 
(38) AGS CJH 358/sf, document of 11 th November, 1596; Ulloa 532. 
(39) AGS EK1600/27,28. cf. AGR PEA 197/38 f o r the state of the Flemish 
Treasury. 
- 76 -
increasingly inevitable, and not only with Henry IV: although only a month 
before his declaration of bankruptcy P h i l i p had repudiated any idea of 
including England and the United Provinces i n any agreement, he now realized 
that there might be too many risks i n remaining intransigent. The Council's 
words seem therefore rather poignant: 
"the objective of wars i s peace, always provided that proper conditions 
may be obtained; and so the door should not be shut on these discussions, 
the more so since three wars are being waged against declared enemies -
France, England and the rebels - to say nothing of those who are believed 
secretly to be encouraging them." 
(La paz es e l f i n de las guerras siempre que se pueda concluir con 
condiciones convenientes y asi no se debe cerrar l a puerta a estas 
pldticas especialmente siendo tres las guerras que se sustentan con 
franceses ingleses y rebeldes enemigos declarados sin los otros 
encubiertos que se cree dan fomento a dstos.) 
Every expedient should be t r i e d i n order to separate the a l l i e s - tra n s f e r r i n g 
the entire business to papal hands seemed to be as good a means as any. But 
the p r inciple had to be admitted (40). Whereas the Council had proposed 
only that a truce be arranged, however, P h i l i p himself was prepared to go 
further s t i l l . With his policy crumbling about his ears, he ordered Albert 
to give the French to understand that a well-negotiated peace might well 
prove to be the f i r s t step towards some more permanent arrangement. I f 
P h i l i p could not continue to be a warrior of righteousness, at least the 
world should see that he knew another of his Christian duties to be to seek 
peace and ensue i t ( 41 ) . 
Although the negotiations started through de Vic had come to nothing, 
a second attempt was proving more successful. A Flemish gentleman called 
La Bolvena had been sent to France on a private matter by the Count de l a Fera. 
When passing through the French town of Guise, he was i n v i t e d to dinner by 
(40) AGS E2223 /H5; AGS E2855/sf, consulta of 13th November, 1596. 
(41) AGS E2223/182: "ddndoles a entender que esto puede a b r i r camino a 
lo p r i n c i p a l y lo dema's que fuere apropdsito." 
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the governor, du Peche, who l a t e r set him on his road as f a r as Soissons. 
On his return journey, La Bolvena received a midnight message to meet his 
f r i e n d the governor at Meaux. There he was t o l d that Henry IV himself 
wished to see hira; and an interview between the two took place i n Rouen at 
three o'clock on the morning of 1st November. During the course of the next 
two days, there were further interviews, during the course of which i t became 
clear that Henry, whilst protesting that he would stand by his English and 
Dutch a l l i e s , wished to conclude an honourable peace with Spain; t h i s 
achieved, remarked his secretary, "the two kings could easily subjugate and 
punish t h e i r vassals." (42) And, not for the f i r s t nor the las t time, the 
diplomatic chestnut of a crusade against the Turk was mentioned by the 
French. Albert did not f e e l able to disregard so signal a mark of good-will; 
and late i n November, he sent La Bolvena back to Rouen to assure Henry of 
his joy at hearing so godly a suggestion as a crusade from the newly-
converted French king. When the conditions f o r peace were mentioned, the 
French admittedly were once more clear that Spain should return the towns 
that she occupied; but on a more encouraging note, V i l l e r o y himself t o l d 
La Bolvena of Henry's sincere desire f o r peace ( 43 ) . Hitherto, no record 
of these tentative negotiations had been made. I n order to r e c t i f y t h i s , 
Albert ordered Richardot to write u n o f f i c i a l l y to Vi l l e r o y , his opposite 
number i n France, to suggest that matters of such importance ought to be 
dealt with by men of greater standing than was La Bolvena (44)* V i l l e r o y 
had no choice but to reply; and four l e t t e r s , a l l of them expressing a 
desire f o r peace amongst Christians but couched i n the most general of terms, 
were exchanged between 18th December, 1596, and 9th February, 1597 ( 4 5 ) . 
(42) AGS E611/206,204. 
(43) AGS E611/219: "que e l rey con todo su corazdn desea l a paz y sobre 
todo para que pueda emplear sus armas contra e l Turco y siente en 
extremo l a rota de los cristianos." 
(44) AGS E611/218. 
(45) AGS E6l3/38,39. 
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The problem of how to begin effective negotiations remained. P h i l i p 
refused to take the i n i t i a t i v e , and Henry had not gone f a r enough. What 
might have been a serious impasse was eventually resolved by the continued 
e f f o r t s of the Pope. From the f i r s t , Clement had urged his two wayward sons 
to make up t h e i r differences, and with some measure of success. Even before 
P h i l i p ' s declaration of bankruptcy, his ambassador i n Rome had conscientiously 
followed orders to shew himself open to the Pope's exhortations. Moreover, 
for a l l the favour that he had shewn to him, Clement was no devoted partisan 
of Henry IV ( 4 6 ) . The l a t t e r ' s dalliance with Huguenot and G a l l i c a n a l i k e 
was frowned upon i n Rome ; and no pope could be blind to the advantages of 
keeping Spain's friendship - for apart from her doctrinal purity, Spain's 
lands surrounded the papal states. Clement therefore did his best to 
sweeten Spain's bitterness a f t e r Henry's absolution. He spoke se c r e t l y of 
Spain's important role as a counterweight to France, a piece of f l a t t e r y 
that P h i l i p welcomed (4.7). He suggested that, i f P h i l i p abandoned on his 
daughter's behalf a l l claims to the duchy of Brittany and the throne of 
France, Henry might be persuaded to help i n placing I s a b e l l a on the English 
throne ( 4 8 ) . Moreover, he re s i s t e d Henry's wish to have the t a l k s trans-
ferred to Rome, purely from a desire to further Spain's i n t e r e s t s . He knew 
well that c e r t a i n factions i n the curia and the c i t y could do t h e i r utmost 
to disrupt the negotiations, and was esp e c i a l l y suspicious of Venice and 
Tuscany, both a l l i e s of France and enemies of Spain, and with whom he had 
cause of his own for complaint (49). Although Henry was claiming that, i f 
t a l k s were held i n Rome, he would find i t easier to r i d himself of his 
Protestant a l l i e s , Clement seems to have r e s i s t e d the temptation to take 
up the point. I f , i n the l a s t analysis, P h i l i p decided to make peace with 
England and the United Provinces, he had better do so elsewhere: a compromise 
(46) cf Ossat i i i l e t t e r 128. 
(47) AGS E967/sf, document of 16th May, 1596; AGS E969/sf, document of 
16th March, 1597. 
(48) AGS E967/sf, document of 16th May, 1596; qvi ?^suWs 
(49) CMH 397. 
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with Protestants, although i t might be essential f o r Spain, could scarcely 
take place under the papal aegis. For Spain's convenience, therefore, 
Clement decided to send a legate northwards i n order to set negotiations 
i n motion; and as a further token of his wish to reassure P h i l i p , he chose 
Fra Bonaventura Secusi d i Caltagirona, the General of the Franciscan Order 
and one of the King's south I t a l i a n vassals (50). 
P h i l i p therefore had especial cause to be gra t e f u l f o r Clement's 
intervention. He could come to terms with Henry with a f a r clearer con-
science. His opponent had made the f i r s t moves, and the Pope, for whose 
religious interests P h i l i p claimed to be f i g h t i n g , had smoothed the path 
considerably. Admittedly, the negotiations were to take place on French 
s o i l at Vervins, whereas i n 1559 the Habsburgs had played the gracious 
host at Cateau-Cambre*sis. But because the t a l k s were i n fact to take place 
at the house of Clement's second legate, the Cardinal Aldobrandino, there 
were no embarassing and unpleasant wrangles about precedence, such as were 
to mar the meetings with the English envoys at Boulogne i n 1600 (51). 
Since, therefore, a l l the Pope's suggestions now seemed i n keeping with 
Philip's sense of decorum, the l a t t e r decided to commit matters i n t o the 
hands of his representatives; and, at Albert's request, i n August, 1597, 
he issued powers to enable his nephew to conduct negotiations with the 
French (52). 
This was indeed fortunate, f o r the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n the north 
was increasingly unfavourable. Amiens f e l l to Henry on 25th September, and 
a r e l i e f expedition destined f o r Brittany was frustrated by storms about 
the same time. Above a l l , Spain's p r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y base, the Low Countries, 
(50) AGS E969/sf, documents of 4th and 24th February, 1597-
(51) cf Winwood i , document of l4/24th May, 1600; AGR PEA 4.29, frontispiece. 
(52) AGS E969/sf, document of 31st March, 1597; AGS E614./25; AGS E2224 V234; 
AGS E2864/63,64. 
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was d a i l y becoming weaker. The Flemish authorities knew even better than 
t h e i r Spanish masters that the war could not be continued without running 
the gravest of ri s k s . I t was feared that the populace, exasperated by years 
of hardship, expense and bloodshed, would j o i n forces with t h e i r Dutch 
neighbours and further complicate matters by beginning a c i v i l war of t h e i r 
own (53)« Albert constantly begged f o r more troops and supplies. I n order 
to keep the war on the French and the Dutch fronts a l i v e , he needed 30,000 
inf a n t r y and 4>000 cavalry, besides the men i n the garrisons. I n the autumn 
of 1597, he was receiving 350,900 escudos each month, but was forced to ask 
f o r another 15,000 in f a n t r y and an extra 100,000 escudos a-month with which 
to pay them (54)• His credit was exhausted and his expenses constantly 
mounting. To the horror of P h i l i p and his advisers, he expected Spain to 
solve his problems: 
" i n a l l the despatches that are sent from here, Your Majesty i s t o l d 
of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n which I f i n d myself and how they increase daily, 
f o r i t i s so long since fresh resources came from Spain. The 600,000 
escudos are now completely spent, and I f i n d myself penniless, with 
neither credit'.mor the means of obtaining i t , and with heavier 
obligations than ever." 
(En todos los despachos que de aqul van representando a VM l a necesidad 
con que me hallo y como estd creciendo cada dia ma's habiendo tanto 
tiempo que no viene de Esparia e l recaudo que serla menester ... Se han 
acabado de conservar los 600,000 escudos sin hallarse con un r e a l n i 
crddito n i forma ninguna de donde sacarla y con mayores obligaciones 
que nunca.) 
Two days aft e r the a r r i v a l of t h i s alarming news, the councillors of state 
made t h e i r inevitable pronouncement; i f there had been any lingering doubts 
about t r e a t i n g with the French, they were now dispelled f o r good. 
" I n the present s i t u a t i o n of waging open war with three such powerful 
enemies as the French, the English and the rebels, and with the 
(53) AGS E615/112; cf. report of the Flemish Treasury i n January, 1596: 
AGR PEA 197/38. 
(54) AGS E6l4/64,65. 
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Treasury so exhausted, there can be no doubt that the best thing i s 
to make peace with a l l of them, or simply with the French, so that we 
may draw breath and re-organize f o r the future." 
(El estado presente de tener guerra abierta con tres enemigos tan 
poderosos como son franceses, ingleses y rebeldes y l a hacienda tan 
exhausta como se sabe no se puede dudar que lo m£s conveniente es 
hacer una paz o con todos o con franceses para tomar aliento y reformar 
para adelante (55). ) 
From the councillors' language even at a p a r t i c u l a r l y dark hour, i t i s 
p l a i n that Spain s t i l l had not given up. The conditions of peace with France 
would not only have to safeguard the aims f o r which P h i l i p had waged the war, 
but also put Spain i n a position from which to protect them i n the future. 
The new assumption was that Spain would l i v e to f i g h t another day. I t was 
t h i s that reconciled P h i l i p and his advisers to t h e i r most important con-
cession: the religious question, which at f i r s t had been so much emphasized, 
was q u i e t l y allowed to drop. The force of Clement's argument that, i f he 
himself entertained no scruples on t h i s score, neither should Spain, was 
gradually acknowledged (56). Curiously, the King himself made the v i t a l 
decision. On 15th March, 1597, the Council thought that the cause of 
r e l i g i o n - "the primary aim" - would be best served by opening negotiations: 
"and even i f a l l that we obtain from peace i s that we are thus able t o 
s t i r up the Catholics of France as they promise, and achieve f o r those 
i n England l i b e r t y of conscience and a new way of l i f e so that they 
may evangelize and extend t h e i r influence there, t h i s w i l l be of 
obvious importance f o r the good of Christendom." 
(Y cuando no se saque otro f r u t o de l a paz general que por su medio 
se cuajare que alentar a los catdlicos de Francia por este medio como 
ello s se prometen y granjear a los de Inglaterra l i b e r t a d de conciencia 
para que se predique e l evangelio a l i i y vivan los catdlicos de manera 
que puedan extenderse mds sera' de l a importancia que se deja considerar 
para e l bien de l a Christiandad (57). ) 
(55) AGS E6I4./68; E2855/sf, consulta of 17th December, 1597. 
(56) AGS E967/sf, document of 14th May, 1596. 
(57) AGS E2855/sf, consulta of 15th March, 1597. 
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P h i l i p , on the other hand, did not indulge i n fond hopes when on the 
following day he wrote to Sesa i n Rome. He was f u l l y a l i v e to the need to 
present a stern face to the world, and told his ambassador to act i n such 
a way as not to appear enthusiastic either for peace or war. He s t i l l had 
some confidence - "thank God, there i s no wavering here" - and s t i l l stressed 
that a sense of r e l i g i o u s duty permeated a l l his dealings (58). Henry I V s 
dealings with the Huguenots were as objectionable as ever, and Sesa was 
ordered to t e l l the Pope once more a l l the scandalous d e t a i l s and to urge 
him to obtain the t o t a l exclusion of Protestants from important c i v i l o f f i c e . 
But i n the l a s t resort, P h i l i p was not prepared to lose a l l chance of peace 
simply because of the unsatisfactory state of Roman Catholicism i n France. 
I f Sesa could not carry his point, he was not to be intransigent (59). 
Whether at Rome or i n the north, the Pope and his representatives, not the 
Spaniards, should appear to be the i n s i s t e n t guardians of the f a i t h : i t was 
t h e i r s p e c i a l duty, and i f t h e i r e f f o r t s f a i l e d i t was proper that t h e i r s 
should be the special blame (60). P h i l i p had done his duty. Now that he 
was bowed down under the weight of bankruptcy and defeat, he chose to hand 
on the far-spent torch to the Pope, who had been clamouring for i t over the 
past eighteen months. I f Clement was burnt, the f a u l t would not be P h i l i p ' s . 
Thereafter, r e l i g i o n fades from the diplomatic picture. I t was not mentioned 
i n Albert's l i s t of peace proposals, drawn up i n June, 1597, and the omission 
was not supplied by the King ( 6 l ) . 
A similar fate met the Infanta's claim to Brittany. P h i l i p continued 
to have no respect for "the so-called S a l i c Law" and claimed that even the 
French knew that I s a b e l l a ' s claim was just ( 6 2 ) . But the claim was obviously 
(58) AGS E969/sf, document of 16th March, 1597: " l e s mostre'is cdmo l a 
guerra se ha hecho por puro celo y obligacidn de r e l i g i d n y que l a 
paz se aceptar^ cuando fuere con condiciones convenientes a l a misma 
r e l i g i d n y a l bien publico y a l p a r t i c u l a r de mis cosas." 
(59) i b i d . P h i l i p ' s attitude towards the rel i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n i n England 
and the United Provinces, however, remained unchanged. 
(60) AGS E2224 V239. 
(61) AGS E613/93; AGS E2224V231. 
(62) AGS E969/sf, royal despatch of 16th March, 1597. 
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now impossible. Papal recognition was essential and, since Henry's 
absolution, out of the question. Once more, as we have seen, Clement 
strove t o f i n d a solution. To t r y to gain Brittany alone for the Infanta 
would be to court disaster by giving a handle to the Gallicans. The best 
way of retaining the friendship of both sides was to f i n d them a common 
enemy; and t h i s Clement did by suggesting to Sesa that, i f Spain were to 
relinquish a l l claims to Brittany and the French throne, the French might 
be persuaded to assist i n the winning of England f o r Isabella ( 6 3 ) . The 
idea had a certain success. P h i l i p was not b l i n d to the disadvantages of 
continuing the f i g h t f o r Brittany, f o r even the Duke of Mercoeur's help 
could no longer be depended upon. The English crown was an acceptable 
alternative ( 6 4 ) . Perhaps Clement could remind the French of t h e i r long-
standing enmity with the English and i n t h i s way encourage them to t u r n 
against t h e i r former a l l i e s ; f o r the English had no re a l love f o r t h e i r 
near neighbours and, i n Philip's view, wished to see the two great monarchies 
exhaust themselves by t h e i r quarrels ( 65 ) . Even so, P h i l i p can have had 
l i t t l e hope that the plan would succeed. I t was inconceivable that Henry, 
who had distrusted him f o r so long, would help him to win a prize f a r richer 
than the duchy of Brittany. The Pope's suggestion therefore provided nothing 
more than a seemly reason f o r giving way. And so nothing more was said of 
the Infanta's claim, except when i t was d i s p i r i t e d l y used as a diplomatic 
counter to French demands (66). Oblivion, too, was the l o t that befel the 
Leaguer a l l i e s whom Ph i l i p had wished to be co-signatories to a tr e a t y with 
Henry. His representations f e l l on deaf ears. Henry alleged that he meant 
Mercoeur and the rest no harm, but they would receive t h e i r King's benevolence 
as penitent subjects or not at a l l ( 6 7 ) . Mercoeur's subsequent surrender, 
using to the f u l l the good offices of his sister, the Queen Mother, therefore 
(63) AGS E967/sf, document of 16th May, 1596. 
(64) qvi p. 15<>S"\1-
(65) AGS E969/sf, document of 16th March, 1597. 
(66) i b i d . 
(67) AGS E615/107; LM i v 902; Bellievre & S i l l e r y i 1. 
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came as something of a r e l i e f to Spain (68). 
Clement's hope that Henry might help P h i l i p to win England was the more 
vain because of Henry's constant insistence that his English and Dutch a l l i e s 
be included i n the treaty. From f i r s t to las t he was f i r m on t h i s point ( 6 9 ) . 
Apart from any motives of gratitude, common prudence and s e n s i t i v i t y to the 
Huguenots' wishes warned him against cutting himself o f f from valuable 
reinforcements. He therefore held to the position that he had taken up 
during the f i r s t tentative meetings at Boulogne and Rouen: a l l three a l l i e s 
were to take part i n the negotiations (70). At f i r s t , P h i l i p had been 
equally i n s i s t e n t that he would not agree. Anything that was to Henry's 
advantage - as, clearly, Henry believed t h i s to be - could not be to Spain's. 
Neither Elizabeth nor the Dutch had abandoned t h e i r Protestantism a f t e r 
Henry's example, and the l a t t e r ' s conversion was f o r P h i l i p one of the main 
factors that had reconciled him to making peace. English vessels had jus t 
sacked Cadiz; Elizabeth's war against Spain's Roman Catholic sympathizers 
i n Ireland went on apace; and the Dutch rebels shewed not the least sign of 
penitence. Even a f t e r the bankruptcy of 1596, P h i l i p s t i l l entertained hopes 
of invading England, Ireland and the United Provinces; the war against 
treacherous subjects and, to a lesser extent, against the Protestant Jezebel, 
was s t i l l a thing to be pursued. At f i r s t , indeed, he opposed the idea even 
of a truce with the others (71). But slowly, as we have seen, he was forced 
to change his mind. Three powerful enemies were too many for him; and unless 
he agreed to Henry's condition, peace on even one f r o n t would be impossible. 
Ph i l i p was forced to back down. 
Unpalateable as i t was to make peace with Henry IV, i t was doubly so 
to do so with the English and the Dutch. Under what form, then, ought agree-
ment to be reached? The Council of State favoured a single tre a t y with a l l 
(68) AGS EK1601/91; AGS E970/sf, document of 26th A p r i l , 1598; Dumont V i 542. 
(69) Bellievre & S i l l e r y i 1. 
(70) AGS E611/222. 
(71) qvi f.A78. ; AGS E2223/115-
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three a l l i e s . I n t h e i r view, i f f o r any reason one of them refused to come 
to terras, Spain would have to continue the war whilst two of her opponents 
regained t h e i r strength and, meanwhile, sent secret help to the t h i r d . 
P h i l i p was less w i l l i n g to compromise. He had given way once and had no 
wish t o do so again. There was s t i l l a chance that Henry might be persuaded 
to abandon his a l l i e s , and P h i l i p intended to exploit i t to the f u l l . Sesa 
was therefore under orders to sow the seeds of dissension amongst the a l l i e s 
by r e f e r r i n g , as we have seen, to the t r a d i t i o n a l Anglo-French r i v a l r y (72). 
Moreover, P h i l i p was not ready to forget his self-imposed duty towards the 
Roman Catholic minorities i n England and the United Provinces. Before any 
agreement could be reached, the English would have to be clear that persecution 
of the recusants must cease, and the Dutch that, having returned to t h e i r 
due obedience, though t h e i r Protestantism would be tolerated f o r a time, i t 
would be as an exceptional concession (73). I f peace with the Protestant 
powers became inevitable, P h i l i p envisaged three t r e a t i e s , not one. Perhaps 
t h i s would bring with i t the disadvantages foreseen by the Council: but 
P h i l i p was more concerned to s p l i t up the alliance than to make more certain 
the hope of peace, and he s t i l l had not abandoned his old idea of bringing 
about a strengthening of the Roman Catholic interest i n Europe. And i f , i n 
the very las t resort, Spain were forced to make only one treaty with a l l 
three, there should be included a clause that bound a l l the signatories to 
declare war upon any of t h e i r number who might break the peace i n the 
future (7-4). 
At times, Philip's hope of s p l i t t i n g the alliance seemed l i k e l y to 
succeed. None of the a l l i e s was at any time e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d with the 
aims and conduct of the others, and i n the autumn of 1597 came the welcome 
news from the Pope that relations between Henry and Elizabeth had recently 
(72) AGS E969/sf, document of 16th March, 1597. 
(73) i b i d . 
(74) AGS E2224V239. 
- 86 -
been deteriorating (75). Nevertheless, Henry did not f a i l to make consider-
able e f f o r t s on his a l l i e s ' behalf. I n the very f i r s t meeting of the two 
sides at Vervins, on 24th February, 1598, his representatives insisted that 
a courier be sent to Madrid to obtain powers that e x p l i c i t l y authorized 
tre a t y with the English and the Dutch (76). Before t h i s l o y a l t y , P h i l i p 
and his advisers had to bow. But t h i s was t h e i r only concession. The terras 
upon which the Habsburg delegates were empowered to tre a t with England and 
the Dutch were trenchant and unconciliatory. They could be admitted only 
under separate t r e a t i e s ; the English would have to make satisfactory arrange-
ments for the t o l e r a t i o n of Roman Catholicism; the Dutch would have to return 
to t h e i r due obedience. Once more, P h i l i p raised a l o f t the banner of the 
f a i t h : i f the t a l k s with Henry's friends had to be broken o f f , the delegates 
were ordered to do so i n the name of r e l i g i o n (77). 
I n the end, P h i l i p and Henry were to make peace without the others. 
For a l l the l a t t e r ' s e f f o r t s , England and the United Provinces shewed no 
eagerness to j o i n i n the discussions. Henry was therefore reduced to asking 
on t h e i r behalf f o r a truce, f i r s t f o r a year, then f o r four months and 
then f o r three, during which time they could decide what to do (78). Albert, 
acting on his uncle's behalf, saw no objection to granting the concession to 
England. But the Dutch were a d i f f e r e n t case: contumacious rebels, they 
were also attempting at every t u r n to disrupt the negotiations. Only as the 
result of the repeated intervention of the papal representatives, Aldobrandino 
and Caltagirona, and because of the need to ensure France's continued p a r t i -
cipation, did Albert f i n a l l y give the Dutch a favour they neither desired nor 
deserved. A truce of two months was f i n a l l y granted to both a l l i e s , to take 
effect from the day of the signing of the f i n a l Franco-Spanish treaty, six 
months' grace i n which to decide whether or not to open ta l k s with Spain, 
(75) Birch 99; AGS E969/sf, document of 19th September, 1597. 
(76) AGS E615/107. cf Henry's great deference towards the English 
representatives: LM i v 917. 
(77) AGS E2855/sf, consulta of 14th March, 1598; AGS E2864/97; AGS E2224V4. 
(78) Bellievre & S i l l e r y i 1; AGS E6l5 / l06,92. 
- 87 -
and a month's delay i n the publication of the treaty (79)- Henry could no 
longer afford to bear with the b e l l i c o s i t y of the Dutch nor the procrastina-
t i o n of the English. The terms of his agreement with them i n 1596 had bound 
him to act i n concert with them, but not at the price of his own r u i n . When 
i t came to the point, Henry f u l l y realized that peace was as essential to 
him as i t was to his r i v a l . I f England and the United Provinces chose to 
disregard an opportunity to end the wearisome and expensive struggle and 
put t h e i r forces i n order f o r any subsequent t r i a l of strength, i t was 
regrettable: but his duty was to France (80). 
Philips f i n a l concession touched the matter about which, next to 
r e l i g i o n , he f e l t most strongly. For although he made greater public play 
of his zeal f o r r e l i g i o n and his desire to have his r i g h t s respected, i n 
practice he was more determined to keep certain captures that his forces 
had made i n France: "under no circumstances must we give way i n the matter 
of the f o r t s " ( 8 l ) . This was not to say that, at bottom, P h i l i p was a 
complete hypocrite, f o r his true motives remained as they had always been. 
The fact that he had been obliged to come to terms with Henry IV did not 
betoken a change of heart; he could never t r u s t his r i v a l , whose si n c e r i t y 
he profoundly doubted and whom he expected to renew h o s t i l i t i e s when i t 
suited him - "with the same greatness and resources as past kings of France", 
as one of his ministers grimly observed (82). For a l l his m i l i t a r y set-
backs, P h i l i p s t i l l had several cards to play. Not a l l his captures, of 
course, were invaluable. Amiens was too f a r in t o French t e r r i t o r y to be of 
re a l use as a future bridgehead, and even before i t s loss, P h i l i p had decided 
to use i t as a bargaining-counter (83). Durlan and Ardres, though allegedly 
forming part of the ancient patrimony of the counts of Flanders, whose heir 
(79) AGS E615/92,112,113. 
(80) LM i v 970: "mon peuple est mange', mes deniers sont consomme's...." 
(81) AGS E2224.V239. 
(82) AGS E611/138. 
(83) AGS E22241/200,217. 
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was P h i l i p , might be sacrificed; La Chapelle and Chatelet, which had always 
been French, even more so (84)- But Calais was a vitally-important deep-
water port that commanded the English Channel and would be of incalculable 
value i n any future attempt against any of the three a l l i e s . With f a r 
greater reluctance, therefore, P h i l i p agreed to i t s possible evacuation, 
but only on condition that the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s made there by his troops be 
dismantled ( 8 4 a ) . 
Those who were close to the ba t t l e - f r o n t s , however, proved not to be 
of so strong a mind. Albert and his envoys to the ta l k s - Richardot, 
Verreyken and Juan Bautista de Tasis, a former ambassador to France - wished 
to extract as much p r o f i t from the si t u a t i o n as they could. But the know-
ledge that peace was v i t a l l y necessary i n Flanders weighed heavily upon 
them. Albert saw at once that, since the French were obstinate i n t h e i r 
demand f o r the return of Calais, to follow his uncle's o r i g i n a l orders would 
be to throw up the entire negotiation f o r the sake of a single town, and one 
which, moreover, he and his forces could barely defend. With considerable 
reluctance, he resigned himself to the inevitable, and t o l d his envoys that 
they might surrender Calais i f they had t o : 
"our position i s now so greatly altered from what i t was before that 
i t s direness has forced me to agree to the r e s t i t u t i o n - a decision 
made very much against my w i l l and one that w i l l not bring with i t the 
advantages that we otherwise might have expected." 
(Las cosas est£n tan troncadas y diferentes de entonces en l a hora 
presente que e l r u i n estado de ellas me ha obligado a resolverme en 
conceder l a dicha r e s t i t u c i d n , cosa tan fuera de mi voluntad y de las 
ventajas que en otro tiempo se podrian pretender. (85) ) 
(84) AGS E2224 1/200,202,217; AGS E613/93-
( 8 4 a ) AGR PEA 4.29/140. 
(85) AGS E615/59. cf. the delegates' l e t t e r t o Albert on 2nd March: "ce 
de Calais est bien plus d i f f i c i l e a dige"rer, pour ce qu'a. Madrid i l s 
peignent sur des papiers blancs ce que nous voudrions autant qu'eux, 
mais nous les souhaitions i c i a f i n d'apprendre avec nous a. vouloir ce 
que l'on peut et non pouvoir ce que l'on veut." [AGR PEA 429 /L47 . ] 
Albert's sympathetic reply i s dated 14th March [AGR PEA 429/159.] 
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Within the month, his action was j u s t i f i e d : shortage of supplies and con-
siderable arrears of pay had brought about the mutiny of the garrison. By 
the middle of February, Ardres and Chatelet had been l o s t i n the same way 
(86). 
The p r i n c i p a l objects to agreement removed, the negotiations at Vervins 
were s k i l f u l l y guided to t h e i r close by Aldobrandino, and on 2nd May, 1598, 
the f i n a l treaty was signed (87). The unexciting nature of the terms was 
a token of Spain's f a i l u r e . Admittedly, there had been minor successes. 
Although the Breton fortress of Blavet was t o be evacuated, l i k e the duchy 
i t s e l f , the Spaniards were f i r s t to dismantle i t , a concession that had not 
been allowed to either side i n 1559« Cambrai was to continue under Spanish 
rule. The vexed question of the ownership of the I t a l i a n marquisate of 
Saluzzo was, with the consent of Henry IV and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, 
referred to papal a r b i t r a t i o n . But t h i s was l i t t l e t o shew for nine years' 
war. For a l l her e f f o r t s and her immense expenditure, Spain had won no more 
than the t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s decided by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambre"sis> and 
she had f i n a l l y been obliged to recognize Henry IV as the lawful "Icing of 
France. The former f a i l u r e i n particular haunted the consciences of the 
three Habsburg delegates, as t h e i r lame j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r not retaining 
Calais shews. The f a c t that, i n 1559, Henry I I had given up more than 
P h i l i p I I was explained by the claim that "we had not managed to capture as 
much as they had"; and the delegates also stressed the need to defer to the 
Pope's wish to launch a Crusade, f o r which purpose peace between the two 
kingdoms was v i t a l (88). They could see the prospect of better days ahead: 
the Treasury could regain i t s strength; the Dutch rebels might well come to 
terms with the new Flemish sovereigns, Albert and Isabella; perhaps, too, 
(86) LM i v 902; AGS E615/63-
(87) Aldobrandino's tact and acument, without which the negotiation would 
have been greatly complicated, earned him the praise of both sides: 
AGS E615/112; LM i v 985-
(88) AGS E615/112; AHN E2776/10; Dumont V i 561. 
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Elizabeth would decide to open t a l k s . Nevertheless, such pious speculations 
could not a l t e r the fact that Spain had l o s t the war. 
France was overjoyed with the tre a t y (89)• On the one hand, she had 
made no concessions that might injure national pride, and on the other the 
former Leaguers had no reason to complain that P h i l i p had been subjected 
to unduly harsh terms. A Spanish observer reported i n the summer of 1598 
that both court and country shewed "extraordinary contentment at seeing 
themselves i n peace with lour Majesty" (90). I n Spain, the reaction was 
otherwise. A number of prominent men thought the tre a t y a scandal, and 
there was no public demonstration of joy when news of the agreement came 
through (91). Only P h i l i p seems to have shewn much satis f a c t i o n . I n the 
throes of what was to prove his l a s t and supremely pa i n f u l i l l n e s s , he 
badly wanted to leave his son an inheritance that was not s t i l l t o r n by 
war on every side. Moreover, he expected a good deal from his decision to 
cede the Low Countries to his daughter and her fiance" (92). For him, the 
trea t y was a necessary halt along the way towards the f i n a l v i c t o r y of 
Roman Catholic Christendom: he did not expect Henry to be a f a i t h f u l keeper 
of his promises, and especially of the nebulous clause that prohibited each 
side from aiding the rebels of the other, and he ordered Albert not to 
relax his vigilance along the borders with France. But he was i n no f i t 
state to complain of what had been agreed: 
" I have studied a l l the d e t a i l s , and am most s a t i s f i e d to see that 
you have brought to i t s conclusion t h i s most weighty and important 
negotiation, from which ( i f the French are more scrupulous i n the 
observation than i s t h e i r wont) we may expect much honour f o r Our Lord 
(89) For Henry I V s reaction, v Bellievre & S i l l e r y i i 333-
(90) AGS EK1602/19-
(91) cf CSPV i x 711. 
(92) qvs />-42M_t|. 
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and the good and peace of Christendom. As for the clauses and 
conditions of the peace, I am sure that you did what you could to 
improve them." 
(Queda entendido todo muy particularmente y yo con l a satisfaccidn 
que es razdn de ver acabado por vuestra mano un negocio de tanto peso 
e importancia y de que ( s i franceses guardan mejor que suelen l o 
asentado) se espera mucho servicio de nuestro Senor y bien y quietud 
de l a Cristiandad ... Cuanto a las capitulaciones y condiciones de 
esta paz creo que se hizo lo posible para mejorarlas (93)- ) 
He would have to leave the consummation of his policy to his son. 
(93) AGS E22241/152. 
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IV. PEACE IN THE BALANCE. 
As long as Flanders remained the lynch-pin of Spanish foreign policy, 
I t a l y was to be an area of immense strategic importance. Without the 
guarantee of Spanish pre-eminence there, the war-effort i n the north could 
not long be sustained. Not only was i t one of the main sources of troops: 
the great d i f f i c u l t i e s of safely transporting soldiers and supplies across 
the Bay of Biscay and through the enemy-dominated English Channel forced 
Spain to depend upon a quieter route across the Mediterranean and overland 
to Flanders. Having disembarked i n Genoa, troops would make t h e i r way 
through the Milanesado by one of two main routes to Lorraine and thence to 
the Low Countries: through the Tyrol and Alsace, or through Savoy and the 
Franche-Comte*. The former had considerable drawbacks: the princes of Germany 
were f e a r f u l enough of the Habsburgs, and the constant passage of large 
numbers of troops through t h e i r midst would have been enough to cause a 
grave c r i s i s i n the Empire ( l ) . I t was the l a t t e r route that i n our period 
was the more popular; devised apparently by P h i l i p I I himself i n 1565-1566, 
and generally known as the "Spanish Road", i t had the advantage of keeping 
to lands that were either i n Spain's possession or under her dir e c t influence 
L 
(2). The Franc"e-Comte', which formed part of the h i s t o r i c lands of the duchy 
of Burgundy, had i n the reign of P h i l i p I I gradually l o s t much of i t s 
independent character and was now ruled d i r e c t l y from Brussels; i t was, 
moreover, t r a d i t i o n a l l y neutral, and had been the subject of a separate 
agreement between France and Spain as early as 1596 (3)» The preceding 
stage of the Spanish Road, however, was an independent buffer-state that 
had f o r some time been i n close alliance with the Habsburgs. The architect 
of the new Savoyard duchy, the Duke Emmanuel P h i l i b e r t , had re-established 
(1) Mendoza 4.00. 
(2) Parker, figure on p. 51; 59. 
(3) Febvre; AGS E6ll/l80,181; Dumont V i 527. 
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his country's position at the battle of 8. Quentin i n 1557, i n c o a l i t i o n 
with Spain and the Empire. And although his heir, Charles Emmanuel, was 
the son of a French mother, he too was eager to maintain good relations with 
Spain, marrying i n 1585 the Infanta Catherine Michaela. Possessing there-
fore the two great advantages of being P h i l i p I I 1 s son-in-law and the r u l e r 
of a strategically-placed state, Charles Emmanuel expected a good deal of 
Spanish support (4). 
Regrettably f o r Spain, the burden of the alliance was to prove heavy 
indeed. For Charles Emmanuel, an abnormally-ambitious man, badly wanted to 
complete his father's work of restoring the fortunes of his house by regaining 
the marquisate of Saluzzo, which lay on his south-western border. The last 
marquess had died i n 154-8; and although u n t i l that time i t had been uncertain 
whether Saluzzo should be regarded as a French, a Savoyard or an imperial 
f i e f , Francis I took possession of i t (5). No mention of i t was made i n the 
Treaty of Cateau-Cambr^sis, and Henry I I and his sons succeeded unopposed 
to a crown augmented by the new lands. Emmanuel P h i l i b e r t had intrigued 
hard t o gain the cession of Saluzzo to Savoy, but by his death i n 1580 had 
achieved nothing. Charles Emmanuel, however, chafed at the delay; and, 
p r o f i t i n g by the breakdown of French royal authority and the venality of 
the governor and his lieutenant, moved i n with his troops late i n September, 
1588. But i t was soon apparent that the annexation of Saluzzo was to be 
"the f i r s t and last substantial success" of Charles Emmanuel's adventurous 
reign (6). Henry I V s abjuration of Protestantism and the increased support 
that i t won him made of him a f a r more formidable enemy than had been the 
last of the Valois. By February, 1594, Charles Emmanuel's m i l i t a r y position 
had taken a marked turn f o r the worse. Threatened by Lesdiguieres 1 troops, 
the Duke's only hope of safety lay i n Spanish aid: his subjects were weary 
(4) CMH 399 seqq. 
(5) Cano Saluzzo 10. 
(6) CMH 415. 
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of the war-taxation that he had imposed and seemed l i k e l y to break i n t o 
r e b e l l i o n i f i t were prolonged (7). But Spanish aid was not forthcoming. 
At the best of times, P h i l i p had only with d i f f i c u l t y manned his various 
b a t t l e - f r o n t s , and now, faced with a French king whose popularity at home 
and m i l i t a r y successes abroad were simultaneously increasing, he found i t 
doubly hard to spare resources. Painfully aware of t h i s , i n September, 1596, 
he directed his ambassador i n Savoy to t e l l the Duke that he approved of the 
truce that had just been arranged with Lesdiguieres, and contented himself 
with warning him against the undoubtedly malign intentions of France (8). 
As the months went by, the p o s s i b i l i t y of sending help to Savoy became 
f a i n t e r . I n A p r i l , 1597, the Council of State had to speak of the " d i f f i c u l -
t i e s or near-impossibility" of intervening on Charles Emmanuel's behalf; 
and by July, the Constable of Castile i n Milan could see only disaster 
ahead (9). 
A l a s t i n g agreement between Henry and Charles Emmanuel, however, was 
not easily reached. From the outset, the former enunciated demands f o r 
considerable re-adjustment of boundaries. Not only did he require the 
surrender of the three important fortresses of Castel Delfino and Demonte 
i n the highlands, and Centallo i n the p l a i n beyond; he also insist e d upon 
the return of Saluzzo or the granting of adequate compensation (10). He 
wanted more than the mere recognition of French suzerainty: the Constable 
thought that, under the circumstances, Spain could have tolerated t h i s . 
He stipulated the presence of French garrisons and governors - "which w i l l 
mean l i t t l e less than restoring everything, unless the French are more 
honourable and f a i t h f u l than i s t h e i r wont" ( l l ) . With considerable r e l i e f , 
therefore, the Spanish authorities learned that Charles Emmanuel had managed 
(7) AGS E1282/38; AGS E1283/173-
(8) AGS E1282/174. 
(9) AGS E1284/17; AGS E1283/43. 
(10) AGS E1282/77. 
(11) AGS E1280/129. 
- 95 -
to have the dispute referred to the a r b i t r a t i o n of the Pope. For, although 
under other circumstances a war i n the north of I t a l y would have been wel-
comed as a means of reducing the pressure upon the Archduke Albert i n the 
main theatre of the c o n f l i c t , Spain could not at that moment f i n d the 
necessary forces; and, important as Savoy was, Spain f e l t under no obligation 
to disregard her other interests. The new development seemed promising. I f 
Sesa stressed to the Pope the strategic advantages to be gained by taking 
Savoy's part, and the need to protect I t a l y from the many Huguenot troops 
who would otherwise flood i n t o the area, a satisfactory solution might be 
achieved (12). The Pope took no action i n the matter during the period up 
to and including the Treaty of Vervins; but now that relations with France 
had been resumed, Charles Emmanuel sent the Marquess of Lulino to the talks 
as his representative, and clause twenty-six ended h o s t i l i t i e s between the 
two countries and formally referred the settlement of outstanding differences 
to Clement (13). 
I n f a c t , the signing of the treaty was no more than the postponement 
of an inevitable c o n f l i c t . Charles Emmanuel's f i r s t wish was s t i l l to see 
his state large and powerful; he did not intend to accede to French demands 
fo r large t r a c t s of his land, and expected Spain to lend him support. But 
Henry was equally determined. Since the Treaty of Cateau-Cambre'sis, French 
influence i n northern I t a l y had been i n decline. I n the winter of 1574-1575, 
the Savoyard fortresses that had been retained a f t e r 1559 were evacuated, 
and a f t e r the loss of Saluzzo i n 1588, France found herself pushed to the 
west of the Alps (14). This could not be allowed to go unavenged. Through-
out the sixteenth century, northern I t a l y had been one of the most vulnerable 
points i n the Habsburg empire. Milan was, f o r the Council of State, "the 
key to a l l I t a l y " and a m i l i t a r y powerhouse of the f i r s t importance (15). 
(12) AGS E1284/32. 
(13) AHN E2776/10; AGS E615/113-
(14) CMH 4OO seqq. 
(15) AGS E1288/105. 
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To threaten Milan would i n a very r e a l sense threaten the Spanish empire, 
both i n Flanders and i n the rest of I t a l y . Moreover, prestige was important; 
as the President Jeannin pointed out to Henry, unless he took a f i r m l i n e 
with Savoy, "the already current opinion that t h i s kingdom was regaining 
i t s ancient greatness by Your Majesty's wise and successful conduct w i l l 
diminish." The King had therefore two alternatives: either he could accept 
adequate compensation from Savoy, or he could i n s i s t upon the return of 
Saluzzo. The former course had much to be said f o r i t : Henry would be less 
l i k e l y to have to go to war once more, and he would have an opportunity to 
choose t e r r i t o r y that would better round-off his south-eastern f r o n t i e r . 
But Saluzzo had the greater appeal: 
" i t i s a means of going down i n t o I t a l y without r i s k , and the only 
means of keeping the good-will of Your Majesty's friends there and 
of checking the ambitious schemes of those princes whose greatness 
could be p r e j u d i c i a l to t h i s country ... The loss of t h i s small state, 
on the other hand, w i l l give them to understand that we are u t t e r l y 
abandoning our interest i n I t a l i a n a f f a i r s , that our friends ought to 
expect nothing of us and that Your Majesty's enemies or r i v a l s have 
nothing t o fear." 
(C'est une entre'e pour descendre dans l ' l t a l i e sans pe"ril, seul moyen 
pour y maintenir vos amis en faveur et bienveillance envers nous, 
empecher les desseins ambitieux des princes dont l a grandeur peut 
etre suspecte a cet dtat ... au l i e u que l a perte de ce p e t i t e*tat 
leur fera connaitre que nous abandonnons du tout le soin des af f a i r e s 
d ' l t a l i e , que nos amis n'en doivent plus r i e n esp^rer, n i vos ennemis 
ou emulateurs r i e n craindre (16). ) 
As Jeannin pointed out, despite her lack of t e r r i t o r y i n I t a l y , France 
was not without friends there, nor Spain without enemies. The most powerful, 
though not the most active, was Venice. The constant depredations made upon 
Venetian shipping by privateers from Naples and S i c i l y soured relations with 
Spain. The two viceroys, the Duke of Maqueda i n S i c i l y and the Count of 
(16) Jeannin 673-5. 
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Lemos i n Naples, lined t h e i r pockets with the s p o i l ; and although i n 1602 
they were to receive P h i l i p I l l ' s command to desist, between them i n the 
following year they captured twelve great ships, and were causing an 
estimated annual loss of eight m i l l i o n ducats to the Venetians (17). Venice 
could therefore be depended upon to view French schemes with favour; indeed, 
i t was to France that the Doge and Senate turned f o r mercenary troops to 
help them against the Uscocks late i n 1599 (18). However, though i n the 
words of one wr i t e r , "Venice was the buckler of I t a l i a n independence," she 
was i n no way the sword (19). Her main interest was commerce, and f o r a l l 
her grievances against Spain, she did not wish to go to war (20). France 
found a more eager a l l y i n Florence. The Grand Duke Ferdinand was believed 
i n Spain to be the prime mover of the anti-Habsburg feeling i n I t a l y . 
Flanked by the papal states, the Spanish c l i e n t dukedoms of Parma and Modena, 
and Genoa, the f i n a n c i a l nerve-centre of the Spanish empire, Ferdinand could 
not afford to hold aloof from the great powers. Since Spain had refused to 
grant him the investiture of Siena, he turned to France; and a close alliance 
between the two was sealed by Henry'IVs marriage to Maria de'Medici on 5th 
October, 1600 (21). More a l l i e s were to be found further north amongst the 
Swiss cantons which, by t h e i r proximity to Milan and the early stages of 
the Spanish Road, could play an important part i n s h i f t i n g the balance of 
power i n I t a l y . I n 1589, P h i l i p I I had been able to gain the alliance of 
the six most important members of the Roman Catholic Borromean League (22). 
But the League's h o s t i l i t y to Henry IV could not be kept up a f t e r his 
absolution by the Pope, and even less so a f t e r the signing of his tre a t y 
with Spain. The way was therefore clear f o r the renewal of the old alliance 
(17) Tenenti Piracy & the Decline of Venice 50. 
(18) AGS EK1603/8; AGS E617/13; LM v 572. 
(19) Rott Henri IV... 73. 
(20) cf Venice's passiveness during the strained relations with Spain 
and the Papacy, 1604-1607: (Corral Castanedo.) 
(21) CMH 397. 
(22) viz Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zug, Fribourg:(Bonjour, O f f l e r 
& Potter 179.) 
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between France and the entire Swiss confederation. The negotiations were 
protracted and d i f f i c u l t ; the French envoy, E6ry de Vic, had to give assurance 
that his master's debt of t h i r t y - s i x m i l l i o n l i v r e s would be cleared before 
the f i n a l agreement was signed i n the spring of 1602 (23). But de Vic scored 
a notable diplomatic success, enhanced by the thwarting of a Spanish attempt 
to a l l y with the Valais (a large area on the borders of Savoy, Piedmont and 
Milan) i n the previous year (24). A purely diplomatic success i t was never-
theless to remain. The construction of the well-sited Fort Fuentes gave to 
Spain control of the access to the V a l t e l l i n e along the valley of the River 
Adda, and a tre a t y with the Grisons inevitably followed i n I604 (25). France's 
problem was therefore obvious. I f she was to act e f f e c t i v e l y i n northern 
I t a l y , she would need lands of her own to the east of the Alps. For t h i s 
reason, Henry IV was to prove so i n s i s t e n t i n upholding his claims against 
Savoy. 
One of the reasons f o r Jeannin's bellicose advice was his f i r m b e l i e f 
that P h i l i p I I I would not go" to war. I n t h i s he did Spain less than justice:, 
f o r P h i l i p and his advisers were f u l l y alive to the dangers that they faced 
i n northern I t a l y . The new king had, as Prince of Asturias, been present at 
the council-session that had f i n a l l y decided that peace with France, though 
unpalateable, was v i t a l (26). Youthful and of a warlike temperament, even 
more than his father he refused to regard the Treaty of Vervins as the f i n a l 
word. From the ambassador i n Paris, Juan Bautista de Tasis, came a disturbing 
description of the French king: proud, self-confident and obviously unwilling 
to abandon his Dutch a l l i e s despite the terms of the treaty, he was as 
(23) Rott Henri IV... 196; AHN El86l/sf, document of 31st January, 1602; 
Dumont V i i 18. 
(24) Rott Henri IV... 196: "jamais pendant le x v i siecle ndgociateur frangais 
n'avait obtenu des conditions aussi avantageuses." i b i d , 187-8. 
(25) The f o r t , b u i l t i n I604, was situated upon a ridge close to the shores 
of Lake Como, near Colico: Rott Henri IV... endpaper; Parker 75; 
AGS EK1293/56; Dumont V i i 32. 
(26) AGS E2855/sf, document of 17th December, 1597. 
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formidable an opponent as ever. Only the worst could be expected of him, 
and at no time did P h i l i p and the Council allow themselves to believe that 
they had gained more than a temporary respite from the struggle: 
"the delay i n evacuating French troops from Holland strongly suggests 
that the peace w i l l almost cer t a i n l y not survive the day they see f i t 
to declare war ... The Council believes that i t must warn Your Majesty 
of the scant p o s s i b i l i t y that the French w i l l not break the peace when 
i t most suits them." 
(Cuanto a las largas que hay en r e t i r a r los franceses de Holanda se 
deja bien entender de su manera de proceder l a poca seguridad que se 
puede tener de que dure l a paz mds tiempo de e l que a ellos les 
estuviere bien romper l a guerra ... Ha parecido a l consejo representar 
a VM l a poca seguridad que se puede tener ... de que franceses no 
rompan cuando les pareciere que les conviene (27). ) 
When, therefore, the Savoyard ambassador sounded out P h i l i p and his 
advisers early i n 1599 during the royal progress to Valencia, he met with a 
favourable response. But to his complaint that nothing positive had been 
done on Charles-Emmanuel's behalf, a less direct answer had to be given. 
The Duke seemed to have forgotten that Spain had done what she could at 
Vervins and that through Sesa she was constantly urging the Pope to decide 
the issue i n Savoy's favour (28). Charles Emmanuel, however, wanted con-
crete assurances. Knowing f u l l well that he could not withstand the impact 
of a French assault, he had recently taken f r i g h t at Henry's expressed wish 
to by-pass the Pope and meet his r i v a l at Lyons i n order to decide the issue 
between themselves. His fears were echoed by the Constable of Castile and 
Lodosa, the ambassador i n Savoy. Meeting three weeks a f t e r t h e i r f i r s t 
conference on Saluzzo, the Council consequently decided upon more positive 
action. They advised P h i l i p to t e l l the Pope that under no circumstances 
ought Henry to threaten or intimidate one of the signatories of the recent 
treaty, and that Spain would not stand i d l y by i f Henry misbehaved. Since 
words would not be enough, they also decided to send a good sum of money to 
(27) AGS EKI426/4. 
(28) AGS E1287/244-
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Savoy - the figure of h a l f - a - m i l l i o n or a m i l l i o n ducats was mentioned - i n 
the hope that the French would be frightened-off (29)• Their determination 
to baulk Henry's schemes was passed on to Charles Emmanuel, and f o r a time 
served to s t i f f e n his resistance to French demands (30). Other factors were 
working i n Spain's favour. Tasis reported that, although "the occasion 
makes the t h i e f " , i n his view Henry would not f o r the moment go to war. 
Always reluctant to spend what l i t t l e money he had, even to the point of 
making himself unpopular with his n o b i l i t y , he apparently wanted a peaceful 
and prosperous inheritance f o r his heir (31). Perhaps most important of a l l , 
Henry needed the Pope's good-will to r i d himself of Margaret of Valois, a 
queen who had provided him with no son, before marrying Maria de' Medici (32). 
Whatever the reason, Henry yielded to the pleas of the papal envoy, the 
Patriarch of Constantinople: the question of the ownership of Saluzzo was 
once more referred to Rome, and the marquisate given into the Pope's ward 
(33). 
To Spain's great surprise and concern came the news late i n December, 
1599, that Charles Emmanuel was about to burn his boats and set out f o r 
Paris (34)- Th e foolishness of his decision soon became clear. After a 
brave i n i t i a l showing, he seemed to capitulate (35), and on 25th February 
agreed to a remarkably unfavourable set of terms. His offer of Bresse and 
Barcelonetta had been rejected out of hand, even though Bresse alone was 
said to be worth three times as much as Saluzzo: i t was strategic, rather 
than f i n a n c i a l , advantage that interested Henry. Charles Emmanuel was 
therefore to make a choice by 1st June. Either he should return Saluzzo 
(29) AGS E1287/28. 
(30) AGS EKI6O2/46; cf /51. 
(31) AGS EK1602/70; AGS EK1603/18,49,56,71; cf the i d e n t i c a l conclusions 
reached by the English ambassador i n Paris the following year: 
Winwood i 348. 
(32) AGS EK1602/106; Duraont V i i 4. 
(33) AGS E1430/156. 
(34) AGS EK1602/121. 
(35) AGS EK1603/4. 
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w i t h i n three years, and receive i n return the fortresses held by France i n 
Bresse, Savoy and Barcelonetta: or he should r e t a i n Saluzzo and cede to 
France Bresse, with her main town of Bourg, from the borders of Savoy to 
the River Saone, and with i t Barcelonetta (an area on the western borders 
of Saluzzo), the Valley of the Stura, the Valley of the Pe'rousse, and the 
fortresses of Pinerolo, Deraonte, Roquesparvieres, Chateau-Dauphin and 
Gentallo (which was within Saluzzo i t s e l f ) (36). 
Whichever choice Charles Emmanuel made, Spain's interests would be 
jeopardized. I n Lodosa's view, the least damaging settlement would have 
been precisely that which Henry had rejected. France seemed about to come 
west of the Alps, whether in t o Saluzzo or in t o the fortresses - some of them 
v i r t u a l l y impregnable - that had been specified (37). The tre a t y of Paris 
therefore caused grave concern i n Madrid. Everything pointed to a French 
desire to disrupt the precarious settlement reached at Vervins, and Charles 
Emmanuel seemed more sinned against than sinning. The Council of State were 
unanimous i n declaring that, i n normal circumstances, the new arrangement 
would have been ample cause f o r a declaration of war. But the ideal reaction 
was not the most r e a l i s t i c . Even P h i l i p himself agreed that the Treasury 
would have to be replenished before Spain could be excused from temporizing 
even i n so important an a f f a i r as t h i s . The best course seemed to be to 
strengthen a l l Spanish f r o n t i e r s , at home and abroad, i n preparation f o r 
the French attack that seemed to be i n the o f f i n g (38). 
As soon as they could, the Council advised P h i l i p to take stronger 
measures, even at the r i s k of exposing his flank. For the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n 
w i t h i n Spain i t s e l f was f a r from favourable throughout our period. The most 
weighty of the frequent memoranda that called f o r better garrisons on the 
northern border with France came to the Council's attention i n the middle of 
(36) AGS EK1603/15; Dumont V i i 3. 
(37) AGS EL430/156,158; AGS EK1602/121. 
(38) AGS EKI426/4. 
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the c r i s i s . The Adelantado of Castile, pointing out the danger from morisco 
and converso> the exhaustion brought about by long wars and depopulation 
and the appalling weakness of peninsular garrisons, advised his colleagues to 
look to home a f f a i r s before they interfered i n I t a l y : "one may l i v e without 
a limb, but not without a head." I n his view, Henry IV was f a r more l i k e l y 
to attack Navarre, to which he l a i d claim, than Milan; or Aragon, where there 
were good numbers of moriscos: or Catalonia, which was f u l l of Frenchmen 
anyway. A l l that he would need would be an English or Dutch attack upon 
Portugal, and his victory i n the north would be assured (39). I n reje c t i n g 
the Adelantado's advice, the Council shewed t h e i r sense of Spain's p r i o r i t i e s . 
Much of what he said was undoubtedly true. But a dire c t threat was being 
levelled at another part of the empire; and the councillors, trained to think 
i n imperial terms, were bound to avert i t . Since there was neither the time 
nor the money to deploy forces i n two places at once, the more immediate 
danger had to be attended t o . Spain had not yet regained the "peninsular 
mentality" that Ganivet was nearly three centuries l a t e r to see as her true 
c a l l i n g (40). I n the eyes of the King and a group of councillors - which 
included Lerma but not the more cautious Ididquez - war had been as good as 
declared. A l l Spain's e f f o r t s ought therefore to be dedicated to the single 
aim of preventing the French occupation of Savoy, Bresse or any of the other 
places mentioned i n the treaty. Come what may, Charles Emmanuel was to be 
given the f u l l e s t support. P h i l i p and the Council therefore decided to 
despatch the new governor of Milan, the Count of Fuentes, with money and 
troops and orders to send f i v e thousand escudos each month to Savoy; he was 
to watch over the Duke's t e r r i t o r i e s as over Philip's own, giving advice to 
Charles Emmanuel and not allowing himself to be stampeded int o hasty action 
by the more excitable Savoyard ministers (41)• 
(39) AGS EI487/I6. 
(40) AGS E1487/17; Ganivet, [»»im. 
(41) AGS E1937/11; AGS E1288/105; Fuentes 167 seqq. 
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Yet there were d i f f i c u l t i e s i n picking up the gauntlet that Henry had 
thrown down. Towards the end of May, the Pope for the f i r s t time made his 
attitude p l a i n to Sesa. Everything he said was intended to dissuade P h i l i p 
from going to war. Gently pointing out the undeniable t r u t h that P h i l i p had 
no legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n whatever f o r breaking the Treaty of Vervins by re-
opening h o s t i l i t i e s , he suggested that the c o n f l i c t with England and the 
United Provinces was burden enough. Charles Emmanuel, perhaps thinking that 
Spanish help was too f a r away to be of use, had f o r better or worse signed 
an agreement with Henry, and he would have to keep his word. Clement would 
rather see Henry east of the Alps than r i s k bringing war to I t a l y (42). 
Faced with the Pope's declaration of i n t e n t , and constantly mindful of the 
emptiness of the Treasury, the Spanish authorities realized that some less-
spectacular solution to the problem would have to be found. The Council, 
meeting i n the King's presence on 25th June, decided to t e l l Clement that 
they would f a l l i n with his wishes. I f f i g h t i n g had already begun, Spanish 
forces would remain passive u n t i l the Pope's reaction to the s i t u a t i o n were 
known; and i f Charles Emmanuel s t i l l held Saluzzo, he should be encouraged, 
fo r the moment, to keep i t , receiving f i f t y thousand ducats to help him to 
do so. But Henry I V s admission to the ranks of the I t a l i a n potentates was 
a matter of supreme importance, not only f o r the sake of future peace but 
also, i n the Council's view, f o r the p u r i t y of Roman Catholicism i n the 
area: af t e r a l l , Charles Emmanuel's greatest opponent i n the recent wars had 
been the Huguenot, Lesdiguieres. Crucial, therefore, to the acceptability 
of t h i s new policy was that the status quo be guaranteed. Henry would have 
to give some sort of security that he would keep the peace a f t e r he had 
received his due from the Duke. The Council l a i d great store by the 
assurance, given to Sesa i n Rome and repeated by the nuncio i n Spain, that 
the Pope would be foremost i n opposing any future French aggression i n I t a l y ; 
and indeed, the Pope had already suggested that, i f Spain and Venice joined 
(42) AGS E9.72/sf, document of 26th May, 1600. 
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with him i n guarding the settlement, Henry would be quite unable to make 
any future headway (43) • If> then, Henry played his proper part, Spain 
would be s a t i s f i e d : Charles Emmanuel would be ordered by P h i l i p to hand to 
the French the t e r r i t o r i e s that had been agreed upon, and the Pope and a l l 
the world would see 
"that Your Majesty's avowed aim i s to maintain peace and public 
t r a n q u i l i t y i n I t a l y , as did your late father f o r many years - and 
t h i s i s the justest cause that Your Majesty could espouse." 
(Que e l f i n de VM desnudamente va enderezando a conservar en I t a l i a 
l a paz y quietud pdblica como lo hizo e l Rey nuestro senor que haya 
g l o r i a nor muchos anos, que es l a causa mds justa que VM debe seguir 
Spain's resolve was soon sorely tested. For, true to his rash nature, 
Charles Emmanuel took matters in t o his own hands once more by repudiating 
the Treaty of Paris and defying Henry to take what he could. Spain, though 
not unsympathetic, could not go to his aid: " i t would be highly inconvenient 
f o r Your Majesty to perform acts of war without j u s t i f i c a t i o n " (45). Even 
i f the Duke would not wait f o r the Pope's decision, Spain would. But Spain's 
sin c e r i t y was unknown or disbelieved i n Paris. Despite his e a r l i e r reports 
that Henry would not go to war, Juan Bautista de Tasis now saw that the 
French king was greatly annoyed. Henry f u l l y expected that P h i l i p , even i f 
he was too af r a i d to put his armies i n t o the f i e l d (as his ambassador i n 
Madrid assured him was the case), would cert a i n l y send secret help to Charles 
Emmanuel; and he had been t o l d by the Duke himself that i t had been Spain, 
and not Savoy, that had insisted upon the repudiation of the treaty (46). 
French suspicions and Savoyard l i e s had by early August led to the mobilization 
of French forces; by the eleventh, war had been declared upon Charles Emmanuel, 
and Henry began to move int o Bresse and Savoy (47). 
(43) AGS E972/sf, document of 25th May, 1600; AGS E1288/152. 
(44) i b i d . 
(45) AGS E1288/156. 
(46) Rochepot 12. 
(47) Cano Saluzzo 123-
*xoria p 
(44). ) 
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Despite t h e i r anger at Henry's unjust accusations, the Council of State 
held to t h e i r previous opinion: i f Henry would give the necessary undertaking 
to keep the peace, Spain would f u l f i l her part of the bargain. I t was not an 
ideal solution, f o r i d e a l l y Henry would never be allowed to set foot i n I t a l y . 
But at f i r s t , Spain could not afford to be other than cautious. The dead-
weight of the Flemish war was too hampering: "we cannot attend to everything", 
i t was observed. The one dissentient i n the Council, Chinchdn, believed that 
the only course was to oppose Henry's f o u l plot to intimidate Charles Emmanuel 
at every point. To t h i s , his colleagues gave a reply noteworthy f o r i t s 
resignation: 
"for fear of what might happen, Your Majesty should not assume the 
burden of a war as unjust as t h i s would be. I f Your Majesty keeps your 
cause j u s t , i t may be that we may expect of Our Lord that a l l w i l l come 
r i g h t . " 
(Por sospecha de lo que puede suceder no se debe VM cargar de una 
guerra tan i n j u s t a como lo serla e"sta y que justificando VM su causa 
sea de esperar en nuestro sefior que todo sucedera' mejor (48). ) 
France's declaration of war against Savoy, however, was another matter 
altogether. No Spanish monarch could afford to disregard so direct a 
challenge. France had acted with excessive freedom i n the a f f a i r , but she 
would do so no more. Whatever the ri g h t s of the matter, Charles Emmanuel 
was too valuable an a l l y to lose; common sense, no less than honour, demanded 
that action be taken. Tasis was therefore ordered to deliver an ultimatum: 
i f Henry wanted Saluzzo, he must f i r s t evacuate his troops from Bresse and 
Savoy. And i f , as the Council expected, Henry shewed his true colours by 
reje c t i n g Philip's wholly reasonable demand, he would l i v e to regret i t . 
By giving him a l a s t chance, 
"Your Majesty w i l l have kept f a i t h with God, with man and with what 
i s owed to your greatness, to your noble s p i r i t and to the flower of 
your youth, and no-one w i l l be able to impute to Your Majesty any 
(48) AGS EK1593/5-
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motive other' than the pious zeal which you have f o r the well-being 
and extension of Christendom. I f the King of France does not comply 
with so jus t a demand, i t w i l l be a sign that his sins b l i n d him to 
the favour that God has shewn and i s shewing him, and lead him to c a l l 
down upon himself the due reward of his pride. He i s not so young, 
healthy or r i c h , nor are his a f f a i r s at home so well-ordered or 
acceptable to his former followers, nor w i l l the war i n I t a l y be so 
cheap and easy, that a l l i n a l l the result may not be very d i f f e r e n t 
from the expectation - especially i f the Pope comes to support Your 
Majesty's just cause, as he has offered to do." 
(VM habrd curaplido con Dios con los hombres y con lo que debe a su 
grandeza y gallardfa de £nimo y a l a f l o r i d a edad en que VM se ha11a 
sin que nadie lo pueda a t r i b u i r sino a l santo celo que VM tiene del 
bien y aumento de l a Cristiandad; y s i e l Rey de Francia no viniere 
en tan justa demanda sera1 serial que sus pecados le ciegan para que 
no conozca l a merced que Dios le ha hecho y hace y provoque e l justo 
castigo de su soberbia pues n i es tan mozo n i tiene tanta salud n i 
hacienda ni las cosas de su reino tan asentadas n i tan gratificadas 
a los que por l o - pasado le han servido ni serd le guerra en I t a l i a 
tan f a c i l y barata que juntandose todo no pueda esperar muy diferentes 
sucesos de los que se imagina mayormente s i e l papa acude a l a j u s t i c i a 
de l a causa de VM como lo ha ofrecido (49)• ) 
The exact nature of the action to be taken against Henry was s t i l l not 
specified, for there was one las t chance that war could be averted. I f the 
Pope could extract securities from Henry, Spain would be s a t i s f i e d . But 
from Sesa's despatches, the Council realized that, despite his former 
assurances, Clement was not prepared to be f i r m with France, an impression 
that was confirmed by a l e t t e r from the Pope himself (50). With the l a s t 
l i n e of defence gone, P h i l i p and the Council had to prepare t h e i r own cam-
paign. On 6th September, another meeting was held i n the King's presence. 
At once, P h i l i p announced that he was w i l l i n g to take a personal part i n 
the handling of the c r i s i s , p l a i n l y thinking of commanding any m i l i t a r y 
operations i n I t a l y . The one councillor to give enthusiastic support to 
the aspiring warrior-king was his favourite, Lerma. Over a t h i r d of the 
(49) AGS EK1593/6; AGS EKI4 51/16. 
(50) AGS E1288/158,159. 
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consulta i s taken up with his speech. He revealed to his colleagues that 
Henry IV - " e l francos", as he rather rudely called him - was said to have 
promised Protestant preachers free r e i n i n Saluzzo (51). P h i l i p therefore 
could not stand i d l y by: i n the t r a d i t i o n of his godly ancestors, he should 
be ready to devote a l l his resources, and i f necessary his very person, to 
opposing Henry (52). Even though only six days before the Council had 
bewailed the impos s i b i l i t y of maintaining adequate f r o n t i e r defences i n 
Spain i t s e l f , Lerma urged that ways and means of r a i s i n g troops and money 
f o r service i n I t a l y be explored, so that Spanish reputation be enhanced by 
a sizeable campaign (53)- The Pope, too, was to be taken to task f o r having 
been patently remiss throughout the whole a f f a i r . Whereas P h i l i p had always 
shewn the highest regard f o r Clement, the l a t t e r had not reciprocated: i t 
was a poor return f o r l o y a l t y to be suspected of self-seeking. Lerma, with 
his colleagues' approval, advised the King to send a strongly-worded auto-
graph l e t t e r to Rome, urging Clement to do his duty (54.) • 
P h i l i p and Lerma were alone i n t h e i r euphoria. Naturally, the rest of 
the Council had said that Spain should be proud of so high-spirited a young 
monarch, and they expressed t h e i r profound gratitude to the King f o r his 
selfless offer. But they could hardly t e l l him to his face that his warlike 
impulses were better curbed. When the three confidential advisers - Ididquez 
Miranda and the Confessor - met l a t e r i n the same month to discuss the issues 
raised i n the recent meeting, more moderate advice was given and more moderat 
words used. As expected, the Pope had l a t e l y w r i t t e n to say that the surest 
way to peace was to l e t Henry have Saluzzo so that Christian princes could 
then combine to launch a long-overdue Crusade. I n response, the junta 
(51) The source of his information i s not clear. 
(52) "Es cosa tan propia de rey tan cat61ico como VM imitando lo que sus 
progenitores han acosturabrado opondrsele con todas sus fuerzas y su 
re a l persona s i fuere menester." 
(53) "Pues s i no se entrase con ese pie no lucuria e l servicio del reino." 
(54) AGS El856/sf, document of 7th September, 1600. 
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reiterated the policy that had already been decided upon: i f Henry gave 
adequate securities to keep the peace, Spain would acquiesce i n the cession 
of Saluzzo, and so the matter would end. I n contrast to Lerma's righteous 
indignation at the prospect of Protestantism i n those parts, however, the 
.junta shewed no eagerness to wage holy war. They expressed sincere regret 
that Roman Catholicism i n I t a l y should be so threatened, but were content 
to recommend that the Pope be t o l d that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to act was his. 
Ph i l i p would f e e l bound to swell his forces i n Milan to protect his subjects 
from doctrinal assaults: but no more than t h i s ought to be expected of him. 
Clement had received adequate warning and, the .junta hoped, could be trusted 
to take the steps that the s i t u a t i o n demanded (55). 
Grave news from Savoy, however, forced the councillors to concur at 
least i n part with t h e i r king and his favourite. So rapid and decisive had 
been French progress that Charles Emmanuel had become, i n Henry I V s 
f e l i c i t o u s phrase, "le due sans Savoie" (56). And, encouraged by his success, 
Henry was becoming bolder. According to an intercepted despatch from the 
papal envoy i n France to the curia, the King had openly announced that he 
would seek s a t i s f a c t i o n of the other claims that he had against the Duke, 
secure i n the b e l i e f that P h i l i p would not dare to oppose him. He had 
replied contemptuously to the envoy's attempts to arrange a truce: the Pope's 
judgement, he said, had been impaired by his benevolence. To a suggestion 
that Geneva might be adequate compensation, Henry had said that he had no 
wish to lose the friendship of the Swiss cantons, which he valued more than 
any c i t y . His chancellor expressed similar views: his master could consider 
nothing less than a f r o n t i e r bounded by the Rhone and f u l l indemnity f o r the 
costs that he had incurred during the campaign. The effect of the information 
upon the Council of State was decisive. Negotiation had been t r i e d and had 
(55) AGS E1288/159. 
(56) LM v 307. 
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f a i l e d . I f Henry was so unmindful of the Pope's numerous favours as to make 
such a series of pronouncements, force was the only l i k e l y means of reaching 
a just settlement. Fuentes should therefore be sent reinforcements "as 
though f o r a great campaign"; and the Council f e l t strongly enough to endorse 
- t h i s time unasked - Philip's proposal to cross to I t a l y i f the need arose, 
much to the King's joy (57). 
But even anger and dismay could not t o t a l l y dispel the Council's 
habitual caution. Within three days, t h e i r belligerence had gone. Sesa had 
sent the all-important news that the Pope had decided to end his apparently 
endless lethargy by sending a cardinal-legate to Henry with a proposal to 
leave Charles Emmanuel with Saluzzo and a f r o n t i e r up to the mountains (58). 
Once more, there seemed a chance of a settlement without a costly, and perhaps 
risky, recourse to arms. Constant defeats had shewn the poor q u a l i t y of the 
Savoyard army. The obvious compensation - a strong Spanish force with which 
to back i t up - had i n the recent past proved v i r t u a l l y impracticable. There 
had been disgracefully long delays i n sending reinforcements to Milan; and 
although the detection and punishment of those responsible had been suggested 
by Lerma and approved by the Council, the damage had been done (59). Sesa 
had f o r some time suspected that the Pope's lukewarmness was, i n part at 
least, to be explained by the torpor that notoriously attended the deployment 
of Spanish troops; and the Council was convinced that Henry IV had been so 
adventurous f o r t h i s very reason (60). Since there was l i t t l e hope of 
remedying the defect, the Pope's i n i t i a t i v e was to be welcomed. Naturally 
enough, his idea of terms aroused some comment. Ididquez, agreeing with an 
opinion expressed by the Constable of Castile some weeks before, suggested 
that to give Henry a part of Savoy was tantamount to giving him a l l of i t , 
(57) AGS E1288/]6l; AGS El856/sf, document of 13th October, 1600. 
(58) "...y los demds lugares de los montes a su parte." 
(59) AGS E1856/sf, document of 7th October, 1600. 
(60) AGS E972/sf, document of 26th May, 1600. 
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and that perhaps Spanish interests would be better served by agreeing to 
the cession of Saluzzo ( 6 l ) . His colleagues thought otherwise. Saluzzo had 
by t h i s time become such a diplomatic shibboleth that prestige would be 
better served i f Charles Emmanuel kept the marquisate. These, however, were 
comparatively minor points: the essential thing was to end the a f f a i r grace-
f u l l y (62). A l l were therefore agreed that Fuentes be given an open commission 
to advise the Duke as he thought f i t , according to circumstances. The snows 
would quickly bring the campaigning-season to an end, and the French were 
too well-ensconsed i n t h e i r captured fortresses to be dislodged. Negotiation 
was the only way (63)-
Philip's reply to the Council's prudent advice was affirmative but b r i e f , 
f o r he s t i l l longed f o r adventure. For nearly a week he pondered the la t e s t 
news from Rome and the Council's reaction to i t . He was not disposed to 
allow his hopes of martial glory to fade so easily: why should Henry IV be 
the only monarch on the b a t t l e f i e l d ? He therefore sent Franqueza to the 
Council with a short note that registered once more his determination to go 
wherever need called him, both to resolve the Saluzzo question and also f o r 
a greater good - "the preservation and extension of the Catholic r e l i g i o n 
and our reputation i n public a f f a i r s . " The Council could not allow such 
t a l k to go unchecked. They expressed once more t h e i r deep thankfulness at 
having so fine and so conscientious a master, but were forced nevertheless 
to state t h e i r considered opinion with unmistakeable c l a r i t y : P h i l i p should 
stay at home. He should f e e l under no moral obligation to take to the 
f i e l d : there was no unanimity as to whether modern rulers ought to go to 
war i n person or stay at home to supervise the operations of t h e i r delegates, 
f o r experience suggested that either course could lead to success. Particular 
circumstances were therefore all-important; and f o r a l l Philip's j u s t i f i a b l e 
(61) cf AGS E1288/4.2. 
(62) "La reputacidn est^ en acabar bien e l negocio." 
(63) AGS El856/sf, document of 16th October, 1600. 
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anger at Henry's disgraceful and unkingly behaiyour; i n the present case 
they seemed to t i p the balance against his leaving Spain. He s t i l l had no 
son, and to establish the succession was, i n the Council's view, "the matter 
of the greatest importance f o r your crown and, indeed, f o r Christendom 
i t s e l f . " Moreover, at the moment he had no money. He would therefore be 
wise to postpone shewing his personal valour u n t i l some more opportune time 
- f o r there would be no shortage of occasions i n the future, whether the 
struggle were to prove to be against the French or against the Turk. The 
Council ended with an impassioned piece of special pleading: 
"the Council with due humility beseeches Your Majesty to defer your 
departure and to look at the matter with your great prudence and 
sense of Christian duty. The more determined Your Majesty i s to go, 
the more laudable w i l l be your decision to change your mind and f a l l 
i n with the opinion of the Council, so closely-reasoned as i t i s . I n 
the meantime, we sh a l l be able to prepare a l l that i s necessary f o r so 
great an expedition so that, i f the need arise, a l l w i l l be ready and 
the a f f a i r may be put i n t o execution without delay and with decisive 
effect and reputation, dealing with the I t a l i a n question with men and 
money without losing time. By waiting, Your Majesty's cause w i l l be 
the more j u s t i f i e d before God, the Pope and the world, and i t w i l l be 
the proper time to go to the fray on behalf of r e l i g i o n and the 
reputation both of Your Majesty and of a l l Spain." 
(Suplica a VM e l consejo con l a humildad que debe suspender l a ida 
mirando y considerdndolo con su gran prudencia y cristiandad y cuanto 
mas resuelto esta- VM en i r sera' significacidn de mayor valor dejarlo 
por conformarse con e l parecer del consejo con causas tan precisas 
como a VM se proponen; y entretanto se podrd i r preveniendo lo que 
es menester para tan gran jornada con f i n que llegando e l caso l o estd 
todo y se pueda ejecutar sin dil a c i d n y con mucha autoridad y reputacid 
lo que entonces parecera fomentando sin perder tiempo lo de I t a l i a con 
gente y dinero y con haber aguardado este suceso estard mds j u s t i f i c a d a 
l a causa de VM con Dios e l papa y e l mundo y serd l a propia sazdn de 
volver por l a r e l i g i d n y por l a r e p u t a c i 6 n de VM y de toda Espana ( 6 4 ) . 
(64) AGS E2636/124. 
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P h i l i p took the Council's skilfully-tendered advice well. Agreeing 
with the force of t h e i r arguments, he announced that he would postpone his 
expedition to I t a l y and only go as f a r as Barcelona, where he could wait 
upon events. The Council could hardly f e e l reassured: P h i l i p might s t i l l 
cross the Mediterranean. They were therefore obliged to state b l u n t l y the 
other, rather more sordid, reason fo r the advice that they had given: P h i l i p 
had not enough money. He had just completed a round of t r i p s , made at the 
time of his marriage, and at great cost. His f i r s t m i l i t a r y venture, that 
which i n the eyes of the world would set the tone f o r his entire reign, 
would require a huge sum. He was "the greatest monarch i n the world" and 
his expedition would have to be the grandest and most elaborate ever known 
(65). He simply could not afford to make the necessary preparations; indeed, 
i n the opinion of some councillors, there was not even enough money to 
finance a royal progress to Barcelona. And i n the end, i t could not be 
denied that, although Henry IV had taken personal control of French operations, 
he had done so i n upholding legal claims that he had gained by the Treaty of 
Paris: P h i l i p , on the other hand, was bound by no such necessity (66). For-
tunately, P h i l i p was convinced: fortunately, because w i t h i n three weeks he 
and his Council were forced to acknowledge that there were barely enough 
resources to cover the welter of existing commitments i n Flanders and Ireland,, 
l e t alone elsewhere (67). The intervention of the Pope seemed to have saved 
them a l l . They could c l i n g to the straw-like hope that negotiation would 
put a l l to righ t s , or at least give them time gradually to strengthen Milan 
(68). 
The hope proved vain, as i t was bound to do. Henry IV was not i n a 
conciliatory mood. He continued, quite unjustly, to suspect Spain of 
encouraging Charles Emmanuel to be troublesome and was s t i l l s a t i s f i e d that 
(65) "Ha de ser en grandeza de fuerzas y en l i b e r a l i d a d l a mayor que se 
haya leldo." 
(66) AGS E2636/124,123. 
(67) qvif-57- qvs PMf<ost<\<\. 
(68) AGS E2023/7. 
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P h i l i p would not intervene with his own forces (69)- He therefore rejected 
the Duke's off e r of Saluzzo and an indemnity of between 200,000 and 300,000 
e"cus: the marquisate had been so despoiled that the indemnity should be raised 
to a m i l l i o n . By Christmas, Charles Emmanuel had been forced to change his 
t a c t i c s . His of f e r was now most handsome - Bresse, Bugey and "7eroime as f a r 
as the Rhone, with the reservation of a corridor through which the Spanish 
Road could be kept open. To t h i s , Henry added further demands: the cession 
of the four strongholds i n Dauphine* - Centallo, Demonte, Roquesparvieres 
and Chateau-Dauphin - and an indemnity of 300,000 £cus. He also insisted 
that any corridor be under his sovereignty, but gave his kingly word that 
he would allow Spanish troops to pass through i t . But even before his 
harshness had become known i n Madrid, P h i l i p and the Council had thrown 
caution to the winds. Compared with what was l a t e r to be demanded, the 
proposed settlement that Aldobrandino had just forced Fuentes to endorse -
the surrender of Saluzzo with no French securities f o r keeping the peace, 
but with an obligation upon Spain to guarantee Charles Emmanuel's good 
f a i t h - was comparatively mild (70). Yet Spain found i t i ntolerable. Henry 
seemed to have played his cards well: P h i l i p had been gulled i n t o leaving 
Charles Emmanuel defenceless, and was about to have his strategic interests 
damaged as a r e s u l t . There was no certainty that, before he moved i n t o 
Saluzzo, Henry would not dismantle the Savoyard f o r t s that he had captured. 
Nor could Spain be sure that Henry, from his great new base i n I t a l y , would 
not launch a series of attacks upon her possessions as former French kings 
had done. Both Spain's pride and sense of security were at stake. The 
Council therefore had to advise P h i l i p to mobilize his forces on a grand 
scale: f o r t y companies should be raised i n Spain, at a cost of f o r t y thousand 
ducats, "arranging everything with such care and resolution that whoever 
wishes to disturb Your Majesty or our a l l i e s may be checked." There were 
(69) cf AGS EK1603/106,119; f o r Henry's a t t i t u d e , v.LM v 334-
(70) AGS El430/282,284.; Rochepot 55-
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l i k e l y to be grave d i f f i c u l t i e s . The Council admitted that snow had f o r the 
moment made campaigning impossible, and P h i l i p observed, f o r once appreciating 
the point without the Council's prompting, that money was short (71). But 
Spain had reached the end of her patience: Henry IV was to be taught a lesson. 
Once again, more moderate counsels quickly prevailed. The decision to 
take on 30 crushing a f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y burden had been taken i n the 
heat of the moment, and the Council found themselves able to acquiesce i n the 
still-unfavourable terms of the treaty f i n a l l y agreed upon by Henry and the 
representatives of Charles Emmanuel at Lyons on 17th January, 1601. Whether 
such would have been the case i f Henry had been able to have his way must 
remain uncertain. But Henry had d i f f i c u l t i e s of his own. Although he was 
i n the future to be reticent about his change of mind - he referred vaguely 
to "various reasons, both of a general and a particular nature" i n a l e t t e r 
to his father-in-law - he was more e x p l i c i t to his ambassador i n Spain: "my 
great desire to please His Holiness and my army's obvious need f o r peace" 
had forced him to moderate his terms (72). Although Lesdiguieres was perhaps 
harsh i n comparing him to a merchant and Charles Emmanuel to a prince, Henry 
had indeed to give way a good deal (73)- Saluzzo was confirmed as part of 
Savoy, as were Centallo, Demonte and Rocquesparvieres. France received the 
provinces of Bugey, Bresse and Gex and the fortress of Chateau-Dauphin, thus 
gaining a f r o n t i e r on the northern and western banks of the Rhone and a f o o t -
hold i n Piedmont. For 100,000 e*cus> a corridor was established between the 
Pont de Gre'sin over the Rhone and the borders of the Franc he-Comte' a few 
miles away, l i n k i n g the l a t t e r with Savoy and so i n theory keeping the 
Spanish Road i n t a c t . Savoy, however, was bound not to f o r t i f y the corridor 
at any point, nor were the troops that passed along i t to take supplies from 
the surrounding countryside without pr i o r consent. As an indemnity, Savoy 
(71) AGS E1856/sf, document of December, 1600: "yo espero en Dios que no 
faltara' hacienda para pagarles." 
72) LM v 369; Rochepot 63. 
73) Rott Henri IV... 98. 
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was to pay 100,000 dcus and, more serious, to lose the a r t i l l e r y and 
munitions belonging to her occupied fortresses (74). 
The treaty s a t i s f i e d none but the Pope. Lesdiguieres sourly commented 
that the single town of Carmagnola on the p l a i n of Piedmont, captured by 
the French but soon to be evacuated, was of more strategic value than a l l 
the lands that Charles Emmanuel had agreed to cede (75). The Duke delayed 
his r a t i f i c a t i o n of the treaty u n t i l March, and even spoke of handing over 
to Spain the deputies who had so badly looked af t e r his interests at Lyons 
(76). Of the Spaniards, both Fuentes and Ledesma considered i t a defeat: 
P h i l i p had spent two m i l l i o n ducats and raised a large army to prevent 
such a settlement, but had achieved nothing that could save his brother-in-
law from severe embarrassment (77). I t must have been sorely tempting f o r 
c 
the Council to approve of Fuentes1 e f f o r t s t o persuade Charles Emmanuel 
not to r a t i f y (78). But, b i t t e r l y disappointed as they were, they could 
not advise P h i l i p to do other than recognize the f a i t accompli. A formal 
agreement had been signed by the two opposing parties and the papal legate, 
and no matter how disadvantageous the terms, Spain had no r i g h t to i n t e r f e r e . 
Far from punishing the offending Savoyard diplomats, P h i l i p would have to 
uphold the tre a t y that they had signed. The most unsatisfactory provision 
- the fact that the m i l i t a r y corridor was at the mercy of the French - was 
not, however, hopelessly so. At some future date, Spain might be able to 
buy the s t r i p from Savoy. I n any case, as the legate Aldobrandino pointed 
out to Juan Andrea Doria i n a remarkable interview held i n Genoa i n February, 
France would only be able to block the corridor by declaring war, and he 
gave an assurance that, i f Henry did so, the Pope would oppose him with an 
army of his own (79). There was also one grain of s o l i d comfort. Apart 
(74) Jeannin 347-8; Dumont V i i 10. 
(75) G. Zeller 118. 
(76) AGS E1290/130; AGS EK1630/55; AGS E1290/13-
(77) AGS E1290/130,13-
(78) AGS E1290/13-
(79) AGS E1481/77. 
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from the single isolated fortress of Chateau-Dauphin, France had been kept 
west of the Alps* and Saluzzo, the ostensible casus b e l l i , was to remain 
with Spain's a l l y . For better or worse, therefore, Spain acceded to the 
Treaty of Lyons with a good grace (80). And i f they had learned nothing 
else, P h i l i p and his advisers had realized that the time f o r an open 
confrontation with France was not yet. 
(80) AGS EKI4.51/25. 
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V. THE COLD WAR. 
Although the Saluzzo c r i s i s was the most serious confrontation between 
Spain and France i n the years that immediately followed the Treaty of 
Vervins, there were a good many lesser incidents that soured relations 
between the two countries. Historians no longer cre d i t Henry IV with a 
"Grand Dessein" ( l ) : but i n the hope that Spain's commitments would remain 
as many and burdensome as possible, he undoubtedly made i t his business to 
foment trouble for his r i v a l wherever he could. When peace with Spain was 
being mooted, he had been reluctant to act without his a l l i e s and had wished 
to see them both included i n the 1598 settlement. Once the treaty had been 
signed, however, he strongly encouraged them to continue t h e i r quarrels with 
Spain and so f i g h t his battles f o r hira. The Dutch needed l i t t l e urging, but 
the English were less unbending. As France and Savoy slowly but inexorably 
moved towards h o s t i l i t i e s , there seemed a r e a l chance that Spain and England 
might reach agreement (2). Henry could not well refuse to allow the two 
sides the use of Boulogne f o r t h e i r t a l k s , but he did his best to put the 
apple of discord i n t h e i r midst. Shortly before the formal sessions began, 
he was quick to lend his weight to the English opinion that they deserved 
precedence over the Spanish deputies; Villeroy, standing next to the throne 
during an audience granted to the English ambassador, observed that England 
had always taken precedence over Spain down to the time of the Emperor 
Charles V, and that to open the question would be to damage English prestige 
(3). I n the same way, Henry t r i e d to discourage James I from ending the war 
on his accession i n 1603, receiving i n return the t a r t reply that the new 
King was not prepared to prolong a f i g h t simply to keep his French brother 
i n peace (4). Although i n neither case was his influence of decisive 
importance, Henry's machinations were known and detested i n Madrid. 
(1) cf P f i s t e r , ^ sam. 
(2) qvi p-ffaf*^. 
(3) Winwood i, l e t t e r of I4/24 May, 1600. 
(4) CSPV v 90. 
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I n Germany, too, Henry did his best to cause trouble. His l i n k s with 
the Protestant princes, who had provided him with mercenary troops during 
the recent wars, were i n good repair, and they looked to him, as they had 
looked to Francis I , as t h e i r natural a l l y against the Habsburgs (5)-
Despite his heavy debts to most of them - Anhalt was pressing claims 
against the restored House of Bourbon i n 1818— the alliance was to remain 
f i r m (6). I n his capacity as u n o f f i c i a l patron, Henry encouraged the princes 
to oppose Spanish interests wherever possible. When the Admiral of Aragon 
led his troops on to imperial s o i l and occupied J'ulich i n September, 1598, 
Vil l e r o y urged the Westphalian c i r c l e t o act. Thanks to French pressure, 
a meeting of the princes i n Frankfurt-am-Mein i n 1600 agreed i n pri n c i p l e 
to support the United Provinces against Spain (7). Henry was further 
i n s i s t e n t that Lutheran and Calvinist forget t h e i r differences and unite 
against the common enemy: 
"you can take no decision more useful f o r yourselves than to unite; 
i t behoves you to wipe out a l l grudges and occasions of discord so 
as to dedicate your united forces to the common weal, which you know 
to stand i n need of advancement: and i f you have any doubts on t h i s 
score, mark well that the enemies of your l i b e r t y are doing what they 
can to prevent i t . " 
(Sachez que vous ne pouvez prendre de resolution qui vous s o i t plus 
u t i l e que de vous unir tous ensemble, car i l convient d'oublier et 
de mettre sous le pied toutes sortes de de*plaisirs et de r i o t t e s pour 
tendre d'une commune main a l'avancement de l a cause publique, au 
besoin que vous voyez qu'elle en a, et s i vous voulez connaitre combien 
votre intelligence vous y importe, consid^rez bien que les ennemis de 
votre l i b e r t y font ce qu'ils peuvent pour l'empecher. (8) ) 
The greatest danger posed by Henry IV i n Germany was his interest i n 
the vexed question of the imperial succession. P h i l i p I I had already lighted 
upon a suitable candidate f o r the kingship of the Romans i n the Archduke 
(5) cf AGS EK1603/37. Juan Bautista de Tasis noted that Henry would 
probably need German reinforcements before embarking upon a campaign 
against Savoy. 
(6) Anquez 63-
(7) Anquez 73,77. 
(8) Henry IV to the Landgrave of Hesse, 1599: Anquez 120. 
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Albert, and his son confirmed the choice (9). But the delays caused by the 
paranoic suspicions of the Emperor Rudolph gave Henry an opportunity to 
disrupt Spain's plans. Of a l l the candidates, Albert was the least accept-
able to him, f o r his s t r i c t l o y a l t y to Spain and his uncompromising d i s l i k e 
of Protestants. At one stage, he considered putting himself forward as a 
candidate, but i n the end reconciled himself to the prospect of one of 
Albert's less r i g i d relations as the future heir (10). Spain, however, 
could only think of Henry's ambition and ruthlessness. Although his own 
candidature would stand small chance of success, he could be expected to do 
his utmost to break the Habsburg empire by fostering the claim of some 
Protestant princeling. The thought was h o r r i f y i n g . I f Rudolph were succeeded 
by other than a Habsburg and heir to the house's glorious t r a d i t i o n s , the 
very foundations of the world would be put out of j o i n t . A pol i t i q u e , a 
Protestant or a Frenchman could be expected to make peace with the Turk and 
dismember Hungary; rob the Roman Catholic Church of her nominal lay leader 
and weaken the power of her effectual standard-bearer, the King of Spain; 
and completely isolate the Low Countries from the rest of the Habsburg 
empire. For the Council of State, therefore, 
"the solution of t h i s problem i s of the utmost importance f o r the 
universal good of Christendom. I f once the imperial d i g n i t y were to 
f a l l into the hands of the King of France or one of the heretic 
electors, the damage would be irreparable." 
(El remedio de e l l o es e l negocio mas importante a l bien universal 
de l a Cristiandad ... Serfan irreparables los danos que re s u l t a r i a n 
s i l a dignidad imperial cayese en e l Rey de Francia o en alguno de 
los electores herejes.) 
(9) qvi p ^ z i * ^ . 
(10) Anquez thought that Henry's intervention was caused by a report i n 
the summer of 1600 that P h i l i p I I I wished to make a bid f o r the t i t l e . 
I n f a c t , at no time did the Spanish authorities take such a candidature 
seriously, and Henry's a c t i v i t i e s antedate by at least six months his 
receipt of the allegation: Anquez 139; AGS E706/sf, document of 15th 
January, 1600. 
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Although Spain's commitments at the time of the Council 's memorandum were 
unusually pressing - Albert had been worsted at the Bat t le of the Dunes i n 
June, the s i t ua t i on i n Savoy was c r i t i c a l and the i l l - f a t e d I r i s h expedition 
had just been sent o f f - there could be no doubt of Spain's r e spons ib i l i t i e s 
"we must seek the solut ion wi th the greatest possible attentiveness, 
regardless of cost or labour, f o r besides being highly f i t t i n g f o r 
Your Majesty i n the capacity of defender of the f a i t h , upon i t s success 
depends the securi ty and peace of Your Majesty's realms." 
(Se debe atender a l remedio con l a mayor asistencia que sea posible 
s in perdonar a ningiin gasto n i t rabajo que se ofrece, pues dem^s de 
ser tan digna y propia de VM como defensor de l a fe consiste en e l 
buen suceso de e l l a l a seguridad y quietud de los reinos de VM ( l l ) . ) 
But undoubtedly the most irksome of Henry's a c t i v i t i e s was the help 
that he continued to send to the Dutch. The second clause of the Treaty of 
Vervins had not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned the rebels, but each signatory Had 
undertaken not to aid the enemies of the other (12). O f f i c i a l l y , Henry 
made a show of respecting the provis ion and would, when prompted, issue 
proclamations that forbade m i l i t a r y service wi th the United Provinces; and 
i f taxed wi th a p a r t i c u l a r l y f l agran t breach, he would express his anger 
and demand appropriate act ion from his o f f i c i a l s (13). This, however, 
could cut no i ce . A Dutch ambassador openly resided i n Paris, and large 
sums of money were annually remitted to the United Provinces - i n 1605 they 
reached the l e v e l of about a tenth of royal income (14). Henry f i r m l y 
believed that a Spanish v i c to ry i n Flanders would bring r u i n upon France 
and that the Dutch war alone had b r id l ed Spain's "inordinate ambition" (15). 
Since t h e i r own expostulations could not be other than vain, the Spaniards 
placed t h e i r hope i n the Pope, who was expected to complain of Henry's 
constant amity wi th the enemies of Spain and of Roman Catholicism a l i k e . 
(11) AGS E2323/116, 25th November, 1600. 
(12) AHN E2776/10. 
(13) AGS EKl602/62,86; AGS EK1603/79; AGS EK1605/153-
(14) Buisseret, 82, f o r a table of expenditure from 1598 u n t i l 1610: the 
amount f o r 1601 i s missing. 
(15) L-Mv 572. 
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Since, however, Clement could not a f f o r d to offend Henry and thus only-
made his disapproval known i n f a t h e r l y l e t t e r s , Spain needed some other 
form of r e l i e f i f Henry's plans were to be thwarted (16). 
Such r e l i e f was found i n an attempt to pay Henry back i n his own coin . 
He had no shortage of enemies w i t h i n France. The Edict of Nantes had been 
to one side inadequate and to the other excessive (17). The King's keen 
desire to mend his finances made him enemies amongst the needy n o b i l i t y 
who had, wi th some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , expected to receive royal largesse, and 
Tasis noted that because of t h i s Henry had t o be slow to offend them i n 
other matters (18). The powerful Guise f a c t i o n had by no means fo rg iven 
t h e i r old opponent. I n token of t h e i r wish to continue on good terms wi th 
the Habsburgs, they gave a warm welcome i n Nancy to Albert and Isabel la 
as the l a t t e r were making t h e i r way to Flanders i n 1599- They at least had 
stayed i n France: Mercoeur, disgusted wi th Henry, was on his way to j o i n 
Count Charles of Mansfeldt i n the war against the Turk i n Hungary (19). 
For a l l t h i s potential ly-combusti le mater ial , Juan Bautista de Tasis was 
b l i n d to the opportunit ies of causing trouble f o r Henry, and claimed that 
there was no French subject f i t t e d to be a t o o l f o r P h i l i p (20). Others 
were more hopeful . I n the squabbles between Henry and his n o b i l i t y , the 
Duke of Biron, who governed the duchy of Burgundy, came increasingly to 
the fore as the po ten t i a l r ingleader (21). Spain had already made contact 
wi th him i n the l a t e r years of the French war. Although he had been named 
as a member of the war-party i n 1596, by the autumn of the same year Tasis, 
at that time an o f f i c i a l w i th the army i n Flanders, saw him as a po ten t i a l 
(16) Even Tasis, who from the f i r s t doubted that Henry would go to war 
over Saluzzo, was perpetually nervous about his designs upon the 
Low Countries. 
(17) c f Mousnier, passim. 
(18) AGS EK1602/70. 
(19) AGS E616/177,178. 
(20) AGS EK1603/4.9. 
(21) AGS E619/60. The most recent work on Spain's re la t ions wi th Biron 
i s that by Sr Cano de Gardoqui. I t s usefulness i s severely l i m i t e d , 
however, by the author's examination of only part of the available 
sources. 
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a l l y . He Relieved that i f Biron were paid twenty or twenty-f ive thousand 
escudos each month, he would mobilize numerous Leaguer dissidents against 
Henry (22). The plan was cautiously approved by P h i l i p I I : i f Tasis could 
guarantee that the investment would pay regular and tangible dividends, he 
should pursue the matter (23)- Apparently, Tasis could not, and the matter 
was allowed to drop. 
Towards the end of the Saluzzo c r i s i s , however, Fuentes took up the 
a f f a i r . Biron had t o l d him that he and ce r ta in of his f r i ends - Montmorency, 
the Constable of France, Soissons, Auvergne and J o i n v i l l e - were w i l l i n g to 
a l l y wi th P h i l i p I I I i n peace, war or neu t r a l i t y (24)• These were amongst 
the most i l l u s t r i o u s and powerful names i n France; the ent i re proposi t ion 
savoured of another Treaty of J o i n v i l l e . The report was immensely important 
- too important to entrust to the Council of State. I t was therefore sent 
to the .junta de t res f o r the a t ten t ion of Idiaquez, Miranda and Cdrdoba. 
There was no doubt of t h e i r in te res t . P h i l i p had been presented wi th an 
opportunity to serve Henry as he deserved. But they scrupled t o say so i n 
so many words. To aid rebels was an immensely serious step, the more so 
since Spain was nominally at peace wi th France and prided herself on her 
greater moral probi ty i n such matters. They therefore put a d i f f e r e n t slant 
upon the matter: 
" i t appears that the state i n which Providence has placed Your Majesty 
does not allow you to t u r n a deaf ear to t h i s a f f a i r , the motives 
behind which are the preservation of r e l i g i o n i n France and the peace 
and t r a n q u i l l i t y which these kingdoms enjoy, and i f Your Majesty closes 
the door on them, they may be crushed and give i n . " 
(22) AGS E611/138,14.3. 
(23) AGS E2223/183-
(24) They had already made an approach to Charles Emmanuel during his 
stay i n Paris. 
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(Parece que e l estado en que Dios puso a VM no permite que deje de 
o i r esta p l a t i c a cuyo pretexto es l a conservacidn de l a r e l i g i d n en 
Francia y l a quietud y paz de que gozan estos reinos y s i VM les 
cerrase l a puerta podrfa ser que se anilanasen y r indiesen.) 
Although the three counci l lors were not e n t i r e l y happy about the ethics of 
the s i tua t ion , they advised P h i l i p to pursue the o f f e r (25)• Apart from 
learning that Biron wanted 500,000 escudosi the .junta (by t h i s time including 
Velada) heard nothing more f o r six months (26). 
I n the meantime, re la t ions w i t h France had taken a t u r n f o r the worse 
as the resu l t of a diplomatic "incident" of the f i r s t magnitude. I t began 
i n holiday mood. Whilst some members of the suite of Rochepot, the French 
ambassador, were bathing i n the r i v e r close to Val ladol id , an a l t e r ca t i on 
w i t h some of the loca l inhabitants resulted i n the death of two of the 
l a t t e r - one of them a c l e r i c - and the wounding of another. The Frenchmen, 
t r u s t i n g to diplomatic immunity, promptly took refuge i n Rochepot's lodging. 
Early the fo l lowing morning, the alguaciles, three of the party of Spaniards 
and, according to French sources, a mob of over four hundred enraged 
val l i sole tanos broke in to the house whi ls t the unfortunate ambassador was 
s t i l l abed, arrested the offenders and, al legedly, made o f f wi th a bonus of 
27 or 28 s i l v e r plates (27). The French au thor i t ies made a great deal of 
the a f f a i r . Sul ly i n l a t e r years regarded i t as another of the "noires 
malices" wi th which Spain dishonoured what she had promised at Vervins (28). 
I n f a c t , Henry's a t t i tude was u n j u s t i f i a b l e . Contemporary theory, although 
unclear about the status of ambassadorial lodgings, l e f t no doubt i n the 
matter of c r imina l r e spons ib i l i t y : even the ambassador himself could not 
consider himself immune from the rigours of the law (29). The Spanish 
au thor i t i es were therefore i n no mood to take Rochepot's par t . The offence 
had taken place close to the Court and was a f l ag ran t breach of the King's 
(25) AGS El874./sf, document of 17th February, 1601. 
(26) AGS E1897/115. 
27) AGS EK160//67. 
28) Sul ly i 362; JM v 44.7. 
(29) Mattingley Renaissance Diplomacy 261,265-
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peace; the murdered men had been unarmed; and the ac t ion of the alguaciles 
would have been wholly j u s t i f i e d "even i f the house of the said ambassador,, 
were a consecrated church" (30). The deadlock was broken only by the 
personal in tervent ion of the Pope, who i n an autograph l e t t e r urged P h i l i p 
to clemency f o r the sake of the peace of Christendom. The l e t t e r was not 
welcome: the Council b i t t e r l y observed that the Pope's zeal f o r peace would 
be better consumed i n protest ing against Henry's close re la t ions w i t h England 
and the Dutch. But by t h i s time i t was December, and the case had been 
allowed to drag on f o r too long. I f P h i l i p were now to have the offenders 
executed, the world would th ink that he was acting out of vengefulness and 
not a sense of j u s t i ce . The minori ty of some of the offenders - amongst 
whom was Rochepot's nephew - was a convenient reason f o r granting a pardon, 
and the Council decided to r e f e r the ent i re matter to the Pope f o r his 
decision (31). 
The incident had done i t s damage, however, and the junta de t res next 
met to discuss the Biron a f f a i r i n an atmosphere of increased tension. 
Fuentes had reported that Biron was more w i l l i n g than ever. The junta now 
did not doubt what use to make of the informat ion. Henry : IV's malign 
in tent ions were unmistakeable: unless he could be dis t racted by troubles 
at home, he would continue to upset Spanish in te res t s . For the sake of 
those in teres ts as, of course, f o r those of Christendom as a whole, Biron 1 s 
support should be enl i s ted ; or, as the counci l lors put i t wi th t h e i r meta-
phors somewhat mixed, 
" I t i s as important as the t r a n q u i l l i t y and securi ty of these and the 
rest of Your Majesty's kingdoms and of a l l Christendom to set his own 
house on f i r e , f an the embers i n a l l possible ways, and open him a 
running sore." 
(30) AGS E2636/90: t h i s was the unanimous opinion of the Council of State 
on 26th August, 1601. 
(31) AGS El856/sf, document of 7th December, 1601. 
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(importa no raenos que l a quietud y seguridad de estos reinos y los 
demas de VM y de toda l a crist iandad encenderle fuego en su casa y 
soplar las ascuas por todas las vfas que se pudiere y tenerle abier ta 
una postema.) 
But the small doubt remained: was i t proper to do so? Fray Gaspar de 
Cdrdoba, as b e f i t t e d a clergyman, put i t i n t o words. The King had sworn 
to uphold the Treaty of Vervins: even i f Henry were oppressing his Roman 
Catholic subjects and unduly favouring the Huguenots, or even i f he:,were 
on the point of declaring war, would P h i l i p be j u s t i f i e d i n breaking his 
word? Considering that the Protestants throughout Europe and the Turk i n 
the east would be quick to p r o f i t from a war between France and Spain, would 
i t not be more proper to stop short of encouraging Biron to open rebel l ion? 
Cdrdoba's two colleagues were quick to reassure him. Contrary to his 
reported promise at the time of his absolution, Henry had i n s t a l l e d Huguenots 
i n a l l the most important c i v i l and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e s . Sees and other bene-
f i c e s were bestowed at the whim of women and r u f f i a n s upon men who had no 
i n t e n t i o n of discharging t h e i r canonical obl igat ions , except f o r saying a 
single mass on Red Letter days. As f o r France's declaring war, the uninter-
rupted help sent to the Dutch was i n i t s e l f tantamount to t h i s . Thanks to 
Henry, indeed, P h i l i p ' s finances had been so depleted that he could not 
de l iver the ultimatum that the former's actions r i c h l y deserved. I n the 
past when France had been weakened by c i v i l wars, Spain, I t a l y and the Low 
Countries had enjoyed comparative peace and quie t . P h i l i p would therefore 
be wholly j u s t i f i e d i n fos t e r ing d i v i s i o n w i t h i n France. I t was dubious 
reasoning, based upon biased or b la t an t ly fa l se data: but i t convinced 
Cdrdoba and the King himself. The avowedly re l ig ious aims of Biron had 
tipped the balance. An appealing scheme had now become a r e l ig ious duty, 
as P h i l i p ' s r ide r to the consulta shews c l ea r l y : 
"since the conventional methods that have been used only damage the 
Catholics of that kingdom, I f i n d myself obliged to take thought f o r 
them, the more so since they so pers i s ten t ly urge me to do so; and since 
t h i s i s t o defend the cause of r e l i g i o n , I am resolved to act ." 
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(Pues los buenos medios de que se ha usado son para mayor dafio de 
los catdlicos de aquel reino hallome obligado a mirar por e l los y 
mds pidie'ndome con tanta instancia y con esto acudiendo a l a causa 
de l a r e l i g i d n estoy resuelto de hacerlo (32). ) 
Further informat ion confirmed t h e i r opinion. Biron was said to be standing 
f i r m , declaring his scorn f o r the Treaty of Vervins and refusing to accept 
more than t h i r t y thousand of the f i f t y thousand ducats of fered him by 
Fuentes. He had also spoken of a possible marriage between the Roman 
Catholic claimant, Soissons, and the Princess Margaret of Austria i f a l l 
went w e l l . Although the junta did not e x p l i c i t l y acknowledge the deep 
signif icance of Biron 's h in t about changing the order of succession to the 
French throne, they saw t h e i r plans of bringing c i v i l war to France r ipening 
f a s t . There could be no question of changing t h e i r minds. Henry since 
1598 had consis tent ly played fa l se , and Biron 's o f f e r was a bargain that 
could not be refused (33). 
But during the next s ix months, Henry I V s suspicions of Biron grew. 
I n May, 1602, he began to mobilize his forces and by the middle of June 
had placed the Duke under arrest , accused of treason (34-). Although Henry 
was never quite sure of how f a r P h i l i p himself was implicated, there was 
no doubt i n his mind that Biron had been encouraged by both Fuentes and 
Charles Emmanuel (35). For some time, he was expected to declare war, 
and Tasis, Zriniga and the Archduke a l l expected the blow to f a l l i n Flanders 
(36). I n f a c t , the fear was groundless. Despite his understandable annoy-
ance, Henry knew that he could not a f f o r d an open war. I f nothing else 
weighed wi th him, the unfavourable react ion of the populace to Biron 's 
execution was proof enough that his subjects would not support him i f he 
(32) AGS El856/sf, consulta of 16th September, 1601. 
(33) AGS El874/sf, consulta of 15th October, 1601. Fuentes was ordered 
to continue negotiations with Biron by a l e t t e r of 3rd November: 
AGS E1874/94. 
(34) AGS EKl605/72,85. 
(35) LM v 628,649,669. 
(36) AGS EK1605/96; AGS E620/182; AGS E621/192. 
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went to war against Spain and the la te Duke's memory (37). He was, however, 
at l i b e r t y to stand upon his diplomatic d ign i t y , and did so both i n Paris 
and i n Rome. Even the Pope f e l t that he was la rge ly j u s t i f i e d . Although 
protest ing that he was ce r t a in that P h i l i p himself had nothing to do wi th 
the p lo t , Clement d id not conceal his disapproval. Admittedly, Henry had 
no business to send help to the Dutch, but t h i s was hardly the same as 
fomenting r e b e l l i o n and treason w i t h i n a neighbour's own kingdom (38). 
There were s imi la r repercussions w i t h i n the c i r c l e of P h i l i p ' s own 
advisers. None but he, Lerma, Franqueza and the four members of the junta 
knew the f u l l story and Tasis' reports of the Biron a f f a i r took the rest 
of the Council by surprise. Chinch6n, Alba, Poza and the Constable of 
Casti le expressed t h e i r f i r m opinion that , as a general p r inc ip l e , the King 
had not enough money to finance a war wi th France, and ought therefore to 
leave the French Roman Catholics to t h e i r own devices. I f P h i l i p I I had 
been forced to end the war whi l s t he s t i l l had a large number of French 
sympathizers under arms, his son was doubly bound to avoid picking a quarrel 
I f the King had indeed known about the p l o t , he would have to keep s i l e n t : 
but i f not, a strong denial , both i n Paris and Rome, was cal led f o r . The 
counc i l lo r s ' ve i led s t r i c tu res were perhaps u n j u s t i f i a b l e : a f t e r a l l , the 
plan to aid Biron had not been a bad one. I n part , they may be a t t r ibu tab le 
to pique: Miranda had already as good as admitted that there was more to the 
conspiracy than met the eye, and the most i n f l u e n t i a l of the King's minister 
were conspicuous by t h e i r absence from the meetings at which t h i s supremely 
important c r i s i s was discussed (39). 
(37) c f M a r i i j o l 43; IM v 550. Winwood, the English ambassador, had a low 
opinion of Henry's threats . " I n i r r e s o l u t i o n he w i l l ever remain; 
p a r t l y upon the weakness of his own judgement which doth never resolve 
i n cold blood but i n f u r y and upon impetuosity as the extremities of 
his fortunes by force do carry him. He w i l l submit himself and the 
honour of his Crown to many i n d i g n i t i e s before he w i l l hearken to an 
open war: from which the jealousies w i t h i n the state do dissuade him 
(as we l l as his pa r t i cu la r i n c l i n a t i o n to the continuance of peace 
whereing his wishes are to end his days)." Winwood i 4O8. 
(38) AGS EK1631/181. 
(39) AGS EKI426/31,33-
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Whatever the r igh t s of the matter, Spanish interes ts were i n danger. 
A report that Henry was making f o r the duchy of Burgundy f i l l e d the 
author i t ies wi th alarm: perhaps he would use the opportunity to attack 
Salins, occupy the Franche-Comte' and thus block the Spanish Road (40). 
Coupled wi th t h i s was grave news from Flanders - "never has our need been 
so desperate" - and not an hour could be los t i n sending help to the Arch-
dukes. James VI of Scotland had now to be regarded as a po ten t i a l a l l y 
whose support should be won, and an envoy was to be sent to his court (41). 
I n short, there could not have been a worse time to r i s k a war w i t h France. 
Since the Biron plan had backfired so unpleasantly, P h i l i p at once wrote 
to f o r b i d Fuentes from l i s t e n i n g to any f u r t h e r appeals from France, and 
urged both him and Charles Emmanuel to act w i th the utmost d i sc re t ion (42). 
Nevertheless, the s i tua t ion continued to deter iora te . Henry had begun to 
spread a story that Fuentes had been implicated i n a p lo t against the l ives 
of the French roya l fami ly (43)- Even worse, he had taken advantage of the 
Treaty of Lyons by blocking the de-mi l i t a r i zed corr idor over the Gresin 
Bridge; two thousand Milanese troops on t h e i r way to Flanders were held up 
f o r six weeks by Lavardin, on the grounds that they might be destined f o r 
the support of Biron (44)* Although t h i s was not, i n f a c t , the harbinger 
of doom f o r the Spanish Road - f o r the a l te rna t ive route through Germany 
was s t i l l available - i t was both an inconvenience and an i n s u l t to Spain. 
And i t i s a measure of the Council 's pessimism that t h e i r only react ion 
was to advise that a formal complaint be l a i d before the Pope (45)• 
The unaccustomed posture of humi l i ty was not to be maintained f o r long. 
At some time la te i n August or early i n September, encouraging news came 
(40) AGS EKI426/31,33. 
(41) qv i M7°-
(42) AGS E1897/163. 
(43) AGS E2023/72; Alcocer i 211. 
(44) AGS EK1605/100,110. 
(45) AGS EK1426/35. The decision was taken on the same day as that to 
arrange a truce wi th the Dutch and to win James' support. 
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from the Treasury. The King and his Council were now given a welcome 
opportunity to regain t h e i r self-respect . P h i l i p believed tha t , since 
Henry had broken his word, he himself was no longer bound by the Treaty of 
Vervins; yet again, he o f fe red his personal services i n the f i e l d and 
ordered a mobi l iza t ion f o r the fo l lowing spring. His b e l l i c o s i t y was 
shared by Lerma: since the navy was i n order, the Flemish army now pro-
visioned and the Treasury as f u l l as i t was l i k e l y to be, could P h i l i p l e t 
Henry score a point of such importance without losing face? The various 
counci l lors , however, had learnt t h e i r lesson from the Saluzzo c r i s i s . 
Although P h i l i p ' s honour had been f lou ted enough to j u s t i f y a declarat ion 
of war, they preferred to see diplomatic, rather than m i l i t a r y , measures 
taken. And f o r once i t was not Idiaquez who propounded t h i s course most 
strongly, but two men who knew the seamier side of the Spanish imper ia l 
i dea l only too w e l l : Poza, the former President of the Treasury Board, and 
the Constable of Cast i le , who had personal experience of commanding an 
e r r a t i c a l l y - p a i d army. The l a t t e r , although capable of the most uncompro-
mising of stances (46), was clear that d i sc re t ion was, i n t h i s case, the 
better part of valour, "since peace i s much more convenient than war" (47). 
The c r i s i s resolved i t s e l f as Henry's anger began to subside. The 
f i r s t sign of bet ter re la t ions was the proposal that Spain and France unite 
i n selecting a neutral candidate f o r the English throne. The second was 
Henry's renewed in teres t i n forg ing a marriage-alliance wi th the Habsburgs. 
The idea had been mentioned i n Paris la te i n the previous year (4.8), and 
was to be raised again by Jeannin i n a conversation wi th Richardot i n 
Brussels the fo l lowing May, but the Council had been unimpressed (49)- The 
(4.6) cf Rubio, passim, f o r his role i n the negotiations that preceded the 
1609 truce wi th the Dutch. 
(47) AGS EKl426/37,38,39,- AGS E1874/sf, document of 11th September, 1602; 
AGS El8$6/sf, document of 16th September, 1602. 
(48) AGS EK1604/107; AGS E25H/28. 
(49) AGS E620/9. 
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matter merited serious consideration only when the nuncio i n Spain passed 
on a thoroughly u n o f f i c i a l proposal from Paris: a Florentine confidant of 
Henry IV apparently believed the King to be w i l l i n g to help Spain to put 
down the Dutch i n re turn f o r the marriage of the Dauphin to the Infan ta 
Anna. Spain's react ion was uniformly scept ica l . I t was inconceivable that 
Henry would t u r n on the Dutch and i n any case, as the .lunta de t res observed, 
"to entrust him wi th the p a c i f i c a t i o n of Flanders would be to put our own 
kni fe i n to his hands." Henry obviously stood to gain f a r more from the 
match than did P h i l i p . The recent troubles i n France had made him fear f o r 
the safety of his throne, and he seemed to be th inking that an a l l iance 
wi th Spain would strengthen the pos i t ion of his i n fan t son and he i r . For 
Spain, on the other hand, the dangers were manifold. Under no circumstances 
ought the heir-presumptive of Spain to marry the heir-apparent of France. 
Apart from the inconveniences of governing the j o i n t empire that might 
resul t from the match, the Bourbon dynasty was of scant r e spec tab i l i ty and, 
from Spain's point of view, had come to power by dubious means. Neverthe-
less, i t was a chance of peace and, i n the jun ta ' s f i r m view, as such ought 
not to be re jec ted. I f P h i l i p ' s next c h i l d were a son, the match between 
the In fan ta and the Dauphin might be considered; and, i f a daughter, perhaps 
one wi th her. I f , therefore, Henry wished to pursue the matter, he ought 
not to be rebuffed (50). The f u l l Council, meeting some three weeks l a t e r , 
expressed the same views- With needs i n Flanders so pressing, Spain could 
not a f f o r d to make a worse enemy of Henry IV : "nothing at the moment could 
be of more importance to the service of God and of Your Majesty than a good 
peace" (51). Juan Bautista de Tasis was t o l d to give u n o f f i c i a l encourage-
ment to Henry i f the proposal were brought up i n Paris (52). Although 
nothing more was heard of the matter, the incident i s a clear i nd i ca t i on 
(50) AGS E435/29-
(51) c f AGS E621/1. 
(52) AGS EK1426/42; AGS E620/11,12,13,14; AGS EKI45I/8O. 
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of the lengths to which the Spanish government f e l t obliged to go i n order 
to maintain peace wi th France. 
Thus, the Biron a f f a i r safely passed i t s danger-point. But Henry's 
insolence grew no less. New cause f o r complaint came wi th the accession 
of James VI of Scotland to the throne of England i n March, 1603- Henry 
had always done his best to ensure James' success. There had been f r i e n d l y 
re la t ions wi th Scotland f o r so long that he wished to see i n England the 
pro-French t r ad i t i ons of the northern kingdom. His l e t t e r to his best 
f r i e n d i n Rome, the Cardinal d'Ossat, stated the pos i t ion that he was to 
maintain i n the years jus t before Elizabeth 's death: James, although a 
Protestant, had the best t i t l e to the throne, and his progress ought not 
to be impeded (53)- Spain's a c t i v i t i e s were therefore badly hampered. 
On the one hand, Elizabeth ought not to be succeeded by one whose d i s l i k e 
of France was less than hers and whose debt would be considerably greater. 
On the other, Spain was not strong enough to back up a candidate of her 
own: the Flemish war consumed most of her resources, and she could expect 
l i t t l e help from a Pope whose constant fear was of provoking a schism with 
the Gallicans i n the French Church. Even the secret steps that Spain f e l t 
able to take were robbed of t h e i r effect iveness: the French proposal -
almost ce r t a in ly a red herring - to adopt a j o i n t neutral candidate served 
only to cloud the issue i n the las t c r i t i c a l months of El izabeth 's re ign . 
James' accession was therefore proof of a French v i c to ry , and seemed to 
be the earnest of another: by the beginning of June, Sul ly himself had 
been sent to bring o f f an Anglo-French al l iance that would, i t was hoped 
i n Paris, permanently damage Habsburg interes ts i n London and elsewhere. 
Although Henry's hopes were not to be f u l f i l l e d i n t h i s respect, the 
mission hadly alarmed the Spanish au thor i t i e s , and helped to hasten t h e i r 
making peace wi th the nation that had so inconvenienced them wi th her 
p i ra tes , her Protestantism and her aid to the Dutch (54). 
(53) qv i p 6 6 -
(54) qv i p. 
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Henry even enjoyed some success i n inf luencing the terms of the Treaty 
of London. One of Villamediana's main d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the negotiations was 
the question of trade. I n order to destroy Dutch prosperi ty, Spain had 
imposed the t a r i f f of 30$ on a wide range of goods ( 5 5 ) • The t a r i f f , an 
inconvenience to a l l including i t s or ig ina tors , was made doubly unpopular 
by Henry's react ion. Contrary to his al legat ions, i t was we l l w i t h i n the 
l e t t e r of the Treaty of Vervins; freedom of trade had been promised, but 
the levying of new dues had not been forbidden. Moreover, no-one was 
obliged to pay the t a r i f f : a trader could take his merchandise elsewhere, 
or, i f he wished, obtain a passport from the Archdukes and so gain exemption 
(56). Henry chose to disagree. Perhaps influenced by the anguished cries 
of his merchants, he imposed his own t a r i f f of 30$ upon a l l imports and 
exports to and from Spain and her European possessions, wi th the sole 
exception of gra in . Two months l a t e r , t h i s time to French dismay, the 
t a r i f f was succeeded by a complete embargo (57). The repercussions went 
we l l beyond France. As tfillamediana saw, English vessels could no longer 
transport Flemish or Spanish goods to France, and i t would therefore not 
be good enough merely to include England i n the new Habsburg trade area. 
Because of France's r e t a l i a t i o n , the 30% t a r i f f would have to go e n t i r e l y 
(58). Henry had neatly robbed of i t s usefulness a bargaining-counter from 
(55) AGS E196/sf, document of 27th February, 1603; qvs 
(56) AGS EKI4.26/56; AGS EK1665/5. I n f a c t , since the Treaty of Vervins, 
Spain had been more scrupulous i n trade matters than had France. 
Despite the plethora of r e s t r i c t i ons that Spain's special pos i t i on 
made necessary - notably the p r o h i b i t i o n of the export of gold and 
s i l v e r b u l l i o n and of the importat ion of English and Dutch goods -
French merchants were not badly treated. On more than one occasion 
the Council of State recommended that mercy be shewn towards French 
traders who had been g u i l t y of i l l e g a l i t i e s , and Henry's frequent 
complaints were always inves t iga ted . (c f AGS EK1451/53)- I t was 
France that had countenanced the only o f f i c i a l departures from the 
t r ea ty : Henry's embargo, declared i n r e p r i s a l f o r the Rochepot 
incident , was quite improper, as was his decision not to allow the 
importat ion of Spanish sal t and imported s i l k s -
(57) AGS EK1616/113,lit; AGS EKI606/I24,133-
(58) AGS E842/101. 
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which Spain had hoped great things, and had also made necessary a new 
pol icy towards the Dutch traders. I n t h i s , as i n other matters, "the 
fai thlesness and disordered ambition" of the French king took t h e i r 
t o l l (59). 
(59) AGS EK16Q4/37. 
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V I . THE NUISANCE. 
Although h i s t o r i c a l l y speaking Spain's main quarrel was wi th France, 
there was no doubt that Elizabethan England was a formidable opponent. 
She was not yet i n the f r o n t rank of European nations, i t was t rue , but 
her force was s u f f i c i e n t to a f f e c t the balance of power d r a s t i c a l l y . As 
the English commentator, S i r Thomas Overbury, noted, 
"This part of Christendom i s balanced betwixt the three kings of 
Spain, France and England . . . Spain hath the advantage of both the 
rest i n treasure, but i s defective i n men: his dominions are 
scattered and the conveyance of his treasure from the Indies l i e s 
obnoxious to the power of any nation that i s stronger by sea. France 
abounds wi th men, l i e s close together, and hath money s u f f i c i e n t l y . 
England, being an i s land, i s hard to be invaded, abounds wi th men, 
but wants money to employ them . . . England i s not able to subsist 
against any of the other hand i n hand; but joined with the Low 
Countries ( s ic : the United Provinces are c lea r ly meant) i t can give 
the law to both by sea: joined wi th e i ther of them two, i t i s able 
to oppress the t h i r d , as Henry V I I I d id ( l ) . " 
I n the early years of the sixteenth century, Spain's re la t ions w i t h t h i s 
wel l -posi t ioned maritime power had been f a i r l y c o r d i a l : Henry V I I married 
i n t u r n both his sons to Katherine of Aragon, and f o r a time contemplated 
a match of his own wi th Joanna the Mad. Even Henry V I I I ' s Great Matter 
d id not cause the disastrous breach wi th the Habsburgs that some Englishmen 
feared. And wi th the accession i n 1553 of Katherine's daughter, Mary, 
there seemed a rea l prospect of an enduring a l l i ance . The new queen was 
deeply conscious both of her Roman Catholicism and of her Habsburg blood, 
and eagerly responded to the suggestion that she marry Charles V's son and 
(1) Overbury 314-
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he i r , P h i l i p . The marriage took place by proxy on 6th March, and the 
couple were f i n a l l y united i n July, 1554 (2) . 
I r o n i c a l l y , i t was the re ign of Queen Mary that saw the signal 
de te r io ra t ion i n Anglo-French re la t ions . P h i l i p was severely d i s i l l u s ioned 
wi th his pa the t ica l ly -do t ing wife and her f a i l u r e to produce an heir , and 
also wi th the s ince r i ty of the Protestant Englishman. The nation's general, 
but half-hearted, abandonment of Reform convinced him that , i n contrast to 
the re l ig ious fervour of the land of the Catholic Kings, time-serving and 
personal in teres t were the dominant features of the English character. 
I n one th ing alone the English seemed passionate: i n t h e i r hatred of P h i l i p 
and his countrymen. Mary's obvious and occasionally-embarrassing dependence 
upon her husband and his retinue meant that the Spaniards became tar red 
wi th the brush of what was, i n r e a l i t y , an exceedingly unpopular r e l ig ious 
po l i cy . Spanish f r i a r s were to be seen at the f i r e s of Smi th f i e ld ; Spanish 
influence was said to be behind the re in t roduct ion of papal author i ty and 
- quite un jus t ly - behind the Queen's wish that the gentry re turn to t h e i r 
o r i g i n a l owners the Church lands that they had obtained during and a f t e r 
the Dissolut ion. By 1559> Spain had displaced France as England's nat ional 
enemy. 
The enmity deepened throughout the re ign of Elizabeth. I n response 
to Spain's Roman Catholic ideology there now came to the fore one f o r 
England: that of the Protestant Elect Nation, whose representatives had 
i n a l l ages fought f o r t rue r e l i g i o n and godliness against popery and 
supers t i t ion , and whose monarch, the new Deborah, had f reed the country 
from the bloody tyranny of her unfortunate Jezebel-like s i s te r , Mary (3) . 
Though prudent by nature, Elizabeth could not disregard the strength of 
anti-Spanish f e e l i n g . Her Parliament, whether through convict ion or fear 
(2) E. H. Harbison, Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary: 
Princeton, M.J . , 1940, passim. 
(3) Hal ler , passim. 
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f o r t h e i r Church lands, was s o l i d l y h o s t i l e t o Spain; and as her f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d , Parliament's wishes became an i n c r e a s i n g l y important 
f a c t o r i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of her p o l i c i e s . I n any case, Spain's own stance 
was f a r from c o n c i l i a t o r y . The f i r s t years of Elizabeth's r e i g n saw the 
f i n a l c o d i f i c a t i o n of Roman Catholic d o c t r i n e by the Council of Trent, and 
w i t h t h i s new weapon the a c t i v i t i e s of the I n q u i s i t i o n continued unabated. 
For England, as f o r other Protestant c o u n t r i e s , the spectre of a pan-European 
Roman Catholic empire under the f i r m c o n t r o l of the Spanish Habsburgs seemed 
very r e a l . The f e a r of a powerful Spanish base i n the Low Countries t h e r e -
f o r e forced E l i z a b e t h and her advisers t o overcome t h e i r deeply-rooted 
scruples and send help t o the Dutch r e b e l s . S i m i l a r considerations brought 
about the complete change i n Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s : 
"now the only e n t i r e body i n Christendom t h a t makes head against the 
Spanish monarchy i s France; and t h e r e f o r e they say i n France t h a t , 
'The day of the r u i n of France i s the eve of the r u i n of England. 1 
And t h e r e f o r e England hath ever since the Spanish greatness i n c l i n e d 
r a t h e r t o maintain France r a t h e r than t o r u i n i t . " (4) 
When, t h e r e f o r e , P h i l i p I I declared himself against Henry of Navarre, 
E l i z a b e t h went t o the l a t t e r ' s a i d t o forge the t r i p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e t h a t , 
by the l a s t year of P h i l i p I I ' s r e i g n , was bleeding the Spanish monarchy 
dry. 
During the second h a l f of the s i x t e e n t h century, another p o i n t of 
co n t e n t i o n had sprung up between the two nations: t h a t of trade w i t h the 
I n d i e s . The problem was l a r g e l y of Spain's own making. Her r i g i d r e f u s a l 
t o permit other than Spanish n a t i o n a l s t o trade w i t h the New World possessions 
aroused b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y . To Spanish complaints about i n f r a c t i o n s of the 
monopoly, the English had a p i t h y and unsympathetic r e p l y : 
(4.) Qverbury 314. 
- 137 -
"The Spaniards have brought these e v i l s by t h e i r i n j u s t i c e towards 
the E n g l i s h whom, contra jus gentium, they have excluded from commerce 
w i t h the West I n d i e s . The Queen does not acknowledge t h a t her subjects 
and those of other nations may be excluded from the I n d i e s on the c l a i m 
t h a t these have been donated t o the King of Spain by the Pope, whose 
a u t h o r i t y t o i n v e s t the Spanish King w i t h the New World she does not 
recognize. The Spaniards have no claim t o p r o p e r t y there except t h a t 
they have est a b l i s h e d a few settlements and named r i v e r s and capes. 
This donation of what does not belong t o the donor and t h i s imaginary 
r i g h t of property ought not t o prevent other princes from c a r r y i n g on 
commerce i n those regions or e s t a b l i s h i n g colonies there i n places 
not i n h a b i t e d by the Spaniards. Such a c t i o n would i n no way v i o l a t e 
the law of nations, since p r e s c r i p t i o n without possession i s not v a l i d . 
Moreover, a l l are at l i b e r t y t o navigate t h a t vast ocean, since the 
use of the sea and the a i r are common t o a l l . No n a t i o n or p r i v a t e 
person can have a r i g h t t o the ocean, f o r n e i t h e r the course of nature 
nor p u b l i c usage permits any occupation of i t (5)>" 
The " e v i l s " were of two types: clandestine trade and p i r a c y . E n g l i s h 
merchantmen d i d not much d i s t i n g u i s h between the two. The need t o defend 
themselves against the Spanish gunboats t h a t were sent t o punish t h e i r 
presence amongst the c o l o n i s t s of Cuba and on the coast of Guiana was a 
p l a u s i b l e reason f o r counter-attack against Spanish vessels of a l l types 
( 6 ) . As f a r as the E n g l i s h were concerned, t h i s was g l o r i o u s s t u f f . 
Fortunes could be made i n swashbuckling s t y l e and i n f u l l accord w i t h 
(5) Camden Annales, subjanno 1580: quoted Cheyney I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. .. 660. 
(6) For the e x c e l l e n t r e l a t i o n s between En g l i s h t r a d e r s and Cuban c o l o n i s t s , 
v. Wright. The l i c e n c i a d o Francisco Manso de Contreras, oidor of 
Santo Domingo, complained t o P h i l i p I I I i n 1606 of the c o l o n i s t s : 
"they are the most d i s l o y a l and r e b e l l i o u s vassals t h a t any king or 
prince i n t h i s world ever had, and i f Your Highness were t o appear 
amongst them they would s e l l Your Highness f o r three yards of Rouen 
s i l k or even f o r nothing, f o r there i s nothing they detest more than 
the a u t h o r i t y of the King and h i s m i n i s t e r s . " i b i d . 3 % . 
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England's maritime h e r i t a g e ; and i n the process, a blow could be st r u c k a t 
Roman Catholicism. According t o Dr. Andrew's estimates, p r i z e s worth a 
t o t a l of between £100,000 and £200,000 were taken annually ( 7 ) . Between 
1588 and 1595, seventy-eight voyages are known t o have been made, and between 
1595 and 1603 another seventy-three ( 8 ) . Some were remarkably successful: 
the E a r l of Cumberland threw Puerto Rico i n t o u t t e r confusion i n 1598 and 
W i l l i a m Parker Porto B e l l o f o u r years l a t e r ( 9 ) • On the Spanish side, there 
was cause f o r great apprehension. I t was w e l l known, both at home and abroad, 
t h a t "the sword of Spain was forged i n the gold-mines of Peru" (10). The 
presence of English vessels i n the Caribbean and the western A t l a n t i c was 
pe r t u r b i n g , and the various E n g l i s h attempts t o found colonies or bases i n 
the Americas ( l l ) doubly so: f o r i f once the p r i v a t e e r s managed t o capture 
the t r e a s u r e - f l e e t , a l l would be l o s t (12). 
Yet the E n g l i s h d i d not confine themselves t o att a c k s on the other side 
of the world. A f t e r the beginning of d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the two 
powers c. 1585, the very coasts of Spain were open t o a t t a c k . I n 1589, 
Lisbon was sacked and i n 1596 Cadiz (13)• The t o t a l d i s a r r a y of Spanish 
defences was compensated only by the i n a b i l i t y o f the E n g l i s h forces t o 
f o l l o w up t h e i r successes: hadi they done so, Spain would have been i n the 
greatest p e r i l . The l a t t e r ' s o p i n i o n of her cocksure enemy was t h e r e f o r e 
very low; i n one of the state papers, England was described as "the head 
(7) Andrews Elizabethan P r i v a t e e r i n g 128. 
(8) i b i d 176. 
(9) i b i d 178; Corbett, cap. i i i . 
(10) Froude, J.A. : Short Studies on Great Sub.iects: 4- vol: London, 1890, 
v o l i 458. 
(11) Andrews o p . c i t . cap i x ; idem Caribbean R i v a l r y 7. 
(12) c f Cornwallis 307: "the s t r e n g t h of t h i s great monarchy c o n s i s t s only 
i n the r i c h e s drawn out of the I n d i e s , i n the s o l d i e r s of Spain and 
the captains of I t a l y : the f i r s t f a i l i n g , the second would want arms 
and the t h i r d l egs." I n token of t h i s , the Venetian ambassador i n 
Madrid noted i n 1586 t h a t , f o r a while a f t e r the execution of Mary 
S t u a r t , P h i l i p was t h i n k i n g more of an e x p e d i t i o n t o the I n d i e s t o 
eradicate p r i v a t e e r i n g than of a d i r e c t assault upon England: 
CSPV v i i i 383. 
(13) Hume The Year...cap i ; Corbett, caps i i i & i v . 
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and fount of a l l the e v i l s i n Flanders, i n the I n d i e s and i n the i n t e r n a l 
peace of these kingdoms" (14.) • But i t was d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n . 
Despite the obvious obstacles, Spanish pride demanded t h a t f o r ce be met 
w i t h f o r c e . The o p i n i o n of Don 3 a l t a s a r de Barrientos, whose memorial t o 
P h i l i p I I I i s dated 1598, may be taken as t y p i c a l : 
" i t would be n e i t h e r proper nor p r o f i t a b l e t o make peace w i t h England: 
nor would any such peace be f i r m , f o r t h i s crown has been extremely 
offended by t h a t woman (sc. E l i z a b e t h : s i c ) . She i s a schismatic and 
u t t e r l y c o n t r a r y t o our r e l i g i o n , and w i l l consequently never t r u s t 
us; peace w i t h her w i l l be very unsure. We have no need of her, f o r 
she can harm and d i s t r a c t us only on two f r o n t s - i n Flanders and i n 
the I n d i e s - and by the same token cannot l i v e without p r i v a t e e r i n g . 
I t i s not a good t h i n g t o make peace w i t h her, f o r i t cannot l a s t : i t 
i s b e t t e r t o prevent her p r i v a t e e r i n g and r o o t out the canker of her 
e v i l deeds. Moreover, Your Majesty and Your Majesty's kingdoms need 
an enemy l i k e her t o keep you a l e r t , f o r i f peace were t o r e i g n on a l l 
sides, we should f a l l i n t o vice and s l o t h . I t would also be most harm-
f u l t o the p r e s t i g e of t h i s crown and of Your Majesty's splendid empire 
i f peace were made w i t h her a f t e r her many offences and wit h o u t f u r t h e r 
s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r past damage t o the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n . " 
(Con I n g l a t e r r a ... no es honesto n i provechoso hacer paz n i segura l a 
que se h i c i e r e porque esta corona esta' ofendidisima de aquella mujer; 
es cismdtica y c o n t r a r i a de todo punto a nuestra r e l i g i d n ; y por todo 
esto no se puede f i a r jamas de nosotros y semejantes paces son poco 
seguras. No tenemos necesidad de e l l a porque en solas dos partes nos 
puede hacer dafio y remover humores: en Flandes y en I n d i a s y por l o 
mismo que no puede v i v i r s i n andar en corso. No es provechoso hacer 
paces con e l l a porque no pueden durar: sino q u i t a r l e esto ... y a t a j a r 
e l cdncer de sus malas obras. Y para que VM y sus reinos v i v a n con 
cuidado es menester enemigo como dste, que s i por todas partes fuese 
paz tambie'n nos perderfamos con l o s v i c i o s y ociosidad ... y s e r i a 
gran desautoridad de esta corona y e l imperio f e l i c i s i m o de VM que 
estando t a n ofendido h i c i e s e paces con e l l a s i n mas s a t i s f a c c i d n de 
l o s agravios pasados de l a r e l i g i d n c r i s t i a n a (15). ) 
( L t ) AGS E840/36. 
(15) BN 904/305 verso, 306 r e c t o . 
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And not only had immense sums of money and thousands of men been 
expended on account of England's i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Spanish a f f a i r s : the 
En g l i s h and I r i s h recusants, who c o n s t a n t l y appealed t o P h i l i p I I f o r 
p r o t e c t i o n , merited some t a n g i b l e r e t u r n f o r t h e i r constancy and t h e i r 
w i l l i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of the King of Spain as the w i e l d e r of the sword of 
Roman Catholic Christendom. The English seminary p r i e s t s bombarded P h i l i p 
w i t h schemes and memoranda, assuring him of an immense fund of g o o d - w i l l 
i n England, and urging large-scale i n v a s i o n plans t o complete s u c c e s s f u l l y 
what had been attempted i n 1588 (16). Although P h i l i p was sensible enough 
not t o take l i t e r a l l y a l l t h a t the seminarians said - "these are the ideas 
of men who wish t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r homes," he once observed (17) - the f a c t 
remained t h a t Spain owed i t t o h e r s e l f t o do something p o s i t i v e . So perhaps 
there was more pride than t r u e d i s i n t e r e s t e d zeal i n her wish t o i n t e r v e n e : 
" i f the E n g l i s h a f f a i r were f e a s i b l e , i t would undoubtedly deserve 
p r i o r i t y , f o r i n s t r i k i n g the blow there a l l would be made safe and 
our r e p u t a t i o n would remain i n t a c t , q u i t e apart from the godly work 
t h a t has always been planned i n t h a t kingdom, r e s t o r i n g the f r e e 
exercise of our holy c a t h o l i c f a i t h , which i s Your Majesty's main aim." 
(Si l o de I n g l a t e r r a se pudiera emprender esto es s i n duda l o que 
debiera preceder porque con dar a l l ! e l golpe quedard, todo asegurado 
y entera l a reputacidn dem£s d e l s e r v i c i o que siempre se ha pretendido 
hacer en aquel r e i n o a nuestro Senor r e s t i t u y e n d o e l e j e r c i c i o l i b r e 
de nuestra santa f e cat61ica que es l a p r i n c i p a l mira de SM (18). ) 
Various schemes t h e r e f o r e came under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A f l e e t under the 
Adelantado of C a s t i l e was planned f o r the autumn of 1596 w i t h orders t o 
make f o r I r e l a n d or, i f winds were contr a r y , f o r M i l f o r d Haven (19); a 
p r o j e c t t o invade England from Calais, using Spanish g a l l e y s and troops 
from the army of the Low Countries was mooted (20); Colonel Stanley, who 
(16) e.g. AGS E967/sf, document of May, 1596. 
(17) AGS E1429/114* 
(18) AGS E2855/sf, document of 9th July, 1597. 
(19) AGS E176/sf, document of 3rd October, 1596; AGS E2223/I4 • 
(20) AGS E2223/187. 
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had begun his chequered career as an o f f i c e r of Queen El i z a b e t h , was 
mentioned i n connexion w i t h a plan t o harry the E n g l i s h coast w i t h seven 
vessels and 1,200 s o l d i e r s (21); a p r o j e c t t o land some three thousand men 
near the mouth of the Humber - an area said t o be b r i s t l i n g w i t h Roman 
Catholic sympathizers - was r e f e r r e d t o the Archduke A l b e r t f o r h i s serious 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n (22); and the Council of State i n July, 1597, suggested sending 
two thousand troops t o I r e l a n d i n the hope of d i s t r a c t i n g Elizabeth's 
a t t e n t i o n away from the Continent (23). But d e s i r a b l e as the m i l i t a r y and 
naval defeat of England was, i n the short term plans t o b r i n g i t about had 
t o give place t o other, more pressing, matters. As long as the war w i t h 
France and the United Provinces continued, money could not be spared, f o r 
the bankruptcy of 1596 had set the seal upon an already unfavourable 
f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n . A l b e r t was i n s i s t e n t t h a t r e a l success i n England 
would need t h i r t y thousand troops, of which he could not spare a s i n g l e 
one (24). When i t came t o the p o i n t , t h e r e f o r e , P h i l i p and h i s advisers 
decided t o a t t e n d t o f i r s t t h i n g s f i r s t ; and when i n July, 1597, the 
deployment of the A t l a n t i c f l e e t was discussed, B r i t t a n y was agreed upon 
as a b e t t e r o b j e c t i v e than e i t h e r England or I r e l a n d : i f a l l went w e l l 
there, perhaps Spain would thus also win a base f o r f u t u r e operations 
against E l i z a b e t h (25). The f a i l u r e of the B r i t t a n y e x p e d i t i o n , l i k e t h a t 
of the f l e e t of the previous year, served t o underline another, and h i g h l y 
important, c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Spain could not hope t o r i v a l England's naval 
e f f i c i e n c y . The absence of c a r e f u l preparations f i n i s h e d i n good time had 
(21) AGS E2224V238; Loomie Spanish Elizabethans cap v. 
(22) AGS E2224V24I. 
(23) AGS E2855/sf, document of 9 t h July, 1597. 
(24) AGS E613/120. 
(25) AGS EK1599/77; AGS EI429/IL;; AGS E2855/sf, document of 9th J u l y , 
1597: "por l a j u s t i f i c a c i 6 n t a n n o t o r i a d e l derecho l a mayor 
aparencia de buen efecto l o que ocupard a franceses y podria 
mover a l a paz y ayudar a l o de Flandes y enfrenara 1 ingleses y 
rebeldes a no pensar en mds que asegurarse d e l p e l i g r o de l a s 
armas vecinas ... esperando en Dios que desde a l l ! a b r i r a mejor 
camino para l o de I n g l a t e r r a . " 
- 142 -
made the Adelantado set s a i l on both occasions r i d i c u l o u s l y l a t e i n the 
year, and he encountered nothing but storms i n s t e a d of the south-westerly 
winds and c u r r e n t s t h a t ought t o have c a r r i e d him on h i s way (26). Moreover, 
the very nature of the Spanish f l e e t was a handicap. I n c o n t r a s t t o the 
advantages enjoyed by m i l i t a r y men, s a i l o r s were s o c i a l l y under-rated and 
b a d l y - t r a i n e d (27); crews and commanders were m u l t i - n a t i o n a l ; vessels were 
r o y a l and consequently s u f f e r e d from the government's severe lack of money. 
The s t r e n g t h of the English navy was t h a t i t s r o o t s were planted f i r m l y i n 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e ; p r i v a t e e r i n g and overseas trade had kept the e f f i c i e n c y 
of both mariners and vessels i n good r e p a i r . Spain had no equivalent of 
Drake (28). 
Thus, despite the accession of a more w a r l i k e monarch i n 1598, the 
conquest of England remained as u n l i k e l y as ever. I t was t r u e t h a t the 
r e d u c t i o n of m i l i t a r y commitments brought about by the Treaty of Vervins 
presented a much-desired o p p o r t u n i t y f o r P h i l i p I I I t o win g l o r y f o r himself 
and his armies and t o d i s s i p a t e the odour of defeat t h a t had hung over 
Spanish o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s since the ending of h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h the French. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , one of P h i l i p ' s f i r s t recorded acts was t o ask h i s newly-
enlarged Council of State f o r t h e i r ideas about the f e a s i b i l i t y of some 
m i l i t a r y e n t e r p r i s e : the eyes of the world were upon him, and his f i r s t 
a c tions would set the tone f o r h i s e n t i r e r e i g n (29). But England, though 
an appealing t a r g e t , was beyond his reach. Spanish finances were s t i l l 
unstable, and the Council advised the King t o defer the matter i f he wished 
t o avoid another f i a s c o (30). Thus was set the p a t t e r n f o r the next f o u r 
(26) AGS E177/sf, document of 23rd November, 1596; AGS E2224.1/270,229; 
AGS El80/sf, document of 28th October, 1597. 
(27) Salas 40-9-
(28) c f Corbett 225-
(29) AGS E1953/sf, document of 13th December, 1598. 
(30) i b i d . I n a memorial presented t o P h i l i p , the E n g l i s h J e s u i t , Creswell, 
complained t h a t he had spoken t o two c o u n c i l l o r s , one of them "one of 
the most respected persons i n these kingdoms", who thought t h a t h i s 
i n v a s i o n plans were dangerous dreams and t h a t only a t r a i t o r would 
encourage the King t o t r y t o b r i n g them t o f r u i t i o n : AGS E285l/sf, 
document of 24th A p r i l , 1599-
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years. Only the most modest of plans were acceptable. Eederico Spinola, 
younger brother of the more famous Ambrosio, set out from Santander i n the 
summer of 1599 w i t h seven ga l l e y s of the Spanish squadron and the hope of 
r a i s i n g f o u r thousand i n f a n t r y and a thousand c a v a l r y i n the Low Countries 
f o r an i n v a s i o n of England, hoping too t o f o l l o w up h i s f i r s t assault w i t h 
a second one of greater weight. But Spinola was not taken s e r i o u s l y by 
the Council of State, as t h e i r calm acceptance of the numerous setbacks 
t h a t he received shews. A f t e r a l l , i t had been h i s o f f e r t o lend money of 
his own towards the cost of operations t h a t had o r i g i n a l l y t i p p e d the balance 
i n h i s favour. A l b e r t ' s need t o commandeer the forces intended f o r Spfnola 
was unfortunate, as A l b e r t himself was the f i r s t t o admit, but the war 
against the Dutch had f i r s t p r i o r i t y . And as the s i t u a t i o n i n Savoy 
d e t e r i o r a t e d , the Council had even less wish t o commit Spain t o an e n t e r -
p r i s e t h a t would cost her money and men (31). By December, 1600, o p i n i o n 
was d e f i n i t e l y against Spinola, and w h i l s t h i s p r i v a t e e r i n g o f f the Eng l i s h 
coast w i t h a f l o t i l l a of half-a-dozen g a l l e y s was u s e f u l , he was ordered 
not t o t r y t o land. Before long, he was t o l d t o concentrate upon Dutch, 
r a t h e r than English, shipping (32). 
I f a d i r e c t assault upon the mainland was out of the question, there 
s t i l l remained England's underbelly, the t u r b u l e n t kingdom of I r e l a n d . The 
advantages presented by I r e l a n d could not be disregarded: fewer troops would 
be needed, f o r defences were poorer, and the I r i s h Roman Catholics,, u n l i k e 
t h e i r E nglish counterparts, could be depended upon t o give spontaneous 
m i l i t a r y support on a large scale. Once i n s t a l l e d , the Spaniards could l a y 
(31) AGS E25H/54: " sangrar l a s fuerzas y hacienda de aca\.." 
(32) AGS E2023/3; Alcocer i 93: "de l a jornada de I n g l a t e r r a que los 
cat61icos proponen parece a l consejo que no hay que t r a t a r pues 
l a experiencia ha mostrado l a i m p o s i b i l i d a d que t i e n e l a conquista 
de aquel r e i n o para hacerse de golpe aunque hubiera mds sustancia 
de l a que ahora hay." c f AGS E84O/36; AGS E2023/36,137. 
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down the law t o E l i z a b e t h or invade England at t h e i r l e i s u r e (33)• Links 
w i t h I r i s h d i s s i d e n t s had been forged as e a r l y as 1569 by the r e b e l Desmond; 
indeed, he and h i s p a r t y i n the f o l l o w i n g year had o f f e r e d the kingship of 
I r e l a n d t o Don John of A u s t r i a (34)• Contact was resumed i n 1593 by the 
E a r l of Tyrone who badly needed a i d against Elizabeth's forces and who 
made great play of h i s zeal f o r Roman Catholicism and the wicked e f f o r t s 
of the Protestant English. But although r e l i g i o u s considerations undoubt-
edly weighed w i t h the Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s , i n the l a s t r e s o r t i t was st r a t e g y 
t h a t mattered. The e x p e d i t i o n of 1596 had been provoked by the Cadiz a f f a i r 
e a r l i e r i n the summer, and came three years a f t e r the second I r i s h appeal 
and twenty-seven a f t e r the f i r s t ( 3 5 ) . A remark made i n the Council of 
State i n July, 1600, makes the p o s i t i o n q u i t e c l e a r : 
"we t h i n k t h a t t o p r o t e c t and help these Catholics w i l l be an act 
most worthy of Your Majesty's greatness and most convenient f o r God's 
service and Your Majesty's: f o r besides the f a c t t h a t i t w i l l r e s u l t 
i n the conservation of our holy Catholic f a i t h t h e r e , at the same 
time Your Majesty w i l l be able t o copy what the Queen does through 
the rebels of Holland and Zealand, and at a very small cost." 
(Ha parecido que serd obra muy digna de l a grandeza de VM y muy 
conveniente a l s e r v i c i o de Dios y de VM amparar a estos c a t d l i c o s 
y s o c o r r e r l o s pues dem£s de que de e l l o resultara" conservarse a l i i 
nuestra santa f e cat61ica por aquello mano podra- VM hacer e l mismo 
efecto que l a r e i n a hace por l a de los rebeldes de Olanda y Zelanda 
a muy poca costa (36). ) 
P h i l i p I l l ' s f i r s t attempt on I r e l a n d came not long a f t e r h i s accession. 
I n f o r m a t i o n i s l a c k i n g at a l l stages of the e n t e r p r i s e : the year 1599 saw 
a good deal of d i s l o c a t i o n i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n because of the various 
r o y a l progresses and the double marriage i n Valencia. Nevertheless, i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t the Adelantado of C a s t i l e set o f f from E l E e r r o l l a t e i n August 
(33) AGS E1953/sf, document of 13th December, 1598. 
(34) F a l l s 138 seqq. 
(35) c f CSPV i x 469. 
(36) AGS E25H/ 3-
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of t h a t year, destined f o r I r e l a n d w i t h a large f l e e t of g a l l e y s and galleons 
and an un s p e c i f i e d number of Spanish and I r i s h troops. A serious storm 
sprang up on 31st August, breaking the f l e e t ' s f ormation, and once more 
nothing was achieved (37). The f a i l u r e had i t s e f f e c t upon P h i l i p and h i s 
advisers. When i n May, 1600, another I r i s h appeal f o r help was discussed, 
i t e l i c i t e d no more than an expression of deep sympathy and the a l l o c a t i o n 
of twenty thousand ducats and some supplies. Apart from t h i s , God was t o be 
l e f t t o defend His own cause u n t i l P h i l i p could f r e e himself from other 
matters (38). An e x p e d i t i o n t o I r e l a n d was indeed the best means of damaging 
Elizabeth's i n t e r e s t s : but shortage of money and the high cost of the 
Adelantado's f r u i t l e s s attempt discouraged Spain from t a k i n g the matter 
f u r t h e r (39). As long as resources were being stretched t o keep an army 
i n the f i e l d i n Flanders, the c o r r e c t course seemed t o be t o make the f l e e t 
ready f o r the day when E l i z a b e t h , already i n poor he a l t h , should d i e , and 
i n the meantime t o help the rebels i n I r e l a n d (40). 
A change i n a t t i t u d e was brought about by a series of d i s t u r b i n g 
r e p o r t s from various p a r t s of Europe. News t h a t the Boulogne t a l k s w i t h 
England were i n jeopardy over the precedence question gave a new importance 
t o I r e l a n d (41): only three days a f t e r a d v i s i n g against a large-scale 
involvement t h e r e , the doyen of the Council, Idiaquez, spoke i n favour of 
sending a f l e e t as soon as possible i n order t o enhance Spanish p r e s t i g e 
and so b r i n g E l i z a b e t h t o reason (42). L e t t e r s from Rome t o l d of James V I 1 s 
recent progress i n winning support f o r h i s candidature t o the En g l i s h throne, 
a t h r e a t t h a t Spain at t h i s stage wished t o avert (43): I r e l a n d would be a 
(37) AGS EK1602/80,97,98. cf. Cork,//-. cap. * i . 
(38) AGS E2511/15-
(39) AGS E6l7/4l,236. 
(40) AGS E972/sf, document of 11th May, 1600; AGS E2023/31; AGS E1856/sf, 
document of 11th July, 1600; AGS E25H/35-
(41) q v i ?i8istq<). 
(42) AGS E25H/20, consulta of 4 t h July, l600. 
(43) q v i f.Aio. 
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v i t a l base from which t o oppose h i s designs. Above a l l the prestige, t o be 
gained from conquering so great an area as I r e l a n d "when the world l e a s t 
expects i t " was enormous, and Spain's i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n could be 
expected t o improve i n every respect. Appealing as the prospect was, the 
Council nevertheless had t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o p r a c t i c a l i t i e s . An e x p e d i t i o n 
i n 1600 was s u r e l y out of the question, f o r time and money were so short. 
But since delay could be f a t a l t o the I r i s h cause, they advised P h i l i p t o 
hasten the despatch of twenty thousand ducats and the supplies t h a t had 
been assigned i n May, and s t a r t t o make long-term plans f o r a f l e e t (44). 
The King had other ideas. He had always thought the Council's generosity 
t o be inadequate, and at the time of r e c e i v i n g the l a t e s t consulta on I r e l a n d 
he was t r a v e l l i n g i n n o r t h e r n C a s t i l e w i t h Lerma, f a r removed from the f i n -
a n c i a l cares of Madrid (4.5). P r i n c i p l e , and not expediency, was t o be served. 
Observing t h a t he had been eager f o r an I r i s h e x p e d i t i o n ever since h i s 
accession, he countered the Council's c a u t i o n w i t h an order t o muster two 
thousand veterans and two thousand r e c r u i t s f o r immediate despatch t o I r e l a n d 
(46). Ten days l a t e r , a dazed Council met t o discuss the r o y a l command. 
Having so d i s t i n c t l y advised the King against assuming a new and heavy 
burden, they were expected t o work miracles. Complimenting P h i l i p upon h i s 
holy z e a l and a d m i t t i n g t h a t success i n I r e l a n d would indeed enhance h i s 
r e p u t a t i o n i n Europe - the more so, i t was ominously noted, since everyone 
j u s t then thought t h a t Spain was weak - they remained f i r m i n t h e i r o p i n i o n : 
experience had shewn t h a t an e x p e d i t i o n t h a t went o f f at h a l f - c o c k would 
jeopardize a l l the i n t e r e s t s , Spanish and I r i s h , t h a t the King hoped t o 
p r o t e c t . At l e a s t 150,000 ducats would be needed f o r the equipping and 
maintenance of a f l e e t , and the Treasury was unable t o provide such a sum. 
Moreover, the summer was f a r advanced: i n another s i x weeks any f l e e t would 
(44) AGS E25H/1. 
(45) Cabrera Felipe I I I 73-
(46) AGS E1856/ Sf, document of 11th July, 1600. 
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r i s k damage or even t o t a l loss through storms. Nevertheless, the c o u n c i l l o r s 
knew t h e i r master: 
"but since the matter i s of such great importance f o r the service of 
God and Your Majesty, and the e n t e r p r i s e so worthy of your r o y a l 
greatness and so appealing t o Your Majesty, n e i t h e r these nor any 
other d i f f i c u l t i e s must dampen ardour, but must r a t h e r give encourage-
ment t o overcome them, so t h a t the valour and greatness of Your Majesty' 
r e g a l s p i r i t may shine out the more - though t h i s without spurning any 
of the many means of gaining time so t h a t , i f possible, an e x p e d i t i o n 
may be sent t h i s year, and i f not, preparations may be made t o send 
one w i t h the January winds next year, or whenever seems most appropriate 
t r u s t i n g t h a t Our Lord w i l l a i d His own cause." 
(Pero siendo e l negocio de t a n gran importancia para e l s e r v i c i o de 
Dios y de VM y l a empresa t a n digna de su r e a l grandeza y de que VM 
t i e n e t a n t o gusto no se debe por l a s dichas n i o t r a ninguna d i f i c u l t a d 
d e j a r de l a raano antes conviene poner e l pecho a vencerlas para que 
m£s resplandezca e l v a l o r y grandeza d e l r e a l dnimo de VM s i n d e j a r 
cosa de todas cuantas se pudieren hacer para ganar tiempo con f i n de 
que s i e'ste diere lugar se haga jornada este ano y s i no se prevenga 
para que se pueda e j e c u t a r en l as b r i s a s de enero d e l ano que viene 
o en l a saz<5n que mds pareciere convenir confiando en nuestro Sefior 
que ha de poner mano en e l l a como en causa t a n propi a suya (4.7) • ) 
The Council's manifest reluctance - sharply contrasted w i t h P h i l i p ' s 
own o f f e r t o forgo the money needed f o r h i s personal expenses - was overcome 
only when a blow was str u c k at what they held most dear. The unwelcome news 
of A l b e r t ' s unfortunate engagement w i t h the Dutch at the B a t t l e of the Dunes 
succeeded where other considerations had f a i l e d . A p i s a l l e r , a scheme 
f o i s t e d on t o the Council by a b e l l i c o s e young king, now became an urgent 
and necessary s t r a t e g i c move. The very f a c t t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i n Flanders 
had become so c r i t i c a l made i t e s s e n t i a l t o d i s t r a c t Elizabeth's a t t e n t i o n 
and so prevent her from helping the Dutch t o continue t h e i r campaign. 
Equally important was, once more, P h i l i p ' s r e p u t a t i o n ; i f the enemy could 
see t h a t , f a r from being perturbed by the B a t t l e of the Dunes, he was able 
(47) AGS E25H/2; CSPSp 688. 
- 148 -
t o deploy h i s forces wherever he chose and where h i s neighbours l e a s t 
expected, i t would be g r e a t l y enhanced. P h i l i p at f i r s t had grandiose 
plans: t e n thousand men at a t o t a l cost of 600,000 ducats should be sent 
t o I r e l a n d as soon as possible along w i t h the supplies already decided upon 
(48). He was, of course, absurdly u n r e a l i s t i c - there were d i f f i c u l t i e s 
enough i n sending supplies t o A l b e r t - and as the summer wore on he seems 
t o have r e a l i z e d h i s mistake. The c a p t a i n who was t o take the f i r s t supplies, 
Don M a r t i n de l a Cerda, received h i s formal i n s t r u c t i o n s only on 28th Sept-
ember, some two months a f t e r the d e c i s i o n t o send him had been made (49); 
and the grand e x p e d i t i o n of t e n thousand men had by the middle of the same 
month been reduced t o f i f t e e n hundred or two thousand t o be sent t h a t autumn 
or, more probably, i n the e a r l y spring under the command of Don Diego de 
Brochero (50). The e x p e d i t i o n remained at the top of the l i s t o f p r i o r i t i e s , 
f o r i t was s t i l l seen as the best way of easing the pressure upon A l b e r t ; 
and as a token of t h i s , the troops f o r the Low Countries were t o be d i v e r t e d 
t o I r e l a n d , Spain p r o f i t i n g from the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t were 
embarrassing Maurice of Nassau (51). But even i n i t s reduced form the 
e n t e r p r i s e was beset w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s : f i n a n c i a l d e b i l i t y and the need t o 
strengthen the Milanesado d u r i n g the Saluzzo c r i s i s were worrying d i s t r a c t i o n s . 
I t was t h e r e f o r e w i t h genuine r e l i e f t h a t the Council heard from I r e l a n d 
t h a t the rebels f e l t able t o hold out u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g May (52). 
The conclusion of the Treaty of Lyons allowed Spain t o t u r n her f u l l 
a t t e n t i o n northwards. A good many troops and supplies had been prepared 
f o r a war w i t h France, and the a u t h o r i t i e s f e l t t h a t something ought t o be 
done w i t h them (53). I r e l a n d was the n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e , t a k i n g precedence 
even over the plans against Islam (.54). The committee set up t o organize 
(48) AGS E25H/7; AGS E2023/28; Alcocer i 39> 
(49) AGS E2604/sf, document of 28th September, 1600. 
(50) AGS E2511/13; a consulta of 9 t h September i s missing. 
(51) AGS E25H/17. 
(52) AGS E1856/sf, document of 25th January, 1601. 
(53) AGS E84O/4I. 
(54) AGS El874/sf, consulta of 17th February, 1601. 
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the venture t h e r e f o r e f e l t impelled t o p l a n on a large scale: s i x thousand 
men f o r an i n i t i a l s i x months' service and at a cost of 200,000 ducats, a 
f u r t h e r 150,000 being necessary f o r the f l e e t t h a t was t o c a r r y thern t o 
t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n (55). And despite the m u l t i p l i c i t y of adverse f a c t o r s -
the delays, the worsening of r e l a t i o n s w i t h France, the need t o strengthen 
Spanish f r o n t i e r s - the preparations were pushed ahead. I n the midst o f 
a p e s s i m i s t i c Court, the c o u n c i l l o r s made a bold show. The Venetian 
ambassador reported t h a t "the m i n i s t e r s have embarked on t h i s e n t e r p r i s e 
when already engaged i n so many others i n order t o shew the power of t h i s 
crown: nor do they omit t o go about vaunting and exaggerating the ease w i t h 
which i n a short time they have put together such f o r c e s m i l i t a r y and naval" 
(56). Any l i n g e r i n g doubts i n t h e i r minds were d i s p e l l e d by the growing 
f e a r t h a t the I r i s h could wait no longer. I f they c a p i t u l a t e d t o E l i z a b e t h , 
as seemed i n c r e a s i n g l y l i k e l y , Spain would s u f f e r badly and her money be 
wasted. The Council t h e r e f o r e s t r o n g l y f e l t t h a t the f l e e t should set o f f 
as soon as possible. But the s i x thousand troops a l l o t e d seemed too few, 
and they observed t h a t t e n or twelve thousand would be needed i n order t o 
be a b s o l u t e l y sure of avoiding a shameful defeat. P h i l i p , however, chose 
not t o w a i t . Perhaps r e a l i z i n g t h a t the assembly of e x t r a forces would 
take valuable time, or perhaps f e a r f u l t h a t d i s c r e t i o n would q u i c k l y get 
the b e t t e r of the Council's valour i f he delayed, he ordered the immediate 
despatch of the forces t h a t were already prepared (57). 
Nearly a month l a t e r , on 3rd September, 1601, the e x p e d i t i o n , under 
Aguil a and Brochero, set s a i l . On board were the 4*4-32 troops t h a t had 
been mustered - a number f a r short of t h a t intended (58). The Council 
hoped t o be able t o send the reinforcements t h a t Aguila badly needed: but 
the problem of where t o r a i s e them remained. By December, Lerma was i n 
(55) AGS E840/4I. 
(56) CSPV i x 999-
(57) AGS E618/112; AGS E2511/37, consulta of 4 t h August, 1601. 
(58) S i l k e Kinsale 104. 
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despair and Cdrdoba was combining h i s two o f f i c e s of c l e r i c and Treasury 
o f f i c i a l by advancing as the sole remedy f o r the shortage of resources a 
pu b l i c appeasement of d i v i n e wrath by prayer and penitence i n every diocese 
(59). Aguila's p o s i t i o n i n e v i t a b l y d e t e r i o r a t e d , and on 29th January the 
Council acknowledged t h a t i t would be a miracle i f he had not already 
surrendered. "The d i f f i c u l t y , " as they r i g h t l y observed, " i s i n the men 
t h a t have t o be sent, because there are none." The only spare troops were 
t o be found i n the garrisons of Portugal, whose normal task was t o guarantee 
the s a f e t y of the west coast from E n g l i s h and Dutch r a i d s . But so hard-
pressed were the Council t h a t they advised P h i l i p t o send these men t o 
I r e l a n d and t o put the barely-competent members of the Extremaduran m i l i t i a 
i n t h e i r place u n t i l r e g u l a r s could be r e c a l l e d from I t a l y (60). An atmos-
phere of profound gloom hung over the Council. I n one of the few p r i v a t e 
l e t t e r s extant from the period, the secretary of st a t e Andre's de Prada 
wrote t o Moura i n mid-February, 
" I confess t o Your Excellency t h a t , as God l i v e s , I have f e l t f o r 
t h i s I r i s h business as badly as i f the blame had been a l l mine. Indeed, 
I p e r s o n a l l y f e e l t h a t , since so j u s t and w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d a p r o j e c t 
l i k e t h a t of the King can only go badly because of the sins of us, 
i t s p r i n c i p a l movers, my own are s u f f i c i e n t t o cancel out whatever 
good s t i l l c l i n g s t o the r e s t . " 
(Confieso a VE y l e j u r o por Dios vivo que he sentido l o de I r l a n d a 
de manera que s i fuera l a culpa enteramente mia, y en efecto h a l l o 
por mi cuenta que pues en causa t a n j u s t a y con i n t e n c i d n t a n santa 
como l a d e l rey nuestro sefior nos va t a n mal deben de ser pecados de 
lo s que tratemos de e l l o y los m£os solos bastan para estragar cuanto 
bueno se pegare a e l l o s ( 6 l ) . ) 
The d e f i n i t e news of Aguila's defeat and surrender t h e r e f o r e came as 
no s u r p r i s e . But unshaken i n the b e l i e f t h a t I r e l a n d was God's cause and 
t h a t , as He had chastened f a i t h f u l kings i n the past, so now He was proving 
(59) CSPV i x 1032; AGS E25H/29. 
(60) AGS E84.O/48. 
(61) AM E tomo 7 8 d / l 0 2 . 
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P h i l i p ' s constancy, the Council was comforted i n the knowledge t h a t they 
had t r i e d t o do t h e i r best. Regrettable as i t was, there was no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of sending any f u r t h e r supplies t o Aguila, the rnore so since a j o i n t f l e e t 
of f i f t y E n g l i s h and Dutch vessels was reported t o be heading f o r Spain 
and a l l a v a i l a b l e forces would be needed t o r e p e l them. For the moment, 
a l l t h a t could be done f o r the I r i s h was t o send f o r t y or f i f t y thousand 
ducats t o help O'Donneil i n h i s advance on D u b l i n - though w i t h i n a week 
the sum had been halved (62). The summer was a d i f f e r e n t matter; and no 
sooner had news of the defeat been received than a committee made up of 
IdiSquez, Miranda, Cdrdoba and Lerma was hard at work discussing a p l a n 
submitted by the Adelantado, and t h i n k i n g i n terms of a force of f o u r t e e n 
or f i f t e e n thousand men, a mustering i n Lisbon and the personal presence of 
t h e King there t o speed the preparations ( 6 3 )• Once more, there were the 
usual d i f f i c u l t i e s . When the matter was r a i s e d i n the f u l l Council on 
13th May, there was l i t t l e progress t o r e p o r t , and by the end of J u l y 
P h i l i p had c a l l e d o f f the operation because of the delay i n t r a n s p o r t i n g 
from I t a l y the 6 , 400 troops t h a t had t o be r e c a l l e d t o Spain ( 6 4 ). The 
need t o create a d i v e r s i o n i n I r e l a n d was greater than ever, not l e a s t 
because of the Council's recent d e c i s i o n t o envisage James VI's accession 
t o the E n g l i s h throne. But whether as a d i v e r s i o n or as a spring-board, 
I r e l a n d was d i f f i c u l t t o get. Even P h i l i p had ceased t o be hopeful; and 
he was s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a l i s t i c only t o increase by h a l f the twenty thousand 
ducats voted by the Council t o the I r i s h (65)• 
(62 ) AGS E251l/49 , 4 8 . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , P h i l i p thought t h i s inadequate, 
and seemingly without c o n s u l t i n g the Council a l l o c a t e d f i f t y thousand 
ducats t o O ' N e i l l and twenty thousand t o 0 ' S u l l i v a n and the two 
O ' D r i s c o l l b r o t h e r s : AGS E19l/sf, document of 1 4 t h March, 1602. 
(63) AGS E19l/sf, document dated January, 1602: i n t e r n a l evidence shews 
i t t o have been drawn up i n mid-March of the same year. 
(64) AGS E84O/36; AGS E19l/sf, document of 27th July, 1602 . 
(65) AGS EKI426/36; AGS E25H / 4 3 -
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The f i n a l blow to the I r i s h policy came, l o g i c a l l y , from the Low 
Countries. The c r i t i c a l state of the siege of Ostend seemed ample proof 
that the diversion i n Ireland had been, i n part at least, a mistake. 
Although Sesa reported from Rome i n March that Elizabeth had been frightened 
considerably by Aguila's presence i n Kinsale and that she was therefore 
more open to thoughts of peace with Spain, there had been no tangible and 
beneficial effects either on t h i s front or i n the Low Countries (66). Only 
Cdrdoba was i n favour of launching another expedition: the rest of the 
Council agreed with Poza, the former President of the Treasury, when he 
reminded his colleagues that Spain's true p r i o r i t i e s were elsewhere: 
"although Ireland i s very important, Flanders i s much more so; and 
since there i s not enough f o r both, i t seems that we must look to 
the l a t t e r as best we may, without allowing ourselves to be distracted." 
(Aunque lo de Irlanda es de tanta importancia lo es mucho mds lo de 
Flandes y no habiendo para lo uno y para lo otro parece que se debe 
acudir a esto con todo lo que se pudiere s i n d i v e r t i r s e a otra cosa 
(67). ) 
T h i r t y thousand ducats and a monthly subsidy of ten thousand ducats were, 
at Philip's d i r e c t i o n , to be sent to Tyrone as from January, 1603, as an 
interim measure: but even t h i s proved to be impossible i n the l i g h t of the 
demands made upon the Treasury by Albert (68). As late as February, 1603, 
the Council noted that nothing had been sent and that Spain ran the r i s k 
of forcing the I r i s h to surrender to the English. The tartness of Philip's 
reply shews that he too had come to realize that the w i l l was no substitute 
f o r the deed: " i f the obvious obligation to attend to my many commitments 
allowed me to give precedence to t h i s , the Council would not need to remind 
me about i t " (69)• When f i n a l l y Don Martin de l a Cerda arrived with money 
(66) AGS EK1631/88. 
(67) AGS E2023/69; Alcocer i 232, consulta of 22nd October, 1602. 
(68) i b i d . 
(69) AGS E25H/89-
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i n Ireland on 12th May, he was met with the news of Queen Elizabeth's 
death. By that time, thoroughly disabused of t h e i r hope of finding a 
m i l i t a r y solution to England's enmity, P h i l i p and the Council were con-
sidering an e n t i r e l y new policy (70). 
(70) AGS E194/sf, document of 3rd July, 1603- Cerda had received his 
wri t t e n instructions on 24th January, but was not to set o f f from 
La Coruna u n t i l 24.th A p r i l : AGS E2571/2. 
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V I I . FRUSTRATED DIPLOMACY 
Unlikely as the conquest of England or Ireland seemed to be, i n i t s e l f 
i t would be only a short-term solution to the English problem. Spain's 
o f f i c i a l view was cogently expressed by her ambassador i n Rome early i n 
1597: 
" i f England i s not given into the hands of a t r u l y Catholic prince 
who i s deep i n Your Majesty's confidence, I do not see how Your Majesty 
can have confidence i n any sort of peace that might be made with either 
England or France." 
( s i no se muda e l estado de Inglaterra en prlncipe verdaderamente 
catdlico y confidente de VM y de su corona yo no veo como ha de poderse 
f i a r VM de ningun ge"nero de paz que se haga con Inglaterra n i Francia 
(1). ) 
Whatever happened, the Tudor l i n e was to die with Elizabeth; and the Queen's 
constant reluctance to name her successor l e f t a clear f i e l d f o r i n t r i g u e . 
The obvious successor, James VI of Scotland, was prima facie no lover of 
the Habsburgs, despite his late mother's many links with P h i l i p I I and his 
ministers. His upbringing had been r i g i d l y Protestant, his character was 
pedantic and argumentative, and his sympathies were with Spain's English, 
French and Dutch enemies (2). P h i l i p could f i n d nothing but knavery and 
"siniestras intenciones" i n James, and viewed with the utmost scepticism 
the l a t t e r ' s offer, made through John Oglivy of Poury, to be converted to 
Roman Catholicism i f only P h i l i p would help him to the English throne (3). 
A reciprocal mission, authorized by Ph i l i p , was to be s i m i l a r l y insincere. 
The envoy, Captain Antonio Escobar, was given a complicated task: bli n d 
James with hopes, though without committing P h i l i p i n any way; arrange a 
trade-agreement, whilst secretly asking the Scottish Roman Catholics f o r 
help i n case of an I r i s h expedition; and ascertain whether i t was practicable 
(1) AGS E969/sf, document of 24th February, 1597. 
(2) A treaty of perpetual peace had been renewed by James and the United 
Provinces as recently as July, 1594- Dumont V i 507. 
(3) Law; Winwood i 1; AGS E2223/162. 
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t o transport troops from Ireland to Scotland - adequate proof that P h i l i p 
thought a campaign against James to be worthy of consideration (4). I n 
the event, Escobar remained i n the Low Countries and the attempt to g u l l 
James was abandoned: but Philip's attitude was not to change (5). 
Of the other claimants, the most appealing was undoubtedly Philip's 
daughter, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia^ whose claim had recently 
been publicized i n A Conference about the next succession i n England, 
published under the pseudonym of R. Doleman, but i n r e a l i t y the work of 
an English Jesuit, Robert Persons. Tracing the claim of the Habsburgs 
back to John of Gaunt and William the Conqueror, Persons' premise was that 
the former were the true heirs and representatives of the Lancastrian l i n e , 
whereas t h e i r r i v a l s were for the most part descendants of the tainted 
House of York and as such inadmissible. But since on genealogical grounds 
James' claim was undoubtedly superior, Persons l a i d predictable emphasis 
upon true godliness as the prerequisite i n any candidate, a condition which, 
i n his view, either P h i l i p or the Infanta would f u l f i l admirably. Despite 
t h i s encouragement, however, P h i l i p did not much concern himself with 
following the matter up. I n his instructions to his nephew Albert i n 1595, 
he noted the existence of Persons' book, but did not see that i t was 
necessary to act upon i t . Provided that Elizabeth's successor was suitably 
f i t , he did not much mind who i t was to be: 
"and because there i s no ambition on t h i s side, a l l e f f o r t s must be 
dedicated simply to ensure the succession of a Catholic prince, and 
i f i t i s possible for them to f i n d a feasible candidate from amongst 
themselves, t h i s i s what we most desire and what could most quickly 
bear f r u i t and restore that country to our holy Catholic f a i t h and 
the obedience of the Roman Church. This would suffice to give me 
U) 
(5) 
AGS E611/230. 
AGS E613/2. 
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great s a t i s f a c t i o n without any personal i n t e r e s t , the more so since 
the monarch, being a Catholic and newly-installed and with r i v a l s , i n 
return f o r help would have to offer terms that would be of great 
benefit to my Low Countries." 
(y porque en efecto no hay de esta parte ambicidn ninguna se ha de 
hacer toda l a fuerza en s61o que se prevengan a s a l i r con un rey 
catdlico, pues s i fueren parte para hacerle de entre s i mismos t a l 
que pueda prevalecer eso es lo que hemos de desear lo que m£.s presto 
pudiere s a l i r a luz y r e s t i t u i r aquel reino a nuestra santa fe catdlica 
y obediencia de l a i g l e s i a romana, que esto me bastaria a mi para tener 
un gran contento sin interns mio ninguno, cuanto mds que siendo e l 
cat61ico y rey nuevo y con competidores 61 nos habria de ofrecer a 
trueque de ser ayudado partidos muy convenientes a l bien de mis estados 
bajos.) 
Only i f , a f ter a l l his exhortations to the English recusants, Albert found 
that they could s t i l l reach no agreement upon a candidate was he to press 
that of the Habsburgs; and even then, he was to stress to the utmost that 
there would be no question of incorporating England in t o the Spanish crown, 
"for that i s something which they would take badly and which has never been 
contemplated." (6) Philip's comparative casualness i n the matter was 
probably caused by his continued hope of a m i l i t a r y solution; having once 
gained control of England, there would be time enough to f i n d a new king. 
Consequently, there was no mention of a claimant made i n the proclamations 
drawn up for the Adelantado's use i n England or Ireland i n 1596 (7). 
A change i n policy was brought about by the peace negotiations with 
France. The Pope, anxious to reconcile France and Spain, saw England as a 
possible common enemy against which his two wayward sons would concentrate 
t h e i r hatred. Since the Infanta's claim to the duchy of Brittany and thus 
to the French crown would be the greatest of the many stumbling-blocks i n 
the ta l k s , he suggested to Sesa i n May, 1596, that i t would be good to seek 
the French reaction to a new proposal: that, i n return f o r the renunciation 
of her claims i n France, Isabella be i n s t a l l e d i n England by the combined 
(6) AHJM EL;L;/sf, document of 21st July, 1595-
(7) AGS E176/sf, document of 23rd September, 1596; qvs p.-14.0. 
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forces of P h i l i p and Henry (8). At f i r s t , P h i l i p did not rise to the b a i t : 
the war with France continued and, as we have seen, he pressed ahead with 
plans f o r the invasion of Ireland without taking account of the Pope's 
idea. But as his attitude towards a peace with France changed, and doubt-
less disappointed by the Adelantado's f a i l u r e (9), he became more interested 
i n the o f f e r . Of course, many pr a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s s t i l l remained, and 
Clement was obviously f a r too optimistic. l e t peace was patently necessary, 
and the best means of saving face over the abandoning of Isabella's claims 
was undoubtedly to compensate her with England (10). How seriously P h i l i p 
took the offer, however, i s open to question. Sesa was provided with two 
sets of instructions, i n the f i r s t of which the Pope was to be taken at 
his word, and i n the second Elizabeth's inclusion i n the treaty with France 
was contemplated. I n the end, Clement was to be disappointed. Henry I V s 
reluctance to abandon his a l l i e s proved to be stronger than Spain's i n s i s t -
ence upon due compensation; P h i l i p badly needed peace, and his daughter's 
claims formed part of the price that he eventually was prepared to pay. 
No mention of the English succession was made during the talks, at Vervins, 
nor i n the f i n a l treaty. By the time that agreement with France had been 
reached, P h i l i p I I was a dying man. Able less and less to follow the daily 
pattern of work that he had evolved f o r himself over many years, he began 
to l e t go his grasp of a f f a i r s . Since his f a i l i n g energies were taken up 
with the conclusion of the tre a t y with France and the cession of the Low 
Countries to his daughter and her fiance* Albert, he l e f t the English 
succession question alone. Now that there was no hope of e n l i s t i n g French 
(8) AGS E967/sf, document of 16th May, 1596. 
(9) qvs M 4 - < F " I - -, 
(10) AGS U969/sf, document of 16th March, 1597; also E2224 /202: "sera 
bien que acorde*is ... a SS lo que mas de una vez os ha dicho de 
cuanto deseaba encaminar l a sucesidn de l a infanta mi h i j a a 
Inglaterra quedando reino por s i y allanando para e l l o los impedimentos 
de Francia y aun procurando su ayuda en consideracidn de r e m i t i r l e s 
de esta parte los grandes derechos de l a misma infanta y tambie'n los 
mlos a l a recompensa de los excesivos gastos hechos en su beneficio..." 
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support f o r a m i l i t a r y expedition, and since such support would be v i t a l 
f o r success, he was wise to do so. At his death, the business seemed as 
f a r from solution as ever. 
P h i l i p I I I was less easily daunted; and just as he made a more deter-
mined e f f o r t to f i n d a m i l i t a r y solution to the English problem, so he 
t r i e d harder to f i n d a successor to Elisabeth. The English Roman Catholic 
exiles therefore received attention as never before. Joseph Creswell, t h e i r 
self-appointed spokesman and a member of the English seminary i n Valladolid 
( l l ) , appeared before the Council of State i n December, 1598, with the 
f i r s t of his many memoranda. Although, as we have seen, his schemes f o r 
the invasion of England could not be entertained, his observations upon 
the English succession were not to be dismissed so readily. I n e f f e c t , he 
offered to P h i l i p the opportunity to decide upon the next r u l e r of England: 
either P h i l i p himself could make the nomination and secure the Pope1s 
endorsement, or he could supervise the recusants' selection of t h e i r own 
nominee,(12). There were many obvious advantages i n following Creswell's 
advice. The English recusants were reported to be d i s i l l u s i o n e d with 
Spain's constantly u n f u l f i l l e d offers of help and protection and i n con-
sequence to have spoken of the reasonable p o s s i b i l i t y of James VI's con-
version to Roman Catholicism (13). I f Spain intervened, she would there-
fore avert the danger of losing c r e d i b i l i t y with her supporters. But 
there were s t i l l greater dangers i n acting too h a s t i l y . For Spain to 
commit herself without f i r s t having ready enough forces to back up her 
word would be f o l l y ; and the Council advised the King t h a t , for the moment, 
he should make no announcement (14). Even when Zdfiiga, the ambassador i n 
the Low Countries, reported that Elizabeth was i n poor health and l i k e l y 
(11) Loomie Spanish Elizabethans cap. v i . 
(12) AGS E1953/sf, document of 13th December, 1598; E25H/54-
(13) AGS E969/sf, document of 1st December, 1598. 
(14) AGS E2511/54-
- 159 -
to die before long, the Council did not f e e l that i t was the time to act. 
Although the Spanish claim was, f o r them, undoubtedly the best i n every 
sense, they had no means of knowing which of the candidates would be best 
received i n England. Their advice was simple: P h i l i p should keep on good 
terms with a l l the claimants - even with James - u n t i l the s i t u a t i o n became 
clearer, and not play the kingmaker (15). I t needed more than Creswell to 
force an intervention i n England, and his successive pleas met with no 
further response ( l 6 ) . 
The s i t u a t i o n became more pressing, though no easier, with the a r r i v a l 
of news that James VI was making diplomatic overtures i n I t a l y and even the 
papal curia. As early as 1596 there had been t a l k of his changing his 
religious allegiance, but i t had not been taken seriously. Now the rumour 
was growing stronger. During a conversation with Sesa, the Pope revealed 
that James' wife, Anne, had recently become a Roman Catholic and that, one 
day when James was about to go hunting, he p l a y f u l l y had taken away from 
her a reliquary set i n a necklace and carried i t with him. Whilst sub-
sequently crossing a stretch of water i n a boat, James and his companions 
had been surprised by a sudden storm, from which they escaped ( i n the Pope's 
words) "almost miraculously". Shortly afterwards, as she was about to be 
hanged, a sorceress had admitted that she had called up the storm i n order 
to drown the King: but that the demons whom she had sent to do her bidding 
had returned with the excuse that the reliquary carried by James had 
frustrated t h e i r mistress's designs. The reaction of both Sesa and the 
leader of the English Jesuits i n Rome was predictably scornful. The Pope, 
on the other hand, had seemed to take the tale seriously, and there were 
many enemies of Spain round about him to encourage him to do so. Clement 
had, i n Spain's view, already been deceived once about a royal conversion 
(15) AGS El856/sf, document of 18th November, 1599; E2288/sf, document 
of 30th January, 1600; E22242/3; E2604/sf, document of 6th May, 1600. 
( 1 6 ) AGS £617/241,242; E2511/53-
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- that of Henry IV - and could well be deceived again (17). The Council 
knew that James' schemes were better scotched, but had to recognize that 
they had no sure means of doing him down. A l l that they could suggest was 
that the English exiles be fobbed o f f with the bogus assurance that P h i l i p 
had h i t upon a candidate but was not yet ready to announce the name (18). 
Only one councillor, Guevara, and he neither the most experienced nor 
the most prestigious, wished to come to a f i r m decision about the candidate 
that Spain was to support. The King, however, was struck by his idea, and 
whilst following the advice of the majority i n what he should t e l l the 
exiles, he ordered the Council to discuss the matter f u l l y . On 11th July, 
the debate on the English succession took place. The Council saw as the 
f i r s t and v i t a l objective the exclusion of James from England, as that of 
any candidate who was l i k e l y to have sympathies with France, as any 
Protestant would. Failure to achieve i t could be the r u i n of the Spanish 
empire: the Low Countries would be completely surrounded by a hostile 
alliance of France, England, Scotland, Denmark (for James' wife was Danish), 
the Protestant Germans and the Dutch. On the subject of who should supplant 
him, the Council's feelings were not as strong. I n t h e i r view, none of 
the Roman Catholic claimants ought to be ruled out; a hasty declaration or 
a public s l i g h t could upset the diplomatic apple-cart. The Pope's good 
offices were essential, and an announcement against either the Duke of Parma 
or his brother the Cardinal Farnese, whose candidatures Clement seems 
seriously to have considered (19), could t u r n him against Spain. Silence 
would bring with i t the f l e x i b i l i t y that would be necessary i f , the 
councillors noted s i g n i f i c a n t l y , P h i l i p was forced not to intervene. 
Nevertheless, a claimant had been asked fo r , and the Council had to comply. 
(17) AGS E972/sf, document of 19th A p r i l , 1600. 
(18) AGS El856/sf, document of 3rd June, 1600; E973/sf & El856/sf, 
document of 3rd July, 1600. 
(19) Ossat v 299-
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The King's own claim was at once ruled out; i t would be acceptable neither 
to the English, f e a r f u l for t h e i r sovereignty, nor to the world, envious 
of his greatness. He had i n any case f a r too many commitments to allow him 
to be an absentee monarch: experience with Portugal had shewn how a viceregal 
administration could be a constant drain upon resources. A better claimant 
by f a r was the Infanta Isabella. She would excite less h o s t i l i t y , being 
the sovereign of the Low Countries rather than that of Spain; she was, from 
the Jesuits' reports, apparently acceptable to large numbers of the English 
exiles; and, not least important, she could be expected i n large measure to 
pay her own way, both before and a f t e r her accession. The one dissentient 
voice, that of the Archbishop of Toledo, who feared that, although Albert 
and Isabella were at present Spain's best a l l i e s , the leadership of a strong 
Anglo-Burgundian state might cause t h e i r friendship to weaken, was on t h i s 
occasion over-ruled; the Archbishop's colleagues f e l t that adequate safe-
guards could be exacted from the couple when the time came. The Council's 
advice was therefore wholly tentative and provisional; and they continued 
strongly to advise P h i l i p to keep s i l e n t before the world. Only on two 
counts did they recommend more positive measures: the f i r s t , that prepar-
ations f o r Queen Elizabeth's death should be made i n Flanders; and the 
second, that Sesa t e l l the Pope simply that P h i l i p wished to see a Roman 
Catholic successor to the Queen, whilst expressing his personal suspicion 
that the Infanta would be the Spanish candidate.. (20). 
But now that P h i l i p had the opinion that he had asked for, he took 
another six months i n which to make up his own mind. The decision was of 
great importance and the s i t u a t i o n extremely complex. Clearly, intervention 
would be f u t i l e without adequate m i l i t a r y backing: yet preparations f o r the 
expedition to Ireland, which could have been the prelude to so much, were 
(20) AGS El856/sf, document of 11th July, 1600; CSP Sp 686. 
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encountering constant setbacks. But equally serious was the fact that, 
despite the Council's pronouncement, there was s t i l l no obvious candidate 
to whom Ph i l i p could give his unstinted support. None of the native English 
claimants had much to commend them to the King, f o r both t h e i r r e l i g i o u s 
orthodoxy and t h e i r popularity with t h e i r compatriots were i n doubt. The 
acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of the claims of either the Duke of Parma or of 
his brother, the Cardinal Farnese, had to be decided with extreme circum-
spection: the c r i s i s with France over Saluzzo was looming large, and the 
Pope, who might be favourable to either of these claims, could not be 
alienated. For the same reason, the suggestion that Arbella Stuart or one 
of the daughters of the Earl of Derby should be married to the Duke of 
Savoy or to one of his sons could not be taken up: Charles Emmanuel's f i r s t 
wife had been the Infanta Catherine Michaela, and his connexion with Spain 
was too obvious. Moreover, Savoy's entering the l i s t s f o r the English 
crown might i n c l i n e the Pope to favour Henry I V s claims to Saluzzo: and 
Saluzzo was even more important for Spain's strategic interests than was 
England, for i t protected the Spanish Eoad to Flanders-
Above a l l , the Infanta's claim was not so obviously suitable as i t 
might at f i r s t have appeared. There was no need to take the Archbishop's 
warning too sericmsly: P h i l i p was always on good terms with his s i s t e r and 
brother-in-law, and had no reason to d i s t r u s t them. Furthermore, there was 
now every doubt that the couple would ever produce offspring. Both had 
married l a t e : Albert was by t h i s time 4 1 and subject to occasional f a i n t i n g 
f i t s , and Isabella 34 > neither of them having had previous spouses. Accord-
ing to in t e r n a t i o n a l gossip, i n t h i s case purveyed by Henry IV, Albert had 
not been able to consummate the marriage on his b r i d a l n i g h t - ( 2 1 ) . The 
r e a l danger was elsewhere. For some years, Spain had been deeply concerned 
( 2 1 ) Uinwood i 26. 
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with the question of who was to succeed the eccentric and intractable 
Rudolph as Holy Roman Emperor (22). The heir by t r a d i t i o n Jield the t i t l e 
of King of the Romans, and Spain's unchanging desire was that the next 
holder should be, as usual, a Habsburg. Rudolph, however, was unco-operati 
Sometimes more mad than eccentric, he feared that the election of his suc-
cessor would be the immediate prelude to his own deposition, knowing f u l l 
well that his heterodox beli e f s made him something of an embarrassment to 
his family. Whilst the Emperor procrastinated, Henry IV was i n t r i g u i n g 
with the Protestant princes (23). And late i n 1600, San Clemente, the 
ambassador i n Prague, reported that Rudolph might well take his own l i f e 
during one of the bouts of acute melancholia to which he was increasingly 
subject. A l l other problems now became secondary. I f the Empire were l o s t , 
Spanish interests i n Flanders and i n I t a l y would be severely threatened, 
and the French, the Protestants and perhaps even the Turk would be cock-a-
hoop. The Council of State therefore had d e f i n i t e opinions: 
"We must look to a remedy with the greatest possible diligence, heed-
less of cost or e f f o r t , f o r besides being a matter so deserving of 
Your Majesty's attention as defender of the f a i t h , i n i t s success 
consists the peace and safety of Your Majesty's realms." 
(se debe atender a l remedio con l a mayor asistencia que sea posible 
sin perdonar a ningiin gasto ni trabajo que se ofrezca pues demds de 
ser tan digno y proprio de VM como defensor de l a fe consiste en e l 
buen suceso de e l l a l a seguridad y quietud de los reinos de VM ( 2 4 ) . ) 
Ph i l i p I I ' s i n t e n t i o n had been that Albert succeed to the imperial 
t i t l e , and one of the reasons that had weighed with him i n deciding to cede 
the Low Countries to him and Isabella had been the need to provide him with 
an adequate dignity and income upon which to subsist whilst s t i l l only King 
of the Romans (25). I n 1600, Albert s t i l l remained the most obvious choice 
(22) The most recent study of Rudolph i s by Dr. R. J. H. Evans. 
(23) qvs firf-
( 2 4 ) AGS E2323/116,136. 
(25) qvs pi 43 ; AGS E614/12. 
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he was loy a l to his family and to the country of his upbringing; his 
religious orthodoxy was above reproach; his m i l i t a r y experience gave him 
the standing that he would need amongst the German princes. But t h i s being 
the case, the English succession had to be examined anew. I f Albert and 
Isabella together ruled the Low Countries, the Empire and England, a great 
new power-bloc would come in t o being - one that perhaps would outshine that 
of Spain: the Spanish Habsburgs might well have to cede pride of place t o 
t h e i r cadets. And what i f the strength of Protestantism i n both England 
and Germany proved enough to force Albert into religious compromise? 
Hitherto, Roman Catholic Spain had combined the greatest empire i n 
Christendom with the greatest zeal f o r the f a i t h . Now there arose a new 
and unwelcome p o s s i b i l i t y - that an empire, i n European terms s t i l l 
greater, would not f e e l a similar c a l l i n g to the crusade. I t was there-
fore perhaps not i n Spain's best interests to see a l l three areas united. 
But a solution to the imperial succession question had to be found. Per-
haps i t i s here that we may see the reason f o r Philip's delay. The husband 
of the best candidate to the English throne, Isabella, was wanted f o r some-
thing of f a r greater importance and was thus rendered unsuitable to be the 
consort of the Queen of England. I n any case, i f England feared the prospect 
of being ruled by the King of Spain, she was not l i k e l y to welcome the wife 
of a future Holy Roman Emperor. 
P h i l i p was f i n a l l y galvanized in t o action by further news of James 
VI 1s I t a l i a n diplomacy. Sesa had come to see the Scottish King as the 
main enemy, a Francophile heretic whose support i n England, Denmark, the 
United Provinces and I t a l y was increasing rapidly. An Englishman called 
Constable had arrived i n Rome, apparently i n order to convince the Pope 
that James would easily be converted to Roman Catholicism and re-introduce 
i t s public exercize in t o both England and Scotland i f only he could be 
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allowed to succeed Elizabeth i n peace; and according to a s i n i s t e r rumour, 
Constable's expenses had been paid by Henry IV (26). The Council of State, 
too, had begun to take notice of James' progress, and sent the King frequent 
reminders that he ought to make up his mind; they feared that, i f the a f f a i r 
were l e f t to time and chance, the recusants would come to terms with anyone, 
even James, and Spain would be l e f t discredited and powerless (27). I t 
seemed to have come to a straight choice between Isabella and James, a view 
confirmed by Persons (28). For a l l the disadvantages inherent i n i t , some 
time between 13th December, 1600, and. 13th January, 1601, P h i l i p decided 
to support his sister's claim. 
The Council received Philip's decision i n a very matter-of-fact fashion, 
fo r they were no more eager than before to have a public announcement made. 
Only Sesa, Persons and the Pope were to be t o l d : even Creswell was to be 
l e f t t o glean the information f o r himself (29). This secretiveness was 
never to a l t e r . A decision had been made merely to t r y to stop James or 
any other claimant from winning the support of the English recusants; only 
the bare minimum could or should be done to ensure t h i s i f Spain were to 
avoid being compromised. As i t was, the Pope was not wholly s a t i s f i e d . 
Although he was reported to be glad that the Infanta had been chosen, he 
was f u l l of misgivings about the reactions of France. He f r e e l y admitted 
that, from his point of view, the union of England and the Low Countries 
(26) AGS E972/sf, document of 14th December, 1600. Nothing but the worst 
was expected of the I t a l i a n s : " l a razdn de estado de estos i t a l i a n o s 
consiste principalmente en procurar cuanto pueden contrapesar las 
potencias de los grandes principes y se persuaden que no es bien que 
Inglaterra se junte ni dependa de l a corona de VM que l a tienen por 
tan grande que desean m&s e l cercenarla que e l acrecentarla y este 
pecado en I t a l i a es tan comun como e l o r i g i n a l . " AGS E972/sf, document 
of 20th November, 1600. 
(27) AGS E2023/3; Alcocer i 93: "porque s i este negocio tan importante se 
deja a beneficio del tiempo los catdlicos se arrimardn a l rey de 
Escocia o a otro de los pretensores y cualquiera que saiga con l a 
corona de aquel reino por otra mano que por l a de VM sera1 m£s poderoso 
enemigo de VM que lo es ahora l a reina." 
(28) AGS E972/sf, document of 13th November, 1600. 
(29) AGS E251l/55,56. 
- 166 -
would create a welcome bulwark i n northern Europe. But he could not afford 
to harbour any i l l u s i o n s about France's idea of her int e r n a t i o n a l interests: 
Henry IV had f i r m l y decided to salute James' r i s i n g star. I n December, 
1601, he stated to the Cardinal d'Ossat the attitude that he had maintained 
throughout: James was more worthy of papal favour than P h i l i p . 
"As f a r as I am concerned, l i k e the Pope, I want England to f a l l i nto 
the hands of a Catholic prince. I am not unaware of the reasons that 
should make me want to prevent the union of that crown and Scotland, 
but i t i s unjust to oppose what i s j u s t , and imprudence to engage i n 
a vain enterprise such as that which i s being proposed to His Holiness. 
My opinion i s that i t would be f a i r e r , easier and more useful to the 
Catholic r e l i g i o n to think about bringing the King of Scotland in t o 
the Church's f o l d , rather than of opposing his i n s t a l l a t i o n . " 
(Pour moi, je dis comme SS que l e d i t royaume d'Angleterre tombe entre 
les mains d'un prince catholique; j'ignore aussi les raisons qui me 
doivent f a i r e ddsirer que cette couronne demeure separe'e de celle 
d'Ecosse ... mais c'est i n j u s t i c e de s'opposer a l a justice et 
imprudence de s'engager en une entreprise peu rdussible, comme celle 
que l'on propose a SS; je dis q u ' i l serait plus equitable, f a c i l e et 
u t i l e a l a r e l i g i o n catholique de penser a reduire l e d i t r o i d'Ecosse 
au giron de l'Eglise qu'a s'opposer a son e*tablissement• (30). ) 
And since the Pope did not wish to offend Henry unduly, he had to t e l l Sesa 
that he would wait u n t i l Elizabeth's death or possibly, whilst she s t i l l 
l i v e d , u n t i l some special emergency arose before making a pronouncement i n 
the Infanta's favour. As Sesa noted, "There i s no woman more f e a r f u l of 
raising her husband's suspicions than i s the Pope of raisin g those of the 
King of France/ 1 (31) The ambassador strongly suspected that, when i t came 
to the point, Clement would not i n fact support the Spanish claim but would 
rather t r y to mediate between France and Spain (32). As long as Spain could 
not t r u s t her neighbours, therefore, i t was better to remain s i l e n t on the 
succession issue. 
(30) LM v 518; Teulet i v 24O; Ossat v appendix p. 4 5 . 
(31) AGS EK1631/6. 
(32) AGS EK1630/207. 
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But at home too, the union of England and the Low Countries, which the 
Pope had seen as the nub of the problem, was not viewed with favour. As 
soon as Philip's decision on the candidature was announced i n the Council 
session of 13th January, 1601, the doubts set i n . Whereas six months 
e a r l i e r , the Archbishop of Toledo had been alone i n his opinion, a l l his 
colleagues were now agreed that the potential danger was considerable. 
Albert and Isabella might be loyal enough, but t h e i r possible heirs were 
an unknown factor. I f Isabella was to have England, i t was thought, then 
the Low Countries should be returned to the direct lordship of the Spanish 
monarch (33). Reincorporation, however, depended upon the goodwill of the 
Archdukes, and reports from Zuniga i n Brussels shewed that neither of them 
was much i n favour of the English project. Albert was not well-disposed 
towards the English exiles i n Flanders, and shewed l i t t l e enthusiasm when 
t o l d that P h i l i p would support his wife's claim (34.) • I n closer touch 
with the grim r e a l i t i e s of governing a war-weary country, neither he nor 
Isabella wished f o r further tasks. Moreover, as P h i l i p was l a t e r to d i s -
cover, they were very jealous f o r t h e i r status as independent sovereigns 
of the Low Countries (35). For t h i s reason, indeed, Ziiniga had thought 
better of mentioning the need to reincorporate Flanders,to them (36). I n 
consequence, the only means of making Isabella's candidature acceptable 
both to Spain and to the world at large was from the f i r s t a dead l e t t e r . 
Nor could i t even be used as a diplomatic ploy with which to allay the 
Pope's fears. I f the Archdukes themselves could not be t o l d d i r e c t l y of 
Spain's wishes, there could be nothing worse than allowing them to learn 
of the plan on the diplomatic grape-vine. Loyal members of the House of 
Habsburg deserved better treatment.(37). 
(33) AGS E2511/56. 
(34) AGS EK1630/85; E619/13; E2288/sf, document of 22nd June, 1601. 
(35) qvs r-5°**w-
(36) AGS E619/13. 
(37) cf AGS El856/sf, document of 12th May, 1601. 
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Nor could i t be denied t h a t I s a b e l l a would not f i n d i t easy t o e s t a b l i s h 
h e r s e l f i n England. Zi iniga, who was w e l l - p l a c e d t o assess the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y 
o f P h i l i p ' s p roposa l , urged the King t o recons ide r . Exposed t o the cu r r en t s 
o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy and able t o see f o r h i m s e l f the bad s t a te o f 
bo th army and popular f e e l i n g i n Flanders , he, l i k e the Archdukes, knew 
what the concerted h o s t i l i t y o f a l l the nor the rn powers could do t o Spain ' s 
hope o f success aga ins t the Dutch. Oppos i t ion t o I s a b e l l a ' s candidature 
was the one p o i n t upon which a l l Spain ' s enemies could agree. Ne i the r 
I s a b e l l a nor her husband wanted the t i t l e ; and, apar t f r o m the seminarians, 
Ziiniga could see few E n g l i s h e x i l e s who wanted her t o take i t . A less 
g l o r i o u s , but more p r a c t i c a b l e , course would be t o take a more ser ious look 
a t A r b e l l a S tua r t or a t the daughters o f the E a r l o f Derby, and buy the 
support o f those impor tan t Englishmen who were sa id to be ready t o s e l l 
themselves (38 ) . From the Duke o f Sesa came s i m i l a r adv ice : 
" I n matters of t h i s s o r t , I be l i eve i t t o be very dangerous t o con-
template on ly one p o s s i b i l i t y t o the ex ten t t h a t , i f i t i s not r e a l i z e d , 
e v e r y t h i n g i s l o s t ; and I t h i n k t h a t what we should do i s , according 
t o the s i t u a t i o n , not t o miss our chance and content ourselves w i t h 
something reasonable, even though i n the f i r s t place we may p r e f e r -
and o b t a i n - the i d e a l . " 
(en estas mater ias tengo por muy p e l i g r o s o poner l a rnira en s61o una 
cosa de manera que s i no sale aqud l l a se haya de perder todo, y 
pienso que l o que conviene es segiin l a ocas idn no pe rde r l a contentdndose 
con l o razonable aunque se desee y procure pr imero l o mejor (39)- ) 
The wisdom of having kept counsel became obvious d u r i n g the middle o f the 
i l l - f a t e d I r i s h e x p e d i t i o n . I n January, 1602, the Count o f Miranda, who 
i n h i s capac i ty as Pres ident o f the Counc i l o f C a s t i l e knew b e t t e r t han 
most the ex ten t o f Spain ' s resources, p l an ted the obvious ques t i on : i f 
m i l i t a r y methods could not be depended upon, might i t not be prudent t o 
t h i n k o f making an agreement w i t h James VI? Thus f a r , c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s 
(38) AGS E620/265. 
(39) AGS EK1630/120. 
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w i t h him had been kep t . P h i l i p had sent him a courteous l e t t e r i n 1600 
(40) and P h i l i p I I 1 s o l d p l a n t o send an envoy was r e v i v e d i n the summer 
o f the f o l l o w i n g year ( 4 1 ) . Miranda now f e l t t h a t the t ime had come t o 
take more ser ious s teps. The crux o f the problem was f i n a n c i a l . I f Spain 
could a f f o r d t o r e j e c t an i n t r i n s i c a l l y - u n w e l c o m e compromise, w e l l : but i t 
looked as though she cou ld no t . Miranda was t h e r e f o r e disposed f o r the 
f i r s t t ime t o take s e r i o u s l y James' r epor ted o f f e r s o f convers ion t o Roman 
C a t h o l i c i s m , and he went so f a r as t o envisage an arranged marriage between 
one of James' daughters and a Savoyard p r i n c e . The judgement was r e a l i s t i c , 
and d i d not f a l l upon deaf ears . The shrewd Id iaquez m i l d l y observed t h a t 
France had always considered Scot land t o be the most e f f i c i e n t check upon 
England, and t h a t perhaps Spain should t e s t t h i s f o r h e r s e l f ( 4 2 ) . Even 
the King , though not prepared t o take a c t i o n , saw the m e r i t s o f Miranda ' s 
suggest ion, and ordered t h a t i t be borne i n mind (43)• A shortage o f money 
and m i l i t a r y disappointment thus bade f a i r t o overcome a good dea l o f 
p r e j u d i c e . 
Of course, Spain cou ld not g ive i n a l l a t once: zea l f o r the f a i t h 
had t o mean more t han t h a t . Consequently, when the French ambassador i n 
Rome began t o make extravagant c la ims on James' beha l f and t o asser t t h a t 
Henry I V could never consent t o the accession o f a Habsburg t o the E n g l i s h 
throne "en razdn de estado", some d i p l o m a t i c c o u n t e r - a c t i o n had t o be taken, 
even a t the r i s k o f seeming t o take a p u b l i c stance ( 4 4 ) . Yet a l though 
Henry 's unswerving and p u b l i c support o f James ipso f a c t o made i t f a r more 
(40) AGS E2604/sf , document o f 6 t h May, 1600. 
(41) AGS E2511/27. A d m i t t e d l y , the suggest ion t o send an envoy had come 
f r o m the E a r l o f Caithness who, a l l e g e d l y a c t i n g on beha l f o f the 
S c o t t i s h Roman C a t h o l i c n o b i l i t y , hoped t h a t t h i s would be the 
prelude t o Spanish m i l i t a r y help agains t James- But the C o u n c i l 
a t tached at l e a s t equal importance t o the m i s s i o n ' s a l l a y i n g James' 
f e a r s . 
(42) AGS EKI4 26/28. 
(43) i b i d . 
(44) AGS EK1631/23; E l 8 5 6 / s f , document o f 31st March, 1602. 
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d i f f i c u l t f o r Spain t o envisage coming t o terms w i t h the l a t t e r , the need 
t o do so was not reduced. Far f r o m i t . Success i n I r e l a n d was remoter 
t han ever, and w i t h o u t i t t he re could be smal l chance o f a succes s fu l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n England on beha l f o f a Spanish c la imant ( 4 5 ) . Money was 
sho r t ; and desp i t e a d e c i s i o n i n the autumn of 1601 t o prov ide Ziiniga w i t h 
200,000 ducats t o prepare the ground i n England w i t h b r i b e s , the sum had 
not been found (46 ) . I n no way was James an i d e a l successor t o E l i z a b e t h , 
but by May, 1602, the Counc i l f e l t t h a t they had no cho ice . " I t w i l l be 
b e t t e r t o win over the King o f Sco t l and , " was t h e i r f e e l i n g , and they 
suggested t h a t an envoy be sent by the Archdukes t o James i n t h e i r own 
name. I f a l l went w e l l , the envoy would be succeeded by an ambassador, and 
f o r m a l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between Spain and Scot land would beg in a new 
chapter ; perhaps, James might even be persuaded t o send h i s son and h e i r 
t o be educated a t the Spanish c o u r t , and, as Miranda had a l ready suggested, 
l a t e r marry him t o one o f Charles Emmanuel's daughters ( 4 7 ) . 
The Counc i l g e n e r a l l y , however, were by no means e n t i r e l y convinced 
o f James' r e l i g i o u s s i n c e r i t y , desp i te the f u r t h e r o f f e r s t h a t had been 
made on h i s b e h a l f . I n March, 1602, Sesa had repor ted t h a t one Edward 
Lombard, a l i a s Drummond, a l l e g e d l y sent t o Rome by James, had spoken o f h i s 
master ' s r eso lve t o abjure P ro tes t an t i sm i f he were a l lowed t o succeed 
E l i z a b e t h . Lombard, whose contac t w i t h Sesa was th rough the Savoyard 
ambassador, was not a f r a i d t o p o i n t out the unpalateable t r u t h : James had 
the support o f the great m a j o r i t y o f Englishmen, and o f h i s f o r e i g n ne igh-
bours - even o f Henry I V . I n h i s view, the E n g l i s h J e su i t s were p a i n t i n g 
a f a l s e and unfavourable p i c t u r e o f James and w i l f u l l y d i s regarded no r the rn 
Europe's f e a r o f Habsburg expansionism (48 ) . But i t was no more t h a n the 
(45) c f AGS E2511/37. 
(46) AGS E2023/105-
(47) AGS E2023/104; Alcocer i 195. This t i m e , there was no ques t i on o f 
i n t r i g u i n g w i t h the S c o t t i s h Roman C a t h o l i c s . 
(48) AGS EK1631/84; E2511/59-
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o l d s t o r y t h a t had been heard a t i n t e r v a l s since 1596. When Sesa's l e t t e r s 
were considered i n the C o u n c i l , the r e a c t i o n was once more s c e p t i c a l : James' 
o f f e r s were p u r e l y u n o f f i c i a l and h i s convers ion, i f i t t ook place a t a l l , 
would be f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons and i n no way proceeding f rom c o n v i c t i o n . 
Nevertheless , however ques t ionable James' s i n c e r i t y might be, Spain was i n 
no p o s i t i o n t o be scrupulous: 
"The Counc i l t h e r e f o r e t h i n k s t h a t Your Majes ty ought t o avoid e n t e r i n g 
i n t o an agreement w i t h the King o f Scot land so long as he does not 
p u b l i c l y declare h i m s e l f t o be a C a t h o l i c . I f there are the necessary 
resources , the best course w i l l be t o go ahead w i t h what has a l ready 
been decided and exclude him f r o m England, i n s t a l l i n g the Lady I n f a n t a 
t h e r e . But i f i t proves imposs ib le t o pursue t h i s p o l i c y and make the 
p repa ra t ions as e a r l y and as f u l l y as the importance o f the mat te r 
demands, and i f the sa id King cannot be excluded, i t would be u s e f u l 
t o conduct ourselves i n such a way t h a t , a l though he might not be 
under any o b l i g a t i o n s t o Your Majes ty , he w i l l not be o f f e n d e d . And 
t h i s w i l l be achieved by n e i t h e r he lp ing nor h i n d e r i n g h i m . " 
(y a s l parece a l consejo que VM debe excusar e n t r a r en p l d t i c a de 
acuerdo con e l Rey de Escocia e n t r e t a n t o que no se dec la rare 
publicamente c a t d l i c o , y que s i hay caudal para e l l o l o m&s acertado 
ser^ pasar adelante con l a r e s o l u o i d n que estd. tomada de e x c l u i r l e 
e i n t r o d u c i r en I n g l a t e r r a a l a senora i n f a n t a : pero s i para encaminar 
esto y proveer l o necesario para e l l o t a n a tiempo y t a n cumplidamente 
como l o pide l a c a l i d a d d e l negocio esper&ndose cada d i a l a muerte de 
l a r e i n a de I n g l a t e r r a no hay l o que es menester . . . s i no se pudiere 
conseguir l a e x c l u s i d n d e l d icho rey conviene proceder de manera que 
ya que no quede obl igado a VM tampoco quede ofendido l o c u a l se 
conseguira no ayudandole n i desayuddndole . (4.9) • ) 
W i t h i n a mat ter o f days, P h i l i p had w r i t t e n t o A l b e r t t o ask why the re 
had been twelve months' de lay i n sending an envoy t o Scot land ( 5 0 ) . His 
l e t t e r had a mixed r e c e p t i o n i n Flanders , f o r the Archduke and Ziiniga he ld 
d i ame t r i c a l l y -opposed views, n e i t h e r o f which co inc ided w i t h those o f the 
Counc i l o f S t a t e . Keen as he was t o see the end o f the war w i t h England, 
(49) AGS E1856/sf , document o f 4 t h June, 1602. 
(50) AGS E2224 2 /369-
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A l b e r t disapproved o f sending any envoy: no th ing u s e f u l would be achieved, 
James' accession would not be prevented, and the E n g l i s h recusants would be 
thrown i n t o s t i l l g rea te r despa i r . B e t t e r by f a r , i n h i s view, would be 
f o r P h i l i p t o in t roduce h i s own candidate i n t o England - though no t , o f 
course, i f t h a t candidate were I s a b e l l a ( 5 1 ) . Zi iniga, on the o ther hand, 
was more r e a l i s t i c . Despite a l l t h a t the E n g l i s h seminarians sa id , James 
was i n a very s t rong l e g a l and d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n . The Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s 
should t h e r e f o r e not s imply recognize h i s accession as i n e v i t a b l e : they 
should give him p o s i t i v e suppor t . Unwelcome as the un ion o f England and 
Scot land might be, i t was i n f i n i t e l y b e t t e r t h a t i t should take place under 
a monarch who was under an o b l i g a t i o n to Spain . The sending o f an envoy 
was t o Ziiniga an e s s e n t i a l s tep, and he d i d not f e e l t h a t James1 r e l i g i o u s 
a l l e g i a n c e was an adequate b a r r i e r ( 52 ) . P h i l i p and the Counc i l were unable 
t o f o l l o w e i t h e r piece o f adv ice : they had not enough money t o do as A l b e r t 
advised, and they had too much p r i de to pe r fo rm the d i p l o m a t i c v o l t e - f a c e 
t h a t Ziiniga seemed t o want. To send an envoy and n e i t h e r t o he lp nor t o 
h inder James was the v i a media t o which t h e y were t o keep. T h e i r one comfor t 
was t h a t the Pope had decided upon a s i m i l a r l i n e o f a c t i o n ; f o r , as Sesa 
p o i n t e d ou t , Clement was u n l i k e l y t o r a i s e any o b j e c t i o n t o James so long 
as he enjoyed Henry I V s suppor t , made o f f e r s , however vague, o f convers ion , 
and had before him a c loud less prospect o f success (53) - I t was a sad 
apology f o r a p o l i c y - i t was scarce ly a p o l i c y a t a l l : but the E n g l i s h 
succession was not an issue upon which Spain f e l t t h a t a stand could be made. 
At l e a s t , such was the p r e v a i l i n g o p i n i o n i n the Counc i l u n t i l the 
advent o f the Count o f O l iva r e s who, having r e c e n t l y r e tu rned f rom a term 
as Viceroy o f Naples, took h i s seat i n the Counc i l i n October, 1602, when 
the p o l i c y was a l ready some months o l d . One o f h i s f i r s t recorded op in ions 
(51) AGS E2288/sf , document o f 19th J u l y , 1602. 
(52) AGS E620/264. 
(53) AGS EK1631/153. 
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was on the E n g l i s h succession. Whereas a l l h i s col leagues had long ago 
r e j e c t e d as un feas ib l e a l l c laims but those o f James and I s a b e l l a , he 
r e fused t o do so. Whi l s t a d m i t t i n g t h a t Spain had not enough resources t o 
s u s t a i n t h a t o f the l a t t e r , he saw no reason why P h i l i p should not be able 
t o support a na t ive Roman Ca tho l i c candidate ( 5 4 ) . Al though h i s suggest ion 
was a t once r e b u f f e d by the more experienced Chinchdn - i n no way a f r i e n d 
o f P ro tes tan t s - O l i v a r e s f e l t s t r o n g l y enough t o repeat h i s p o i n t o f view 
at another session e a r l y i n December (55 ) . This t i m e , he found a p o w e r f u l 
supporter i n the King , who i n h i s r i d e r t o the consu l t a ordered the Counc i l 
t o study the idea i n depth . I n the debate t h a t f o l l o w e d two days l a t e r , 
the Counc i l was s p l i t . Id iaquez , Poza and Cdrdoba were f o r l e t t i n g matters 
take t h e i r course: the f i r s t w i t h h i s u n r i v a l l e d knowledge o f the i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l scene, and the o ther two w i t h t h e i r i n t i m a t e acquaintance w i t h the 
s ta te o f the Treasury, a l l f e a r e d the consequences o f i n t e r v e n t i o n . O l i v a r e s , 
by now j o i n e d by Chinchdn, thought i n o ther te rms: a t a l l costs England and 
Scotland, should not be u n i t e d under a Pro tes tan t k i n g such as James was 
bound t o be. For the moment, however, no a c t u a l change i n p o l i c y was t o be 
made. A l l were agreed t h a t A l b e r t should send h i s envoy, whether the upshot 
were t o accept James o r s imply t o deceive him ( 5 6 ) . 
When the Counc i l met once more t o discuss the mat te r some two months 
l a t e r , O l iva re s found s t i l l more suppor t . Why t h i s should have been so i s 
hard t o say. There had been no improvement i n t h e f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , nor 
was the war i n Flanders being waged w i t h any g rea te r success. A French 
m a r r i a g e - a l l i a n c e had been tu rned down (57) but the danger f r o m France had 
i n no way d imin i shed ; Id idquez had s t ressed t o h i s col leagues i n November 
the d i r e need not t o o f f e n d Henry I V , and i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the E n g l i s h 
{ % ) AGS E2023/34; Alcocer i 281. 
(55) AGS E2511/82. 
(56) AGS E1856/sf , document o f 7 th December, 1602. 
(57) qvs p. -ug 5«n. 
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succession would undoubtedly have t h i s undesi rable e f f e c t ( 58 ) . The 
I n f a n t a ' s c l a i m had become no more f e a s i b l e : indeed, the Counci l openly 
acknowledged t h a t her own l a c k o f enthusiasm, l i k e her c o n t i n u i n g c h i l d l e s -
ness, had l o s t her a good dea l o f suppor t . But O l iva r e s had managed t o 
s t i r up bo th King and Counc i l t o a r e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e i r moral o b l i g a t i o n 
t o adopt a p o s i t i v e p o l i c y . This was not s imply because the recusants were 
f e l t t o have been l o y a l over too many years t o be l e f t i n the l u r c h (59)• 
Sure ly , Spain ' s greatness cou ld not a l low her t o stand by i n a c t i v e w h i l s t 
a mat ter as impor tan t as the E n g l i s h succession, and one t h a t touched her 
so deeply, was decided by o thers - the more so since such immense sums had 
been spent upon e n t e r p r i s e s agains t England and I r e l a n d i n the pas t . And 
as O l iva re s seemed t o be p o i n t i n g ou t , the re was no need t o t h i n k i n 
excess ive ly grand terms: 
" I n t h i s and o ther s i m i l a r mat te rs , my o p i n i o n i s as i t has been i n 
the pas t : t h a t the greatness o f Your M a j e s t y ' s empire and i t s 
p r e s e r v a t i o n does not depend upon adding t o i t new realms, but i n 
ensur ing t h a t there i s no o ther Power t h a t i s capable o f u p s e t t i n g 
Your M a j e s t y ' s s a i n t l y des igns ." 
(para dste y l o s demds negocios semejantes su o p i n i d n ha s ido y es 
que l a grandeza d e l imper io de VM y su conservacidn no cons is te en 
aumento de mas re inos s ino en que no haya o t r a po tenc ia que pueda 
es to rbar sus santos i n t e n t o s . ) 
I n a very r e a l sense, he was c a l l i n g Spain t o a r e c o l l e c t i o n o f her i m p e r i a l 
d e s t i n y ; and i t speaks volumes f o r the m e n t a l i t y o f the King and Counc i l 
t h a t , i n the l a s t r e s o r t , t hey were capable o f abandoning expediency and 
r e t u r n i n g t o p r i n c i p l e s , f o r a w h i l e a t l e a s t . A new p l a n was t h e r e f o r e 
proposed. The E n g l i s h e x i l e s should choose t h e i r own candidate , who would 
t hen rece ive papal b l e s s i n g and Spanish suppor t , " t o the end t h a t a Roman 
Ca tho l i c who would f e e l bound t o Your Majes ty should succeed as K i n g . " 
(58) AGS E2023/126; Alcocer i 252. 
(59) c f AGS E1856/sf , document o f 4 t h June, 1602. 
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The one note o f c a u t i o n , i n t roduced by Miranda, who wanted t o be sure t h a t 
there were s u f f i c i e n t resources a v a i l a b l e t o a l l ow Spain t o o f f e n d James, 
was scouted by P h i l i p : " a l l great mat ters c o n t a i n great d i f f i c u l t i e s : we 
must overcome them" ( 6 0 ) . 
S t i l l more s i g n i f i c a n t , however, was the f a t e t h a t the p o l i c y met. 
For be fo re long a less strenuous a l t e r n a t i v e had presented i t s e l f . According 
t o r e p o r t s , Henry I V might be prepared t o co-operate w i t h Spain i n s e l e c t i n g 
a j o i n t candida te . This i n i t s e l f was no th ing new. Ca rd ina l Aldobrandino 
had mentioned the p o s s i b i l i t y t o Henry I V at Lyons i n January, 1601; and 
i n May, 1602, Zdniga and h i s colleague C a r r i l l o had t o l d P h i l i p t h a t , 
according t o c u r r e n t t a l k i n Flanders , the French would p r e f e r t o see some-
one o ther than James upon the E n g l i s h throne ( 6 l ) . Zdriiga cont inued t o 
pass on what i n f o r m a t i o n he had o f French a c t i v i t i e s amongst the E n g l i s h 
e x i l e s i n Flanders , and foresaw t h a t Spain might e x t r a c t a good dea l o f 
p r o f i t f r o m the s i t u a t i o n ; f o r i f James was indeed t o be excluded, there 
seemed no way of succeeding w i thou t French help ( 6 2 ) . Even the E n g l i s h 
seminarians i n Rome had come t o see t h a t the j o i n t candidate was perhaps 
the best way o f r e f u r b i s h i n g t h e i r badly t a r n i s h e d r e p u t a t i o n as l o v e r s 
more o f Spain than o f England (63 ) . The Pope, w h o l l y i n f a v o u r o f a scheme 
t h a t would solve many of h i s preoccupat ions , urged P h i l i p t o take the 
mat ter s e r i o u s l y . I n h i s view, Henry s i n c e r e l y wanted a compromise: he 
was f e a r f u l o f Spain, and badly needed peace i n order t o e s t a b l i s h h i s 
s t i l l weak p o s i t i o n on the throne o f France ( 6 4 ) . When P h i l i p and the 
Counc i l came f i r s t t o discuss whether or not t o co-operate , t h e i r r e a c t i o n 
was understandably m i s t r u s t f u l . Hot o n l y was Henry n o t o r i o u s l y u n r e l i a b l e , 
as they had found t o t h e i r cost i n the pas t : t hey themselves had on ly j u s t 
(60) AGS E 2 5 H / 8 8 ; c f CSP Sp 733-
(61) AGS E620/9. 
(62) AGS E 2 5 H / 5 2 . 
(63) AGS E977/sf , document o f 17th January, 1603. 
(64) AGS EK1631/218; EKI426/42. 
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been c a l l e d away f r o m the pa th of t i m e - s e r v i n g and compromise. P h i l i p 
t h e r e f o r e wrote t o Sesa on 1st March, 1603, t h a t he wished t o know whom the 
E n g l i s h e x i l e s wished t o nominate f o r themselves (65 ) . But i t was soon 
r e a l i z e d t h a t he could not a f f o r d t o r e b u f f Henry. Most r e g r e t t a b l y , the 
Pope had never ye t been prepared openly t o support Spain agains t France, 
and the success o f O l i v a r e s 1 p l a n depended t o a grea t ex ten t upon papa l 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the e x i l e s ' cho ice . Moreover, Henry, a l though probably 
unable t o s u s t a i n a f u l l - s c a l e war w i t h h i s neighbour, cou ld s t i l l cause 
a great dea l o f t r o u b l e i n the var ious p a r t s o f the Spanish empire. Con-
sequently, and on maturer c o n s i d e r a t i o n , P h i l i p wrote again t o Sesa f o u r 
weeks l a t e r i n q u i t e d i f f e r e n t terms: 
"You are t o encourage these plans as much as you can, g e t t i n g o thers 
t o commit themselves but w i t h o u t commit t ing me; f o r i t might be t h a t 
the King o f France w i l l agree t o exclude the King o f Scot land , con-
s i d e r i n g how bad i t would be f o r him t o have England and Scot land 
u n i t e d under one r u l e ; and i t would be very good f o r the E n g l i s h 
Ca tho l i c s i f i t were announced t h a t bo th Spain and France were agreed 
upon p u t t i n g a Ca tho l i c k i n g i n t o England, f o r i t would make the p r e -
tenders declare themselves C a t h o l i c s ; and great r e p u t a t i o n would be 
gained by the Pope i n bestowing t h a t kingdom w i t h our help and f o r c e s . 
I t would a lso a l l e v i a t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t might a r i s e - who i s t o 
succeed and who t o make the proposals - i f the Pope, as common f a t h e r , 
can take a hand i n the ma t t e r . " 
(os encargo que l a s fomente'is cuanto pudidredes prendando en e l l a s a 
l o s que l as t r a t a n s i n dar prendas de mi par te pues podr i a ser que e l 
rey de Franc ia se acomodase por e x c l u i r a l de Escocia por l o mal que 
l e e s t a r i a que Escocia e I n g l a t e r r a se uniesen en una mano y a l o s 
c a t d l i c o s de I n g l a t e r r a l es e s t a r f a ha r to b i en que se publ icase que 
ambas coronas de Espaha y Francia de conformidad l l e v a n este i n t e n t o 
de poner en aquel r e i n o rey c a t d l i c o , pues o b l i g a r l a a l o s pretensores 
a hacer demostracidn de ser c a t d l i c o s y a l papa se l e s e g u i r f a gran 
au to r idad de dar aquel r e ino con nuestra ayuda y fue rzas y l a d i f i c u l t a d 
(65) AGS E1857/219-
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que p o d r f a atravesarse en esta p l ^ t i c a sobre de qu ien ha de s a l i r 
y e l proponer la se p o d r i a a l l a n a r estando SS de por medio que como 
padre comun podr i a tomar l a mano en e l l a ( 6 6 ) . ) 
But be fore the matter could be taken f u r t h e r , news reached Spain o f 
E l i z a b e t h ' s death and James' unopposed accession ( 6 7 ) , and the house o f 
cards f e l l a t once t o the ground. Spain was not t o blame f o r e i t h e r 
i n e p t i t u d e or s l o t h ( 6 8 ) : f a c t o r s were c o n s t a n t l y aga ins t her . She, l i k e 
the E n g l i s h recusants who were l e f t " i n the b r i a r s " (69 ) , had t o l e a r n 
the b i t t e r t r u t h t h a t diplomacy wi thou t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f m i l i t a r y a c t i o n 
was o f l i t t l e va lue . 
(66) AGS E1857/223,224-
(67) AGS EK1606/29; the l e t t e r , f r o m Juan B a u t i s t a de Tas i s , a r r i v e d on 
17th A p r i l . 
(68) c f Loomie P h i l i p I I I and the S tua r t Succession . . . passim. 
(69) H u r s t f i e l d , 3 7g. 
- 178 -
V I I I . REALISM AND PRIDE. 
The f r u s t r a t i o n o f Spain ' s plans t o conquer England and I r e l a n d and 
t o in t e rvene i n the succession ques t i on under l ined w r i t i n g t h a t had been 
on the w a l l f o r some t i m e : i t might be necessary t o make peace w i t h England 
w i t h o u t f i r s t seeking t o change her p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . Even P h i l i p I I 
had envisaged the p o s s i b i l i t y . As e a r l y as 1595 he ordered A l b e r t t o g ive 
ear t o any peace proposals t h a t might come f r o m England ( l ) . A f t e r the 
bankruptcy o f 1596, when the need f o r peace w i t h France had become i r r e s i s t -
i b l e , an adjustment o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h England became s t i l l more l i k e l y . 
For not on ly d i d Henry I V i n s i s t t h a t he would not abandon h i s a l l i e s : 
P h i l i p and h i s c o u n c i l l o r s had no i n t e n t i o n o f making peace o n l y w i t h France. 
L i t t l e cou ld be worse than t h a t Henry should be able t o conso l ida t e h i s 
p o s i t i o n i n France and augment h i s revenues i n peace, w h i l s t Spain was 
f o r c e d t o cont inue a c o s t l y war aga ins t her two remaining enemies. A l b e r t 
was t h e r e f o r e ordered t o work towards E l i z a b e t h ' s i n c l u s i o n i n the n e g o t i a -
t i o n s ( 2 ) . The c o n d i t i o n s t h a t P h i l i p wished t o e x t r a c t f r o m her, however, 
were f a r f rom c o n c i l i a t o r y : a l though he was prepared t o f o r g o compensation 
f o r the war-damage t h a t the E n g l i s h had i n f l i c t e d upon h i s possessions, he 
was i n f l e x i b l e about what he descr ibed as h i s g rea tes t des i re - l i b e r t y o f 
conscience f o r the recusants ( 3 ) . Nor was the fo rm i n which the peace-
powers were cast t a c t f u l : the constant mention o f the Pope, the C a r d i n a l 
o f F lorence , the Roman C a t h o l i c Church and a cur ious re luc tance t o r e f e r 
t o "the yueen o f England" ("crown" being the term p r e f e r r e d ) could not be 
expected t o please E l i z a b e t h ' s deput ies U)- But because England chose t o 
take l i t t l e p a r t i n the t a l k s a t Vervins a f t e r a l l , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n was 
postponed. A f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n , A l b e r t granted the E n g l i s h a t r u c e o f 
two months, and s i x months i n which t o decide whether they wished t o 
nego t i a t e w i t h Spain f o r themselves - ( 5 ) • 
1) AHN E L t l 4 / s f , document o f 21st J u l y , 1595-
2) AGS E2855/sf , document o f 13th November, 1595; qvs P-?4J«™. 
(3) AGS E2224J/202. 
U ) AGS E2224V4; E2864/65,97. 
(5) AGS E615/92,106,108,112,113-
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W h i l s t E l i z a b e t h p r e v a r i c a t e d , A l b e r t had no doubts about the d e s i r -
a b i l i t y o f peace. Not on ly d i d he wish t o extend the s ix-month p e r i o d 
a l ready g ran ted : he saw the fo r thcoming cess ion o f the Low Countr ies t o 
him and h i s f i a n c e e , I s a b e l l a , as a golden o p p o r t u n i t y t o send an embassy 
t o England, on the grounds t h a t no q u a r r e l e x i s t e d between E l i z a b e t h and 
the new Flemish sovereigns ( 6 ) . Owing t o a gap i n the correspondence, we 
do not know the exact r e a c t i o n o f the Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s t o the p roposa l . 
But a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by A l b e r t ' s locum tenens. the C a r d i n a l Archduke Andrew 
o f A u s t r i a , shews t h a t i t had been agreed both i n Spain and Flanders t h a t he 
should send an envoy t o England i n h i s own name, and t h a t he was not a c t i n g 
on a personal whim ( 7 ) . The man se lec ted f o r the t a sk , Jerome Coemans, was 
ordered t o act w i t h the utmost prudence and t o s t ress t o the E n g l i s h t h a t 
the i n i t i a t i v e was e n t i r e l y Andrew's, so as not t o compromise A l b e r t and 
I s a b e l l a . But , unknown t o the a u t h o r i t i e s i n Madrid , he was a l so g iven 
f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s by Andrew. F i r s t , he was t o say t h a t Andrew wished 
t o b r i n g t o an end the mise r i e s caused by so long a war; and secondly, t h a t 
he understood bo th P h i l i p and the Archdukes t o be i n f a v o u r o f an o f f e n s i v e 
and defens ive a l l i a n c e w i t h E l i z a b e t h ( 8 ) . This was going too f a r and too 
f a s t f o r P h i l i p and the C o u n c i l ; f o r a l l h i s a l l eged p recau t ions , Andrew 
had jeopard ized Spanish d i g n i t y by appearing too eager, and he was sent a 
s t rong rebuke ( 9 ) . Nevertheless , Coemans' f r i e n d l y r e c e p t i o n i n London 
cou ld not be d i s regarded . There were, o f course, fo r seeab le d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
E l i z a b e t h might be w h o l l y i n s i n c e r e and desirous o n l y o f g a i n i n g a r e s p i t e 
under f a l s e pretences before r e t u r n i n g t o the f r a y w i t h renewed v i g o u r : 
though a f l e e t assembled i n La Coruna under the Adelantado was f e l t t o be 
a s u f f i c i e n t safeguard aga ins t the p o s s i b i l i t y . More fundamental was the 
m o r a l i t y o f n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h the excommunicated E l i z a b e t h at a l l . The r o y a l 
(6) AGS EKI460/3. 
(7) AGS E615/4.2; AGR PEA 4.29 / s f , document o f 31st ( s i c ) September, 1598. 
(8) AGS E616/16. 
(9) AGS E2224V334,335,336. 
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confessor , Cdrdoba, t o whom the problem was r e f e r r e d , f o r t u n a t e l y saw no 
obs t ac l e : i n h i s view, the main e f f e c t o f peace w i t h England would be t o 
a l l o w P h i l i p t o r e g a i n h i s s t r e n g t h "so as subsequently t o be able t o 
dedicate h i m s e l f more f u l l y t o the defe nee o f the C a t h o l i c cause". Two 
o the r poss ib le b e n e f i t s were mentioned. Spain might be able t o i n s i s t 
upon the g r a n t i n g o f l i b e r t y o f conscience t o the recusants as the p r i c e o f 
a t r e a t y ; so s t r o n g l y d i d the Counc i l f e e l , indeed, t h a t , l i k e P h i l i p I I , 
t hey were prepared t o w r i t e o f f t h e i r c la ims f o r compensation, and f o r a 
t ime even thought o f g i v i n g up t h e i r c la ims t o the Dutch towns he ld i n 
pledge by E l i z a b e t h , i f on ly t h e i r r e l i g i o u s demands were met ( 1 0 ) . More-
over, peace i n the n o r t h would leave P h i l i p f r e e t o dea l w i t h the c o r s a i r s 
o f A l g i e r s and so t o emulate the deeds o f h i s g randfa the r ( l l ) . Coming t o 
terms w i t h England t h e r e f o r e need not be considered d i s g r a c e f u l - a mat ter 
o f great importance e s p e c i a l l y i n the f i r s t years o f P h i l i p I l l ' s r e i g n (12 ) . 
Much would depend upon the q u a l i t y o f the Spanish n e g o t i a t o r s . Zi iniga, 
the ambassador i n Brusse ls , had s t ressed the great importance o f p r o v i d i n g 
a counte r -weigh t t o the Flemish r ep re sen t a t i ve s , whose presence was made 
necessary by the newly-granted sovereignty^.of A l b e r t and I s a b e l l a . Richardot 
and Verreyken were t ho rough ly l o y a l t o Spain, but Zuniga f e a r e d t h a t they 
would i n e v i t a b l y share t h e i r compa t r io t s ' wish f o r peace at v i r t u a l l y any 
p r i c e , and e s p e c i a l l y a t the cost o f the r e l i g i o u s concessions t h a t Spain 
hoped t o exact f rom the E n g l i s h : 
"Al though they may be C a t h o l i c s - as I be l i eve them t o be - because 
they have been r a i s ed amongst h e r e t i c s , they l a c k t h a t p u r i t y i n 
r e l i g i o u s matters and the zea l f o r the conse rva t ion and ex t ens ion o f the 
f a i t h o f those t h a t have been born where such t h i n g s are so h i g h l y 
regarded." 
(10) c f BN 6170/140; AGS E1855/sf , consu l t a o f 20 th June, 1599-
(11) AGS E1855/sf , consu l t a o f 20 th June, 1599: "cosa que t a n t o han deseado 
sus pasados de VM y que e l emperador nuestro senor abuelo de VM pas6 
en persona a e l l o . " 
(12) c f CSPV i x 834>837,852: the Venet ian ambassador was convinced t h a t 
peace was badly wanted i n Madr id . 
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(aunque sean c a t d l i c o s [qua c i e r t o creo que l o son] como c r i ados 
en t re he re jes no t i e n e n aque l l a pureza en l a s cosas de l a r e l i g i d n 
n i e l ce lo de su conservacidn y auraento que l o s que nac ieron donde 
es td t a n en su punto (13)- ) 
At h i s request , t h e r e f o r e , Don Hernando de C a r r i l l o was sent t o complete 
the team (14) , and a l though the E n g l i s h sources g ive the impress ion t h a t 
Richardot and Verreyken were i n the f o r e f r o n t d u r i n g the t a l k s , i n r e a l i t y 
the d i r e c t i o n came f r o m the two Spaniards. A f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n was 
where the meetings should take p lace . A f t e r an i n i t i a l hope t h a t the 
E n g l i s h would agree t o come t o Flanders as guests, Spain f i n a l l y agreed t o 
ho ld the conference i n Boulogne which, as p a r t o f n e u t r a l France, gave an 
advantage t o n e i t h e r side ( 1 5 ) . Of f a r g rea te r importance were the con-
d i t i o n s t h a t Spain in tended t o i n s i s t upon. The h i g h hopes o f June, 1599* 
which had been expressed d u r i n g P h i l i p ' s honeymoon, were q u i c k l y supplanted 
by a more pragmatic a t t i t u d e . R e l i g i o u s cons ide ra t ions were s t i l l g i v e n 
f i r s t place i n the i n s t r u c t i o n s g iven t o C a r r i l l o on 29th February, 1600: 
but the envoy was t o l d t h a t , i f i t proved imposs ib le t o o b t a i n l i b e r t y o f 
conscience and worship f o r the recusants , he was t o w r i t e t o Spain f o r 
f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s r a t h e r than break o f f the d iscuss ions e n t i r e l y . Com-
pensa t ion f o r war-damage was s t i l l t o be used as a pawn: but the r e t u r n o f 
the Dutch cau t iona ry towns was now regarded as e s s e n t i a l . Two o ther impor tan t 
demands were t o be made: England should abandon her a l l i a n c e w i t h the Uni t ed 
Provinces; and, above a l l , her mariners should cease t h e i r i n t r u s i o n s i n t o 
the Spanish and Portuguese possessions i n the New World ( 16 ) . Spa in ' s 
honour was a t every p o i n t t o be mainta ined; and i n order t h a t the re should 
be no mistake, bo th Ziiniga and C a r r i l l o were warned not t o shew themselves 
eager f o r a se t t lement ( 1 7 ) . 
(13) AGS E2288/sf , documents o f 12th and 30th January, 1600. 
(14) AGS E1855/sf , document o f 22nd June, 1599- Two o thers , nominated 
by the C o u n c i l , the Admira l o f Aragon and Don Diego de I b a r r a , 
dropped o u t . 
(15) AGS E l 8 5 5 / s f , document o f 22nd June, 1599; E617/163-
(16) AGS E l 8 5 5 / s f , document o f 22nd June, 1599; BN 6170/Lj.O. 
(17) AGS E2511/21; CSPSp 678. 
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I n the meantime, Coemans had made another th ree t r i p s t o England, on 
the l a s t o f which he c a r r i e d w i t h him a l e t t e r f r o m A l b e r t t o E l i z a b e t h - i n 
Zuniga ' s o p i n i o n couched i n o v e r - d e f e r e n t i a l terms - and re tu rned w i t h a 
r e p l y . The upshot had been c l e a r s igns on the p a r t of the E n g l i s h t h a t they 
were prepared t o envisage a peace t r e a t y ( 1 8 ) . I n mid-January Thomas Edmonde 
a r r i v e d i n Brusse l s , and d u r i n g the course o f h i s s tay agreed i n p r i n c i p l e 
t o the h o l d i n g o f the t a l k s i n Boulogne. I n r e t u r n , Verreyken was sent t o 
London i n order t o sound out E l i z a b e t h ' s o p i n i o n o f the issues t h a t were 
l i k e l y t o be r a i s e d i n the t r e a t y (19 ) . These exchanges f i n a l l y bore f r u i t 
when, on 28th May, 1600, nego t i a t i ons between the two sides began a t Boulogne 
From the ou t se t , there was l i t t l e chance o f agreement. Spain ' s f i rmness i n 
her demands was no g rea te r than t h a t o f England: E l i z a b e t h and her m i n i s t e r s 
had a l ready decided t o make no concessions apar t f r o m c u t t i n g o f f suppl ies 
o f t roops t o the D u t c h . ( 2 0 ) . Scarcely had an i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t y about the 
nature and scope of the Spanish and Flemish peace powers been overcome when 
there arose the obs tac le upon which the whole t r e a t y was t o founder : which 
side was t o take ceremonial precedence? The m i d - t w e n t i e t h cen tury c la ims 
t o have n e i t h e r sympathy w i t h nor understanding o f the precedence d i spu tes 
o f an e a r l i e r p e r i o d . Yet the p r i n c i p l e o f which group o f envoys was t o 
s i t down at the n e g o t i a t i n g - t a b l e f i r s t was, a t the t ime , of v i t a l i m p o r t -
ance. To give way was t o lose face and, i t was f e a r e d , thereby t o open the 
door t o d i s respec t o f every k i n d f rom a l l o ther n a t i o n s . The E n g l i s h 
government had decided a good month before the t a l k s were due t o beg in 
t h a t t h e i r r ep re sen ta t i ves would make a f o r m a l c l a i m to precedence. Indeed, 
the great a n t i q u a r i a n , S i r Robert Cot ton , p rov ided a l i s t o f seven i r r e f u t -
able grounds f o r doing so ( 2 1 ) . I t was not t h a t E l i z a b e t h and her m i n i s t e r s 
were not s incere i n coming t o the conference: C e c i l , the l ead ing l i g h t i n 
(18) AGS E6l6 /6 ,118 ,182 . 
(19) AGS E617/163. 
(20) Sarum x 145; B i r c h 190 seqq. 
(21) Winwood i 171,204; Sarum x 166. 
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the government, had already expressed a wish t h a t "the war may rece ive an 
end w i t h honourable and safe c o n d i t i o n s " , and the news o f the f i n a l break-
down o f t a l k s was not t o be w e l l - r e c e i v e d i n London (22 ) . But England had 
no i n t e n t i o n o f negat ing many years ' r es i s tance t o the n a t i o n a l enemy by 
bowing down t o a demand t h a t they b e l i e v e d t o be w h o l l y unreasonable. I n 
the past , England had taken precedence over the Kings o f C a s t i l e and Le<5n 
and the Kings o f Aragon, and there seemed no reason t o change the p r a c t i c e ; 
i n e f f e c t , England chose t o d i s r ega rd the f a c t t h a t Spain, f a r f r o m being a 
weak and o f t e n p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l c o n f e d e r a t i o n o f kingdoms threa tened by 
the Moors, had become a great empire. The Spanish r e a c t i o n was p r e d i c t a b l y 
v i o l e n t . Under no circumstances would they submit t o England. I n a l i s t 
o f counter-precedents , they made f u l l use o f t h a t chestnut o f s i x t e e n t h -
century Spanish h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , the u n i t y o f Spain under the Gothic k i n g s , 
o f whom P h i l i p I I I was the d i r e c t h e i r . England's o f f e r t o share e q u a l i t y 
w i t h the Spanish and Flemish envoys was s i m i l a r l y out o f the q u e s t i o n : 
Spain deserved precedence and in tended t o rece ive i t (23) • Zufiiga and 
C a r r i l l o f e l t t h a t they could a f f o r d t o ho ld o u t : i t was r epor t ed t h a t the 
whole idea had been put i n t o E l i z a b e t h ' s head by the hotheads at c o u r t , 
and t h a t she h e r s e l f f e l t d a i l y i n g rea te r need o f peace (24)• 
The C o u n c i l o f State was e n t i r e l y i n agreement. The E n g l i s h demands 
were i n t h e i r view "arrogant and unreasonable"; indeed, Zuniga and h i s 
col leagues were f e l t t o have been over-eager t o j u s t i f y t h e i r p o s i t i o n . 
P h i l i p I I I was:: 
"King and Lord o f a l l Spain and o f many o ther great kingdoms; and 
f u r t h e r t a k i n g i n t o account Your M a j e s t y ' s age, noble s p i r i t and 
v a l o u r , the re i s and can be no e q u a l i t y w i t h the Queen o f England 
w i t h o u t s u s t a i n i n g grave damage t o your r e p u t a t i o n . 1 1 
(22) Winwood i 106,222-
(23) AGS E840/21,25-
(24) AGS E84O/IO; CSPSp 683. For the course o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s , v . AGS 
E840/8 ,10 ,15 ,17 ,19 ,21 ,23 ,25 ; Winwood i 186 seqq.; Gerson; Hamy; 
AGR PEA 363. 
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(rey y senor de toda Espana y de otros rauchos y rauy grandes reinos, 
mayormente anadie"ndose a esto l a edad, ga l l a rd la de dnimo y valor 
de VM en quien no cabe n i puede caber igualdad con l a reina de 
Ing la t e r ra sino faese con tan notable quiebra de l a reputacidn.) 
The t r u t h was that Spain, no less than England, was not prepared to end a 
cost ly and exhausting war wi th the s l ightes t t a rn i sh upon her honour; and 
i n 1600, her concept of what that honour demanded was s t i l l high. The most 
r e a l i s t i c member of the Council, Id i iques , wished to salvage something from 
the s i t ua t ion by arranging f o r meetings to be held i n Zuniga's lodging: 
t h i s would count as Spanish t e r r i t o r y i n Spain's eyes, and the English could 
receive the precedence owed to guests. But only one of his colleagues 
agreed wi th him: the rest , and P h i l i p himself, refused to make even t h i s 
concession. The ta lks should be held on completely neutral ground, the 
English should give way, and Spain's reputat ion should be upheld to the 
utmost (25)• Orders to Boulogne were sent accordingly, and the inevi table 
ending of the conference took place i n an atmosphere of mutual reluctance, 
perhaps more marked on the English than on the Spanish side, on 7th August 
(26). 
Despite the f a i l u r e of the t rea ty of Boulogne, some progress towards 
the ending of the war had been made. Contact had been established; r e l i g i o n 
and the Dutch cautionary towns had emerged as two of the l i k e l i e s t bones of 
contention i f once the d i f f i c u l t i e s over precedence could be resolved; and 
the English had expressed a will ingness to see an end to the Dutch war. 
Indeed, the English made a last-minute o f f e r to t r y to bring the Dutch in to 
the t rea ty , and so resolve the precedence dispute by arranging the next 
conference i n the United Provinces or the l o y a l Low Countries, where the 
English could receive precedence (27). The idea was well-received i n Spain, 
(25) AGS E25H/20: " . . . de debe mirar tanto que serd de mucho menos 
inconveniente no hacer l a paz que perder e l mlnimo punto de e l l a 
(sc. l a reputacidn) no viniendo l a reina a este tratado movida de 
v i r t u d n i celo del bien universal sino forzada de l a pura necesidad." 
(26) AGS E2288/sf, document of 17th August, 1600. 
(27) AGS E617/232; Sarum x i v 256. 
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and f o r the rest of Elizabeth 's re ign the two sides were i n sporadic contact 
Everything possible was done to make Elizabeth come to terms; i t was p a r t l y 
f o r t h i s reason that the I r i s h expedition was considered so important (28). 
But jus t as m i l i t a r y enterprises bore no f r u i t , neither did diplomacy. 
A f t e r her delegates' f i n a l o f f e r at Boulogne, Elizabeth chose only to claim 
that the Dutch were not as amenable to the suggestion as had at f i r s t been 
thought. The Council were not surprised at the news. Like Ziifiiga, they 
considered that Spain's deep involvement i n the Saluzzo c r i s i s was respons-
i b l e f o r Elizabeth 's coolness, since the threat posed to Spain by Henry I V s 
po l icy was working to her advantage (29). Although Ziiniga and C a r r i l l o 
were ordered to do t h e i r best - always provided that they had due regard 
f o r Spain's reputat ion - i n the event t a lks were not resumed. For the next 
two years, nothing more than the occasional l e t t e r was exchanged w i t h 
England (30). 
The peaceful accession of James I to the English throne i n March, 1603, 
put a summary end to the indecisive pol icy that Spain had been forced to 
adopt towards Elizabeth. The news found the Council quite unprepared. With 
t h e i r m i l i t a r y and diplomatic po l ic ies i n ruins , no clear l ine of ac t ion 
commended i t s e l f to them: perhaps James could be persuaded to abjure 
Protestantism; perhaps Henry IV would j o i n i n an invasion of England; perhap 
neither James nor Henry could be t rusted (31) ' But whi l s t the Council 
advised caution u n t i l f u r t h e r information ar r ived , P h i l i p decided to take 
matters in to his own hands. His quarrel and that of his fa ther had been 
w i t h Elizabeth: towards James VI he was o f f i c i a l l y neutral , f o r although 
Scott ish Protestantism was perhaps even more m i l i t a n t than that of England, 
war had never been declared between t h e i r two countries. There would there-
fore be no shame i n appearing from the outset w i l l i n g to discuss peace wi th 
(28) qvs f -145-
(29) AGS E617/110; E2023/3-
(30) AGS E2224 2/68. 
(31) AGS E2557/1. 
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James i n his new capacity as Elizabeth 's heir (32). Staying i n Aranjuez 
wi th Lerma and Franqueza, and apparently wi th no other advisers nearer than 
Val ladol id , P h i l i p appointed an ambassador to James and furnished him wi th 
detai led ins t ruc t ions . As f a r as can be t o l d , he was i n possession of no 
more information than were his counci l lors , and he ce r t a in ly made no r e f e r -
ence to Aremberg's mission t o London, news of which arr ived i n Val ladol id 
on 27th A p r i l (33)- The simple f ac t of James1 accession su f f i ced . But 
apart from his decision to send an ambassador northwards, P h i l i p was at 
bottom as confused as his Council. The man selected f o r the task was a 
complete stranger to a f f a i r s of state: Juan de Tasis, the royal postmaster-
general, came from a respectable but undistinguished fami ly that had held 
the o f f i c e since the previous century. The choice was s i g n i f i c a n t : P h i l i p 
d id not wish to commit himself by sending one of the great men of Ms k ing -
dom to James. Most important of a l l , he did not even wish to commit himself 
i n the eyes of his own counci l lo rs . Tasis was t o l d to conceal the t rue 
purpose of his mission both at home and abroad, and only the Count of Miranda 
was :to be l e t i n to the secret when Tasis passed through Val ladol id . Special 
arrangements wi th the Treasury had to be made f o r him to co l lec t the money 
necessary f o r the journey (3-4)* I n the f i r s t instance, he was to go to 
Flanders, ostensibly to discuss wi th Albert and Isabel la the e lec t ion of a 
King of the Romans i n succession to Rudolph; and whi l s t there, he was to 
reveal that , having already set o f f f o r Brussels, he had received orders to 
proceed to England i n order to give P h i l i p ' s congratulations to James on 
the occasion of the l a t t e r ' s accession. 
Tasis' ins t ruct ions amply complemented the equivocal nature of his 
commission. His rea l task was indeed a mission to England, but he was 
ordered to take the s i tua t ion as he found i t . P h i l i p had s t i l l not fo rmal ly 
(32) cf CSPV x 73-
(33) q v i p W . 
(34) AGS E257l/10,20. 
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given up his f a m i l y ' s claim to the English throne, and he was as eager as 
ever to see that Elizabeth 's successor was of acceptable re l ig ious views 
and one who would favour Spanish in teres ts (35). I t was s t i l l not clear 
how much resistance was being offered to James by his new subjects, and 
P h i l i p wished to be prepared f o r every eventual i ty ; he even thought i t 
worthwhile to provide Tasis wi th a bland l e t t e r of in t roduc t ion t o , amongst 
others, Arbel la Stuart. (36). But he r i g h t l y assumed that James would be 
f i r m l y i n s t a l l e d , and his ins t ruct ions to Tasis shew the lengths to which 
he was prepared to go i n order to win the new monarch's f r iendship and good-
w i l l . Whilst being watchful f o r the in teres ts of the English and I r i s h 
recusants, Tasis was expressly ordered to t e l l them that peace would serve 
t h e i r in teres ts bet ter than war (37). To James, he was to stress the 
h i s t o r i c a l l iance between England and Spain, and the benefi ts that would 
come to him by renewing i t - such as the p o s s i b i l i t y of reconquering those 
parts of France to which the English crown had long l a i d claim i n jus t 
revenge f o r Henry I V s in t r igue wi th Spain to prevent his accession ( i ) , or 
the p a c i f i c a t i o n of Ireland wi th the help of Spain's inf luence. And on the 
other hand, he was not to conceal the r i sks that James would run i n r e j e c t i n g 
Spain's f r i endsh ip (38). A quid pro quo would, of course, be necessary. 
(35) "Mi voluntad es que en Ingla te r ra ( s i ser puede) haya rey ca td l i co , a 
lo menos t a l que deje publico albedrio a los catdlicos con piibl ica y 
descubierta l i be r t ad de conciencia y que sea buen amigo de esta corona y 
no se estreche mas con Francia y res t i tuya las plazas de Zelanda que 
t ienen ingleses." BN 234-7/70. 
(36) AGS E2571/19-
(37) c f P h i l i p ' s r ide r to the consulta of 21st A p r i l , i n which he advised the 
s t i r r i n g - u p of the English and I r i s h recusants, though " s i n dano suyo 
para l a causa de r e l i g i d n y de l a pac i f i cac idn publica procediendo en 
e l l o con tanto t i en to que no se puede juzgar que se prosigue la enemistad 
que se tuvo con l a reina muerta." I n t e rna l evidence, notably P h i l i p ' s 
suggestion that "una gran persona" be sent to Flanders and the f a c t that 
he gave a f a i r l y detai led separate re jo inder to the Council 's subsequent 
consulta of 29th April,suggests that the r ide r was w r i t t e n i n the week 
fo l lowing 2 l s t A p r i l and therefore before Tasis' ins t ruc t ions were 
signed on 29th. AGS E251l/92,93-
(38) "Sea bien que diestramente le hagdis entender las fuerzas de mar y t i e r r a 
que habia mandado antes de esta ocasic5n y l a ga l la rd la y pujanza de 
e l las y que merecie'ndomelo las empleare* en su ayuda con que estard 
amparado de las ofensas que sus vecinos le quieren hacer y a l contrar io 
e l dano que podrla r e c i b i r de e l l a s . " BN 234.7/70. 
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As on previous occasions, P h i l i p specif ied t o l e r a t i o n f o r the recusants and 
the re tu rn of the cautionary towns as the tfcwo things that he most wished to 
gain. I n no sense, therefore, was Tasis to go before James cap i n hand, 
and indeed his rea l mission was to do no more than sound out the new king 
(39). Yet there can be l i t t l e doubt that P h i l i p already knew that he would 
have to come to terms wi th James. I n conversations wi th Lerma and Franqueza 
before he l e f t Aranjuez, Tasis was t o l d that compared wi th the cost of the 
war, the purchasing of peace and the re turn of the cautionary towns would 
be cheap at any price (4.0). 
The Council thus knew nothing of these developments when, on 29th A p r i l , 
they met to discuss the la tes t despatches from the Archduke Alber t . For, 
although there might be v a c i l l a t i o n i n Val ladol id , there was none i n Brussels 
As f a r as Albert and Isabel la were concerned, t h e i r p r i n c i p a l aim was to win 
the war against the Dutch; and the ending of h o s t i l i t i e s wi th England was 
the f i r s t and most important step towards doing 3 0 . The news of El izabeth 's 
death therefore came to them as a r e l i e f . Admittedly, James was a Protestant 
but he had succeeded to the pos i t ion that the Habsburgs had f e l t had r i g h t l y 
belonged to his mother, Mary Stuart, "which shews", Isabel la observed, "how 
her blood has cr ied out before our Lord;" and f o r reasons best known to 
herself , the In fan ta took t h i s as a sign that James' conversion was imminent. 
However, there were more prosaic and perhaps weightier reasons f o r making a 
f r i e n d of James. I f England, Scotland, Denmark, the kingdom of James' 
fa ther - in - law, were united wi th France, the United Provinces and the Protest-
ant princes of Germany, the l o y a l Low Countries would be isola ted i n the 
middle of a power-bloc that was overwhelmingly Protestant and which could 
very eas i ly be overwhelmingly anti-Habsburg. There was now therefore no 
(39) BN 2347/70. 
(40) AGS E 840/108. 
- 189 -
chance of annull ing James' accession, f o r those same a l l i e s would be quick 
to thwart any attempt to unseat him. Albert saw his duty as p l a i n : 
" I f i n d i t u t t e r l y necessary f o r the service of Your Majesty and the 
public good not to attempt at present other than to br ing about a 
f i r m peace wi th him, f o r i t i s expected that a peace w i l l great ly 
benef i t Your Majesty's kingdoms and these provinces: and Your Majesty 
was prepared to attempt an agreement wi th the late Queen, who had given 
so much offence." 
(tengo por forzoso y necesario para e l servic io de VM y e l bien publico 
no t r a t a r a l presente de otra cosa sino encaminarlas todas a una paz 
muy fundada con d l , pues se entiende redundar£ en muy gran benefic io 
de esos reinos y estos estados y VM la tenia por conveniente s i se 
pudiera haber encaminado con l a reina muerta que tanto tenia ofendido 
a VM.) 
He had therefore taken two important steps on his own i n i t i a t i v e . He had 
amended the proclamation on trade that had excluded English vessels from 
trade wi th Spain's European possessions; and he proposed to send at once 
an envoy to James i n his own name and that of his w i f e . For Alber t , the 
circumstances brooked no delay (41) • 
The Council 's react ion was mixed. Although a l l expressed t h e i r regret 
that Albert wished to act so has t i ly , none wished to see his orders changed, 
nor was there any suggestion made that they had been forced in to an unwelcome 
pos i t i on by his actions. The t r u t h was that they were glad of a lead. 
Albert had the strength of w i l l that the Council lacked; at l as t , something 
posi t ive was to be done, which could be amended and improved as necessary. 
Natural ly , P h i l i p would have to take great care of his reputat ion and 
not appear too eager f o r peace. But i t was as Albert had said: i f nego-
t i a t i o n s could be opened wi th Elizabeth, surely they could be opened wi th 
(4.1) AGS £622/28,33; BRAH x l v i i 413. 
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James (4-2). Despite t h i s , the Council remained f a r more cautious than the 
King. For when, without having admitted any more than Miranda in to his 
confidence, P h i l i p rep l ied to the consulta by noting, i n the most general 
of terms, that James1 previous a t t i tude was s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r opening 
closer re la t ions wi th him (43), the Council f e l t some concern at t h i s vague 
benevolence. I t was almost as though P h i l i p had temporarily fo rgo t ten what 
his pos i t ion as the Catholic King demanded of him. The war wi th England 
had been cal led a r e l ig ious war; Spain's main expressed aim had been to f ree 
the English recusants from the Protestant tyranny to which they were said to 
be subjected, and nothing should be done to allow the world to th ink that 
Spain had changed her mind. Hasty act ion seemed to the Council to br ing 
wi th i t two f u r t h e r dangers. I n the f i r s t place, the terms of any t rea ty 
would be the worse f o r haste: the ' .unsatisfactory nature of the agreement 
at Vervins was thought, four years a f t e r the event, to have been caused by 
the Habsburg deputies' excessive eagerness to end the war. I n the second 
place, the Council expected that the s i t ua t ion w i t h i n England would s t i l l 
be f l u i d . There might therefore be an opportunity f o r P h i l i p to p r o f i t 
from the re l ig ious d ivis ions there, f o r the "Protestants" (by which Anglicans 
was surely meant) and the Puritans were said to be at daggers drawn (44)* 
The Council 's slow progress towards the pos i t i on that P h i l i p had long 
before reached was s l i g h t l y hastened by more deta i led news from Flanders. 
(42) Most his tor ians i n the past have seen Albert and Isabel la as fo r c ing 
the pace i n diplomatic matters, and being i n large part responsible 
f o r the Treaty of London. I n f a c t , as A lbe r t ' s l e t t e r makes clear, 
he had no i n t e n t i o n of taking matters in to his own hands: he was 
merely making use of a golden opportunity to put i n to e f f e c t a po l icy 
that had already been agreed i n p r i n c i p l e . Isabel la , too, was eager 
to stress that nothing had been or would be done without the f u l l e s t 
consultat ion wi th her brother P h i l i p and his minis ters . BRAH x . l v i i i 
427; c f Cuvelier, Carter Belgian Autonomy. . . j>assim. 
(43) AGS E2511/93-
(44) AGS E2511/91-
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A f t e r an i n i t i a l contretemps, the mission of Escorza (45) had been an 
unqual i f ied success; James was apparently as eager as Albert to be on 
f r i e n d l y terms. When asked by Escorza to put an end to the r a i s ing of 
troops i n Scotland f o r the United Provinces, James had given an eminently 
sa t i s fac tory rep ly : "je n'aime point ceux de Holande ni leur cause, mais 
ne le d i tes a personne." Escorza had assured him that Albert wished to see 
him succeed Elizabeth without impediment; and since the assurance had been 
made at a p a r t i c u l a r l y propi t ious time - jus t before the Queen's death -
Albert f e l t wi th considerable j u s t i f i c a t i o n that James was more l i k e l y than 
ever to welcome peace proposals (46)• The information was welcomed i n the 
Council, not least by Miranda. Constrained by his f u l l knowledge that 
P h i l i p had taken matters in to his own hands - rashly, as he thought - and 
his duty to keep silence on the matter i n the Council, he was glad to be 
able to say tha t , since James was so well-disposed, some discreet person 
might be sent on P h i l i p ' s behalf to congratulate him on his accession. His 
colleagues, however, s t i l l unaware of the true state of a f f a i r s , were less 
enthusiast ic: James f o r them was by no means wholly trustworthy (47). 
On one point , however, the Council was ce r t a in : the use of force was 
now out of the question. I n a meeting held on 22nd July, the two opposing 
po l ic ies of peace or war were f i n a l l y discussed at length. The English 
exi les , f o r whose in teres ts Spain had long protested deep concern, were 
continuing to press f o r a m i l i t a r y expedit ion against England (48). They 
alleged that the s i tua t ion completely favoured t h i s course. James was very 
short of money, i n a strange realm, f u l l of d i f f idence and j u s t l y a f r a i d 
of the many fac t ions that were hos t i le to him. Their appeal d id not lack 
(45) qvs p.-172**^. 
(46) AGS E622/42,47,48. 
(47) AGS E25H/90. Just over a week l a t e r , the Council f i n a l l y , but 
s t i l l cautiously, decided to advise P h i l i p to send an envoy to Flander 
"que s i de l a otra parte moviera p l a t i c a de acuerdo y confederacidn, 
pudiera t r a t a r de e l l o con l a in t e l igenc ia y autoridad que l a materia 
requiere." AGS E840/49. 
(48) qvs ^140 ; Loomie Guy Fawkes passim. 
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strongly emotive language: 
"This i s the las t mission that the Catholics can send to Spain, and a l l 
they ask i s f o r '.Mis Majesty ( i n whom, under God, they have placed 
t h e i r hopes) to say whether he can help them wi th the aid that he has 
promised f o r t h i s spring. They want to know a l l that His Majesty 
intends as soon as possible, so that they may be able to conform them-
selves as much as possible: f o r t h e i r own decisions about whether or 
not to do ce r ta in important things depends upon ce r ta in informat ion of 
what they can expect here. 
Many of the most important men of the kingdom - not only Catholics but 
others as w e l l - have declared so much t h e i r opposition to King James 
that there can be no backing down; and so, even i f a l l the Catholic 
princes desert them, they w i l l unquestionably depose him on t h e i r own, 
and we t r u s t to God to t u r n again to His own cause . . . They are clear 
that i t i s f a r bet ter honourably to r i s k t h e i r l i ves i n the jus t defence 
of t h e i r r e l i g i o n and wi th the hope of success that the occasion o f f e r s 
them, rather than to allow themselves to be haled before the executioner 
and one by one have t h e i r heads cut on some feigned pretext of treason 
or lese-majeste*. And as I have said, t h i s applies not only to the 
p r i n c i p a l Catholics but also to many Protestants, and especial ly to 
those who are of royal blood, t h e i r f r i ends and a l l i e s . " 
(dsta es l a postrera embajada que los catdl icos pueden enviar a Espafia 
y piden sdlo l a respuesta de SM (en que despuds de Dios t ienen puesta 
su esperanza) s i les puede ayudar con los socorros prometidos para 
esta primavera, y desean saber l a voluntad de SM en todo con l a brevedad 
que e l caso pide con prop6sito de seguirla en cuanto les fuere posible 
pues de l a no t i c i a c i e r t a de lo que pueden esperar de aca" dependen sus 
resoluciones de hacer a dejar de hacer algunas cosas importantes. . . 
Muchos de los mas principales del reino no solo catdlicos sino otros 
tambien se nan declarado tanto de ser sus contrarios que no hay ma's 
lugar de volver atras asf que aunque todos los principes catdlicos les 
desamparasen es lanza forzosa que e l los por si solos le procuren echar 
por usurpador y confiamos que Dios volvera por su causa . . . ksi que nan 
resuelto que es mucho mejor de aventurar sus vidas honradamente en justa 
defensa de su r e l i g i d n con l a esperanza de prdspero suceso que l a 
ocasi<5n les ofrece que dejdndola pasar dejarse sacar a l matadero y 
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degollar uno despue's otro con achaques y f ing idos t l t_ ,ulos de t ra ic iones 
y lesa magestad y esto no toca s61o corao digo a los pr incipales catdlieos 
sino a muchos protestantes y especialmente a los que t ienen deudo y 
sangre rea l y sus aliados y amigos (4.9) • ) 
Two f u r t h e r memoranda supported the s e l f - s t y l ed representatives of the 
English recusants. The f i r s t , sent by a correspondent i n London, was a copy 
of James' declarat ion of his Protestant f a i t h , f i r s t published i n 1580 and 
now re—issued on his a r r i v a l i n England. The second was a report from Tasis, 
by t h i s time i n Brussels, that the recusants were o f f e r i n g to raise 12,000 
men i f only Spain would send them the same number of ducats (50). But i n 
marked contrast to t h i s b e l l i c o s i t y was a holograph l e t t e r from the Pope 
to P h i l i p , dated 2nd June. I n i t Clement, although protest ing that he would 
lean heavily upon the King's advice, urged P h i l i p to take advantage of a 
great opportunity to bring peace to Christendom. Force had been t r i e d over 
many years, and wi th i n d i f f e r e n t success; i t s only e f f e c t had been, he 
alleged, to damage the recusant in teres t i n England. Everything seemed to 
depend upon ending the war, not only Spain's in teres ts - though the Pope 
as tute ly mentioned the Indies and the Low Countries - but that of a l l 
Europe: the Turk was once more threatening I t a l y . He even professed himself 
ready to go i n person to England and, i f necessary, to martyrdom, i n order 
to regain that country's obedience (51). Information from Tasis seemed to 
lend weight to the Pope's point of view. He was given to understand that 
James' wife was a secret Roman Catholic. I t was also being said that 
English and Scots a l ike were eager to satiate t h e i r greed wi th Spanish 
gold, and that even James would, f o r a consideration, agree to some sort 
of temporary truce; 500,000 or 600,000 ducats jud ic ious ly d i s t r i bu ted 
would i n Tasis' opinion have f a r more e f f e c t than money given to English 
dissidents (52). 
(49) AGS E840/129. 
(50) AGS E840/225. 
(51) AGS E840/191,192. 
(52) AGS £840/108,119. 
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The choice was by no means an easy one f o r P h i l i p and his advisers. 
The recusants' memorandum appealed d i r e c t l y to Spain's deep sense of 
r e l ig ious mi l i t a r i sm, and James1 proclamation gave i t f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
Was i t r i g h t to t u r n away the English recusants? Was i t r i g h t to compromise 
wi th a Protestant? As the royal confessor pointed out i n no uncertain terms, 
King Exekiel had merely shewn the temple treasures to Nebuchadnezzar and 
had incurred God's wrath: what r i sks , then, did Spain run? 
"A confession so abominable as that made by the King of Scotland - one 
moreover that he wishes to exact from a l l his subjects - cannot but 
arouse a l i v e l y emotion i n Your Majesty's royal and Chr is t ian breast, 
and make Your Majesty, duly remembering the many blessings received 
at God's hand, oppose the words and works of so obstinate a here t ic : 
bearing i n mind the proper fear tha t , i f you do not defend God's 
honour, He w i l l not defend Your Majesty 's . I am a f r a i d that the 
chastisement that we have suffered i n the past was perhaps f o r not 
having gone to the help and defence of the English Catholics when 
there was most opportunity. We must be very c a r e f u l about making 
f r i ends with an obstinate here t ic . " 
(es fuerza que £ l obre en e l r ea l y c r i s t i ano pecho de VM t ie rno 
sentimiento de una confesidn tan abominable como l a que e l rey de 
Ing la te r ra ha hecho y quiere que hagan sus siibditos y que con santo 
celo acordandose VM de tantos beneficios como ha recibido de l a d iv ina 
mano se oponga a las palabras y obras de tan rebelde y pertinaz hereje 
teniendo presente e l justo temor de que s i VM no defiende l a honra de 
Dios se desobligara - e l devolver por l a de VM y teme que por ventura 
fueron los castigos pasados por no haber acudido cuando hubo mds 
oportunidad a l amparo y defensa de aquellos catdl icos y se debe mirar 
mucho como se t r a t a de amistad l iana con un hereje per t inaz . ) 
3ut despite his impassioned polemic, even Cdrdoba was forced to agree wi th 
his colleagues. P h i l i p was "defensor de l a f e " and would be j u s t i f i e d i n 
invading England i f his forces were adequate. Since they patent ly were 
not, he should look to negotiat ion; and t h i s , even more than the Pope's 
opinion, was to be the deciding f ac to r . The two most i n f l u e n t i a l councillors, 
Idi^quez and Lerma, were i n ent i re agreement. The former enunciated the two 
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basic errors that were to have so s t r i k i n g an e f f e c t upon Spain's po l icy 
towards James: the f i r s t , that James was, l i k e a l l Protestants, "m£s 
p o l i t i c o y estadista que re l ig ioso" and as such was read i ly influenced i n 
re l ig ious matters; the second - admittedly s l i g h t l y less gross - was that 
"the English have always been prepared to s e l l themselves f o r gain" and 
that 200,000 or 300,000 ducats spent by Tasis might be enough to buy 
t o l e r a t i o n f o r the recusants (53). Lerma concurred: u n t i l James expressly 
declared himself the enemy of Roman Catholicism, P h i l i p I I I was under no 
ob l iga t ion to declare war on him (54-) . 
Further encouragement to adopt t h i s course now came th ick and f a s t . 
Albert reported that his envoy Aremberg, who had ar r ived i n London on 18th 
July, had found the English w i l l i n g to come to terms (55)- The same opinion 
was given by an English ex i le of I t a l i a n o r i g i n , Dr. Robert Taylor, who 
during the course of an u n o f f i c i a l v i s i t of his own to London, had spoken 
to the Ear l of Cumberland, the Countess of Su f fo lk and the Secretary Lake 
about t o l e r a t i o n f o r the recusants. They had t o l d him that £50,000 (Lake 
said £100,000) would buy t o l e r a t i o n f o r Roman Catholics i n London. I t 
appeared that a strong major i ty i n the Fr ivy Council was i n favour of 
continuing the war: but Lake alleged that many could be pac i f i ed wi th 
bribes, and Cumberland even of fered to win over Si r Robert Ceci l himself 
by t h i s means (56). Of s t i l l greater importance was the private audience 
granted to Taylor by f i v e members of the Privy Council, al legedly including 
Ceci l , Su f fo lk and Lord Henry Howard, i n which once more he was t o l d that 
the major i ty was i n favour of the war. Two days l a t e r , however, he was 
seen by two of the f i v e who, on behalf of t h e i r small group, o f fe red a 
(53) S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Idiaquez was prepared to spend up to 4.00,000 ducats 
on buying back the Dutch cautionary towns. 
(54-) AGS E2511/79-
(55) Cuvelier 291 seqq. 
(56) AGS E622/84; Loomie Tolerat ion and Diplomacy 17 seqq. 
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re tu rn to the re l ig ious status quo of the th i r t een th year of El izabeth 's 
re ign (57) and i t s confirmation under the Great Seal: f o r , even i f the King 
wished i t , he could not repeal the recusancy laws without the consent of 
Parliament, and his word would have to be s u f f i c i e n t (58). Albert was 
enthusiast ic . Having sent Taylor back to England, furnished wi th a vague 
and s e m i - o f f i c i a l set of ins t ruct ions w r i t t e n on Albe r t ' s behalf i n the 
t h i r d person, he urged P h i l i p to th ink about sending northwards some great 
personage who would be better f i t t e d than Tasis to conduct the negotiations 
that seemed increasingly l i k e l y to come about (59). For e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
reasons, a f a r less enthusiastic Tasis was advising the same course. He 
had few i l l u s i o n s about the d i f f i c u l t i e s that any negotiator would face: 
his conversations wi th Richardot and others had, amongst other things, 
revealed that England would almost ce r t a in ly i n s i s t upon freedom of trade 
wi th the Indies (60). But he had heard that the English recusants, f i n a l l y 
despairing of Spain's help, had sent a Jesuit to Rome to o f f e r t h e i r a l l e -
giance to the Duke of Parma i n the hope that he would come to t h e i r rescue. 
And above a l l , Tasis was deeply concerned about what Aremberg was doing 
and saying i n London; f o r although the l a t t e r ' s contacts wi th English 
statesmen were u n o f f i c i a l , he appeared to be discussing matters - f o r 
instance, money - that were f a r i n excess of his mandate. Alber t , when 
t h i s was pointed out to him, merely urged Tasis not to delay his departure 
f o r London ( 6 l ) . 
As these despatches were read i n the session of 24th July, the las t 
traces of b e l l i c o s i t y almost e n t i r e l y disappeared from the Council. War 
might be the most reputable means of achieving Spain's ends, but there was 
(57) X I I I Elizabethae I cap. i i , An Act against the bringing i n , and put t ing 
i n Execution of Bul l s . Writings or Instruments and other Supersti t ious 
Things from the See of Rome prescribed the penalty as f o r High Treason 
f o r those who imported papal b u l l s , and that as f o r Praemunire f o r those 
who imported devotional objects - crosses, rosaries and the l i k e - from 
Rome. 
(58) "y en lo demas e l Rey darla su palabra de usar conivencia y que e l los 
empenarfan su fe y sus honras por e l restante." AGS E622/224. 
(59) AGS E.622/82,83. 
(60) qvs p ^i^f*^-
(61) AGS E840/173 
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no evidence to suggest that Spanish troops would be successful i n England, 
and the state of the Treasury did not allow Spain the self-indulgence of 
unnecessary m i l i t a r y operations, the more so since there now seemed every 
chance that negotiations were feas ib le . Even C6rdoba could not dodge the 
f a c t ; as he was to say to his colleagues some nine months l a t e r , 
" lour Majesty needs peace much more than does the King of England, 
both because your monarchy i s so much greater and the obl igat ions that 
i t brings wi th i t consequently heavier, and because Your Majesty can 
count upon no a l l i e s , whereas the King of England can look f o r many. 
I f war breaks out, i t i s clear that a l l w i l l j o i n against Your Majesty, 
and i n such a case we cannot be sure of being able to res i s t such a 
weight of opposition, seeing what the English and the Dutch have been 
able to do to the state of Your Majesty's Treasury. I f we cannot 
r es i s t the onslaught and the forces of enemies so many and so great, 
i t cannot be doubted that the state w i l l be placed i n obvious danger.!1. 
( l a paz conviene mucho m&s a VM que a l rey de Ing la te r ra as! porque 
cuanto mayor es l a monarqula de VM mayores son sus obligaciones como 
porque VM no tendr£ ninguna ayuda y aquel rey tendra' muchas... Si se 
rompe l a guerra esta" claro que todos se juntar^n contra VM y en t a l 
caso no se sabe como se pueda r e s i s t i r a tan gran potencia viendo lo 
que han hecho ingleses y rebeldes y e l estado en que se ha l l a l a 
hacienda de VM.. . Si no se puede oponer a l fmpetu y fuerza de tantos 
y tan poderosos enemigos es s in duda que...se pondrd a manifiesto 
pel igro e l estado (62). ) 
This being the case, the Council was eager to point out that there was no 
disgrace i n opening t a lks , and even less i n buying f o r the recusants the 
t o l e r a t i o n that P h i l i p wanted - only i n s e l l i ng i t . Spain could adopt the 
easier and cheaper course wi th a clear conscience. So f i r m was t h i s con-
v i c t i o n that negotiat ion had come to be regarded as the only way i n which 
they could envisage helping the recusants i f i n f ac t the l a t t e r decided to 
rebel against James. I n such an un l ike ly - not to say unwelcome - event, 
Tasis could ask P h i l i p ' s advice, help the insurgents with money and act 
(62) AGS E2557/15-
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as mediator between them and the au thor i t i e s . I n no way ought Tasis to 
foment discord i n England. As f o r the reported recusant o f f e r of 30/000 
men, Olivares, the counci l lor who had so strongly argued f o r a posi t ive 
po l icy over the succession only a few months before, concluded that they 
would be a band of malcontent ragamuffins and not r ea l soldiers . P h i l i p 
was forced to agree. He, l i k e his Council, was undoubtedly uneasy about 
his sense of ob l iga t ion towards the recusants - hence his unusual step i n 
i n t e r rup t i ng a session of the Council i n order to ask t h e i r opinion of the 
quanti ty and nature of the help that he ought to give them. But i n the 
end, he had to be content wi th the new po l icy . Tasis was to be ordered to 
d i s t r i bu t e 100,000 ducats amongst the recusants, but only i f he could do so 
secret ly; and the exi les who had come to Val ladol id to send memoranda t o 
P h i l i p should be given his good wishes and 2,000 ducats f o r t h e i r t rouble , 
but no f i r m undertaking. Otherwise, Spain's money would be used to buy 
peace (63). 
Yet the balance was s t i l l de l ica te . For a l l the fac tors i n favour of 
making peace, the decision had not been easi ly reached, and l i t t l e was 
needed to reveal how b r i t t l e P h i l i p and his Council f e l t about coming to 
terms wi th James. Such an impulse was to come, i r o n i c a l l y , from Rome. 
Sesa's reports shewed that the Pope was d i sgracefu l ly lukewarm about James' 
Protestantism, and that current opinion i n the curia regarded Persons and 
the English Jesuits "as lepers" simply on account of t h e i r f r i endsh ip wi th 
Spain. Sesa was f ree i n his condemnation: 
"We l i v e at a time when the order of the day i s to temporize wi th 
po l i t ique and heretic so as not to lose the scant r e l i g i o n of the 
former and not to give the l a t t e r an occasion of hardening his heart." 
(estamos en tiempo que l a lectura que aca' se l l eva es contemporizar con 
los p o l l t i c o s y con los herej.es para no acabar de perder l a poca r e l i g i 6 n 
de los primeros y dar ocasidn a endurecerse a los o t ros . ) 
(63) AGS E2557/2. 
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These f u r t h e r indicat ions that the Pope could not be depended upon were 
unwelcome though not unexpected. I t was i n f i n i t e l y g a l l i n g that Clement 
should play down the great issues of the day and yet be prepared to wrangle 
incessantly wi th the Spanish author i t ies i n I t a l y over pet ty j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
disputes. But f o r a l l the strong language and the l inger ing desire to be 
able to do something more pos i t ive about the s i t u a t i o n i n England, a l l that 
could be done was to order Sesa to make the appropriate representations 
w i t h the Pope (64). Not even great annoyance enabled P h i l i p and the Council 
to forget that they had no choice but to negotiate, even though i n the same 
session f u r t h e r demands from the recusants were discussed (65)• With a 
heavy heart, they allowed necessity to triumph over a deep-seated sense of 
p r i n c i p l e ; and by mid-August they were hoping that the recusants could be 
persuaded to keep out of t rouble (66). 
U n t i l now, the opening of negotiations wi th James had been regarded as 
a pis a l l e r . The s i tua t ion changed dramatically wi th the t e r r i f y i n g news 
that France and England had concluded a new a l l i ance . Juan Bautista de 
Tasis, a f t e r sending many a verbose despatch from Paris, had f i n a l l y done 
his country a great service. As a resul t of his f r i endsh ip wi th an un-named 
confidant of Henry IV and his c i r c l e , he had been able t o obtain detai led 
knowledge of the f r u i t s of Rosny's mission to London. The old t r ea ty 
between France and Scotland was confirmed and i t s terms extended to include 
England. The two monarchs were henceforth to be bound i n an al l iance of 
offence and defence. Most s i n i s t e r of a l l , they had apparently agreed to 
recognize a peace settlement i n Flanders by which the Dutch would recognize 
the nominal suzerainty of Spain and England and France guarantee to protect 
them from Spanish repr i sa l s . I f such a settlement proved impossible to 
reach, Henry and James were agreed to send subsidies to t h e i r a l l i e s - the 
(64) AGS E1857/11; E977/sf, document of 1st July, 1603-
(65) AGS E841/231. 
(66) AGS E2511/75-
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former w i t h 100,000 ducats a year and the l a t t e r w i t h 4,000 men. I f Spain 
should declare war upon England, France would come t o the rescue w i t h 6,000 
t roops and the immediate repayment o f the debt t h a t Henry owed t o E l i z a b e t h 
( 6 7 ) . Tasis was not e n t i r e l y c e r t a i n t h a t a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n was c o r r e c t : 
i t seemed t h a t James was not p l a y i n g the French game w i t h much eagerness, 
and the French were sa id t o be d o u b t f u l t h a t the agreement would be put i n t o 
e f f e c t ( 6 8 ) . But the s i g n i f i c a n c e was c l e a r enough. And f r o m England i t s e l f 
had come unwelcome news of another s o r t : the Bye p l o t had been discovered 
and nipped i n the bud (69)• There could now be no q u e s t i o n of h e s i t a t i o n . 
A l l the evidence shewed t h a t T a s i s ' proper place was i n London: a f t e r a l l , 
by prompt ly sending h i s own ambassador t o James, Henry I V had been able t o 
s t e a l a march on the Habsburgs (70 ) . From t h i s p o i n t there was t o be no 
t u r n i n g back: Spain would have t o come t o terms w i t h England. 
(67) AGS EK1606/71. The i n f o r m a t i o n s u b s t a n t i a l l y t a l l i e s w i t h the v e r s i o n 
of the agreement p r i n t e d i n Dumont V ii: 30 w i t h the date 30th Ju ly , 1603-
(68) AGS EKl606/70,82. 
(69) Gardiner i 119-
(70) AGS E8334/145; EK1606/93-
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I X . PRIORITIES BECOME CLEARER. 
Juan de Tasis a r r i v e d i n England on 31st August, 1603, and was soon t o 
rece ive a new t i t l e - Count o f Vi l lamediana - bestowed upon him presumably 
i n order t o give him g rea te r s tanding a t the E n g l i s h cour t ( l ) . From the 
f i r s t , he was impressed w i t h the many f a c t o r s t h a t seemed t o be working i n 
h i s f a v o u r . His f i r s t view of Dover Cast le came as a pleasant s u r p r i s e : i t 
was so r u i n e d t h a t , i n h i s o p i n i o n , i t cou ld not be defended f o r an hour -
and t h i s was t r u e o f a l l the o ther f o r t i f i e d places i n the v i c i n i t y . The 
E n g l i s h boasted t h a t the s t r e n g t h o f t h e i r defences l a y not i n t h e i r c a s t l e s 
and t h e i r t roops - the l a t t e r be ing i n a s i m i l a r l y bad s t a te - but i n t h e i r 
f l e e t o f 70 vesse l s : but Vi l lamediana thought t h a t on ly between 35 and 4.0 
o f these could belong t o the Crown. The populace seemed poor and down-
t rodden, and V i l l amed iana ' s i n e v i t a b l e conc lus ion was t h a t "the day they 
have t o go t o war, they w i l l have scant s k i l l and abundant d i so rde r a t 
t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n . " (2) By comparison w i t h t h a t o f the Spanish government, 
the E n g l i s h budget made unimpressive r ead ing : according t o r e p o r t s , James 
cou ld reckon on r e c e i v i n g 1,130,000 ducats (£380 ,000) each year , a sum t h a t 
i n c l u d e d Par l iamentary g ran t s , o f which 4.50,000 ducats would be consumed i n 
o r d i n a r y expenses and what remained would have t o be d i v i d e d amongst the 
F l e e t , presents , graces and e x t r a o r d i n a r y expenses ( 3 ) - The f a c t had not 
been l o s t upon James, and a l ready he was sa id t o be making cons iderable and 
unsuccess fu l at tempts t o r a i s e more money. The new k i n g obv ious ly badly 
needed peace. 
Indeed, James cut a f a r f rom w a r l i k e f i g u r e : b e a t i p a c i f i c i was s i g -
n i f i c a n t l y h i s personal mot to . Apart f rom once harbour ing a s l i g h t doubt, 
V i l l amed iana was always sure t h a t he was t imorous and f ea red war more than 
(1) BRAH x l v i i i 4.27. 
(2) AGS E 8 4 l / l $ l . 
(3) AGS E84.0/189• 
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he des i r ed peace (4.). There was not much t o f e a r f rom a b u f f o o n : 
"The more I come c l o s e r t o meeting t h i s k i n g , the less I am pleased 
by what I hear about him, f o r a l l agree i n d e s c r i b i n g a man of l i t t l e 
substance, t i m i d - some say feminine - and s imply f o r t h i s a l o v e r o f 
peace w i t h everyone, i ncons t an t , wi thou t the l e a s t k i n g l i n e s s , a 
p l ea su re - love r , an enemy t o a f f a i r s o f s t a t e , which t i r e him and which 
are t h e r e f o r e l e f t e n t i r e l y i n the hands o f t h a t man C e c i l , so t h a t he 
h i m s e l f can f o r e v e r be out hun t ing ( t o which he i s p a r t i a l ) . He never 
speaks or acts r e g a l l y and lacks temperance - they say t h a t on the day 
o f h i s co rona t ion , he drank t h i r t y - f i v e t imes and assuredly d i d not 
r i s e f rom the t a b l e sober, but r a t h e r so merry t h a t the Queen h u r r i e d 
t o take him i n hand. Even worse t h i n g s are a t t r i b u t e d t o him. Your 
Majes ty w i l l be able t o judge f rom t h i s what may be expected f r o m so 
godless a man. Al though the King has the r e p u t a t i o n o f be ing a t heo -
l o g i a n and man of l e t t e r s , we can see how v a i n i s h i s t heo logy . They 
say t h a t he does not even know how to be generous." 
(cuanto mds me acerco a este rey menos me agradan l a s r e l ac iones que 
me l l e g a n de su persona porque confe r idas concuerdan todas en ser hombre 
de poco porque l e hacen t i m i d o y t a l que d iga que como una mujer y por 
sdlo esto amigo de paz con todos incons tante s i n pa labra de rey en nada 
amigo d e l oc io enemigo d e l gobierno y que l e canse y que a s i l o de j a 
absolutamente en manos de este C i c e l por sdlo acud i r de o r d i n a r i o a l a 
caza*que es i n c l i n a d o y en e l l a y en o t ra s par tes decompuesto de palabras 
y actos rea les y poco sobr lo pues d i cen que e l d l a de su coronac idn 
bebid 35 veces que seg&n esto no se l evan td t r i s t e de l a t a b l a antes t a n 
a legre que l a r e i n a se d i d p r i s a a recoger le y aiin l e imputan de cosas 
peores que segun esto puede VM juzgar l o que de hombre semejante y s i n 
Dios se puede e s p e r a r . . . y aunque a este rey }e hacen l e t r a d o y ted logo 
ya se ve cuan f a l s a t e o l o g f a es y aun l a l i b e r a l i d a d se d ice que usa 
m a l . . . ( 5 ) . ) 
Al though t ime was t o s o f t e n Vi l l amed iana ' s harsh judgement i n some respec ts , 
he cont inued t o regard James as a p a c i f i s t . I n p u b l i c and i n p r i v a t e , the 
King never appeared t o be o ther than e n t i r e l y i n f avour o f peace w i t h Spain, 
and throughout ; / i l l amed iana 1 s s tay expressed a f i r m des i re "not f o r peace 
f o r a year but one t h a t i s durable and w i l l l a s t f o r c e n t u r i e s . " (6) As a 
(4) AGS £ 8 4 0 / 1 8 4 , 2 6 4 . 
(5) AGS E 8 4 I / I 4 I . 
(6) AGS E840/253 , 259; E842/90,91,92. 
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token o f t h i s , and i n f u l l accord w i t h h i s p o l i t i c a l theory , he openly-
disapproved of the r e b e l Dutch ( 7 ) . He was not prepared t o help Spain 
against them, but he asser ted t h a t i f they r e f u s e d t o come t o terms at the 
same t ime as England, he would not f e e l o b l i g e d t o support them f u r t h e r . 
He could not stand by and see them punished: but as a monarch f u l l y conscious 
o f h i s d i v i n e o f f i c e , he could not but look askance at the Uni ted Provinces 
and d i d not doubt t h a t an a l l i a n c e w i t h a f e l l o w monarch o f P h i l i p ' s s tand-
i n g was f a r more f i t t i n g f o r him ( 8 ) . Encouraging too was h i s r e f u s a l t o 
enter the French camp. He was a l ready known t o have been r e l u c t a n t t o 
accede t o Henry I V s schemes, and was l i t t l e l i k e d i n Pa r i s ( 9 ) . He even 
p u b l i c l y numbered Normandy, Aqui ta ine and Guyenne amongst h i s possessions 
i n a speech before Par l iament i n the sp r ing o f I6O4 ( 1 0 ) . There was ye t 
another aspect t o h i s des i re f o r peace: James had begun t o see h i m s e l f as 
the a r b i t e r o f Europe. 
"The King has become so proud w i t h the grea t a t t e n t i o n pa id him by 
Your Majes ty and o ther monarchs t h a t he has got the idea t h a t a l l t h i s 
comes o f necess i ty . They encourage him t o t h i n k t h a t he and h i s m i n i -
s t e r s have i n t h e i r hand u n i v e r s a l peace or d i s c o r d and war throughout 
the w o r l d . " 
(Este rey es t a n soberbio con e l gran caso que VM y o t ros reyes han 
hecho de 61 y de su amistad que con eso l e han puesto en cabeza que 
sea por necesidad y l e t i e n e n t a n ancho que piense 61 y sus m i n i s t r o s 
que l a paz p t i b l i c a y u n i v e r s a l d e l mundo o l a d i s c o r d i a y l a guerra 
este* en su mano. . . ( l l ) . ) 
I n cour t c i r c l e s , t oo , Vi l lamediana found encouraging signs o f good-
w i l l . Al though as he h i m s e l f po in ted out , " t h i s i s a kingdom i n t o which 
no Spaniard has openly entered f o r t h i r t y yea r s , " he was not shor t o f 
f r i e n d s . ( 1 2 ) . I n f o r m a t i o n about the reputed sympathies o f l ead ing E n g l i s h 
(7) CSPV x 55. James' The Trew Law of Free Monarchies was publ i shed i n 1599-
(8) AGS E840/254. 
(9) AGS EK1606/124; qvs 
(10) AGS E842/90,91,92. 
(11) AGS E840/152. 
(12) AGS E84 2/:K0. 
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statesmen had been a v a i l a b l e t o the Spaniards f o r some t i m e . One o f the 
most cur ious pieces concerned the son of Buckhurst , the Lord High Treasurer , 
who as a young Roman Ca tho l i c convert had v i s i t e d Rome e a r l y i n 1603: here 
was proo'f t h a t the recusant i n t e r e s t had permeated the h ighes t c i r c l e s i n 
England (13)• More d e t a i l e d was a r e l a t i o n g iven t o Vi l lamediana before he 
l e f t Flanders , which purpor ted t o descr ibe the a l l e g i a n c e o f the e n t i r e 
P r i v y Counc i l and some of the o ther l ead ing men, Egerton, Buckhurst , 
VJorcester, Fortescue, Wootton, Northumberland, Cumberland and Mount joy were 
a l l expected t o be f avourab le towards Spain, though C e c i l and h i s f r i e n d s 
were not (14)- And i n r e a l i t y , Vi l lamediana found t h a t the s i t u a t i o n a t 
c o u r t was not as bad as he had expected i t t o be. There was a d m i t t e d l y a 
s izeable core of opponents, made up, he thought , o f those who saw t h e i r 
persona l f o r t u n e s t o depend upon the continuance o f p r i v a t e e r i n g . But 
g r a d u a l l y , he was winning p o p u l a r i t y , and t h a t w i thou t d i s t r i b u t i n g b r i b e s . 
There was a good dea l o f expectancy, i t was t r u e : as the Constable o f C a s t i l e 
was l a t e r t o remark, 11 l a s esperanzas en que es tdn son t e r r i b l e s . " (15) Yet 
t h i s E n g l i s h c u p i d i t y was throughout regarded as one o f Spain ' s best asse ts . 
Never f o r one moment d i d Vi l lamediana t h i n k t h a t there might be more t o 
E n g l i s h a t t i t u d e s than money and s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; h igh p r i n c i p l e s were a 
Spanish p r e r o g a t i v e . 
For a l l the surface g o o d - w i l l , however, James and h i s m i n i s t e r s were 
p l a y i n g a very deep game. I n the P r i v y Counc i l and i n Par l iament , there 
was o p p o s i t i o n t o a peace w i t h the n a t i o n a l enemy. The c o n t r a s t between 
James' sugar and the P r i v y C o u n c i l ' s occas iona l v inegar was t h e r e f o r e 
d e l i b e r a t e : the King could blame any s t r i n g e n c i e s i n the terms o f the t r e a t y 
upon h i s scapegoat m i n i s t e r s , who i n t u r n could plead the awkwardness o f the 
Par l iamentary gen t ry . James' astuteness i s t o be seen above a l l i n h i s 
(13) AGS E977/sf , document o f 13th March, 1603-
(14) AGS E840/118. 
(15) AGS E84I /98 . 
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r e l i g i o u s p o l i c y . Without compromising h imse l f i n h i s c apac i t y as t i t u l a r 
head o f the E n g l i s h Church, he c o n t r i v e d to shew h i m s e l f t o be not unfavour-
able t o Roman C a t h o l i c i s m . He had sent James Lindsey t o the Pope w i t h a 
courteous r e p l y t o the l a t t e r ' s l e t t e r , assur ing him o f h i s c o r d i a l i t y and 
open-mindedness t o t h e o l o g i c a l debate (16 ) . I n a speech d e l i v e r e d a t the 
opening o f Parl iament i n the sp r ing o f I6Q4, he spoke o f h i s warm des i re 
f o r a f u l l y - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e General Counc i l o f the Church, and, f rom Spain ' s 
p o i n t o f view best o f a l l , o f the need t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the s e d i t i o u s 
seminary p r i e s t and the l o y a l recusant layman ( 1 7 ) . They were sma l l s teps, 
perhaps, but enough t o convince Vi l lamediana t h a t James might be more open 
t o Spain ' s r e l i g i o u s demands than had been E l i z a b e t h . Above a l l , the Queen, 
as a Roman Ca tho l i c conver t , was w h o l l y f avourab le t o the Spanish i n t e r e s t . 
She was i n contac t w i t h the Pope; she smiled upon Vi l lamediana f rom the 
f i r s t ; she even went so f a r as t o conf ide i n him her des i re t o marry her 
e ldes t son t o the I n f a n t a , and t h a t she had s e c r e t l y arranged f o r him t o be 
t u t o r e d by a Roman C a t h o l i c . On one occasion, indeed, she made a p o i n t e d 
re ference t o the f a c i a l l i keness between the Prince and Henry V at h i s 
c o r o n a t i o n i n Pa r i s , and expressed the hope t h a t h i s t o r y might repeat i t s e l f 
( 1 8 ) . Only on one occasion was James r epor t ed t o have ob j ec t ed t o h i s w i f e ' s 
meddling i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s : f o r the r e s t , i t was assumed t h a t he was f u l l y 
aware o f what she sa id and d i d and t h a t he t h e r e f o r e had no o b j e c t i o n t o 
r a i s e (19)• I t i s indeed odd t h a t ne i t he r Vi l lamediana nor the Counc i l o f 
Sta te seem t o have doubted f o r a moment t h a t James' i n t e n t i o n s were r a d i a n t l y 
c l e a r . Nevertheless , these r e p o r t s went f a r t o encourage Spain t o ho ld t o 
her course, and even to have sanguine hopes o f s u c c e s s f u l l y conc lud ing a 
f avourab le t r e a t y . 
(16) AGS E84.1/185; E978/17,18. 
(17) AGS E842/90,91,92. The same d i s t i n c t i o n was made i n h i s p roc l ama t ion 
of 22nd February, I603/4 OS; E842/3-
(18) AGS E840/144,145,]46,188; E84.I/155; E84.2/6I. 
(19) AGS E84.0/152. 
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Pressure f rom Rome and Par i s cont inued t o i n c l i n e the Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s 
towards peace. The Pope, w h i l s t r e s i s t i n g pressure f rom c e r t a i n E n g l i s h 
e x i l e s t o send a nuncio t o London, t r i e d not t o f r i g h t e n James away. His 
p o l i c y was t o m a i n t a i n u n o f f i c i a l con tac t , above a l l w i t h the Queen ( 2 0 ) . 
More p o s i t i v e , however, were the steps t h a t he took t o discourage the 
recusants f rom r e s o r t i n g t o arms. From three sources - Tasis i n London, 
the Constable o f C a s t i l e i n 3 russe l s and Ztiniga i n Pa r i s - the C o u n c i l o f 
Sta te l e a r n t t h a t the Pope had spoken unequ ivoca l ly i n f a v o u r o f the new 
k i n g . The Constable, indeed, was able t o send t o V a l l a d o l i d a copy o f the 
l e t t e r sent on beha l f o f the Flemish nuncio t o the A r c h p r i e s t , George B lack -
w e l l , i n which p l o t s agains t the "sacred person" o f James were denounced as 
" i r r e l i g i o u s , scandalous and o f f e n s i v e before God" and i n which p a t i e n t 
endurance o f any pe r secu t ion was e n j o i n e d ( 2 1 ) . I n l a rge measure, the 
Pope's p o l i c y was undoubtedly s t i l l determined by h i s des i re not t o o f f e n d 
Henry I V ; f o r Henry badly wished t o be sure o f James' f r i e n d s h i p . He had 
at tempted t o conclude an o f f e n s i v e and defens ive a l l i a n c e . He had suggested 
t h a t James marry h i s daughter t o the Dauphin (22 ) . He was, moreover, deeply 
suspic ious o f Spain ' s plans i n England. He could not b e l i e v e t h a t P h i l i p 
wanted no more than peace w i t h James: s u r e l y he would seek E n g l i s h he lp f o r 
f u r t h e r p r o j e c t s against France. He saw the E n g l i s h seminary p r i e s t s as 
Spa in ' s grea tes t a l l i e s , and f o r t h i s reason ordered h i s ambassador t o warn 
James of the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h i s f i f t h column (23)• J o i n i n g w i t h the F l o r -
en t ines and the Venetians, he and h i s m i n i s t e r s d i d a l l they cou ld t o place 
obs tac les i n Spain ' s way ( 2 4 ) . Large sums o f money were d i s t r i b u t e d on 
Henry 's beha l f a t the E n g l i s h c o u r t , and w i t h a good dea l o f p u b l i c i t y ; 
(20) The p o l i c y , however, was not e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l . I n February, I6O4, 
he sent r e l i n q u a r i e s and r o s a r i e s t o England - though o s t e n s i b l y they 
came f r o m the Card ina l s Aldobrandino and Da t a r i o - a t the hands o f 
the adventurer , S i r Anthony Standen. Apparen t ly , James took great 
o f f ence and i n a f u r y sent Standen back t o I t a l y . AGS E842/75; 
E978/34,17. 
(21) AGS E84.0/139; E84.2/137,139; EKI606/124. The l e t t e r t o B l a c k w e l l was 
dated 15th August, 1603 OS. 
(22) AGS E840/I88. 
(23) LM v i 175-
(24) AGS E840/I48; E842/137. 
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and i t seemed t h a t at tempts were being made t o d i sp lace Spain i n the con-
f i d e n c e o f the E n g l i s h recusants ( 2 5 ) . Any a r t i f i c e seemed p e r m i s s i b l e : 
e a r l y i n I6O4, a bemused Juan B a u t i s t a de Tasis r epor ted t h a t "un gran 
matemdtico f r ancos" had warned James t h a t he would run;; great p h y s i c a l 
r i s k i n the month o f February ( 2 6 ) . Henry 's progress cou ld not be a l lowed 
t o cont inue unchecked. 
Even so, P h i l i p and the Counc i l r e fu sed t o rush i n ; they had severe ly 
c r i t i c i z e d the Trea ty o f Vervins f o r having been conducted w i t h too much 
haste i n the early, stages, and had no i n t e n t i o n o f r epea t ing the mis take . 
A cour tesy-envoy of some s tand ing had been sent t o a newly-crowned monarch 
w i t h whom there had been no prev ious q u a r r e l , and f o r a long t ime they 
con t inued t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s was q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t . But as A l b e r t had 
p o i n t e d out , Vi l lamediana f o r a l l h i s q u a l i t i e s was not experienced enough 
t o be l e f t i n charge o f so d e l i c a t e a n e g o t i a t i o n . The Counc i l t h e r e f o r e 
decided to g ive the t a sk t o one of t h e i r own number, the Constable o f 
C a s t i l e , who was sent t o Flanders l a t e i n 1603 w i t h a d u a l commission: t o 
ac t as A l b e r t ' s aide-de-camp and t o supervise Vi l l amed iana ' s a c t i v i t i e s . 
He was an obvious cho ice . As a fo rmer Governor o f M i l a n and Captain-General 
o f the Spanish army i n France i n 1588, he had extensive m i l i t a r y exper ience; 
h i s te rm as ambassador i n Rome had in t roduced him to the n i c e t i e s o f d i p l o -
macy; and h i s mother, Lady Jane Dormer, was an E n g l i s h Roman C a t h o l i c who 
had met her husband a t the cour t o f Queen Mary (27 ) . He could t h e r e f o r e be 
expected t o be w a t c h f u l f o r Spain ' s i n t e r e s t s and a l i v e t o the need t o g a i n 
concess ionsfor the recusants . 
(25) AGS E842/79,134,136. 
(26) AGS EK1606/129. 
(27) Loomie Spanish El izabethans cap i v . I cannot agree w i t h Dr . Loomie's 
o p i n i o n t h a t the Constable was e i t h e r less i n f a v o u r o f peace w i t h 
England, or chosen f o r the miss ion f o r t h a t reason; c f idem 
T o l e r a t i o n and Diplomacy 28. 
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The Constable ' s f i r s t t a sk was fundamental t o the e n t i r e n e g o t i a t i o n : 
i t was he who was t o decide when and where t o begin the t a l k s ( 28 ) . His 
f i r s t wish was t o persuade the E n g l i s h t o meet the Spaniards somewhere i n 
the Low Countr ies - f o r England n e u t r a l ground because o f the Archdukes' 
sovere ign ty and f o r Spain Habsburg t e r r i t o r y where E n g l i s h guests cou ld be 
granted precedence wi thou t j e o p a r d i z i n g Spanish honour ( 2 9 ) . James, however, 
thought o the rwise . He was unimpressed by pleas t h a t the Constable, whom 
Vi l l amed iana mendaciously r epor ted t o be i n bad h e a l t h , be spared the journey 
across the Channel. At the end of January a d e p u t a t i o n o f f i v e of h i s P r i v y 
C o u n c i l l o r s - Nottingham, Devonshire, Henry Howard, C e c i l and Northumberland 
- spent th ree hours w i t h Vi l lamediana , i n s i s t i n g t h a t , since James and Anne 
were the s t ronges t supporters o f a t r e a t y w i t h Spain, the n e g o t i a t i o n s had 
b e t t e r take place under t h e i r eye. The p o i n t was made w i t h some s k i l l : when 
f o u r o f the f i v e had a l ready t aken t h e i r leave , the one who remained k i ssed 
a c r u c i f i x i n token o f h i s r e l i g i o u s sympathies, t o l d the ambassador t h a t 
a t l e a s t th ree o f h i s col leagues were we l l -d i sposed towards Spain - and 
urged him not t o i n s i s t upon t r e a t i n g i n Flanders ( 30 ) . W i t h i n a couple o f 
months, James had also begun t o say t h a t he badly needed a l l h i s m i n i s t e r s 
a t home t o dea l w i t h the cu r r en t session o f Parl iament ( 3 1 ) . T h i s , coupled 
w i t h England's r i s i n g o p i n i o n o f h e r s e l f as the a r b i t e r o f Christendom, 
posed a great problem t o the Constable. On the one hand, h i s sense o f 
decency was outraged - " i t would be on ly r i g h t f o r t h a t King t o send h i s 
delegates t o Spain :" but on the o ther , he cou ld not d i s r ega rd the c o n t r a r y 
f a c t o r s . A man by no means g iven t o exaggera t ion or panic , he had come t o 
have a l i v e l y a p p r e c i a t i o n o f why the Archdukes had at t imes seemed ove r -
anxious f o r peace. I n a l e t t e r w r i t t e n soon a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l i n Brusse l s , 
(28) AHN E2798/5-
(29) AGS E84.2/135. 
(30) AGS E842/I4.O. Of the f i v e , on ly Northumberland was said t o be 
f r a n c o p h i l e . 
(31) AGS E 8 4 l / 9 , 2 0 ; E842/73. 
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he pa in t ed a v i v i d p i c t u r e o f the s ta te o f the Low Coun t r i e s : 
" I t has pained me cons ide rab ly t o see the army here, and a l though I 
had heard a good dea l , I must confess t o Your Majes ty t h a t I d i d not 
expect t h a t the general d i scon ten t i n a l l q u a r t e r s , the notable l a c k 
o f resources and the t o t a l decay o f d i s c i p l i n e would be so bad. There 
i s no-one, great or sma l l , who does not want t o get out and does not 
expect t h a t we s h a l l be defea ted . The Archduke does what he can, but 
h i s l a c k o f means and h i s wish t o s a t i s f y h i s sub jec t s prevent him f rom 
shewing i t . Don A g u s t i n Mesia assures me t h a t i f the enemy were t o 
beseige the ca s t l e o f Antwerp, there are not the muni t ions and suppl ies 
t o a l low i t t o l a s t out t e n days. Ghent and a l l the r e s t are the same. 
There are not the t roops t o a t t end t o o r d i n a r y guard d u t i e s - I saw the 
Cambrai g a r r i s o n so deple ted i t was p i t i f u l - and they t e l l me t h a t 
since t h i s wretched siege o f Ostend was begun - the r u i n o f e v e r y t h i n g 
- and many t roops thus redeployed, the s o l d i e r s do not undress except 
t o change t h e i r s h i r t s (always supposing t h a t they are amongst those 
who have them t o change)." 
(hame last imado mucho ver este e je*rci to y aunque habia o ido har to 
con f i e so a VM que no me persuadia a t an to daho; e l descontento general 
de l a s naciones y l a pobreza es notable , l a d i s c i p l i n a y obediencia 
acabada de todo punto; no hay grande n i ch ico que no desee s a l i r de 
aquf y que no este* desconfiado de buen suceso. E l sr Archiduque hace 
l o que puede mas l a f a l t a de hacienda y e l desear dar s a t i s f a c c i d n a l 
pa i s no de ja que luzga . Asegurame Don A g u s t l n Mesla que s i e l enemigo 
s i t i a s e e l c a s t i l l o de Anveres no t i e n e municiones n i comida para 
sustentarse diez d f a s : a s i esta' Gante y a s i es ta todo , y s i n gente 
para hacer l a s guardias o r d i n a r i a s ; v i l a g u a r n i c i d n de Cambray t a n 
apocada que es l a s t i m a y en tendi que desde que se s i t i d este negro 
Ostende ( r u i n a de todo) y se saco* para eso mucha gente de e l l a no se 
desnudan l o s soldados s ino para mudar camisa 61 que l a t i e n e ( 3 2 ) . ) 
He r e p o r t e d t h a t , a l though Spain was sending 200,000 ducats a month t o the 
w a r - e f f o r t , another monthly 150,000 would be needed. W i t h i n another f o r t -
n i g h t , he wrote t o t e l l t h a t the Dutch had walked i n t o the t e r r i t o r y around 
(32) AGS E842/155. 
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Maes t r i ch "as though i n t o t h e i r own house" and t h a t "our r e p u t a t i o n decays, 
and t h e i r s increases , by the hour, and we may p r o p e r l y have great f e a r s f o r 
the s p r i n g . " (33) The Constable was t h e r e f o r e doubly anxious t o end the 
war w i t h England. He was f o r c e d t o the conc lus ion t h a t , i f the E n g l i s h were 
obs t i na t e i n t h e i r wish t o conduct the t a l k s i n London, Spain would have t o 
give way: i t was not wor th t h r o w i n g away the chance o f r e p a i r i n g Spain ' s 
sha t t e red resources f o r what would amount t o a P y r r h i c v i c t o r y (34-) • He took 
very s e r i o u s l y the t a l k about a match between the Pr ince o f Wales and the 
I n f a n t a , and saw i t as a sure earnest o f James1 good i n t e n t i o n s . He a lso 
saw the f o r c e behind the argument t h a t the E n g l i s h nego t i a to r s were b e t t e r 
kept where James would be able t o c o n t r o l them. And a f i n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
had t o be borne i n mind. By a l l accounts, the Flemings would need the 
c lo se s t s u p e r v i s i o n i f i t came t o a t r e a t y . Vi l lamediana had noted w i t h 
some s u r p r i s e on h i s a r r i v a l i n London t h a t Aremberg had on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e 
begun t o make u n o f f i c i a l o f f e r s t o the E n g l i s h . Perhaps because i t was f e l t 
t h a t Aremberg's ac t ions had been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n arous ing England's des i re 
t o nego t i a t e , ne i t he r Vi l lamediana nor the Counc i l o f Sta te took the mat ter 
f u r t h e r (35)- But some compensatory a c t i o n had t o be taken , and n e i t h e r 
Vi l lamediana nor the Constable was disposed t o t r u s t any o f A l b e r t ' s 
m i n i s t e r s ( 3 6 ) . The sooner t h a t the n e g o t i a t i o n s were put on a f o r m a l 
f o o t i n g , the b e t t e r . 
Wi thout w a i t i n g f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s f rom Spain, t h e r e f o r e , l a t e i n March, 
1604, the Constable set o f f f rom Brussels f o r the coast , whence he cou ld 
more e a s i l y m a i n t a i n d a i l y contac t w i t h Vi l l amed iana . For the moment, he 
himself"was not t o cross t o England, f o r the excuse o f i l l - h e a l t h w i t h which 
(33) AGS E84 2/137. 
(34) AGS E842/76: " s i los ing leses es tuviesen obst inados en este punto 
no sd s i convendrla romper por eso siendo t a n necesario como es a l 
estado presente de l as fue rzas y hacienda de VM tomar un poco de 
a l i e n t o . " 
(35) AGS E 8 4 I / I 4 I ; E622/223. 
(36) AGS E842/137,74. 
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Vi l l amed iana had long been p a c i f y i n g James had now become a r e a l i t y . But 
he sent on ahead three col leagues f o r h i s j u n i o r : two Flemings, the Pres ident 
Richardot and the Audienc ie r Verreyken, and an acute Milanese senator, 
Alessandro Robida, who would be Vi l l amed iana 1 s main a ide . The f o u r were 
f u r n i s h e d w i t h powers t o beg in d iscuss ions and orders t o keep i n close 
contac t w i t h the Constable. L a t i n and French were t o be the l inguae f r ancae , 
Robida be ing p r o f i c i e n t i n the former and Vi l l amed iana ' s uncle , Juan B a u t i s t a 
de Tasis (not the former ambassador i n France) i n the l a t t e r ( 3 7 ) . The Con-
s tab le proposed t o wa i t u n t i l the n e g o t i a t i o n s had ended before j o i n i n g the 
r e s t o f the envoys. Not o n l y would i t be more decorous f o r him t o appear 
o n l y t o s i g n the f i n a l d r a f t o f the t r e a t y : i f f o r any reason the t a l k s 
should break down, the wor ld should be l e f t w i t h the impress ion t h a t the 
inexper ienced and obscure Vi l lamediana had been i n charge o f the Habsburg 
l e g a t i o n ( 3 8 ) . The Constable ' s sense o f urgency was not shared by h i s 
f e l l o w - c o u n c i l l o r s i n V a l l a d o l i d . Far removed as they were f r o m the misery 
t h a t p r e v a i l e d i n Flanders , they held to t h e i r o p i n i o n t h a t t ime was Spain ' s 
best a l l y and t h a t i f once the E n g l i s h caught the idea t h a t Spain badly 
wanted peace, they would make imposs ib le demands. There were even those 
who opposed the Constable ' s l e a v i n g Brusse l s ; i n the o p i n i o n o f the Marquess 
o f Poza, the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n was so bad t h a t o n l y b l u f f would serve 
Spa in ' s t u r n (39)• But however unwelcome the Constable ' s d e c i s i o n t o take 
mat ters i n t o h i s own hands had been, they were f o r c e d t o make the best o f 
i t . Cdrdoba, who had f o r m e r l y been the s t ronges t opponent o f compromise, 
put the mat ter i n a n u t s h e l l : i f Spain, by not reduc ing her commitments, 
s u f f e r e d de fea t a f t e r d e f e a t , her r e p u t a t i o n would s u f f e r f a r more than 
would have been the case i f the Constable ' s ac t ions had been approved. 
Realism had vanquished the C o u n c i l ' s previous ideas o f r e p u t a t i o n , and had 
(37) AGS E84 l /21 ,30 ; E842/76, %, 95. 
(38) AGS E2024/85; Alcocer i i 50. 
(39) AGS E2557/12; E2571/57. 
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l e f t the most lukewarm o f i d e o l o g i e s : " t r u e r e p u t a t i o n cons i s t s i n g e t t i n g 
one's way, even though a c e r t a i n amount be r i s k e d i n the manner o f n e g o t i a -
t i o n . " (4.0) The n e g o t i a t i o n s were t o shew t h a t even t h i s was p i t c h e d too 
h i g h . 
Richardo t , Verreyken and Robida a r r i v e d i n England on 19th May, I6O4, 
and the n e g o t i a t i o n s began s h o r t l y a f t e rwards i n Somerset House; and f r o m 
the s t a r t , much t o the c h a g r i n o f t h e i r Flemish col leagues , matters were 
f i r m l y i n the hands o f the Spaniards (41 ) . There were t o be th ree main 
i s sues : t r ade , the cau t iona ry towns he ld by England i n the Uni t ed Provinces , 
and r e l i g i o n . The f i r s t was an obvious p o i n t . Vi l l amediana , indeed, i n 
keeping w i t h h i s b e l i e f t h a t the E n g l i s h were m a t e r i a l i s t s a t hea r t , f e l t 
t h i s t o be the main reason f o r England's des i re f o r peace ( 4 2 ) . I n the 
e a r l y months o f the new r e i g n there had been some encouraging mutual con-
cess ions . E n g l i s h p r i v a t e e r i n g had been f o r b i d d e n by r o y a l p roc lamat ion , 
some E n g l i s h p r i sone r s were r e p a t r i a t e d , and Vi l lamediana was empowered t o 
issue passports t o those E n g l i s h merchants who wished t o waste no t ime i n 
t r a d i n g w i t h Spain (43)- I n the resumption of normal commercial r e l a t i o n s 
there were, however, two main d i f f i c u l t i e s . The f i r s t was England 's 
o b j e c t i o n t o the a c t i v i t i e s o f the I n q u i s i t i o n i n Spanish p o r t s (44)-
There had been a good dea l o f t r o u b l e i n the past , and there were u s u a l l y 
a number o f E n g l i s h seamen i n the c e l l s o f the I n q u i s i t i o n , a l though the 
evidence suggests t h a t they were not t r e a t e d w i t h excessive s e v e r i t y (45)-
The Counc i l o f State d i d not take an extreme p o s i t i o n . As e a r l y as the 
a b o r t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s a t Boulogne, the I n q u i s i t o r - G e n e r a l and h i s c o u n c i l 
(40) AGS E2557/15-
(41) Cuve l i e r 505: " i l s se sont montrds nos mai t res p l u t o t que nos 
compagnons. . . 1 1 
(42) AGS E840/262. James' i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h i s commissioners shew t h a t 
Vi l l amediana had judged r i g h t l y : PRO 3P 94/10/25-
(43) AGS E2557/5; E840/249; E84I/158. 
(44) This was the second p o i n t made i n James' i n s t r u c t i o n s : PRO SP 94/10/25. 
(45) c f A l b e r t i & Wallis-Chapman. 
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had sa id t h a t they would not take unreasonably harsh measures against 
v i s i t i n g P ro tes t an t s , a l though they reserved the r i g h t t o ac t i f p r o h i b i t e d 
l i t e r a t u r e were found on board t h e i r vessels (4.6). By I6O4, the o f f e r had 
inc reased : i f f o r e i g n v i s i t o r s l i v e d "wi thou t scandal i n p u b l i c or i n p r i v a t e , 
i n the manner o f the i n h a b i t a n t s " , they would be l e f t alone (47 ) . The Engl i sh , 
however, found t h i s unacceptable. What was " s i n escdndalo", a f t e r a l l ? and 
d i d i t mean t h a t one o b j e c t o r could have an e n t i r e crew put i n i rons? Des-
p i t e a l l the Spanish p r o t e s t a t i o n s t h a t the meaning was c l e a r and t h a t i t s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would be reasonable, the E n g l i s h i n s i s t e d upon a f o r m a l 
d e f i n i t i o n . Vi l lamediana and h i s col leagues were f o r c e d t o give way, com-
f o r t i n g themselves w i t h the thought t h a t , compared w i t h what was a t s take, 
i t was a smal l p r i c e t o pay ( 4 8 ) . They t h e r e f o r e agreed t h a t f o r e i g n e r s 
who made no open scandal would be unmolested, no mat ter what they d i d i n 
p r i v a t e (49)• 
The second o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s was the recent ly- imposed Spanish t a r i f f 
o f 30% t h a t a f f e c t e d a wide range o f goods (50)- The E n g l i s h ob jec ted t h a t 
a l l but seven o f the products t h a t they h a b i t u a l l y expor ted were sub jec t t o 
i t , and wished to see i t s a b o l i t i o n ( 5 1 ) . Moreover, Henry IV;Vs recent r e p l y 
t o the t a r i f f - an embargo upon a l l Spanish and Flemish goods - had obvious 
repercuss ions w i t h E n g l i s h c a r r i e r s ( 52 ) . F o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s was a concession 
t h a t the Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s were prepared t o a l l o w . Experience had shewn 
t h a t the measure, which had been designed to b r i n g the Dutch t o t h e i r knees, 
(46) AGS E2323/139. 
(47) AGS E2557/19-
(48) AGS E84 l /85 ,86 ,87 . 
(49) "Curabunt e t providebunt ne ex causa, conscient ia . u b i publicum 
scandalum non d e d e r i n t non moles tentur nec i n q u i e t e n t u r . " 
(50) qvs pp 59-"3a-
(51) PRO SP 94/10/25. 
(52) AGS E842/101. 
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was i n f a c t worse than useless (53 ) , and the C o u n c i l ' s approval o f the 
de legates ' des i re t o a b o l i s h i t preceded by on ly s i x weeks t h e i r d e c i s i o n 
t o r ev i se t h e i r commercial s t r a t egy a l t o g e t h e r (54 ) . But more had. been 
expected o f t h i s p o i n t , f o r the Spaniards had hoped t o use i t t o wres t a 
good number o f concessions f rom the E n g l i s h . I n the event, they rece ived 
n o t h i n g . The i r e f f o r t s t o prevent the E n g l i s h f r o m c a r r y i n g Spanish and 
Flemish goods t o the Uni ted Provinces were w h o l l y unsuccess fu l ; n e i t h e r a 
system o f seals and passports nor a r o y a l p roc lamat ion against the p r a c t i c e 
was acceptable t o the E n g l i s h . A l l t h a t could be obta ined was an assurance 
t h a t England would cease t o supply the Dutch w i t h muni t ions (55)• 
P o t e n t i a l l y the most con ten t ious issue of the n e g o t i a t i o n s , however, 
was Spa in ' s des i r e t o ma in t a in her monopoly o f t rade w i t h the I n d i e s . 
Vi l lamediana had repor ted t h a t there was l i t t l e hope o f persuading the Eng-
l i s h t o r e f r a i n f r o m making inroads upon Spain ' s p r i v a c y , and t h a t James 
had t o l d him t h a t h i s sub jec t s were making £60 ,000 annua l ly out o f t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s ( 56 ) . As f a r as he could t e l l , the E n g l i s h were not l i k e l y t o 
launch a great naval o f f e n s i v e upon the New World . James had f rowned upon 
a Dutch o f f e r o f help t o take Cuba by f o r c e , and had t o l d Vi l lamediana t h a t 
he d i d not want h i s subjec ts t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the areas t h a t Spain had 
c o l o n i z e d . But h i s a t t i t u d e was p l a i n : where there was no co lony , there was 
no monopoly, and England had every r i g h t t o m a i n t a i n f a c t o r i e s overseas ( 5 7 ) . 
(53) AGS E623/40. 
(54) qvs M 3 * ; AGS E25 57/19; E2024/6I . 
(55) AGS E84 l /45 ,50 ; E2557/18. 
(56) AGS E842/110 f o r a f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n . 
(57) AGS E842/5,9; PRO SP 94/10/25; c f Co rnwa l l i s 307: "the s t r e n g t h o f 
t h i s great monarchy cons i s t s on ly i n the r i c h e s drawn out o f the 
I n d i e s , i n the s o l d i e r s o f Spain and the capta ins o f I t a l y : the 
f i r s t f a i l i n g , the second would want arms and the t h i r d l e g s . " As 
a token o f t h i s , the Venet ian ambassador i n Madrid noted i n 1586 
t h a t , f o r a wh i l e a f t e r the execu t ion o f Mary, Queen o f Scots , 
P h i l i p was t h i n k i n g more o f an e x p e d i t i o n t o the I n d i e s t o e rad ica te 
p r i v a t e e r i n g than o f a d i r e c t a ssau l t upon England: CSPV v i i i 383-
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For Spain, t h i s was not enough. Much p a i n f u l and bloody e f f o r t had gone 
i n t o c a r v i n g out the empire, and u n t i l r e c e n t l y there had been no ques t i on 
o f f o r e i g n o b j e c t i o n s . I n previous t r e a t i e s , the q u e s t i o n o f t r ade w i t h 
the I n d i e s had not a r i s en , f o r the great growth o f E n g l i s h , as o f Dutch, 
mari t ime e n t e r p r i s e had co inc ided p r e c i s e l y w i t h the wars o f the l a t e r 
s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y . Now t h a t the t e s t i n g - t i m e had come, Spain had t o argue 
her case. The best course seemed t o be t o i n s i s t upon a clause t h a t express ly 
forbade v i o l a t i o n o f the monopoly, and the f i r s t i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n t o the 
Constable i n October, 1603» ordered him t o ensure t h a t t h i s was so ( 5 8 ) . 
For a t i m e , no th ing less than t h i s was contemplated; even Vi l l amediana , who 
was keen t o see peace concluded, a t f i r s t thought t h a t he would be j u s t i f i e d 
f o r b reak ing o f f the t a l k s i f he could not have h i s way on t h i s p o i n t (59)-
But a growing a p p r e c i a t i o n o f E n g l i s h obs t inacy and o f Spain ' s d i r e need t o 
end the war moderated Spanish ideas . The E n g l i s h would not agree t o an 
o u t r i g h t p r o h i b i t i o n , and the Spaniards could not a f f o r d t o cou r t d i s a s t e r 
by i n s i s t i n g upon making t h e i r monopoly de ju re as w e l l as de f a c t o . I n 
consequence, i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t i f the Spanish delegates at tempted t o 
persuade the E n g l i s h t o comply, and t hen were f o r c e d t o back down, the loss 
o f r e p u t a t i o n would be considerable ( 6 0 ) . The Constable t h e r e f o r e had t o 
f i n d an acceptable s o l u t i o n t o the dilemma. I n the t r e a t i e s concluded w i t h 
England by Charles V i n 154.2 and 154.6, the t rade clauses had made no mention 
o f commerce w i t h the I n d i e s , and ye t the Spanish monopoly had s tood. The 
wises t course i n the present circumstances would s u r e l y be t o re-enact the 
same word ing : England would have rece ived no permiss ion t o t r ade and Spain 
would s t i l l be f r e e t o punish i n t e r l o p e r s as she had done i n the past ( 6 l ) . 
The idea was appeal ing , and the de legates ' i n s t r u c t i o n s were amended 
a c c o r d i n g l y ( 6 2 ) . 
(58) AHN E2798/5. 
(59) AGS E84.1/155; E84.2/5. 
(60) AGS E84.I/4.7. 
(61) AGS E 8 4 . I / I I . 
(62) The idea was not o r i g i n a l , f o r the same conc lus ion seems t o have been 
reached i n the Boulogne d iscuss ions f o u r years e a r l i e r : Winwood i 
209,211. 
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Even so, i t was no easy t a s k t o reach agreement. For t h e i r p a r t , the 
E n g l i s h delegates r e a l i z e d t h a t they could not expect t o g a i n e x p l i c i t 
approva l o f t h e i r presence i n the New World, but t h i s was as much as they 
would concede. E n g l i s h mari t ime a c t i v i t y had g r e a t l y increased since 
Charles V ' s day, and i t was f e l t t o be o n l y proper t h a t the terms o f the 
t r e a t y should recognize t h i s ( 63 ) . They r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t a Spanish p r o -
posa l t o permi t t r ade " i n a l l realms where t r ade i s p e r m i t t e d " . Above a l l , 
one o f t h e i r number, the Lord High Admi ra l , Nottingham, was adamant i n h i s 
r e f u s a l t o co-operate w i t h the Spaniards. I n one o f the c r u c i a l sessions 
o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s , j u s t as the l a t t e r had w e a r i l y agreed t o a l l ow bo th 
sides t o punish i n t e r l o p e r s i n t h e i r r e spec t ive t e r r i t o r i e s - which meant 
t h a t they t a c i t l y recognized England 's r i g h t t o have such t e r r i t o r i e s -
Nottingham cut i n . To the mani fes t embarrassment of h i s co l leagues , he 
began t o ask awkward ques t ions , producing a map t o s ta te h i s case the more 
c l e a r l y . What r i g h t had the King o f Spain t o f o r b i d E n g l i s h t r a d e r s access 
t o places where, he a l l eged , h i s own vessels had never been - China or Java, 
f o r ins tance? The session was thrown i n t o immediate c o n f u s i o n . Taking 
t h e i r cue f rom the Admira l , the r e s t o f the E n g l i s h p a r t y began t o demand 
more f avou rab l e wording, such as would not t i e t h e i r hands ( 6 4 ) . The 
A d m i r a l ' s i n t e r r u p t i o n , however, proved t o be a b l e s s ing i n d i s g u i s e . The 
wording t h a t the Spanish delegates had proposed was not acceptable t o t h e i r 
own super io r s e i t h e r . The Constable i n s i s t e d t h a t the E n g l i s h were wrong 
i n t h i n k i n g t h a t where there was no f a c t o r y there was no monopoly, and t h a t 
h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s be f o l l o w e d t o the l e t t e r : avo id d e f i n i t i o n s and re-enact 
the t r a d i t i o n a l fo rms . I n the end, the E n g l i s h gave way ( 6 5 ) . A f o r t n i g h t 
(63) AGS E841/39. 
(64) AGS E84I/6O. 
(65) AGS E84.I/63; c f Barbour 121-2; a lso PRO SP 9 4 / 1 0 / 6 1 : C e c i l t o Parry , 
20th June (O.S.) I6O4: "Consider ing our f r e e t rade i n t o the I n d i e s 
east and west we have much pressed the same unto them but f i n d no 
p o s s i b i l i t y t o o b t a i n i t a t t h e i r hands, and t h e r e f o r e r a t h e r than 
we w i l l admit the l e a s t p r e j u d i c e against i t by way o f t r e a t y , His 
Majes ty i s reso lved t o pass over t h a t p o i n t i n s i l ence and t o leave 
i t undetermined as i t was by the Trea ty a t V e r v i n s . " 
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l a t e r , the I n d i e s ques t i on was r a i s ed once more a t the conference t a b l e . 
The E n g l i s h delegates quoted a Spanish j u r i s t , Hernando de Minchaza, i n 
support o f t h e i r c l a i m t h a t Spain had no r i g h t t o p r o h i b i t f r e e n a v i g a t i o n , 
and would not l i s t e n t o the p r o t e s t a t i o n t h a t the New World belonged t o the 
Spanish sind Portuguese crowns by r i g h t o f d i s cove ry . For them, the f o r m o f 
words t h a t t h e i r opponents i n s i s t e d upon would s i g n a l l y damage E n g l i s h p res -
t i g e , the more so since no mention o f the I n d i e s had been made i n the Trea ty 
o f 7e rv ins ; and they got up t o go, as though the t r e a t y were a t an end. A l l 
the n e g o t i a t o r s were on t h e i r f e e t when somehow - the account o f the meeting 
does not s p e c i f y how - i t was agreed t o accept the by now t r a d i t i o n a l word-
i n g . Trade was o f f i c i a l l y t o take place between those possessions t h a t had 
been customary before the war. Face was saved on bo th sides ( 6 6 ) . 
One f u r t h e r p o i n t o f c o n t e n t i o n , which i n 1600 had been considered 
e s s e n t i a l t o the making o f peace, passed by w i t h o u t i n c i d e n t . Spain had 
hoped t o recover the three border gar r i son- towns o f B r i l l , F lu sh ing and 
Rammekins t h a t England he ld i n pledge f r o m the Dutch, and 4-00,000 ducats 
had been earmarked f o r the purpose ( 6 7 ) . Des i rab le an o b j e c t as i t was, 
however, i n I6O4,peace was more d e s i r a b l e . At no stage was peace t o depend 
upon the recovery o f the towns and the Spanish delegates were q u i c k t o 
r e a l i z e t h a t the t a s k would be too d i f f i c u l t ( 6 8 ) . The E n g l i s h a l l e g e d 
t h a t James' honour d i d not permi t him t o break h i s word t o the Dutch, and 
t h a t i n any case he had no o ther s e c u r i t y f o r the l a rge debt t h a t the Dutch 
owed h i s predecessor, E l i z a b e t h (69 ) . He was not s t rong enough t o f o r c e 
(66) AGS E84I /84 : "sea y deba ser l i b r e e l comercio en lo s (gc.. t e r r i t o r i o s ) 
que antes de l a guerra l o f u e conforme y segtin e l uso y observancia 
de l as ant iguas confederaciones y t r a t ados de antes de l a guer ra" ; 
the L a t i n phrase used was " l i m i t a t i v a s j u s t a usumet observant iam". 
c f C e c i l ' s o p i n i o n , PRO SP 94 /10 /101 ; a lso Salyer , Andrews 
Caribbean R i v a l r y . . . passim. 
(67) qvs 
(68) c f AGS E2557/18. 
(69) AGS E84I/4O; PRO SP 94/10/25. 
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the burghers t o accept Spanish c o n t r o l and, indeed, not e n j o y i n g f u l l l e g a l 
possession cou ld h a r d l y cede the towns t o Spain ( 7 0 ) . Moreover, on the 
Spanish side the re were disadvantages i n re-possess ion. The army i n 
Flanders was i n so bad a s ta te t h a t i t might be impossible t o f i n d adequate 
g a r r i s o n s ; and no th ing could be worse than , having gained the towns, t o lose 
them aga in almost at once t o the enemy ( 7 1 ) . A compromise was needed, and 
the Spaniards were not slow t o f i n d one. I f the E n g l i s h cou ld be persuaded 
t o r e t a i n the towns f o r a set p e r i o d , a t the end o f which e i t h e r the Dutch 
would have p a i d the debt , or they would have come t o terms w i t h Spain, or 
Spain would have pa id o f f the debt f o r them and so be able t o r e g a i n the 
towns, the honour o f bo th p a r t i e s would be s a t i s f i e d . There was a good 
dea l t o be sa id f o r the arrangement. The Spanish w a r - e f f o r t aga ins t the 
Dutch needed t ime i n which t o r ega in impetus, and the towns would probably 
be o f more use i f they were regained i n a few years r a t h e r than at once (72 ) . 
Without much d i f f i c u l t y , the delegates drew up a clause t h a t announced James' 
i n t e n t i o n o f g i v i n g h i s Dutch a l l i e s "adequate t ime" i n which to make up 
t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h the Habsburgs: i f a t the end of t h i s t ime agreement 
had not been reached, James would be f r e e t o f o l l o w the d i c t a t e s o f h i s 
conscience i n d i spos ing o f the three towns (73)• The E n g l i s h had no 
o b j e c t i o n s t o r a i s e . For some t ime t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the Dutch had 
been wearing t h i n , and a l though he was determined not t o abandon h i s a l l i e s 
u t t e r l y , James had no love o f rebe l s ( 74 ) . As a token , besides t h i s agree-
ment, there were o ther clauses t h a t were unfavourable t o the i n t e r e s t s o f 
the Uni ted Provinces . Frequent reference was made t o the under tak ing made 
by both sides not t o a i d the rebe l s o f the o ther , and, as we have seen, the 
(70) AGS E84.1/53. 
(71) AGS E2557/18. 
(72) AGS E841/50. 
(73) BN 2347/229. 
(74) B i r c h 102,137,151; PRO SP 94/10/25; qvs p p ^ . ^ . Saavedra y Fa jardo 
made the same judgement some f o r t y years l a t e r : "ninguna grandeza rnds 
p e l i g r o s a a l r e i n o de I n g l a t e r r a (como tambie'n a todos l o s p r inc ipados ) 
que l a de l o s holandeses, porque l e q u i t a n e l a r b i t r i o d e l mar." 
Idea de un p r j n c i p e p o l i t i c o - c r i s t i a n a , empresa x l v . 
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E n g l i s h agreed t o cut o f f suppl ies o f muni t ions f rom the Dutch ( 7 5 ) . 
The Constable, on hear ing t h a t the I n d i e s ques t ion had been s e t t l e d 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , expressed h i s great r e l i e f , "since t h i s p o i n t i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
the most impor tan t f o r Your Majes ty and Your M a j e s t y ' s rea lms." (76) What, 
then , had happened t o Spain ' s concern f o r the E n g l i s h recusants , t o which 
so much importance had been g iven i n the past? The Constable ' s words must 
have s l i p p e d out i n an unguarded moment, f o r a l l the Spanish m i n i s t e r s were 
o f f i c i a l l y agreed t h a t the r e l i g i o u s issue was by f a r the most i m p o r t a n t . 
Nevertheless , impor tan t as i t was, no-one expected t h a t Spain would e a s i l y 
have her way. I n June, 1601, the Counc i l had d e c i s i v e l y r e j e c t e d the o p i n i o n 
o f the l ead ing recusant , Persons, t h a t , r a t h e r than attempt t o secure i n the 
t r e a t y a clause t h a t gave l i b e r t y o f worship t o the recusants , a r e s i d e n t 
ambassador i n England might w e l l be able to do r a t h e r more to improve t h e i r 
l o t ( 7 7 ) . But two years l a t e r , t h e i r o p i n i o n had changed: t o broach the 
vexed q u e s t i o n o f r e l i g i o n a t the outse t would be t o jeopardize the e n t i r e 
n e g o t i a t i o n . For the sake of Spanish i n t e r e s t s as a whole, t h e r e f o r e , her 
a l l eged pr imary o b j e c t i v e would have t o be put on one s ide f o r the moment. 
The recusants would be b e t t e r helped "por v i a de i n t e r c e s i d n " t han by 
Spanish i n t r a n s i g e n c e . One o f the Counc i l went f u r t h e r and s t a t ed i n p l a i n 
terms what was u l t i m a t e l y t o be Spain ' s p o l i c y . I r o n i c a l l y , i t was the 
C a r d i n a l Archbishop o f Toledo: 
"There are two ways o f h e l p i n g and p r o t e c t i n g C a t h o l i c s : the way t h a t 
j u s t i c e demands, and t h a t demanded by c h a r i t y . The f i r s t a f f e c t s those 
who are Your M a j e s t y ' s vassals and t o whom, as such, Your Majes ty has 
a d e f i n i t e o b l i g a t i o n . The present case o f the E n g l i s h C a t h o l i c s i s a 
mat te r o f c h a r i t y and not o f j u s t i c e . I f Your Majes ty has the f o r c e s 
t o go t o t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n and defence wi thou t de t r iment t o your possess-
i o n s , i t w i l l be tho rough ly proper t o do so: but i f eve ry th ing has t o 
(75) qvs p-ai4-
(76) AGS E841/98. 
(77) AGS E2023/4.8; Alcocer i 131. 
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be placed i n t o extreme jeopardy by doing so (as e v i d e n t l y would be the 
case i f the war w i t h England were t o con t inue) Your Majes ty i s not 
o b l i g e d to any such t h i n g , nor t o cause a breach over the p o i n t o f 
l i b e r t y o f conscience." 
( d i j o que habla dos maneras de amparar y ayudar a l o s c a t d l i c o s , una 
de j u s t i c i a y o t r a de c a r i d a d ; que l a pr imera m i l i t i c e a con l o s que 
eran vasa l l o s de VM que por razdn de s e r l o se l e s t i e n e d i f e r e n t e 
o b l i g a c i d n : que e l caso presente de l o s ca t61icos de I n g l a t e r r a es de 
ca r idad y no de j u s t i c i a , y s i VM t i e n e fuerzas para a s i s t i r a su amparo 
y defensa s i n de t r imento de sus re inos muy j u s t o sera* hacer lo pero s i 
es to ha de ser causa de que VM consuma e l caudal que l e queda y e l de 
sus subdi tos y se ponga todo en e l u l t i m o p e l i g r o (como evidentemente 
parece que s e r l a s i l a guerra con I n g l a t e r r a se cont inuase) no esta" 
VM obl igado a e l l o n i a romper por e l punto de l a l i b e r t a d de 
conc i enc i a . (78) ) 
So s t r o n g l y d i d he f e e l on the mat ter t h a t he wrote a shor t note t o Secre tary 
Prada a f t e r % t h e meet ing: 
" I ask Your Worship t o add t o my vote the f a c t t h a t , since the capture 
o f Oran, the Crown has a l lowed the Jews the p r a c t i c e o f t h e i r Law, w i t h 
the knowledge o f the Pope and o f the Archbishops o f Toledo, who have 
s p i r i t u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over the c i t y . " 
( s u p l i c o a VM ahada en mi voto que desde que se gand Oran se pe rmi ten 
por l o s reyes j u d l o s en e l e j e r c i c i o de su l e y con s a b i d u r f a d e l papa 
y de l o s arzobispos de Toledo que t i e n e n l a j u r i s d i c c i d n e s p i r i t u a l 
en a q u e l l a ciudad ( 7 9 ) . ) 
P h i l i p ' s response seems not t o have s u r v i v e d . However, i n a l e t t e r o f 29 th 
September, 1603> Vi l lamediana admi t ted t h a t he had not needed A l b e r t ' s 
advice t o de fe r d i s cus s ion o f r e l i g i o n , f o r he had gathered as much when 
he was s t i l l i n Spain (80 ) . Al though there i s no d i r e c t evidence t o support 
the a s s e r t i o n , i t i s almost c e r t a i n t h a t he was r e f e r r i n g t o the v e r b a l 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t he had rece ived f r o m Lerma and Franqueza be fo re s e t t i n g 
out f r o m Aran juez . I f such was the case, P h i l i p would have s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
agreed w i t h the Archbishop. The t ime had come t o end the dream t h a t the 
King o f Spain was the sword o f Roman Ca tho l i c Christendom. High-sounding 
p r i n c i p l e s were replaced by pious hopes: 
(78) AGS E622/144. 
(79) AGS E622/I46. 
(80) AGS E841/155. 
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"Al though Your Majes ty i s so zealous f o r the Ca tho l i c f a i t h , having 
i n h e r i t e d i t f rom your g l o r i o u s ancestors and p r a c t i s i n g i t b e t t e r 
t han anyone, and a l though i t i s good t o do a l l t h a t i s poss ib le t o 
i n t roduce i t i n t o England, nevertheless t h i s matter demands s k i l l 
r a t h e r t han i n f l e x i b i l i t y ; and i f t o t a l success should prove imposs ib le , 
p a r t i a l success should be aimed a t , f o r i n t h i s way Our Lord w i l l o r d a i n 
t h a t i n due t ime our aim w i l l be achieved." 
(aunque VM t i e n e t a n t o ce lo a l a f e c a t d l i c a por haber la heredado de 
sus g l o r i o s o s p rogen i to res y e j e r c i t a r l a mejor que nadie y es b i e n 
hacer todo l o pos ib le para i n t r o d u c i r l a en I n g l a t e r r a , t o d a v i a en esto 
se debe usar mds de maha que de r i g o r y s i no se pudiere encaminar e l 
todo se encamine l a par te porque as! con e l tiempo sera" nuestro Senor 
se rv ido que se consiga l o que se p r e t e n d e . . . ( 8 l ) . ) 
The wisdom o f t h i s p o l i c y q u i c k l y became apparent . As he made h i s 
u n o f f i c i a l e n q u i r i e s i n t o the s ta te o f r e l i g i o n i n England, Vil laraediana 
r e a l i z e d t h a t there was very l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d o f a s a t i s f a c t o r y se t t l emen t . 
There was no popular demand f o r the r e p e a l o f the recusancy laws: Par l iament 
was implacab ly h o s t i l e and James' a t t i t u d e ambivalent ( 82 ) . Moreover, 
V i l l amed iana made the s u r p r i s i n g d i scovery t h a t the recusants were i n f a c t 
fewer and sub jec t t o less severe p e n a l t i e s t han had f o r so many years been 
be l i eved i n Spain . They were said t o fo rm no more than the t w e n t i e t h pa r t 
o f the kingdom - a f i g u r e t h a t he thought too h igh— and they were t o r n w i t h 
the r i v a l r y between the J e su i t s and the normal secular c l e r g y (83) - By the 
end o f January, 1604, he was complaining t h a t d u r i n g a l l h i s s tay i n England 
he had not once been v i s i t e d by a s i n g l e Roman Ca tho l i c o f any r e a l s tanding , 
and had come t o t h i n k t h a t none such e x i s t e d ( 8 4 ) . Since James had suspended 
(81) AGS E2557/8. 
(82) That James d i d not contemplate any n e g o t i a t i o n on t h i s p o i n t i s c l e a r 
f r o m the t o t a l absence of the recusant ques t ion f r o m the i n s t r u c t i o n s 
g i v e n t o h i s commissioners: PRO SP 94/10/25• 
(83) AGS E 8 4 l / l 4 l , 1 5 4 . This was i n marked con t r a s t t o the i n f l a t e d c la ims 
broadcast by polemics l i k e t h a t o f D. de Yepes : H i s t o r i a p a r t i c u l a r . . . 
(84) AGS E842/154: "cuanto ha que estoy en este r e i n o no he v i s t o n i ha 
entrado por mis puertas hombre c a t d l i c o de cons ide rac idn n i creo que 
aqul l o s haya en quien se pueda hacer fundamento n i tenga sus tancia 
para nada." 
- 222 -
the c o l l e c t i o n o f recusancy f i n e s and was r epor t ed t o be t e l l i n g the 
recusants a t h i s cour t t o be p a t i e n t , Vi l lamediana and the o ther envoys 
were u n i t e d i n the d e c i s i o n t o leave the t o l e r a t i o n issue t o the Constable; 
once i n London t o s i g n the f i n a l t r e a t y , he cou ld do something "m£s por v i a 
de cons ide rac idn y g rac i a" t han by means o f an e x p l i c i t clause ( 8 5 ) . A d m i t t -
ed ly , orders were t h a t , i f the t a l k s should break down, r e l i g i o n was t o be 
announced as the Spanish reason f o r w i t h d r a w a l . But t h i s was a poor -
almost , a p a t h e t i c - s u b s t i t u t e f o r the thorough-going demands t h a t had 
once been envisaged (86 ) . 
Moreover, there was no longer any idea o f o b t a i n i n g f u l l l i b e r t y o f 
conscience and worship f o r the recusants . As f a r as the Constable cou ld 
see, there was no need t o take an extreme p o s i t i o n . The Pope was m a n i f e s t l y 
more anxious f o r peace than f o r the e x t o r t i o n o f l a rge concessions f r o m the 
E n g l i s h government, and since England formed no p a r t o f Habsburg t e r r i t o r i e s , 
P h i l i p was not o b l i g e d t o i n s i s t upon more than the Pope. I f f u l l r e l i g i o u s 
l i b e r t y could not be ob ta ined , the Constable f e l t , honour would be s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h the l i f t i n g o f the p e n a l t i e s t o which the recusants were c u r r e n t l y 
l i a b l e ( 8 7 ) . So earnest was he i n h i s des i re t o smooth the pa th towards 
agreement t h a t he began to speak s t r o n g l y agains t the very seminary p r i e s t s 
who had been favoured by Spain f o r so l o n g . He had come t o t h i n k t h a t they 
were t h e i r own worst enemies and p e r s i s t e d i n t h e i r i n t r i g u e s i n s t ead o f 
facincg f a c t s as squarely as had the Pope and the Spanish a u t h o r i t i e s . At 
an e a r l i e r date , such an a t t i t u d e would have been un th inkab le i n a man o f 
the Constable ' s background. But now t h a t there was a r e a l prospect o f peace 
w i t h England, Spain could not a f f o r d t o o f f e n d James and h i s m i n i s t e r s . The 
French and the Dutch were eager t o i n f l a t e the importance o f the seminar ians ' 
a c t i v i t i e s i n t o p roof o f Spanish d u p l i c i t y , a manoeuvre t h a t had t o be 
(85) AGS E&4I/49; E842/72. 
(86) AHN E2798/5-
(87) AGS E84.2/162; AHN E2798/5-
- 223 -
f r u s t r a t e d a t a l l costs ( 8 8 ) . I n the Counc i l o f S ta t e , the re was some 
n a t u r a l re luc tance t o back down. As Sesa, who had watched over Spain ' s 
r e p u t a t i o n i n Rome f o r many years , po in t ed out , unless great care were taken, 
E l i z a b e t h ' s o l d a s s e r t i o n t h a t Spain ' s help t o the recusants came f r o m p o l -
i t i c a l , r a t h e r than r e l i g i o u s , motives would be proved. But Sesa was one o f 
the few who f e l t t h a t i t was wor th ending the t a l k s f o r t h i s p o i n t . The 
r e s t o f the Counc i l , and P h i l i p too , were d r i v e n i n t o agreement w i t h the 
Constable: honour would be s a t i s f i e d , though b a r e l y so, i f the recusants 
were f r e e d f r o m l e g a l sanct ions and a l lowed the p r i v a t e performance o f t h e i r 
r i t e s ( 8 9 ) . 
I n the end, the Constable achieved p r e c i s e l y n o t h i n g . Dur ing h i s s tay 
i n London, he urged James on more t han one occasion t o shew l en i ency towards 
the recusants , and he was not slow t o t e l l Anne t h a t her scheme t o marry the 
Prince o f Wales t o the I n f a n t a could on ly be e n t e r t a i n e d i f the former were 
brought up as a Roman C a t h o l i c ( 9 0 ) . T h i s , however, was a l l ; and the Trea ty 
o f London was signed o n l 8 / 2 8 t h August wi thou t f u r t h e r mention of r e l i g i o u s 
concessions. The Constable s t i l l had f i t s o f conscience; a f t e r a l l , much 
had been promised. I t must have been i n t h i s s ta te o f mind t h a t on 20th 
November, 1604, he i n t e r r u p t e d h i s journey back t o Spain i n order t o e x p l a i n 
h i m s e l f t o h i s col leagues by l e t t e r . He expressed h i s great annoyance a t 
the rash o p i n i o n s t i l l he ld by some t h a t Spain cou ld and should impose a 
m i l i t a r y se t t lement upon England i n order t o solve the r e l i g i o u s problem. 
I t was a n o t i o n w i t h which he now had not the s l i g h t e s t sympathy. I f Spain 
were t o help the recusants , her best course was t o proceed q u i e t l y and sec-
r e t l y w i t h e v a n g e l i z a t i o n ; i n t h i s connexion, much cou ld be expected f r o m 
the renewal o f t rade between the two c o u n t r i e s . I f the seminarians would 
o n l y avo id p o l i t i c a l extremism and preach non-res is tance , they cou ld do a 
(88) AGS E841/49. 
(89) AGS E2557/19-
(90) AGS E841/130. 
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g rea t dea l , and he urged h i s col leagues t o take steps t o ensure t h a t the 
seminarians understood the f a c t . The other grounds f o r hope were the con-
t i n u e d suggestions o f a marriage a l l i a n c e between the two r o y a l houses. I n 
the meantime, there was every i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the recusants ' l o t was not too 
hard . James had claimed t h a t he had no des i re f o r b lood , and, indeed, had 
shewn d i s t i n c t signs o f g o o d - w i l l towards h i s Roman Ca tho l i c s u b j e c t s : 
recusancy f i n e s were not c o l l e c t e d , imprisoned seminarians were a l lowed t o 
ce lebra te Mass i n t h e i r c e l l s i n s t ead o f going t o the ga l lows , and recusant 
c o u r t i e r s were h i g h i n the K i n g ' s f a v o u r . The Constable s t r o n g l y b e l i e v e d 
t h a t i t was on ly reason o f s ta te t h a t stopped James f r o m g r a n t i n g o u t r i g h t 
t o l e r a t i o n , f o r throughout t h e r e g o t i a t i o n s , he had helped t o remove many 
obstac les and had shewn h i m s e l f "a f r i e n d o f j u s t i c e , t r a n q u i l , l earned, 
occupied i n v i r t u e and we l l -d i sposed towards Spa in . " (91) Wi th t h i s Spain 
would have t o be con ten t . 
The f i n a l t e x t o f the t r e a t y was g e n e r a l l y w e l l - r e c e i v e d i n V a l l a d o l i d . 
The Counc i l complained t h a t the clause dea l ing w i t h E n g l i s h t r a d e r s ' f u t u r e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the I n q u i s i t i o n seemed t o grant l i b e r t y o f conscience and 
t h a t commercial i n t e r e s t s were t a k i n g precedence over those o f r e l i g i o n ; 
indeed, had not the Constable a l ready r a t i f i e d the terms, t he re might have 
been f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n reaching agreement w i t h England (92 ) . But 
t h i s was t h e i r on ly o b j e c t i o n . The compromise over the Dutch towns was 
acceptable (93 ) ; and the 30% t a r i f f was declared i n a p p l i c a b l e t o E n g l i s h 
vessels on 12th November ( 9 4 ) . Even the arrangement on t r ade w i t h the 
I n d i e s was w e l l - r e c e i v e d , f o r the Constable had s e c r e t l y arranged w i t h 
James t h a t a r o y a l p roc lamat ion would f o r b i d the K i n g ' s sub jec t s f r o m 
cont ravening the monopoly and would a lso recognize Spa in ' s r i g h t t o punish 
(91) BN 6949/115-
(92) AGS E2557/21. 
(93) i b i d . 
(94) AGS E2847/sf . 
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i n t e r l o p e r s (95)• S t i l l more notable was t h e i r apparent s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h 
the mani fes t l a ck o f a r e l i g i o u s se t t l ement . No-one seems t o have found 
i t i n t o l e r a b l e t h a t more e f f o r t had been made t o conserve the I n d i e s mono-
p o l y t han to secure l i b e r t y o f conscience f o r the recusants . What, i n t h e 
end, had Spain achieved by the Trea ty o f London? Just peace: and she was 
g l ad enough of t h a t ( 9 6 ) . 
(95) AGS E841/60,138,89: "Copia d e l c a p l t u l o sobre l a navegacidn de l a s 
I n d i a s : F i a t d e c l a r a t i o q u a l i t e r serenissimus Rex Angl iae &c. d e c l a r a t 
non posse nec debere subdi tos suos v a s a l l o s ac i n c o l a s cujuscunque 
c o n d i c i o n i s f u e r i t navigare neque ad i re ad I n d i a s o r i e n t a l e s e t 
occ iden ta les s e r en i s s imi Hispaniarum Regi quomodocunque subdi tos ac 
expectantes nec ad a l i a s quas cunque Ind ia rum o r i e n t a l i u m e t 
occ iden ta l ium e t seu nove o r b i s a c d i t i o n e s adius e t j u r i s d i c t i o n e m 
d i t i s e ren i s s imi Hispaniarum Regis quomodolibet p e r t i n e n t e s habebi t 
que propterea d i t u s serenissimus Rex Hispaniarum ejusque s u b d i t i ac 
v a s a l l i l i be r am f a c u l t a t e m quoscunque cont ravenien tes cap iend i 
puniendi e t d e b i t i s poenis coe rcend i . " James, however, was t o p l ay 
f a l s e : c f CSPV x 291-
(96) I n Ju ly , 1605, a Spanish notable observed t o the new E n g l i s h 
ambassador i n V a l l a d o l i d , C o r n w a l l i s , t h a t "the King and c o u n c i l l o r s 
o f England had not t h e i r senses when i n such so r t they agreed" t o 
the t r e a t y . C o r n w a l l i s , having seen the exhausted s ta te o f Spain, 
was i n c l i n e d t o agree: Winwood i i 75-
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CONCLUSION 
The e f f e c t o f the p o l i c i e s analyzed i n t h i s t h e s i s i s g e n e r a l l y 
considered t o have been a r e v e r s a l o f the grand i m p e r i a l p o l i c y o f the 
second h a l f o f the s i x t e e n t h cen tu ry . But perhaps i t i s b e t t e r regarded 
as the i n e v i t a b l e c u l m i n a t i o n . The i m p e r i a l m e n t a l i t y had made Spain 
assume a bev j i l de r ing v a r i e t y o f commitments, now f i n a n c e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g 
d i f f i c u l t y , and her r u l e r s were never able t o implement i n t h e i r f u l l n e s s 
the programme and the ideo logy t h a t they i n s t i n c t i v e l y be l i eved t o be r i g h t 
and n a t u r a l : f o r e i g n p o l i c y between 1596 and 1604. may be descr ibed as the 
p o l i t i c s o f the p i s a l l e r . Plans had t o be cut - g r a d u a l l y and w i t h great 
re luc tance - t o the bone. We may t h e r e f o r e see Spain ' s conscious p r i o r i t y 
emerging i n i t s s tarkness : the defea t o f the Dutch rebe l s and the even tua l 
re -es tab l i shment o f Roman Ca tho l i c worship i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . A l l was 
t o be subordinated t o t h i s end: m i l i t a r y r e p r i s a l s f o r French p rovoca t ion , 
the punishment o f England 's impudence i n mat ters r e l i g i o u s and commercial, 
a Crusade agains t the Turk and the poss ib le ex tens ion o f Spanish i n f l u e n c e 
i n t o the eas te rn Medi ter ranean. The o l d i d e a l s a d m i t t e d l y s t i l l l i v e d on. 
As we have seen, i t was s t i l l f i r m l y b e l i e v e d i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s t h a t 
Spain would l i v e t o f i g h t another day: the Trea ty o f Vervins d i d not b r i n g 
i n t o being a "generacidn de 98". The monopoly o f the I n d i e s was j e a l o u s l y 
guarded s t i l l , even though a considerable concession was i n e f f e c t made t o 
the E n g l i s h by l e a v i n g so much unsaid i n the Trea ty o f London. Above a l l , 
the r e l i g i o u s motive was s t i l l sa id t o r e t a i n i t s p r i s t i n e importance. 3ut 
by i t s very nature , C h r i s t i a n i t y can never be a p a r t o f the l i f e o f the 
b e l i e v e r , not even the most impor tan t p a r t : r a t h e r , i t must impar t a new 
dimension t o a l l the f a c e t s o f t h a t l i f e , permeating every thought and 
a c t i v i t y . Because o f i t s p ro tean nature , i t i s t h e r e f o r e perhaps unwise t o 
speak o f the r e l i g i o u s content o f Spanish p o l i c y . Despite occas iona l f e a r s 
o f f a l l i n g i n t o hypocr i sy , the a u t h o r i t i e s , as we have seen, could be l i eve 
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the re t o be no i ncons i s t ency i n making peace w i t h the p o l i t i q u e King o f 
France or w i t h the P ro t e s t an t King o f England. Had they possessed the same 
s c r i p t u a l knowledge as many o f t h e i r enemies, they might have quoted approv-
a l 
i n g l y S. Pau l ' s phrase: "deceivers , y e t t r u e " ( l ) . At some stage i n the 
f u t u r e , i t was expected, Spain would be able t o speak c l e a r l y once more: 
but u n t i l then , she had t o content h e r s e l f w i t h compromise so as t o be able 
t o r e g a i n her s t r e n g t h . Whether t h i s b e l i e f was indeed h y p o c r i t i c a l i s not 
f o r us t o judge. 
Such as i t was, the p o l i c y seemed t o have met w i t h a c e r t a i n success. 
I n I t a l y , French i n f l u e n c e had been curbed ( though as much th rough Henry 's 
weakness as f o r any o ther cause); the accession o f the p a c i f i c James I i n 
England removed another preoccupat ion; and the s i t u a t i o n i n the Low Countr ies 
was, m i r a c u l o u s l y , con ta ined . But apart f r o m the smallness o f these few 
t r iumphs , the p o l i c y was a f a i l u r e f o r another, and as ye t unperceived, 
reason. "True r e p u t a t i o n , " the Counc i l had once remarked, "cons i s t s i n 
g e t t i n g one's way," s t i l l b e l i e v i n g as they d i d t h a t the c h i e f aim was the 
winn ing o f the war aga ins t the Dutch ( 2 ) . I n f a c t , s t r i p p e d t o i t s bares t 
e s s e n t i a l s , the t r u e aim was the conse rva t ion o f r e p u t a t i o n i t s e l f . A d m i t t -
e d l y , i n the con tex t o f the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth cen tu r i e s (not t o say 
t h a t o f our own) p r i de was the l i f e - b l o o d o f a n a t i o n . Saavedra y Fa ja rdo , 
w r i t i n g i n the middle o f the r e i g n o f P h i l i p I V , could s t i l l p ra i se h i s 
master ' s g randfa the r on t h i s score: 
"even when one sees be fo re one's eyes the r u i n a t i o n o f one's s t a t e s , 
i t i s b e t t e r t o lose them than t o lose r e p u t a t i o n : f o r w i t h o u t the 
l a t t e r , the former can never be r ega ined . " 
(Aun cuando se ve a l o s o jos l a r u i n a de l o s estados es mejor d e j a r l o s 
perder que perder l a r epu tac idn , porque s i n e l l a no se pueden 
recuperar ( 3 ) . ) 
(1) I I Cor in th i ans v i 8. 
(2) qvs f-a-fa. 
(3) Saavedra empresa x x x i . 
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But l a t e r events were t o shew t h a t Spain had l o s t r e p u t a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l 
greatness a l i k e . Pr ide had prevented her f rom f a c i n g f a c t s square ly : she 
had outgrown her s t r e n g t h . Nego t ia t ions w i t h Henry I V took th ree va luable 
years , and those w i t h England t e n . Above a l l , the dead-weight o f the Dutch 
war, the cause o f most o f her m a t e r i a l m i s f o r t u n e s , was g iven p r i d e o f place 
i n s t ead o f be ing d i sca rded . Pride a lso b l i n d e d her t o the profound f a c t 
t h a t she d i d not possess the sole monopoly o f t r u t h , s i n c e r i t y and moral 
p r o b i t y - which may have been the essence o f her f a i l u r e . Perhaps John 
Buchan's charac te r , Dickson McCunn, expressed i t best i n words t h a t s u r e l y 
deserve t o be i m m o r t a l : "wi thou t humour, you cannot r u n a sweetie-shop, l e t 
alone a n a t i o n . " (4) 
(4) Castle Gay, London & Edinburgh, 1932, p .377 . 
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